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| author | Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> | 2017-05-05 06:56:54 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2017-05-05 12:00:11 -0400 |
| commit | 84b114b98452c431299d99c135f751659e517acb (patch) | |
| tree | 53778bfd4964bed65ac40a9c1c57a73f21cb9664 /net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | |
| parent | 9051247dcf9ecee156d2ddac39a4f1ca591f8428 (diff) | |
| download | lwn-84b114b98452c431299d99c135f751659e517acb.tar.gz lwn-84b114b98452c431299d99c135f751659e517acb.zip | |
tcp: randomize timestamps on syncookies
Whole point of randomization was to hide server uptime, but an attacker
can simply start a syn flood and TCP generates 'old style' timestamps,
directly revealing server jiffies value.
Also, TSval sent by the server to a particular remote address vary
depending on syncookies being sent or not, potentially triggering PAWS
drops for innocent clients.
Lets implement proper randomization, including for SYNcookies.
Also we do not need to export sysctl_tcp_timestamps, since it is not
used from a module.
In v2, I added Florian feedback and contribution, adding tsoff to
tcp_get_cookie_sock().
v3 removed one unused variable in tcp_v4_connect() as Florian spotted.
Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Tested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4/tcp_input.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 8 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 9739962bfb3f..5a3ad09e2786 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ int sysctl_tcp_dsack __read_mostly = 1; int sysctl_tcp_app_win __read_mostly = 31; int sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale __read_mostly = 1; EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale); -EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_tcp_timestamps); /* rfc5961 challenge ack rate limiting */ int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 1000; @@ -6347,8 +6346,8 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req)) goto drop_and_free; - if (isn && tmp_opt.tstamp_ok) - af_ops->init_seq_tsoff(skb, &tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off); + if (tmp_opt.tstamp_ok) + tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off = af_ops->init_ts_off(skb); if (!want_cookie && !isn) { /* Kill the following clause, if you dislike this way. */ @@ -6368,7 +6367,7 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, goto drop_and_release; } - isn = af_ops->init_seq_tsoff(skb, &tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off); + isn = af_ops->init_seq(skb); } if (!dst) { dst = af_ops->route_req(sk, &fl, req); @@ -6380,7 +6379,6 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, if (want_cookie) { isn = cookie_init_sequence(af_ops, sk, skb, &req->mss); - tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off = 0; req->cookie_ts = tmp_opt.tstamp_ok; if (!tmp_opt.tstamp_ok) inet_rsk(req)->ecn_ok = 0; |