Merge tag 'ipe-pr-20260413' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe

Pull IPE update from Fan Wu:
 "A single commit from Evan Ducas that fixes several spelling and
  grammar mistakes in the IPE documentation. There are no functional
  changes"

* tag 'ipe-pr-20260413' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe:
  docs: security: ipe: fix typos and grammar

1 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/security/ipe.rst b/Documentation/security/ipe.rst
index 4a7d953abcdc..5eb3e6265fbd 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/ipe.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/ipe.rst
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ strong integrity guarantees over both the executable code, and specific
 *data files* on the system, that were critical to its function. These
 specific data files would not be readable unless they passed integrity
 policy. A mandatory access control system would be present, and
-as a result, xattrs would have to be protected. This lead to a selection
+as a result, xattrs would have to be protected. This led to a selection
 of what would provide the integrity claims. At the time, there were two
 main mechanisms considered that could guarantee integrity for the system
 with these requirements:
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ of the policy to apply the minute usermode starts. Generally, that storage
 can be handled in one of three ways:
 
   1. The policy file(s) live on disk and the kernel loads the policy prior
-     to an code path that would result in an enforcement decision.
+     to a code path that would result in an enforcement decision.
   2. The policy file(s) are passed by the bootloader to the kernel, who
      parses the policy.
   3. There is a policy file that is compiled into the kernel that is
@@ -235,8 +235,8 @@ Updatable, Rebootless Policy
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 
 As requirements change over time (vulnerabilities are found in previously
-trusted applications, keys roll, etcetera). Updating a kernel to change the
-meet those security goals is not always a suitable option, as updates are not
+trusted applications, keys roll, etcetera), updating a kernel to meet
+those security goals is not always a suitable option, as updates are not
 always risk-free, and blocking a security update leaves systems vulnerable.
 This means IPE requires a policy that can be completely updated (allowing
 revocations of existing policy) from a source external to the kernel (allowing
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ Simplified Policy:
 Finally, IPE's policy is designed for sysadmins, not kernel developers. Instead
 of covering individual LSM hooks (or syscalls), IPE covers operations. This means
 instead of sysadmins needing to know that the syscalls ``mmap``, ``mprotect``,
-``execve``, and ``uselib`` must have rules protecting them, they must simple know
+``execve``, and ``uselib`` must have rules protecting them, they must simply know
 that they want to restrict code execution. This limits the amount of bypasses that
 could occur due to a lack of knowledge of the underlying system; whereas the
 maintainers of IPE, being kernel developers can make the correct choice to determine