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| author | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2023-03-03 21:41:46 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2023-03-03 21:41:46 -0800 |
| commit | 2564a031ab7be975fb907197227cc5ae0aecff0f (patch) | |
| tree | 8fdcaadb091cc136be7a61a7ee097c0edfa79e47 /kernel | |
| parent | e768e3c5aab44ee63f58649d4c8cbbb3270e5c06 (diff) | |
| parent | 71cf4d027ad53a1e2847191ac14e50132d35a6a7 (diff) | |
| download | lwn-2564a031ab7be975fb907197227cc5ae0aecff0f.tar.gz lwn-2564a031ab7be975fb907197227cc5ae0aecff0f.zip | |
Merge branch 'bpf: allow ctx writes using BPF_ST_MEM instruction'
Eduard Zingerman says:
====================
Changes v1 -> v2, suggested by Alexei:
- Resolved conflict with recent commit:
6fcd486b3a0a ("bpf: Refactor RCU enforcement in the verifier");
- Variable `ctx_access` removed in function `convert_ctx_accesses()`;
- Macro `BPF_COPY_STORE` renamed to `BPF_EMIT_STORE` and fixed to
correctly extract original store instruction class from code.
Original message follows:
The function verifier.c:convert_ctx_access() applies some rewrites to BPF
instructions that read from or write to the BPF program context.
For example, the write instruction for the `struct bpf_sockopt::retval`
field:
*(u32 *)(r1 + offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, retval)) = r2
Is transformed to:
*(u64 *)(r1 + offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt_kern, tmp_reg)) = r9
r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 + offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt_kern, current_task))
r9 = *(u64 *)(r9 + offsetof(struct task_struct, bpf_ctx))
*(u32 *)(r9 + offsetof(struct bpf_cg_run_ctx, retval)) = r2
r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 + offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt_kern, tmp_reg))
Currently, the verifier only supports such transformations for LDX
(memory-to-register read) and STX (register-to-memory write) instructions.
Error is reported for ST instructions (immediate-to-memory write).
This is fine because clang does not currently emit ST instructions.
However, new `-mcpu=v4` clang flag is planned, which would allow to emit
ST instructions (discussed in [1]).
This patch-set adjusts the verifier to support ST instructions in
`verifier.c:convert_ctx_access()`.
The patches #1 and #2 were previously shared as part of RFC [2]. The
changes compared to that RFC are:
- In patch #1, a bug in the handling of the
`struct __sk_buff::queue_mapping` field was fixed.
- Patch #3 is added, which is a set of disassembler-based test cases for
context access rewrites. The test cases cover all fields for which the
handling code is modified in patch #1.
[1] Propose some new instructions for -mcpu=v4
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/4bfe98be-5333-1c7e-2f6d-42486c8ec039@meta.com/
[2] RFC Support for BPF_ST instruction in LLVM C compiler
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221231163122.1360813-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
[3] v1
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230302225507.3413720-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
====================
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/cgroup.c | 49 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 110 |
2 files changed, 82 insertions, 77 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c index a4ae422b8f12..53edb8ad2471 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c @@ -2223,10 +2223,12 @@ static u32 sysctl_convert_ctx_access(enum bpf_access_type type, BPF_FIELD_SIZEOF(struct bpf_sysctl_kern, ppos), treg, si->dst_reg, offsetof(struct bpf_sysctl_kern, ppos)); - *insn++ = BPF_STX_MEM( - BPF_SIZEOF(u32), treg, si->src_reg, + *insn++ = BPF_RAW_INSN( + BPF_CLASS(si->code) | BPF_MEM | BPF_SIZEOF(u32), + treg, si->src_reg, bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset( - 0, sizeof(u32), sizeof(loff_t))); + 0, sizeof(u32), sizeof(loff_t)), + si->imm); *insn++ = BPF_LDX_MEM( BPF_DW, treg, si->dst_reg, offsetof(struct bpf_sysctl_kern, tmp_reg)); @@ -2376,10 +2378,17 @@ static bool cg_sockopt_is_valid_access(int off, int size, return true; } -#define CG_SOCKOPT_ACCESS_FIELD(T, F) \ - T(BPF_FIELD_SIZEOF(struct bpf_sockopt_kern, F), \ - si->dst_reg, si->src_reg, \ - offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt_kern, F)) +#define CG_SOCKOPT_READ_FIELD(F) \ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_FIELD_SIZEOF(struct bpf_sockopt_kern, F), \ + si->dst_reg, si->src_reg, \ + offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt_kern, F)) + +#define CG_SOCKOPT_WRITE_FIELD(F) \ + BPF_RAW_INSN((BPF_FIELD_SIZEOF(struct bpf_sockopt_kern, F) | \ + BPF_MEM | BPF_CLASS(si->code)), \ + si->dst_reg, si->src_reg, \ + offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt_kern, F), \ + si->imm) static u32 cg_sockopt_convert_ctx_access(enum bpf_access_type type, const struct bpf_insn *si, @@ -2391,25 +2400,25 @@ static u32 cg_sockopt_convert_ctx_access(enum bpf_access_type type, switch (si->off) { case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, sk): - *insn++ = CG_SOCKOPT_ACCESS_FIELD(BPF_LDX_MEM, sk); + *insn++ = CG_SOCKOPT_READ_FIELD(sk); break; case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, level): if (type == BPF_WRITE) - *insn++ = CG_SOCKOPT_ACCESS_FIELD(BPF_STX_MEM, level); + *insn++ = CG_SOCKOPT_WRITE_FIELD(level); else - *insn++ = CG_SOCKOPT_ACCESS_FIELD(BPF_LDX_MEM, level); + *insn++ = CG_SOCKOPT_READ_FIELD(level); break; case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, optname): if (type == BPF_WRITE) - *insn++ = CG_SOCKOPT_ACCESS_FIELD(BPF_STX_MEM, optname); + *insn++ = CG_SOCKOPT_WRITE_FIELD(optname); else - *insn++ = CG_SOCKOPT_ACCESS_FIELD(BPF_LDX_MEM, optname); + *insn++ = CG_SOCKOPT_READ_FIELD(optname); break; case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, optlen): if (type == BPF_WRITE) - *insn++ = CG_SOCKOPT_ACCESS_FIELD(BPF_STX_MEM, optlen); + *insn++ = CG_SOCKOPT_WRITE_FIELD(optlen); else - *insn++ = CG_SOCKOPT_ACCESS_FIELD(BPF_LDX_MEM, optlen); + *insn++ = CG_SOCKOPT_READ_FIELD(optlen); break; case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, retval): BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct bpf_cg_run_ctx, run_ctx) != 0); @@ -2429,9 +2438,11 @@ static u32 cg_sockopt_convert_ctx_access(enum bpf_access_type type, *insn++ = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_FIELD_SIZEOF(struct task_struct, bpf_ctx), treg, treg, offsetof(struct task_struct, bpf_ctx)); - *insn++ = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_FIELD_SIZEOF(struct bpf_cg_run_ctx, retval), - treg, si->src_reg, - offsetof(struct bpf_cg_run_ctx, retval)); + *insn++ = BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_CLASS(si->code) | BPF_MEM | + BPF_FIELD_SIZEOF(struct bpf_cg_run_ctx, retval), + treg, si->src_reg, + offsetof(struct bpf_cg_run_ctx, retval), + si->imm); *insn++ = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, treg, si->dst_reg, offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt_kern, tmp_reg)); } else { @@ -2447,10 +2458,10 @@ static u32 cg_sockopt_convert_ctx_access(enum bpf_access_type type, } break; case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, optval): - *insn++ = CG_SOCKOPT_ACCESS_FIELD(BPF_LDX_MEM, optval); + *insn++ = CG_SOCKOPT_READ_FIELD(optval); break; case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, optval_end): - *insn++ = CG_SOCKOPT_ACCESS_FIELD(BPF_LDX_MEM, optval_end); + *insn++ = CG_SOCKOPT_READ_FIELD(optval_end); break; } diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index c2adf3c24c64..4c5d2b5e25c8 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -14813,6 +14813,44 @@ static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev) !reg_type_mismatch_ok(prev)); } +static int save_aux_ptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, enum bpf_reg_type type, + bool allow_trust_missmatch) +{ + enum bpf_reg_type *prev_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; + + if (*prev_type == NOT_INIT) { + /* Saw a valid insn + * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off) + * save type to validate intersecting paths + */ + *prev_type = type; + } else if (reg_type_mismatch(type, *prev_type)) { + /* Abuser program is trying to use the same insn + * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off) + * with different pointer types: + * src_reg == ctx in one branch and + * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch. + * Reject it. + */ + if (allow_trust_missmatch && + base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && + base_type(*prev_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { + /* + * Have to support a use case when one path through + * the program yields TRUSTED pointer while another + * is UNTRUSTED. Fallback to UNTRUSTED to generate + * BPF_PROBE_MEM. + */ + *prev_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED; + } else { + verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + } + + return 0; +} + static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) { bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); @@ -14922,7 +14960,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return err; } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { - enum bpf_reg_type *prev_src_type, src_reg_type; + enum bpf_reg_type src_reg_type; /* check for reserved fields is already done */ @@ -14946,43 +14984,11 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (err) return err; - prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; - - if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) { - /* saw a valid insn - * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off) - * save type to validate intersecting paths - */ - *prev_src_type = src_reg_type; - - } else if (reg_type_mismatch(src_reg_type, *prev_src_type)) { - /* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn - * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off) - * with different pointer types: - * src_reg == ctx in one branch and - * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch. - * Reject it. - */ - if (base_type(src_reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && - base_type(*prev_src_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { - /* - * Have to support a use case when one path through - * the program yields TRUSTED pointer while another - * is UNTRUSTED. Fallback to UNTRUSTED to generate - * BPF_PROBE_MEM. - */ - *prev_src_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED; - } else { - verbose(env, - "The same insn cannot be used with different pointers: %s", - reg_type_str(env, src_reg_type)); - verbose(env, " != %s\n", reg_type_str(env, *prev_src_type)); - return -EINVAL; - } - } - + err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, src_reg_type, true); + if (err) + return err; } else if (class == BPF_STX) { - enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type; + enum bpf_reg_type dst_reg_type; if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC) { err = check_atomic(env, env->insn_idx, insn); @@ -15015,16 +15021,12 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (err) return err; - prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; - - if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) { - *prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type; - } else if (reg_type_mismatch(dst_reg_type, *prev_dst_type)) { - verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } - + err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, dst_reg_type, false); + if (err) + return err; } else if (class == BPF_ST) { + enum bpf_reg_type dst_reg_type; + if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n"); @@ -15035,12 +15037,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (err) return err; - if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { - verbose(env, "BPF_ST stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", - insn->dst_reg, - reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type)); - return -EACCES; - } + dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type; /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, @@ -15049,6 +15046,9 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (err) return err; + err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, dst_reg_type, false); + if (err) + return err; } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); @@ -16157,14 +16157,12 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access; - bool ctx_access; if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) { type = BPF_READ; - ctx_access = true; } else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || @@ -16174,7 +16172,6 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) { type = BPF_WRITE; - ctx_access = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX; } else { continue; } @@ -16197,9 +16194,6 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) continue; } - if (!ctx_access) - continue; - switch ((int)env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) { case PTR_TO_CTX: if (!ops->convert_ctx_access) |
