diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/landlock/audit.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/landlock/audit.c | 522 |
1 files changed, 522 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/landlock/audit.c b/security/landlock/audit.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7e5e0ed0e4e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/audit.c @@ -0,0 +1,522 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Landlock - Audit helpers + * + * Copyright © 2023-2025 Microsoft Corporation + */ + +#include <kunit/test.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/bitops.h> +#include <linux/lsm_audit.h> +#include <linux/pid.h> +#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h> + +#include "access.h" +#include "audit.h" +#include "common.h" +#include "cred.h" +#include "domain.h" +#include "limits.h" +#include "ruleset.h" + +static const char *const fs_access_strings[] = { + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)] = "fs.execute", + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE)] = "fs.write_file", + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)] = "fs.read_file", + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR)] = "fs.read_dir", + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR)] = "fs.remove_dir", + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE)] = "fs.remove_file", + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR)] = "fs.make_char", + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR)] = "fs.make_dir", + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG)] = "fs.make_reg", + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK)] = "fs.make_sock", + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO)] = "fs.make_fifo", + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK)] = "fs.make_block", + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM)] = "fs.make_sym", + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)] = "fs.refer", + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)] = "fs.truncate", + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)] = "fs.ioctl_dev", +}; + +static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(fs_access_strings) == LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS); + +static const char *const net_access_strings[] = { + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP)] = "net.bind_tcp", + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)] = "net.connect_tcp", +}; + +static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(net_access_strings) == LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET); + +static __attribute_const__ const char * +get_blocker(const enum landlock_request_type type, + const unsigned long access_bit) +{ + switch (type) { + case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_PTRACE: + WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit != -1); + return "ptrace"; + + case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_CHANGE_TOPOLOGY: + WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit != -1); + return "fs.change_topology"; + + case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS: + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit >= ARRAY_SIZE(fs_access_strings))) + return "unknown"; + return fs_access_strings[access_bit]; + + case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_NET_ACCESS: + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit >= ARRAY_SIZE(net_access_strings))) + return "unknown"; + return net_access_strings[access_bit]; + + case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET: + WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit != -1); + return "scope.abstract_unix_socket"; + + case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_SIGNAL: + WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit != -1); + return "scope.signal"; + } + + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + return "unknown"; +} + +static void log_blockers(struct audit_buffer *const ab, + const enum landlock_request_type type, + const access_mask_t access) +{ + const unsigned long access_mask = access; + unsigned long access_bit; + bool is_first = true; + + for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_mask, BITS_PER_TYPE(access)) { + audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s", is_first ? "" : ",", + get_blocker(type, access_bit)); + is_first = false; + } + if (is_first) + audit_log_format(ab, "%s", get_blocker(type, -1)); +} + +static void log_domain(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + + /* Ignores already logged domains. */ + if (READ_ONCE(hierarchy->log_status) == LANDLOCK_LOG_RECORDED) + return; + + /* Uses consistent allocation flags wrt common_lsm_audit(). */ + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN, + AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN); + if (!ab) + return; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(hierarchy->id == 0); + audit_log_format( + ab, + "domain=%llx status=allocated mode=enforcing pid=%d uid=%u exe=", + hierarchy->id, pid_nr(hierarchy->details->pid), + hierarchy->details->uid); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, hierarchy->details->exe_path); + audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, hierarchy->details->comm); + audit_log_end(ab); + + /* + * There may be race condition leading to logging of the same domain + * several times but that is OK. + */ + WRITE_ONCE(hierarchy->log_status, LANDLOCK_LOG_RECORDED); +} + +static struct landlock_hierarchy * +get_hierarchy(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, const size_t layer) +{ + struct landlock_hierarchy *hierarchy = domain->hierarchy; + ssize_t i; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(layer >= domain->num_layers)) + return hierarchy; + + for (i = domain->num_layers - 1; i > layer; i--) { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!hierarchy->parent)) + break; + + hierarchy = hierarchy->parent; + } + + return hierarchy; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST + +static void test_get_hierarchy(struct kunit *const test) +{ + struct landlock_hierarchy dom0_hierarchy = { + .id = 10, + }; + struct landlock_hierarchy dom1_hierarchy = { + .parent = &dom0_hierarchy, + .id = 20, + }; + struct landlock_hierarchy dom2_hierarchy = { + .parent = &dom1_hierarchy, + .id = 30, + }; + struct landlock_ruleset dom2 = { + .hierarchy = &dom2_hierarchy, + .num_layers = 3, + }; + + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 10, get_hierarchy(&dom2, 0)->id); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 20, get_hierarchy(&dom2, 1)->id); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 30, get_hierarchy(&dom2, 2)->id); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 30, get_hierarchy(&dom2, -1)->id); +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */ + +static size_t get_denied_layer(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, + access_mask_t *const access_request, + const layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[], + const size_t layer_masks_size) +{ + const unsigned long access_req = *access_request; + unsigned long access_bit; + access_mask_t missing = 0; + long youngest_layer = -1; + + for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req, layer_masks_size) { + const access_mask_t mask = (*layer_masks)[access_bit]; + long layer; + + if (!mask) + continue; + + /* __fls(1) == 0 */ + layer = __fls(mask); + if (layer > youngest_layer) { + youngest_layer = layer; + missing = BIT(access_bit); + } else if (layer == youngest_layer) { + missing |= BIT(access_bit); + } + } + + *access_request = missing; + if (youngest_layer == -1) + return domain->num_layers - 1; + + return youngest_layer; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST + +static void test_get_denied_layer(struct kunit *const test) +{ + const struct landlock_ruleset dom = { + .num_layers = 5, + }; + const layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = { + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)] = BIT(0), + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)] = BIT(1), + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR)] = BIT(1) | BIT(0), + [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR)] = BIT(2), + }; + access_mask_t access; + + access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE; + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0, + get_denied_layer(&dom, &access, &layer_masks, + sizeof(layer_masks))); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE); + + access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE; + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 1, + get_denied_layer(&dom, &access, &layer_masks, + sizeof(layer_masks))); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE); + + access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR; + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 1, + get_denied_layer(&dom, &access, &layer_masks, + sizeof(layer_masks))); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR); + + access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR; + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 1, + get_denied_layer(&dom, &access, &layer_masks, + sizeof(layer_masks))); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR); + + access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR; + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 1, + get_denied_layer(&dom, &access, &layer_masks, + sizeof(layer_masks))); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR); + + access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE; + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 4, + get_denied_layer(&dom, &access, &layer_masks, + sizeof(layer_masks))); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, 0); +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */ + +static size_t +get_layer_from_deny_masks(access_mask_t *const access_request, + const access_mask_t all_existing_optional_access, + const deny_masks_t deny_masks) +{ + const unsigned long access_opt = all_existing_optional_access; + const unsigned long access_req = *access_request; + access_mask_t missing = 0; + size_t youngest_layer = 0; + size_t access_index = 0; + unsigned long access_bit; + + /* This will require change with new object types. */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(access_opt != _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL); + + for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_opt, + BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t)) { + if (access_req & BIT(access_bit)) { + const size_t layer = + (deny_masks >> (access_index * 4)) & + (LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS - 1); + + if (layer > youngest_layer) { + youngest_layer = layer; + missing = BIT(access_bit); + } else if (layer == youngest_layer) { + missing |= BIT(access_bit); + } + } + access_index++; + } + + *access_request = missing; + return youngest_layer; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST + +static void test_get_layer_from_deny_masks(struct kunit *const test) +{ + deny_masks_t deny_mask; + access_mask_t access; + + /* truncate:0 ioctl_dev:2 */ + deny_mask = 0x20; + + access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE; + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0, + get_layer_from_deny_masks(&access, + _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL, + deny_mask)); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE); + + access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV; + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 2, + get_layer_from_deny_masks(&access, + _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL, + deny_mask)); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV); + + /* truncate:15 ioctl_dev:15 */ + deny_mask = 0xff; + + access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE; + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 15, + get_layer_from_deny_masks(&access, + _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL, + deny_mask)); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE); + + access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV; + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 15, + get_layer_from_deny_masks(&access, + _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL, + deny_mask)); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV); +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */ + +static bool is_valid_request(const struct landlock_request *const request) +{ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(request->layer_plus_one > LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS)) + return false; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(!!request->layer_plus_one ^ !!request->access))) + return false; + + if (request->access) { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(!!request->layer_masks ^ + !!request->all_existing_optional_access))) + return false; + } else { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(request->layer_masks || + request->all_existing_optional_access)) + return false; + } + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!!request->layer_masks ^ !!request->layer_masks_size)) + return false; + + if (request->deny_masks) { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!request->all_existing_optional_access)) + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +/** + * landlock_log_denial - Create audit records related to a denial + * + * @subject: The Landlock subject's credential denying an action. + * @request: Detail of the user space request. + */ +void landlock_log_denial(const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject, + const struct landlock_request *const request) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + struct landlock_hierarchy *youngest_denied; + size_t youngest_layer; + access_mask_t missing; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!subject || !subject->domain || + !subject->domain->hierarchy || !request)) + return; + + if (!is_valid_request(request)) + return; + + missing = request->access; + if (missing) { + /* Gets the nearest domain that denies the request. */ + if (request->layer_masks) { + youngest_layer = get_denied_layer( + subject->domain, &missing, request->layer_masks, + request->layer_masks_size); + } else { + youngest_layer = get_layer_from_deny_masks( + &missing, request->all_existing_optional_access, + request->deny_masks); + } + youngest_denied = + get_hierarchy(subject->domain, youngest_layer); + } else { + youngest_layer = request->layer_plus_one - 1; + youngest_denied = + get_hierarchy(subject->domain, youngest_layer); + } + + if (READ_ONCE(youngest_denied->log_status) == LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED) + return; + + /* + * Consistently keeps track of the number of denied access requests + * even if audit is currently disabled, or if audit rules currently + * exclude this record type, or if landlock_restrict_self(2)'s flags + * quiet logs. + */ + atomic64_inc(&youngest_denied->num_denials); + + if (!audit_enabled) + return; + + /* Checks if the current exec was restricting itself. */ + if (subject->domain_exec & (1 << youngest_layer)) { + /* Ignores denials for the same execution. */ + if (!youngest_denied->log_same_exec) + return; + } else { + /* Ignores denials after a new execution. */ + if (!youngest_denied->log_new_exec) + return; + } + + /* Uses consistent allocation flags wrt common_lsm_audit(). */ + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN, + AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS); + if (!ab) + return; + + audit_log_format(ab, "domain=%llx blockers=", youngest_denied->id); + log_blockers(ab, request->type, missing); + audit_log_lsm_data(ab, &request->audit); + audit_log_end(ab); + + /* Logs this domain the first time it shows in log. */ + log_domain(youngest_denied); +} + +/** + * landlock_log_drop_domain - Create an audit record on domain deallocation + * + * @hierarchy: The domain's hierarchy being deallocated. + * + * Only domains which previously appeared in the audit logs are logged again. + * This is useful to know when a domain will never show again in the audit log. + * + * Called in a work queue scheduled by landlock_put_ruleset_deferred() called + * by hook_cred_free(). + */ +void landlock_log_drop_domain(const struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!hierarchy)) + return; + + if (!audit_enabled) + return; + + /* Ignores domains that were not logged. */ + if (READ_ONCE(hierarchy->log_status) != LANDLOCK_LOG_RECORDED) + return; + + /* + * If logging of domain allocation succeeded, warns about failure to log + * domain deallocation to highlight unbalanced domain lifetime logs. + */ + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, + AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN); + if (!ab) + return; + + audit_log_format(ab, "domain=%llx status=deallocated denials=%llu", + hierarchy->id, atomic64_read(&hierarchy->num_denials)); + audit_log_end(ab); +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST + +static struct kunit_case test_cases[] = { + /* clang-format off */ + KUNIT_CASE(test_get_hierarchy), + KUNIT_CASE(test_get_denied_layer), + KUNIT_CASE(test_get_layer_from_deny_masks), + {} + /* clang-format on */ +}; + +static struct kunit_suite test_suite = { + .name = "landlock_audit", + .test_cases = test_cases, +}; + +kunit_test_suite(test_suite); + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */ |