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|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) guest driver interface
*
* Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
*
* Author: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/platform_device.h>
#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
#include <linux/set_memory.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <crypto/aead.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
#include <uapi/linux/sev-guest.h>
#include <uapi/linux/psp-sev.h>
#include <asm/svm.h>
#include <asm/sev.h>
#include "sev-guest.h"
#define DEVICE_NAME "sev-guest"
#define AAD_LEN 48
#define MSG_HDR_VER 1
#define SNP_REQ_MAX_RETRY_DURATION (60*HZ)
#define SNP_REQ_RETRY_DELAY (2*HZ)
struct snp_guest_crypto {
struct crypto_aead *tfm;
u8 *iv, *authtag;
int iv_len, a_len;
};
struct snp_guest_dev {
struct device *dev;
struct miscdevice misc;
void *certs_data;
struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto;
struct snp_guest_msg *request, *response;
struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout;
struct snp_req_data input;
u32 *os_area_msg_seqno;
u8 *vmpck;
};
static u32 vmpck_id;
module_param(vmpck_id, uint, 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(vmpck_id, "The VMPCK ID to use when communicating with the PSP.");
/* Mutex to serialize the shared buffer access and command handling. */
static DEFINE_MUTEX(snp_cmd_mutex);
static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
{
char zero_key[VMPCK_KEY_LEN] = {0};
if (snp_dev->vmpck)
return !memcmp(snp_dev->vmpck, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
return true;
}
/*
* If an error is received from the host or AMD Secure Processor (ASP) there
* are two options. Either retry the exact same encrypted request or discontinue
* using the VMPCK.
*
* This is because in the current encryption scheme GHCB v2 uses AES-GCM to
* encrypt the requests. The IV for this scheme is the sequence number. GCM
* cannot tolerate IV reuse.
*
* The ASP FW v1.51 only increments the sequence numbers on a successful
* guest<->ASP back and forth and only accepts messages at its exact sequence
* number.
*
* So if the sequence number were to be reused the encryption scheme is
* vulnerable. If the sequence number were incremented for a fresh IV the ASP
* will reject the request.
*/
static void snp_disable_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
{
dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, "Disabling vmpck_id %d to prevent IV reuse.\n",
vmpck_id);
memzero_explicit(snp_dev->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
snp_dev->vmpck = NULL;
}
static inline u64 __snp_get_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
{
u64 count;
lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex);
/* Read the current message sequence counter from secrets pages */
count = *snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno;
return count + 1;
}
/* Return a non-zero on success */
static u64 snp_get_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
{
u64 count = __snp_get_msg_seqno(snp_dev);
/*
* The message sequence counter for the SNP guest request is a 64-bit
* value but the version 2 of GHCB specification defines a 32-bit storage
* for it. If the counter exceeds the 32-bit value then return zero.
* The caller should check the return value, but if the caller happens to
* not check the value and use it, then the firmware treats zero as an
* invalid number and will fail the message request.
*/
if (count >= UINT_MAX) {
dev_err(snp_dev->dev, "request message sequence counter overflow\n");
return 0;
}
return count;
}
static void snp_inc_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
{
/*
* The counter is also incremented by the PSP, so increment it by 2
* and save in secrets page.
*/
*snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno += 2;
}
static inline struct snp_guest_dev *to_snp_dev(struct file *file)
{
struct miscdevice *dev = file->private_data;
return container_of(dev, struct snp_guest_dev, misc);
}
static struct snp_guest_crypto *init_crypto(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u8 *key, size_t keylen)
{
struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto;
crypto = kzalloc(sizeof(*crypto), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!crypto)
return NULL;
crypto->tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(crypto->tfm))
goto e_free;
if (crypto_aead_setkey(crypto->tfm, key, keylen))
goto e_free_crypto;
crypto->iv_len = crypto_aead_ivsize(crypto->tfm);
crypto->iv = kmalloc(crypto->iv_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!crypto->iv)
goto e_free_crypto;
if (crypto_aead_authsize(crypto->tfm) > MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN) {
if (crypto_aead_setauthsize(crypto->tfm, MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN)) {
dev_err(snp_dev->dev, "failed to set authsize to %d\n", MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN);
goto e_free_iv;
}
}
crypto->a_len = crypto_aead_authsize(crypto->tfm);
crypto->authtag = kmalloc(crypto->a_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!crypto->authtag)
goto e_free_iv;
return crypto;
e_free_iv:
kfree(crypto->iv);
e_free_crypto:
crypto_free_aead(crypto->tfm);
e_free:
kfree(crypto);
return NULL;
}
static void deinit_crypto(struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto)
{
crypto_free_aead(crypto->tfm);
kfree(crypto->iv);
kfree(crypto->authtag);
kfree(crypto);
}
static int enc_dec_message(struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto, struct snp_guest_msg *msg,
u8 *src_buf, u8 *dst_buf, size_t len, bool enc)
{
struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *hdr = &msg->hdr;
struct scatterlist src[3], dst[3];
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
struct aead_request *req;
int ret;
req = aead_request_alloc(crypto->tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req)
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* AEAD memory operations:
* +------ AAD -------+------- DATA -----+---- AUTHTAG----+
* | msg header | plaintext | hdr->authtag |
* | bytes 30h - 5Fh | or | |
* | | cipher | |
* +------------------+------------------+----------------+
*/
sg_init_table(src, 3);
sg_set_buf(&src[0], &hdr->algo, AAD_LEN);
sg_set_buf(&src[1], src_buf, hdr->msg_sz);
sg_set_buf(&src[2], hdr->authtag, crypto->a_len);
sg_init_table(dst, 3);
sg_set_buf(&dst[0], &hdr->algo, AAD_LEN);
sg_set_buf(&dst[1], dst_buf, hdr->msg_sz);
sg_set_buf(&dst[2], hdr->authtag, crypto->a_len);
aead_request_set_ad(req, AAD_LEN);
aead_request_set_tfm(req, crypto->tfm);
aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, crypto_req_done, &wait);
aead_request_set_crypt(req, src, dst, len, crypto->iv);
ret = crypto_wait_req(enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req), &wait);
aead_request_free(req);
return ret;
}
static int __enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_msg *msg,
void *plaintext, size_t len)
{
struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto = snp_dev->crypto;
struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *hdr = &msg->hdr;
memset(crypto->iv, 0, crypto->iv_len);
memcpy(crypto->iv, &hdr->msg_seqno, sizeof(hdr->msg_seqno));
return enc_dec_message(crypto, msg, plaintext, msg->payload, len, true);
}
static int dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_msg *msg,
void *plaintext, size_t len)
{
struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto = snp_dev->crypto;
struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *hdr = &msg->hdr;
/* Build IV with response buffer sequence number */
memset(crypto->iv, 0, crypto->iv_len);
memcpy(crypto->iv, &hdr->msg_seqno, sizeof(hdr->msg_seqno));
return enc_dec_message(crypto, msg, msg->payload, plaintext, len, false);
}
static int verify_and_dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, void *payload, u32 sz)
{
struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto = snp_dev->crypto;
struct snp_guest_msg *resp = snp_dev->response;
struct snp_guest_msg *req = snp_dev->request;
struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *req_hdr = &req->hdr;
struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *resp_hdr = &resp->hdr;
dev_dbg(snp_dev->dev, "response [seqno %lld type %d version %d sz %d]\n",
resp_hdr->msg_seqno, resp_hdr->msg_type, resp_hdr->msg_version, resp_hdr->msg_sz);
/* Verify that the sequence counter is incremented by 1 */
if (unlikely(resp_hdr->msg_seqno != (req_hdr->msg_seqno + 1)))
return -EBADMSG;
/* Verify response message type and version number. */
if (resp_hdr->msg_type != (req_hdr->msg_type + 1) ||
resp_hdr->msg_version != req_hdr->msg_version)
return -EBADMSG;
/*
* If the message size is greater than our buffer length then return
* an error.
*/
if (unlikely((resp_hdr->msg_sz + crypto->a_len) > sz))
return -EBADMSG;
/* Decrypt the payload */
return dec_payload(snp_dev, resp, payload, resp_hdr->msg_sz + crypto->a_len);
}
static int enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 seqno, int version, u8 type,
void *payload, size_t sz)
{
struct snp_guest_msg *req = snp_dev->request;
struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *hdr = &req->hdr;
memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
hdr->algo = SNP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM;
hdr->hdr_version = MSG_HDR_VER;
hdr->hdr_sz = sizeof(*hdr);
hdr->msg_type = type;
hdr->msg_version = version;
hdr->msg_seqno = seqno;
hdr->msg_vmpck = vmpck_id;
hdr->msg_sz = sz;
/* Verify the sequence number is non-zero */
if (!hdr->msg_seqno)
return -ENOSR;
dev_dbg(snp_dev->dev, "request [seqno %lld type %d version %d sz %d]\n",
hdr->msg_seqno, hdr->msg_type, hdr->msg_version, hdr->msg_sz);
return __enc_payload(snp_dev, req, payload, sz);
}
static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, __u64 *fw_err)
{
unsigned long err = 0xff, override_err = 0;
unsigned long req_start = jiffies;
unsigned int override_npages = 0;
int rc;
retry_request:
/*
* Call firmware to process the request. In this function the encrypted
* message enters shared memory with the host. So after this call the
* sequence number must be incremented or the VMPCK must be deleted to
* prevent reuse of the IV.
*/
rc = snp_issue_guest_request(exit_code, &snp_dev->input, &err);
switch (rc) {
case -ENOSPC:
/*
* If the extended guest request fails due to having too
* small of a certificate data buffer, retry the same
* guest request without the extended data request in
* order to increment the sequence number and thus avoid
* IV reuse.
*/
override_npages = snp_dev->input.data_npages;
exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST;
/*
* Override the error to inform callers the given extended
* request buffer size was too small and give the caller the
* required buffer size.
*/
override_err = SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN;
/*
* If this call to the firmware succeeds, the sequence number can
* be incremented allowing for continued use of the VMPCK. If
* there is an error reflected in the return value, this value
* is checked further down and the result will be the deletion
* of the VMPCK and the error code being propagated back to the
* user as an ioctl() return code.
*/
goto retry_request;
/*
* The host may return SNP_GUEST_REQ_ERR_EBUSY if the request has been
* throttled. Retry in the driver to avoid returning and reusing the
* message sequence number on a different message.
*/
case -EAGAIN:
if (jiffies - req_start > SNP_REQ_MAX_RETRY_DURATION) {
rc = -ETIMEDOUT;
break;
}
schedule_timeout_killable(SNP_REQ_RETRY_DELAY);
goto retry_request;
}
/*
* Increment the message sequence number. There is no harm in doing
* this now because decryption uses the value stored in the response
* structure and any failure will wipe the VMPCK, preventing further
* use anyway.
*/
snp_inc_msg_seqno(snp_dev);
if (fw_err)
*fw_err = override_err ?: err;
if (override_npages)
snp_dev->input.data_npages = override_npages;
/*
* If an extended guest request was issued and the supplied certificate
* buffer was not large enough, a standard guest request was issued to
* prevent IV reuse. If the standard request was successful, return -EIO
* back to the caller as would have originally been returned.
*/
if (!rc && override_err == SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN)
return -EIO;
return rc;
}
static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, int msg_ver,
u8 type, void *req_buf, size_t req_sz, void *resp_buf,
u32 resp_sz, __u64 *fw_err)
{
u64 seqno;
int rc;
/* Get message sequence and verify that its a non-zero */
seqno = snp_get_msg_seqno(snp_dev);
if (!seqno)
return -EIO;
memset(snp_dev->response, 0, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
/* Encrypt the userspace provided payload */
rc = enc_payload(snp_dev, seqno, msg_ver, type, req_buf, req_sz);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = __handle_guest_request(snp_dev, exit_code, fw_err);
if (rc) {
if (rc == -EIO && *fw_err == SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN)
return rc;
dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, "Detected error from ASP request. rc: %d, fw_err: %llu\n", rc, *fw_err);
snp_disable_vmpck(snp_dev);
return rc;
}
rc = verify_and_dec_payload(snp_dev, resp_buf, resp_sz);
if (rc) {
dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, "Detected unexpected decode failure from ASP. rc: %d\n", rc);
snp_disable_vmpck(snp_dev);
return rc;
}
return 0;
}
static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg)
{
struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto = snp_dev->crypto;
struct snp_report_resp *resp;
struct snp_report_req req;
int rc, resp_len;
lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex);
if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data)
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&req, (void __user *)arg->req_data, sizeof(req)))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the
* response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the
* authtag.
*/
resp_len = sizeof(resp->data) + crypto->a_len;
resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!resp)
return -ENOMEM;
rc = handle_guest_request(snp_dev, SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST, arg->msg_version,
SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ, &req, sizeof(req), resp->data,
resp_len, &arg->fw_err);
if (rc)
goto e_free;
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->resp_data, resp, sizeof(*resp)))
rc = -EFAULT;
e_free:
kfree(resp);
return rc;
}
static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg)
{
struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto = snp_dev->crypto;
struct snp_derived_key_resp resp = {0};
struct snp_derived_key_req req;
int rc, resp_len;
/* Response data is 64 bytes and max authsize for GCM is 16 bytes. */
u8 buf[64 + 16];
lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex);
if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the
* response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the
* authtag.
*/
resp_len = sizeof(resp.data) + crypto->a_len;
if (sizeof(buf) < resp_len)
return -ENOMEM;
if (copy_from_user(&req, (void __user *)arg->req_data, sizeof(req)))
return -EFAULT;
rc = handle_guest_request(snp_dev, SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST, arg->msg_version,
SNP_MSG_KEY_REQ, &req, sizeof(req), buf, resp_len,
&arg->fw_err);
if (rc)
return rc;
memcpy(resp.data, buf, sizeof(resp.data));
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->resp_data, &resp, sizeof(resp)))
rc = -EFAULT;
/* The response buffer contains the sensitive data, explicitly clear it. */
memzero_explicit(buf, sizeof(buf));
memzero_explicit(&resp, sizeof(resp));
return rc;
}
static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg)
{
struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto = snp_dev->crypto;
struct snp_ext_report_req req;
struct snp_report_resp *resp;
int ret, npages = 0, resp_len;
lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex);
if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data)
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&req, (void __user *)arg->req_data, sizeof(req)))
return -EFAULT;
/* userspace does not want certificate data */
if (!req.certs_len || !req.certs_address)
goto cmd;
if (req.certs_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE ||
!IS_ALIGNED(req.certs_len, PAGE_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
if (!access_ok((const void __user *)req.certs_address, req.certs_len))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* Initialize the intermediate buffer with all zeros. This buffer
* is used in the guest request message to get the certs blob from
* the host. If host does not supply any certs in it, then copy
* zeros to indicate that certificate data was not provided.
*/
memset(snp_dev->certs_data, 0, req.certs_len);
npages = req.certs_len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
cmd:
/*
* The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the
* response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the
* authtag.
*/
resp_len = sizeof(resp->data) + crypto->a_len;
resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!resp)
return -ENOMEM;
snp_dev->input.data_npages = npages;
ret = handle_guest_request(snp_dev, SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST, arg->msg_version,
SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ, &req.data,
sizeof(req.data), resp->data, resp_len, &arg->fw_err);
/* If certs length is invalid then copy the returned length */
if (arg->fw_err == SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN) {
req.certs_len = snp_dev->input.data_npages << PAGE_SHIFT;
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->req_data, &req, sizeof(req)))
ret = -EFAULT;
}
if (ret)
goto e_free;
if (npages &&
copy_to_user((void __user *)req.certs_address, snp_dev->certs_data,
req.certs_len)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto e_free;
}
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->resp_data, resp, sizeof(*resp)))
ret = -EFAULT;
e_free:
kfree(resp);
return ret;
}
static long snp_guest_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev = to_snp_dev(file);
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
struct snp_guest_request_ioctl input;
int ret = -ENOTTY;
if (copy_from_user(&input, argp, sizeof(input)))
return -EFAULT;
input.fw_err = 0xff;
/* Message version must be non-zero */
if (!input.msg_version)
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&snp_cmd_mutex);
/* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */
if (is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
dev_err_ratelimited(snp_dev->dev, "VMPCK is disabled\n");
mutex_unlock(&snp_cmd_mutex);
return -ENOTTY;
}
switch (ioctl) {
case SNP_GET_REPORT:
ret = get_report(snp_dev, &input);
break;
case SNP_GET_DERIVED_KEY:
ret = get_derived_key(snp_dev, &input);
break;
case SNP_GET_EXT_REPORT:
ret = get_ext_report(snp_dev, &input);
break;
default:
break;
}
mutex_unlock(&snp_cmd_mutex);
if (input.fw_err && copy_to_user(argp, &input, sizeof(input)))
return -EFAULT;
return ret;
}
static void free_shared_pages(void *buf, size_t sz)
{
unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
int ret;
if (!buf)
return;
ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)buf, npages);
if (ret) {
WARN_ONCE(ret, "failed to restore encryption mask (leak it)\n");
return;
}
__free_pages(virt_to_page(buf), get_order(sz));
}
static void *alloc_shared_pages(struct device *dev, size_t sz)
{
unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
struct page *page;
int ret;
page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, get_order(sz));
if (!page)
return NULL;
ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)page_address(page), npages);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev, "failed to mark page shared, ret=%d\n", ret);
__free_pages(page, get_order(sz));
return NULL;
}
return page_address(page);
}
static const struct file_operations snp_guest_fops = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.unlocked_ioctl = snp_guest_ioctl,
};
static u8 *get_vmpck(int id, struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout, u32 **seqno)
{
u8 *key = NULL;
switch (id) {
case 0:
*seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_0;
key = layout->vmpck0;
break;
case 1:
*seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_1;
key = layout->vmpck1;
break;
case 2:
*seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_2;
key = layout->vmpck2;
break;
case 3:
*seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_3;
key = layout->vmpck3;
break;
default:
break;
}
return key;
}
static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout;
struct sev_guest_platform_data *data;
struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev;
struct miscdevice *misc;
void __iomem *mapping;
int ret;
if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
return -ENODEV;
if (!dev->platform_data)
return -ENODEV;
data = (struct sev_guest_platform_data *)dev->platform_data;
mapping = ioremap_encrypted(data->secrets_gpa, PAGE_SIZE);
if (!mapping)
return -ENODEV;
layout = (__force void *)mapping;
ret = -ENOMEM;
snp_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!snp_dev)
goto e_unmap;
ret = -EINVAL;
snp_dev->vmpck = get_vmpck(vmpck_id, layout, &snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno);
if (!snp_dev->vmpck) {
dev_err(dev, "invalid vmpck id %d\n", vmpck_id);
goto e_unmap;
}
/* Verify that VMPCK is not zero. */
if (is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
dev_err(dev, "vmpck id %d is null\n", vmpck_id);
goto e_unmap;
}
platform_set_drvdata(pdev, snp_dev);
snp_dev->dev = dev;
snp_dev->layout = layout;
/* Allocate the shared page used for the request and response message. */
snp_dev->request = alloc_shared_pages(dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
if (!snp_dev->request)
goto e_unmap;
snp_dev->response = alloc_shared_pages(dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
if (!snp_dev->response)
goto e_free_request;
snp_dev->certs_data = alloc_shared_pages(dev, SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE);
if (!snp_dev->certs_data)
goto e_free_response;
ret = -EIO;
snp_dev->crypto = init_crypto(snp_dev, snp_dev->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
if (!snp_dev->crypto)
goto e_free_cert_data;
misc = &snp_dev->misc;
misc->minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR;
misc->name = DEVICE_NAME;
misc->fops = &snp_guest_fops;
/* initial the input address for guest request */
snp_dev->input.req_gpa = __pa(snp_dev->request);
snp_dev->input.resp_gpa = __pa(snp_dev->response);
snp_dev->input.data_gpa = __pa(snp_dev->certs_data);
ret = misc_register(misc);
if (ret)
goto e_free_cert_data;
dev_info(dev, "Initialized SEV guest driver (using vmpck_id %d)\n", vmpck_id);
return 0;
e_free_cert_data:
free_shared_pages(snp_dev->certs_data, SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE);
e_free_response:
free_shared_pages(snp_dev->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
e_free_request:
free_shared_pages(snp_dev->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
e_unmap:
iounmap(mapping);
return ret;
}
static int __exit sev_guest_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
free_shared_pages(snp_dev->certs_data, SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE);
free_shared_pages(snp_dev->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
free_shared_pages(snp_dev->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
deinit_crypto(snp_dev->crypto);
misc_deregister(&snp_dev->misc);
return 0;
}
/*
* This driver is meant to be a common SEV guest interface driver and to
* support any SEV guest API. As such, even though it has been introduced
* with the SEV-SNP support, it is named "sev-guest".
*/
static struct platform_driver sev_guest_driver = {
.remove = __exit_p(sev_guest_remove),
.driver = {
.name = "sev-guest",
},
};
module_platform_driver_probe(sev_guest_driver, sev_guest_probe);
MODULE_AUTHOR("Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_VERSION("1.0.0");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("AMD SEV Guest Driver");
MODULE_ALIAS("platform:sev-guest");
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