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authorArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>2026-06-10 21:03:16 -0300
committerArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>2026-06-17 08:29:00 -0300
commit033e85edfbf271f92979d2a39aeaf40f8472a795 (patch)
tree88abbce280d2d954df149afd3d829557f319f149
parent2d6ea0875093da9033fcb62c09a9e2f1de49fe91 (diff)
downloadlwn-033e85edfbf271f92979d2a39aeaf40f8472a795.tar.gz
lwn-033e85edfbf271f92979d2a39aeaf40f8472a795.zip
perf bpf: Bounds-check array offsets in bpil_offs_to_addr()
bpil_offs_to_addr() converts offsets stored in perf.data's bpf_prog_info_linear structure into heap pointers by adding the offset to the data allocation base. The offsets come from untrusted file input and are not validated against data_len. If an offset exceeds data_len, the computed address points outside the allocated data buffer. Callers like synthesize_bpf_prog_name() then dereference prog_tags[sub_id] or func_info pointers, reading arbitrary heap memory. Add a bounds check: when an offset exceeds data_len, zero the field and skip the conversion. This prevents out-of-bounds pointer construction from crafted perf.data files. Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org> Fixes: 6ac22d036f86c4e2 ("perf bpf: Pull in bpf_program__get_prog_info_linear()") Cc: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4.6 Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
-rw-r--r--tools/perf/util/bpf-utils.c16
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/bpf-utils.c b/tools/perf/util/bpf-utils.c
index d6d2c9c190f7..69148197b1ef 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/bpf-utils.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/bpf-utils.c
@@ -264,12 +264,28 @@ void bpil_offs_to_addr(struct perf_bpil *info_linear)
for (i = PERF_BPIL_FIRST_ARRAY; i < PERF_BPIL_LAST_ARRAY; ++i) {
const struct bpil_array_desc *desc = &bpil_array_desc[i];
__u64 addr, offs;
+ __u32 count, size;
if ((info_linear->arrays & (1UL << i)) == 0)
continue;
offs = bpf_prog_info_read_offset_u64(&info_linear->info,
desc->array_offset);
+ count = bpf_prog_info_read_offset_u32(&info_linear->info,
+ desc->count_offset);
+ size = bpf_prog_info_read_offset_u32(&info_linear->info,
+ desc->size_offset);
+ /* offset and extent from perf.data are untrusted — keep within data[] */
+ if (offs >= info_linear->data_len ||
+ (u64)count * size > info_linear->data_len - offs) {
+ bpf_prog_info_set_offset_u64(&info_linear->info,
+ desc->array_offset, 0);
+ bpf_prog_info_set_offset_u32(&info_linear->info,
+ desc->count_offset, 0);
+ /* clear the bit so bpil_addr_to_offs() won't reverse a zeroed address */
+ info_linear->arrays &= ~(1UL << i);
+ continue;
+ }
addr = offs + ptr_to_u64(info_linear->data);
bpf_prog_info_set_offset_u64(&info_linear->info,
desc->array_offset, addr);