diff options
author | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2014-07-22 10:39:48 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2014-07-25 11:47:46 -0700 |
commit | 5a9196d715607f76d6b7d96a0970d6065335e62b (patch) | |
tree | df323588d1026b947e489c5fb9c83299dbcb9689 /security | |
parent | 6593d9245bc66e6e3cf4ba6d365a7833110c1402 (diff) | |
download | lwn-5a9196d715607f76d6b7d96a0970d6065335e62b.tar.gz lwn-5a9196d715607f76d6b7d96a0970d6065335e62b.zip |
ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmware
The "security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook" patch defined a
new security hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built
into the kernel.
This patch defines ima_fw_from_file(), which is called from the new
security hook, to measure and/or appraise the loaded firmware's
integrity.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/integrity.h | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 7 |
6 files changed, 41 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index c42056edfc97..57da4bd7ba0c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert(struct inode *inode); struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode); /* IMA policy related functions */ -enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, MMAP_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK, POST_SETATTR }; +enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, MMAP_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK, FIRMWARE_CHECK, POST_SETATTR }; int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags); @@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void); #define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE 0x01 #define IMA_APPRAISE_FIX 0x02 #define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES 0x04 +#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE 0x08 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 59ac90275070..86bfd5c5df85 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, return iint->ima_bprm_status; case MODULE_CHECK: return iint->ima_module_status; + case FIRMWARE_CHECK: + return iint->ima_firmware_status; case FILE_CHECK: default: return iint->ima_file_status; @@ -94,6 +96,9 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, case MODULE_CHECK: iint->ima_module_status = status; break; + case FIRMWARE_CHECK: + iint->ima_firmware_status = status; + break; case FILE_CHECK: default: iint->ima_file_status = status; @@ -113,6 +118,9 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int func) case MODULE_CHECK: iint->flags |= (IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); break; + case FIRMWARE_CHECK: + iint->flags |= (IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); + break; case FILE_CHECK: default: iint->flags |= (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 0d696431209c..2917f980bf30 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -319,6 +319,17 @@ int ima_module_check(struct file *file) return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK); } +int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) +{ + if (!file) { + if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && + (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) + return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ + return 0; + } + return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, FIRMWARE_CHECK); +} + static int __init init_ima(void) { int error; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index cea84d8bd7be..07099a8bc283 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = { {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, }; static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = { @@ -241,6 +242,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func) return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE; case MODULE_CHECK: return IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE; + case FIRMWARE_CHECK: + return IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE; case FILE_CHECK: default: return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE; @@ -486,6 +489,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->func = FILE_CHECK; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = MODULE_CHECK; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FIRMWARE_CHECK") == 0) + entry->func = FIRMWARE_CHECK; else if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0) || (strcmp(args[0].from, "MMAP_CHECK") == 0)) entry->func = MMAP_CHECK; @@ -636,6 +641,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) result = -EINVAL; else if (entry->func == MODULE_CHECK) ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES; + else if (entry->func == FIRMWARE_CHECK) + ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE; audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result); audit_log_end(ab); return result; diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 09c440d9aaee..19b8e314ca96 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -46,10 +46,14 @@ #define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED 0x00002000 #define IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE 0x00004000 #define IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED 0x00008000 +#define IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE 0x00010000 +#define IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED 0x00020000 #define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \ - IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE) + IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE | \ + IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE) #define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \ - IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED) + IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED | \ + IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED) enum evm_ima_xattr_type { IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01, @@ -104,6 +108,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache { enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4; enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4; enum integrity_status ima_module_status:4; + enum integrity_status ima_firmware_status:4; enum integrity_status evm_status:4; struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash; }; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 35d37d0f0d49..e41b1a8d7644 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -847,7 +847,12 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) { - return security_ops->kernel_fw_from_file(file, buf, size); + int ret; + + ret = security_ops->kernel_fw_from_file(file, buf, size); + if (ret) + return ret; + return ima_fw_from_file(file, buf, size); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_fw_from_file); |