diff options
author | Nicolas Geoffray <ngeoffray@google.com> | 2019-11-30 17:53:28 -0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-12-01 12:59:03 -0800 |
commit | 05d351102dbe4e103d6bdac18b1122cd3cd04925 (patch) | |
tree | bfeabe4ba2dff1f3a3cb110e74e8522106bda6ee /mm/shmem.c | |
parent | 625110b5e9dae9074d8a7e67dd07f821a053eed7 (diff) | |
download | lwn-05d351102dbe4e103d6bdac18b1122cd3cd04925.tar.gz lwn-05d351102dbe4e103d6bdac18b1122cd3cd04925.zip |
mm, memfd: fix COW issue on MAP_PRIVATE and F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE mappings
F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE has unexpected behavior when used with MAP_PRIVATE:
A private mapping created after the memfd file that gets sealed with
F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE loses the copy-on-write at fork behavior, meaning
children and parent share the same memory, even though the mapping is
private.
The reason for this is due to the code below:
static int shmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(file_inode(file));
if (info->seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE) {
/*
* New PROT_WRITE and MAP_SHARED mmaps are not allowed when
* "future write" seal active.
*/
if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
return -EPERM;
/*
* Since the F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seals allow for a MAP_SHARED
* read-only mapping, take care to not allow mprotect to revert
* protections.
*/
vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE);
}
...
}
And for the mm to know if a mapping is copy-on-write:
static inline bool is_cow_mapping(vm_flags_t flags)
{
return (flags & (VM_SHARED | VM_MAYWRITE)) == VM_MAYWRITE;
}
The patch fixes the issue by making the mprotect revert protection
happen only for shared mappings. For private mappings, using mprotect
will have no effect on the seal behavior.
The F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE feature was introduced in v5.1 so v5.3.x stable
kernels would need a backport.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: reflow comment, per Christoph]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191107195355.80608-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
Fixes: ab3948f58ff84 ("mm/memfd: add an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal to memfd")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Geoffray <ngeoffray@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/shmem.c')
-rw-r--r-- | mm/shmem.c | 11 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c index 9ec9dd1946d6..60de3d9e26a7 100644 --- a/mm/shmem.c +++ b/mm/shmem.c @@ -2214,11 +2214,14 @@ static int shmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) return -EPERM; /* - * Since the F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seals allow for a MAP_SHARED - * read-only mapping, take care to not allow mprotect to revert - * protections. + * Since an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE sealed memfd can be mapped as + * MAP_SHARED and read-only, take care to not allow mprotect to + * revert protections on such mappings. Do this only for shared + * mappings. For private mappings, don't need to mask + * VM_MAYWRITE as we still want them to be COW-writable. */ - vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE); + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) + vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE); } file_accessed(file); |