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authorThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>2016-10-18 19:51:19 +0200
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2016-10-19 11:09:28 -0400
commit57a09bf0a416700676e77102c28f9cfcb48267e0 (patch)
treead40f415e0cc209db360cac500abcfb120031f17 /kernel/bpf/verifier.c
parent3134e9bdbe9c81a943b2c027a78433d4b0cf50dc (diff)
downloadlwn-57a09bf0a416700676e77102c28f9cfcb48267e0.tar.gz
lwn-57a09bf0a416700676e77102c28f9cfcb48267e0.zip
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers
A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c61
1 files changed, 45 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 99a7e5b388f2..846d7ceaf202 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -212,9 +212,10 @@ static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state)
else if (t == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP || t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL ||
t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ)
- verbose("(ks=%d,vs=%d)",
+ verbose("(ks=%d,vs=%d,id=%u)",
reg->map_ptr->key_size,
- reg->map_ptr->value_size);
+ reg->map_ptr->value_size,
+ reg->id);
if (reg->min_value != BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
verbose(",min_value=%llu",
(unsigned long long)reg->min_value);
@@ -447,6 +448,7 @@ static void mark_reg_unknown_value(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
{
BUG_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG);
regs[regno].type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
+ regs[regno].id = 0;
regs[regno].imm = 0;
}
@@ -1252,6 +1254,7 @@ static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id)
return -EINVAL;
}
regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
+ regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
} else {
verbose("unknown return type %d of func %d\n",
fn->ret_type, func_id);
@@ -1644,8 +1647,7 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
- regs[insn->dst_reg].type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
- regs[insn->dst_reg].map_ptr = NULL;
+ mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, insn->dst_reg);
}
} else {
/* case: R = imm
@@ -1907,6 +1909,38 @@ static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
check_reg_overflow(true_reg);
}
+static void mark_map_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, u32 id,
+ enum bpf_reg_type type)
+{
+ struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
+
+ if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL && reg->id == id) {
+ reg->type = type;
+ if (type == UNKNOWN_VALUE)
+ mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, regno);
+ }
+}
+
+/* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually
+ * be folded together at some point.
+ */
+static void mark_map_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, u32 regno,
+ enum bpf_reg_type type)
+{
+ struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
+ mark_map_reg(regs, i, regs[regno].id, type);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
+ if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
+ continue;
+ mark_map_reg(state->spilled_regs, i / BPF_REG_SIZE,
+ regs[regno].id, type);
+ }
+}
+
static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx)
{
@@ -1994,18 +2028,13 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
- if (opcode == BPF_JEQ) {
- /* next fallthrough insn can access memory via
- * this register
- */
- regs[insn->dst_reg].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
- /* branch targer cannot access it, since reg == 0 */
- mark_reg_unknown_value(other_branch->regs,
- insn->dst_reg);
- } else {
- other_branch->regs[insn->dst_reg].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
- mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, insn->dst_reg);
- }
+ /* Mark all identical map registers in each branch as either
+ * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional.
+ */
+ mark_map_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg,
+ opcode == BPF_JEQ ? PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE : UNKNOWN_VALUE);
+ mark_map_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg,
+ opcode == BPF_JEQ ? UNKNOWN_VALUE : PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE);
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGT &&
dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {