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| author | Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> | 2023-10-05 08:41:23 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> | 2023-10-06 20:16:44 +0200 |
| commit | bc5bc309db45a7ab218ce8259ba9bc7659be61ca (patch) | |
| tree | 658e32196afca145b29b0c268385fd2a57046df1 /tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/queue_stack_map.c | |
| parent | 9c8c3fa3a52bc55696ccc4dfcb8a49f969b5fb0e (diff) | |
| download | lwn-bc5bc309db45a7ab218ce8259ba9bc7659be61ca.tar.gz lwn-bc5bc309db45a7ab218ce8259ba9bc7659be61ca.zip | |
bpf: Inherit system settings for CPU security mitigations
Currently, there exists a system-wide setting related to CPU security
mitigations, denoted as 'mitigations='. When set to 'mitigations=off', it
deactivates all optional CPU mitigations. Therefore, if we implement a
system-wide 'mitigations=off' setting, it should inherently bypass Spectre
v1 and Spectre v4 in the BPF subsystem.
Please note that there is also a more specific 'nospectre_v1' setting on
x86 and ppc architectures, though it is not currently exported. For the
time being, let's disregard more fine-grained options.
This idea emerged during our discussion about potential Spectre v1 attacks
with Luis [0].
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/b4fc15f7-b204-767e-ebb9-fdb4233961fb@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: Luis Gerhorst <gerhorst@cs.fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231005084123.1338-1-laoar.shao@gmail.com
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/queue_stack_map.c')
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