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Pull ceph updates from Ilya Dryomov:
"The two things of note here are the disablement of inline data support
and a new lazyio mount option to enable LAZYIO behavior globally
(instead of via an ioctl on a per-file basis), both from Xiubo.
Despite being over a decade old, the inline data feature never lost
its experimental status -- it has always been off by default and
required passing --yes-i-really-mean-it flag to be turned on. It was
officially deprecated in 2020 and is now in the process of being
removed on the MDS side. For now it's still possible to re-enable it
in Kconfig, but the code will eventually be dropped from the kernel
client entirely.
Outside of that we have a number of bug fixes, a series from Tal to
help phase out older page APIs, some cleanups from Max and a large
pile of LLM-based hardening patches.
Xiubo is also back in a maintainer role, replacing Slava"
* tag 'ceph-for-7.4-rc1' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client: (66 commits)
ceph: fix uninitialized err in ceph_netfs_issue_read()
MAINTAINERS: update ceph and libceph maintainers
ceph: validate encoded xattr name lengths
ceph: validate MDS reply fragtree split array length
ceph: bound name skips in ceph_mdsmap_decode() by the message end
ceph: validate fscrypt auth blob length
ceph: check the caps of a closed file after caps_wanted_delay_min
ceph: don't fail write_begin with -EAGAIN after flushing old snapc
ceph: fail readdir when the MDS reply carries no dirfrag
ceph: clamp MDS reply result code to the errno range
libceph: initialize CRUSH choose argument weights
libceph: fix out-of-bounds reads from repeated CRUSH bucket entries
ceph: fix 32-bit overflow in readdir reply count check
libceph: reject bad connect_seq in msgr1 READY reply
ceph: Fix mds session leak in __open_export_target_session()
ceph: Fix xattr buffer leak in __send_cap()
ceph: fix integer overflow in the snap trace bounds check
libceph: bound mon_command ack decode to front len
ceph: use alloc_page() in fill_fscrypt_truncate()
libceph: use alloc_page() in ceph_alloc_page_vector()
...
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Initialize the CRUSH choose argument weight-set array before decoding so
entries start in a defined state while the decoder fills them.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5cf9c4a9959b ("libceph, crush: per-pool crush_choose_arg_map for crush_do_rule()")
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Darong Lu <zzyy19904204639@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <weir@nebusec.ai>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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decode_choose_arg() assumes that its destination is zero-initialized.
Although decode_choose_args() zeroes the argument array, it does not reject
a repeated bucket_index and can decode into an already populated entry.
Repeating a bucket with weight_set_size=0 preserves its existing weight_set
pointer but clears the count. Placement then reads weight_set[-1].weights
and dereferences the resulting pointer.
A malformed monitor OSDMap triggers this during RBD placement:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in crush_bucket_choose+0xdd1/0xf90
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800290df70 by task init/75
Reject populated arguments before decoding another entry, so the error
path can free their original allocations.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c7ed1a4bf4b4 ("crush: assume weight_set != null imples weight_set_size > 0")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5
Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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process_connect() WARN_ON()s when the peer's READY/SEQ reply carries a
connect_seq other than ours + 1. That value comes off the wire, so a
misbehaving or malicious server can trigger the warning at will (and
panic machines running with panic_on_warn).
Check it before touching connection state and fail the connection with
a protocol error instead, like the other bad-reply cases here.
Fixes: 31b8006e10a4 ("ceph: messenger library")
Reported-by: syzbot+21f8628595b2061c438d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=21f8628595b2061c438d
Signed-off-by: Nguyen Ngoc Thang <ngocthang2710.1999@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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handle_command_ack() bounds the decode with msg->front_alloc_len, the size
of the reply buffer, instead of msg->front.iov_len, the number of bytes the
monitor sent. mon_alloc_msg() routes every CEPH_MSG_MON_COMMAND_ACK to
get_generic_reply(), which returns the preallocated ->reply of whichever
generic request carries the same tid, so the buffer keeps its fixed size
however short the reply is. An ack with hdr.front_len below sizeof(struct
ceph_mon_request_header) + sizeof(u32), including 0, still passes
ceph_decode_need(), and ceph_decode_32() returns four bytes that were never
received: uninitialized slab memory, stale bytes of an earlier message, or
bytes the peer planted by sending a reply that lands in the same buffer and
is then rejected. The read stays within the allocation, so KASAN does not
flag it.
req->result reaches userspace through ceph_monc_do_statfs(),
ceph_monc_get_version() and ceph_monc_blocklist_add(); rbd hands it back
from write() on /sys/bus/rbd/add_single_major, and rbd_get_client() passes
it to ERR_PTR() unchecked, which faults:
rbd: failed to get latest osdmap: -186318427
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfffe9ca034
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7105)
Call Trace:
...
kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:345)
vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:595 fs/read_write.c:687)
ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:739)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Use msg->front.iov_len, matching handle_subscribe_ack(),
handle_statfs_reply(), handle_get_version_reply() and handle_auth_reply().
A well-formed ack has front.iov_len >= 22 and is unaffected; a short one
takes the existing bad: path. This applies commit d3c32939fa0e ("libceph:
bound get_version reply decode to front len") to the last decode-side
use of front_alloc_len in this file.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6305a3b41515 ("libceph: support for blacklisting clients")
Reported-by: co+25860fb17af97289@bugs.sh
Assisted-by: Cursor
Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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ceph_alloc_page_vector() allocates its pages with __page_cache_alloc().
However, the pages are never inserted into an address_space and do not
need the cpuset memory spread policy __page_cache_alloc() provides. Use
alloc_page() instead.
Assisted-by: Cursor
Signed-off-by: Tal Zussman <tz2294@columbia.edu>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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build_initial_monmap() takes the monitor count straight from
ceph_options::num_mon and builds a monmap with that many entries without
checking that there is at least one. ceph_parse_ips() writes *count only
after it has parsed an address successfully, so a ceph_options that went
through a failed parse still has num_mon == 0 and the resulting monmap
has no monitors in it at all.
The first thing the client does with that monmap is open a session, and
pick_new_mon() asserts the invariant that it is non-empty:
kernel BUG at net/ceph/mon_client.c:211!
RIP: 0010:pick_new_mon net/ceph/mon_client.c:211 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__open_session+0x60f/0x740 net/ceph/mon_client.c:245
Call Trace:
ceph_monc_open_session+0x46/0x60 net/ceph/mon_client.c:534
__ceph_open_session+0x135/0x590 net/ceph/ceph_common.c:798
ceph_real_mount fs/ceph/super.c:1173 [inline]
ceph_get_tree+0xd98/0x1fd0 fs/ceph/super.c:1362
vfs_get_tree+0x92/0x320 fs/super.c:1947
vfs_cmd_create+0xd7/0x2a0 fs/fsopen.c:231
__do_sys_fsconfig+0x55a/0xcb0 fs/fsopen.c:463
The reproducer gets there through the new device syntax: an fsconfig()
mon_addr= that does not resolve ("libceph: resolve '127.0.0.' (ret=-3):
failed") leaves fsopt->mon_addr set but num_mon at 0, so the "No monitor
address" check in ceph_get_tree() passes and the mount proceeds with an
empty monmap. The next patch stops that string from being kept, but the
assertion should not be reachable from a mount option in the first place.
Commit 40480eee361e ("libceph: Reject monmaps advertising zero monitors")
made the same BUG_ON() unreachable from the wire by rejecting
num_mon == 0 in ceph_monmap_decode(). Apply the same rule to the initial
monmap, which is the only other way one gets built, and fail the mount
with -EINVAL rather than assert afterwards.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7b19b4db5add ("ceph: new device mount syntax")
Reported-by: syzbot+1dbed5969931c19d3eb5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=1dbed5969931c19d3eb5
Assisted-by: Cursor
Signed-off-by: Yogesh Gaur <yogeshgaur.83@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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A CEPH_MSG_OSD_MAP message can contain CRUSH choose args with replacement
weight vectors for straw2 buckets. decode_choose_args() validates the
optional IDs vector against the referenced bucket, but does not validate
the size of any replacement-weight vector.
The CRUSH mapper assumes that each replacement vector has exactly as many
entries as the bucket. A zero-length vector for a nonempty bucket makes
bucket_straw2_choose() dereference NULL, while a shorter nonzero vector
causes an out-of-bounds read. An authenticated monitor or OSD can deliver
such a map and crash a kernel client when it performs placement for an
ordinary request.
Reject a nonempty collection of weight sets for an absent bucket and
require every replacement-weight vector to match its bucket size.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5cf9c4a9959b ("libceph, crush: per-pool crush_choose_arg_map for crush_do_rule()")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5
Signed-off-by: Felix Hoffmann <f3lix.dev@gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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ceph_oloc_decode handles unchecked data received over the network from
an OSD. Currently, there are multiple decode operations that aren't
covered by any bounds check. Decoding these fields can therefore result
in out-of-bounds reads if a corrupted message is received.
This patch fixes the issue by adding bounds checks covering all
previously uncovered decode operations.
[ idryomov: use ceph_decode_64_safe() for hash ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 205ee1187a67 ("libceph: follow redirect replies from osds")
Assisted-by: Cursor
Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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ceph_redirect_decode handles unchecked data received over the network
from an OSD. Currently, there is only a bounds check covering the first
three decode operations. After decoding the first len field from the
message, the only remaining check ensures there is enough buffer space
to hold len bytes. However, there is no guarantee that this value is
large enough to hold the subsequently decoded fields. The decoding of
the second len field is missing an explicit bounds check. Consequently,
a corrupted message can trigger an out-of-bounds read.
This patch fixes the issue by switching the decoding from
ceph_decode_32() to the bounds-checked version ceph_decode_32_safe().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 205ee1187a67 ("libceph: follow redirect replies from osds")
Assisted-by: Cursor
Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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ceph_osdc_alloc_request() ORs the mount option's read_from_replica
flag into r_flags for every request, writes included. The flag is
meant for reads: calc_target() skips the replica choice for any
request that has CEPH_OSD_FLAG_WRITE, and the OSDs only know
BALANCE_READS on read ops. Sending it on writes is at best ignored;
with read_from_replica=balance a buffered write that fell back to
ceph_sync_write() after losing BUFFER to a revoke failed with -EIO,
while the same run without the option works fine.
Gate the flag on CEPH_OSD_FLAG_READ.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 22d2cfdffa5b ("libceph: move away from global osd_req_flags")
Assisted-by: Cursor
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubo.li@clyso.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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Use the new helpers instead of open coding the SOCK_NOSPACE
manipulation, so that TCP can later maintain a cheaper private
copy of this bit.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260929071743.23624-9-edumazet@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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ceph_msg_data_iter_next() gets a page reference from
iov_iter_get_pages2() only to immediately drop it, asserting that the
page is pinned some other way. The assertion is the last caller of
PageWriteback() in the tree, blocking removal of the PG_writeback page
flag accessors.
Remove the assertion, as it is a CONFIG_DEBUG_VM-only check of an
assumption the FIXME comment already documents. Converting to
iov_iter_extract_pages() instead was considered, but the messenger never
releases what it extracts, so it would still rely entirely on the caller
holding the pages. That would be just as much of an abuse of the API, so
leave it as-is for now.
Signed-off-by: Tal Zussman <tz2294@columbia.edu>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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Pull ceph updates from Ilya Dryomov:
"A wide variety of mostly CephFS fixes and cleanups, split between
changes that address edge cases (Sam, Xiubo, Matthew), efficiency
improvements (Max) and AI-assisted hardening (Michael, Jeremy).
One thing that stands out is Alex's change to how CephFS behaves in
NEARFULL scenarios: the long-standing "make all writes synchronous"
behavior has become opt-in. It was always somewhat controversial and
doesn't make much sense for modern deployments; the new default is to
continue normal operation (i.e. buffer writes as MDS allows, etc). The
behavior in case the cluster reaches any FULL state remains the same
as before"
* tag 'ceph-for-7.3-rc1' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client: (32 commits)
ceph: force a cap message when a deferred revoke can't be acked immediately
libceph: reject buckets with mismatched CRUSH ids
ceph: reject export_targets ranks >= CEPH_MAX_MDS in mdsmap decode
ceph: fix leaked inode reference on writeback abort at umount
libceph: remove ceph_put_page_vector()
libceph: validate banner payload length
ceph: make nearfull sync writes opt-in
ceph: do not repeat ceph_trim_dentries() if no progress possible
ceph: drop mdsc->mutex before decoding the MDS reply
ceph: fix UAF in check_new_map() on session freed during unlock
ceph: fix UAF in __kick_flushing_caps() on cf entry freed during unlock
ceph: pass inode pointer around instead of reloading it
ceph: mark cap remove with RB_CLEAR_NODE() instead of setting ci=NULL
ceph: add helper function ceph_cap_is_removed()
ceph: make __ceph_remove_cap() static
ceph: cap delegated inode count in ceph_parse_deleg_inos()
ceph: bound num_export_targets array for mds info v2/v3
ceph: bound MDSCapAuth path and fs_name decode in handle_session()
ceph: bound xattr value length in __build_xattrs()
ceph: bound copied dentry name length in NFS export get_name
...
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crush_decode() stores bucket data by array slot, and the mapper later
derives the per-bucket workspace index from the decoded bucket id. A
malformed map can therefore make one bucket reuse another bucket's
workspace by encoding an id different from -1 - slot.
For uniform buckets, the second replica selection expands the source
bucket's permutation into that aliased workspace buffer. If the source
bucket is larger than the aliased bucket, the write runs past the smaller
permutation array and can escape the kvmalloc'd CRUSH workspace. KASAN
reports a slab OOB write of 4 bytes in bucket_perm_choose().
Reject buckets whose encoded id does not match their array slot. Valid
CRUSH maps already use the canonical negative id corresponding to the
bucket slot, so this restores the invariant expected by
work->work[-1 - in->id] without changing valid map behavior.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 66a0e2d579db ("crush: remove mutable part of CRUSH map")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5
Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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ceph_put_page_vector() was paired with ceph_get_direct_page_vector(),
which was removed in commit 97a385e55829 ("libceph: remove
ceph_get_direct_page_vector()"). Its only remaining caller,
finish_netfs_read(), uses it to put a page vector allocated with
iov_iter_get_pages_alloc2(), which is confusing. Open-code the
put_page() loop and kvfree() there instead.
The caller passed dirty = false, so this also removes the dead dirty
branch and with it a call to the deprecated set_page_dirty_lock().
Signed-off-by: Tal Zussman <tz2294@columbia.edu>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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When parsing the Ceph messenger v2 protocol banner, the `payload_len` field
is decoded from the banner prefix. If a client sends a banner with a
`payload_len` of 0, the kernel sets up a 0-length socket read. This
violates an invariant in the state machine, triggering a warning in
`populate_in_iter()`:
------------[ cut here ]------------
!iov_iter_count(&con->v2.in_iter)
WARNING: net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 at populate_in_iter
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 [inline], CPU#1: kworker/1:3/5070
WARNING: net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 at ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x6634/0x6810
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3159, CPU#1: kworker/1:3/5070
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ceph_con_workfn+0x1f5/0x14a0 net/ceph/messenger.c:1575
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3322 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa8e/0x14e0 kernel/workqueue.c:3405
worker_thread+0xa47/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3486
kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
According to the msgr2 protocol specification, the banner payload is
expected to contain at least two 64-bit integers (`server_feat` and
`server_req_feat`). Therefore, `payload_len` must be at least 16 bytes.
Fix this by adding a check in `process_banner_prefix()` to reject a
`payload_len` smaller than 16 bytes. This prevents the 0-length read and
correctly aborts the connection with a protocol error.
Fixes: cd1a677cad99 ("libceph, ceph: implement msgr2.1 protocol (crc and secure modes)")
Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.5-flash Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview syzbot
Reported-by: syzbot+87c7c2d63c44e41c77a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=87c7c2d63c44e41c77a3
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/ai_job?id=c8ca3d63-717a-4933-89ec-f3d761b8690d
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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net/ceph/osd_client.c:osd_sparse_read() validates that the sparse-read
data length matches the summed extent lengths, but it does not validate
that each OSD-supplied extent is monotonic and lies inside the original
request range. A malformed authenticated OSD reply can advertise a
far-forward nonzero extent offset with a matching data length and make
the client advance the message-data cursor beyond the request buffer.
This reaches the BUG_ON(!*length) assertion in ceph_msg_data_next() from
the client receive path.
Impact: A malicious or compromised authenticated Ceph OSD peer can crash
a kernel Ceph client via a malformed sparse-read reply.
Reject sparse extent maps that overflow, move backwards, overlap, or
extend outside the original sparse-read request before advancing the
cursor.
[ idryomov: perform sparse_extent_map_valid() check a bit earlier,
in CEPH_SPARSE_READ_DATA_LEN instead of CEPH_SPARSE_READ_DATA_PRE
state ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f628d7999727 ("libceph: add sparse read support to OSD client")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-5-xhigh
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/axboe/linux
Pull block updates from Jens Axboe:
- NVMe updates via Keith:
- Enable Clang context analysis for the nvme host driver, adding
context annotations across core, fabrics, rdma, tcp and pci
- nvmet reservation state exposed through a new namespace-level
debugfs directory, plus ABI documentation for the host sysfs and
target configfs interfaces
- nvme-tcp host memory disclosure fixes on the read path: reject a
read that transferred too few bytes, don't accept C2HData based
on blk_rq_payload_bytes() alone, and fix the R2T case for a read
command
- Parallelize nvme-rdma I/O queue allocation and startup (Surabhi)
- Apple nvme fixes and quirks: page aligned admin queue buffers,
destroy the admin queue on removal, and various DMA/NVMMU
correctness fixes
- A large pile of nvmet and host fixes for out-of-bounds reads,
refcount/resource leaks, and NULL derefs across auth, zns,
passthru, pci-epf, rdma and configfs
- Various other fixes and cleanups
- MD updates via Yu Kuai:
- llbitmap reshape support, the large series wiring exact bitmap
mapping and reshape lifecycle through raid5 and raid10, growing
the page cache in place, and remapping checkpointed bits as
reshape progresses
- raid5 fixes for lockless max_nr_stripes and recovery_offset
accesses, a reshape deadlock with more failed devices than max
degraded, and bitmap batch counter consistency
- Atomic write handling for raid1/raid10, and removal of the
REQ_NOWAIT support from raid1/10/456
- raid5-ppl use-after-free fix in ppl_do_flush()
- A batch of smaller fixes across md core and the bitmap code
- s390/dasd ESE full-track write support and the surrounding
infrastructure, plus enabling CONTEXT_ANALYSIS for s390/block
- RWF_DONTCACHE support for block devices, built on new task-context
bio completion infrastructure, and wiring it up for the iomap and
buffer dropbehind writeback paths
- Async io_uring zone reset all, plus zone management command cleanups
allowing REQ_NOWAIT and tightening conventional zone rejection
- Block integrity refactoring: lift BIP_CHECK_FLAGS to the shared
header, handle nogenerate/noverify properly in fs-integrity, and drop
the blk-integrity.h include from bdev.c
- Split out a new blk_plug.h header
- ublk improvements: add UBLK_F_IO_DESC_SIZE, split request validation
from io_desc init, reject non-power-of-2 zone sizes in SET_PARAMS,
and a series of hardening fixes around map/unmap and auto buf reg
- null_blk cleanups and configfs serialization fixes
- nbd queue freeze removal on the setup paths, and a new
pre_defined_connections module parameter for pre-created devices
- blk-cgroup fixes for the race between policy activation and blkg
destruction, and accounting per-cpu stats over possible CPUs across
blk-stat, iolatency, iocost and kyber
- Various dio fixes: leak on metadata mapping error, validate user
space vectors during extraction, and set dma_alignment from the
backing file for loop and zloop direct I/O
- bio cleanups
- Various other fixes and cleanups all over
* tag 'for-7.3/block-20260819' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/axboe/linux: (241 commits)
nbd: add pre_defined_connections module parameter for pre-created devices
nbd: remove queue freeze for newly created nbd from netlink path
nbd: factor out a nbd_genl_foreach_sock
nbd: skip queue freeze when setting size at device startup
nbd: remove queue freeze in nbd_add_socket
nbd: clear queue limits on disconnect
nbd: disallow NBD_SET_SOCK on an active device
nbd: simplify find_fallback() by removing redundant logic
blk-mq: add missing call to srcu_barrier() in blk_mq_free_tag_set()
block: mtip32xx: synchronize ioctls with device removal
ublk: avoid teardown retry loop on xarray allocation failure
null_blk: fix UBSAN shift-out-of-bounds when zone_size is 0 or overflows
block: don't include blk-integrity.h in bdev.c
xfs: avoid double deferrals for RWF_DONTCACHE writes
loop: Fix recently introduced lock inversion
block: set QUEUE_FLAG_DYING unconditionally in blk_mark_disk_dead()
swim3: Add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION
selftests: ublk: add SET_PARAMS validation test
selftests: ublk: add helper for SET_PARAMS
ublk: reject non-power-of-2 zone sizes in SET_PARAMS
...
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A corrupted osdmap received from a Ceph monitor or OSD may contain osd
indices in its pg_temp, primary_temp, pg_upmap, and pg_upmap_items parts
that don't exist, i.e., that are greater than max_osd or smaller than
CEPH_HOMELESS_OSD (-1). These indices are used to create the up and
acting set in ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds(), called from calc_target().
While most of these osd indices are checked, the one from primary_temp
is not. Subsequently, this may lead to calc_target() returning this
(potentially invalid) index as target osd for a (linger) request.
Because the osd_state, osd_weight, and osd_addr arrays only contain
max_osd entries (with indices 0 to max_osd -1), this leads to
out-of-bounds accesses when trying to read values from these arrays.
This patch fixes the issue by adding a check to get_temp_osds(), so that
only valid osd indices from primary_temp are used, and it falls back to
using the primary from pg_temp or the up set if it is invalid.
[ idryomov: changelog ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5e8d4d36bf23 ("libceph: add support for primary_temp mappings")
Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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ceph_start_decoding() validates that struct_len bytes remain in the
buffer after the encoding header, but accepts struct_len=0 as valid:
ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes. When a malicious or
compromised OSD sends an obj_list_watch_response_t reply with
struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end,
leaving zero bytes guaranteed for subsequent reads.
The immediately following ceph_decode_32(p) in decode_watchers() has
no preceding bounds check. With p == end this is a 4-byte read past
the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is then passed
directly to kzalloc_objs() as the watcher count.
The sibling function decode_watcher() already uses the safe variants
(ceph_decode_copy_safe, ceph_decode_64_safe, ceph_decode_skip_32)
after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_watchers() is the
only site that uses the bare variant, confirming an oversight.
Fix by replacing ceph_decode_32(p) with ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end,
*num_watchers, bad), consistent with the established pattern.
Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
deployment (e.g. cloud) can trigger this against any kernel client
that calls CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS, without any further privileges
beyond OSD session establishment.
[ idryomov: trim changelog ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a4ed38d7a180 ("libceph: support for CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS")
Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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decode_locker() in cls_lock_client.c contains three unsafe decode
operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger
slab-out-of-bounds reads:
1. ceph_decode_copy() at the locker_id_t name field has no preceding
bounds check. With p == end after ceph_start_decoding() accepts
struct_len=0, this reads sizeof(ceph_entity_name) = 9 bytes past
the validated buffer boundary.
2. *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) after the locker_info_t header
is an unchecked pointer advance. A malicious OSD can position p
past end, causing all subsequent _safe checks to pass against a
bogus boundary.
3. len = ceph_decode_32(p) has no preceding bounds check, and the
immediately following *p += len is uncapped. A malicious OSD can
send len=0xffffffff, advancing p gigabytes past end and escaping
the decode window entirely.
Fix all three by replacing bare operations with their safe variants:
ceph_decode_copy -> ceph_decode_copy_safe
*p += sizeof(...) -> ceph_decode_skip_n
ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe
*p += len -> ceph_decode_skip_n
A new label is added to return -EINVAL on any bounds violation.
-EINVAL is appropriate here: the data received from the OSD
is structurally malformed, which is an invalid argument to the decode
contract regardless of whether the caller or the wire is at fault.
Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the
lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition)
without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment.
[ idryomov: use ceph_decode_skip_string() to skip description, trim
changelog ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info")
Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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ceph_decode_entity_addrvec() rejects any addrvec containing more than
one entry that matches the requested msgr type (LEGACY or MSGR2),
logging "another match of type N in addrvec" and returning -EINVAL.
Some admin tooling (e.g. pveceph mon create from Proxmox VE) generates
addrvecs with multiple same-type entries when public_network lists more
than one CIDR: it picks one local IP per subnet and emits both a v2 and
a v1 entry for each IP. Monmaps shaped this way cause:
libceph: mon0 (1)10.10.10.15:6789 session established
libceph: another match of type 1 in addrvec
libceph: problem decoding monmap, -22
No Ceph code uses the extra entries: since Nautilus, the userspace
messenger (AsyncMessenger) unconditionally picks the first address of
the requested type and ignores any subsequent matches.
Match that behavior: use the first matching entry and silently skip any
subsequent ones. This is a compatibility fix for existing deployments
and does not enable dual-stack or multi-subnet address selection.
[ idryomov: tweak ceph_decode_entity_addrvec() comment ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a5cbd5fc22d5 ("libceph, ceph: get and handle cluster maps with addrvecs")
Link: https://bugzilla.proxmox.com/show_bug.cgi?id=7518
Signed-off-by: Kefu Chai <k.chai@proxmox.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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struct bvec_iter::bi_bvec_done is used an offset in the current bvec,
let's rename it accordingly for better clarity. I also plan to use it
for non-bvec based iteration in the future like dma-buf, so drop the
"bvec" part.
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/4e4c21858705a200bd8848ffe4080522e3eb5c1c.1786018753.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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__decode_pg_temp() decodes an user-controlled length but only rejects
values large enough to overflow the allocation; it does not bound it to
CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE. The helper backs both pg_temp and pg_upmap decoding, and
apply_upmap()/get_temp_osds() later copy the decoded list into the fixed-size
on-stack array struct ceph_osds.osds[CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE]. A monitor that sends
an OSDMap with a pg_temp/pg_upmap entry longer than 32 thus causes a stack
out-of-bounds write.
An OSD set for a single PG can never exceed CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE, so reject longer
entries at decode time. The bound is well below the old overflow threshold, so
it also covers the allocation-size overflow the previous check guarded against.
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds
Write of size 4 ... by task exploit
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds (net/ceph/osdmap.c:2617 net/ceph/osdmap.c:2833)
calc_target (net/ceph/osd_client.c:1638)
__submit_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2394)
ceph_osdc_start_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2490)
ceph_osdc_call (net/ceph/osd_client.c:5164)
rbd_dev_image_probe (drivers/block/rbd.c:6899)
do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7138)
...
kernel BUG at net/ceph/osdmap.c:2670!
[ idryomov: do the same in __decode_pg_upmap_items() ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a303bb0e5834 ("libceph: introduce and switch to decode_pg_mapping()")
Reported-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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ceph_x_create_authorizer() caches au->buf->vec.iov_base and
au->buf->vec.iov_len in struct ceph_auth_handshake. These
cached values are then used by the messenger connect code when
sending the authorizer.
ceph_x_update_authorizer() can rebuild the authorizer when a newer
service ticket is available. If the rebuilt authorizer no longer
fits in the existing buffer, ceph_x_build_authorizer() drops its
reference to au->buf and allocates a new one. If this is the final
reference, ceph_buffer_put() frees the old ceph_buffer and its
vec.iov_base, but auth->authorizer_buf still points at that freed
memory.
A subsequent msgr1 reconnect can therefore queue the stale pointer
and trigger a KASAN slab-use-after-free in _copy_from_iter() while
tcp_sendmsg() copies the authorizer.
Refresh auth->authorizer_buf and auth->authorizer_buf_len after a
successful authorizer rebuild so the messenger sends the current
buffer.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0bed9b5c523d ("libceph: add update_authorizer auth method")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/E378850E-106C-427B-A241-970EB2D054D7@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Shuangpeng Bai <shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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Localized read selection can walk a parent bucket whose name exists in
the CRUSH map while its type has no matching entry in type_names.
get_immediate_parent() then dereferences a NULL type_cn and passes an
invalid pointer into strcmp(), causing a null-ptr-deref.
Skip such malformed parent buckets unless both the bucket name and type
name metadata are present. This keeps malformed hierarchy data from
crashing locality lookup and safely falls back to "not local".
[ idryomov: add WARN_ON_ONCE ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 117d96a04f00 ("libceph: support for balanced and localized reads")
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4
Signed-off-by: Zhao Zhang <zzhan461@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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ceph_destroy_client() tears down the monitor client before removing
the per-client debugfs files. A concurrent read of the monmap debugfs
file can enter monmap_show() after ceph_monc_stop() has freed
monc->monmap, triggering a use-after-free.
Remove the debugfs files before stopping the OSD and monitor clients.
debugfs_remove() drains active handlers and prevents new accesses, so
the debugfs callbacks can no longer race the rest of client teardown.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 76aa844d5b2f ("ceph: debugfs")
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4
Signed-off-by: Douya Le <ldy3087146292@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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handle_get_version_reply() uses msg->front_alloc_len as the decode
boundary for MON_GET_VERSION_REPLY. That is the size of the reused
reply buffer, not the number of bytes actually received.
A truncated reply can therefore pass ceph_decode_need() and decode the
second u64 from stale tail bytes left in the buffer by an earlier
message, causing an uninitialized memory read.
Use msg->front.iov_len as the receive-side decode boundary, matching
other libceph reply handlers and limiting decoding to the bytes that
were actually read from the wire.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 513a8243d67f ("libceph: mon_get_version request infrastructure")
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4
Signed-off-by: Douya Le <ldy3087146292@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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decode_lockers() in cls_lock_client.c contains two bare decode operations
that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds
reads:
1. ceph_decode_32(p) at the num_lockers field has no preceding bounds
check. ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0 as valid -- the
internal ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes -- so when an
OSD sends struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with
p == end. The immediately following bare ceph_decode_32(p) then reads
4 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is
passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the locker count.
The sibling function decode_watchers() in osd_client.c already uses
ceph_decode_32_safe() after its own ceph_start_decoding() call.
decode_lockers() was the only site using the bare variant.
2. ceph_decode_8(p) after the decode_locker() loop has no preceding
bounds check. If an OSD crafts num_lockers such that the loop
advances p exactly to end, the subsequent bare ceph_decode_8(p) reads
one byte past the validated buffer boundary. The result is passed
directly into *type, which is used as a lock type discriminator by
callers, giving an OSD-controlled one-byte OOB read with direct
influence over the lock type field.
Fix both by replacing bare operations with their safe variants:
ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_lockers,
err_inval)
ceph_decode_8(p) -> ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, *type,
err_free_lockers)
The goto targets differ intentionally:
err_inval: is a new label returning -EINVAL directly. It is used for
the pre-allocation failure path where *lockers is not yet allocated
and must not be passed to ceph_free_lockers().
err_free_lockers: is the existing label. It is used for the
post-allocation failure path where *lockers is allocated and must
be freed.
ret is set to -EINVAL before ceph_decode_8_safe() so that
err_free_lockers returns the correct error code on bounds violation.
Without this, err_free_lockers would return a stale ret value (0 from
the successful decode_locker() loop), silently swallowing the error.
-EINVAL is correct for both failure paths. The data received from the
OSD is structurally malformed. -ENOMEM would misrepresent the failure
class to callers and to stable@ backporters triaging error paths.
Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the
lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition).
[ idryomov: trim changelog, formatting ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info")
Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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A message of type CEPH_MSG_MON_MAP contains a monmap that is sent from a
monitor to the client. This monmap contains information about the
existing monitors in the cluster. Currently, a monmap indicating that
there are zero monitors in the cluster is treated as valid. However, it
is impossible to have zero monitors in the cluster and still receive a
valid monmap from a monitor. Therefore, such a monmap must be corrupted
and should be treated as invalid. Furthermore, a monmap with a monitor
count of zero can subsequently crash the client when attempting to open
a session with a monitor in __open_session(). This happens because the
"BUG_ON(monc->monmap->num_mon < 1)" assertion in pick_new_mon() is
triggered.
This patch extends a check in ceph_monmap_decode() to also reject
arriving mon_maps with num_mon == 0 rather than only with
num_mon > CEPH_MAX_MON.
[ idryomov: drop "log output for unusual values of num_mon" part ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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CRUSH bucket type 0 is reserved for devices. The mapper relies on
that invariant and uses type 0 to identify leaf devices.
If crush_decode() accepts a bucket with type 0, a malformed CRUSH map
can make the mapper treat a negative bucket ID as a device and pass it
to is_out(), which then indexes the OSD weight array with a negative
value.
Reject zero bucket types while decoding the CRUSH map so the invalid
state never reaches the mapper.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f24e9980eb86 ("ceph: OSD client")
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4
Signed-off-by: Douya Le <ldy3087146292@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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If a message of type CEPH_MSG_OSD_MAP contains a (maliciously) corrupted
osdmap, out-of-bounds memory accesses may occur in
decode_new_up_state_weight(). This happens because the bounds check for
the new_state part is based on calculating its length depending on a len
value read from the incoming message. This calculation may overflow
leading to an incorrect bounds check. Subsequently, out-of-bounds reads
may occur when decoding this part.
This patch switches the multiplication to use check_mul_overflow() to
abort processing the osdmap if an overflow occurred. Therefore,
osdmaps/messages containing large values for len that result in a
multiplication overflow are treated as invalid.
[ idryomov: rename new_state_len -> new_state_item_size, formatting ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 930c53286977 ("libceph: apply new_state before new_up_client on incrementals")
Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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A message of type CEPH_MSG_OSD_MAP contains an OSD map that itself
contains a CRUSH map. When decoding this CRUSH map in crush_decode(), an
array of max_buckets CRUSH buckets is decoded, where some indices may
not refer to actual buckets and are therefore set to NULL. The received
CRUSH map may optionally contain choose_args that get decoded in
decode_choose_args(). When decoding a crush_choose_arg_map, a series of
choose_args for different buckets is decoded, with the bucket_index
being read from the incoming message. It is only checked that the bucket
index does not exceed max_buckets, but not that it doesn't point to an
index with a NULL bucket. If a (potentially corrupted) message contains
a crush_choose_arg_map including such a bucket_index, a null pointer
dereference may occur in the subsequent processing when attempting to
access the bucket with the given index.
This patch fixes the issue by extending the affected check. Now, it is
only attempted to access the bucket if it is not NULL.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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A message of type CEPH_MSG_OSD_MAP contains an OSD map that itself
contains a CRUSH map. The received CRUSH map may optionally contain
choose_args that get decoded in decode_choose_args(). In this function,
num_choose_arg_maps is read from the message, and a corresponding number
of crush_choose_arg_maps gets decoded afterwards. Each
crush_choose_arg_map has a choose_args_index, which serves as the key
when inserting it into the choose_args rbtree of the decoded crush_map.
If a (potentially corrupted) message contains two crush_choose_arg_maps
with the same index, the assertion in insert_choose_arg_map() triggers a
kernel BUG when trying to insert the second crush_choose_arg_map.
This patch fixes the issue by switching to the non-asserting rbtree
insertion function and rejecting the message if the insertion fails.
[ idryomov: changelog ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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When decoding osd_state and osd_weight from an incoming osdmap in
osdmap_decode(), both are decoded for each osd, i.e., map->max_osd
times. The ceph_decode_need() check only accounts for
sizeof(*map->osd_weight) once. This can potentially result in an
out-of-bounds memory access if the incoming message is corrupted such
that the max_osd value exceeds the actual content of the osdmap message.
This patch fixes the issue by changing the corresponding part in the
ceph_decode_need() check to account for
map->max_osd*sizeof(*map->osd_weight).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dcbc919a5dc8 ("libceph: switch osdmap decoding to use ceph_decode_entity_addr")
Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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In __ceph_x_decrypt(), a part of the buffer p is interpreted as a
ceph_x_encrypt_header, and the magic field of this struct is accessed.
This happens without any guarantee that the buffer is large enough to
hold this struct. The function parameter ciphertext_len represents the
length of the ciphertext to decrypt and is guaranteed to be at most the
remaining size of the allocated buffer p. However, this value is not
necessarily greater than sizeof(ceph_x_encrypt_header). E.g., a message
frame of type FRAME_TAG_AUTH_REPLY_MORE, that is just as long to hold
the ciphertext at its end with a ciphertext_len of 8 or less, can
trigger an out-of-bounds memory access when accessing hdr->magic.
This patch fixes the issue by adding a check to ensure that the
decrypted plaintext in the buffer is large enough to represent at least
the ceph_x_encrypt_header.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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In crush_decode_uniform_bucket(), the item_weight field of the bucket
is set. This is a single field of type u32 since the uniform bucket uses
the same weight for all items. The value in ceph_decode_need() is set to
(1+b->h.size) * sizeof(u32), which is higher than actually needed.
This patch removes the call to ceph_decode_need() with the unnecessarily
high value and switches the subsequent operation from ceph_decode_32()
to ceph_decode_32_safe(), which already includes the correct bounds
check.
Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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A message of type CEPH_MSG_OSD_MAP containing a crush map with at least
one bucket has two fields holding the bucket algorithm. If the values
in these two fields differ, an out-of-bounds access can occur. This is
the case because the first algorithm field (alg) is used to allocate
the correct amount of memory for a bucket of this type, while the second
algorithm field inside the bucket (b->alg) is used in the subsequent
processing.
This patch fixes the issue by adding a check that compares alg and
b->alg and aborts the processing in case they differ. Furthermore,
b->alg is set to 0 in this case, because the destruction of the crush
map also uses this field to determine the bucket type, which can again
result in an out-of-bounds access when trying to free the memory pointed
to by the fields of the bucket. To correctly free the memory allocated
for the bucket in such a case, the corresponding call to kfree is moved
from the algorithm-specific crush_destroy_bucket functions to the
generic crush_destroy_bucket().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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If a (potentially corrupted) message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY
contains a positive value in its result field, it is treated as an
error code by ceph_handle_auth_reply() and returned to
handle_auth_reply(). Thereafter, an attempt is made to send the
preallocated message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH, where the returned value is
interpreted as the size of the front segment to send. If the result
value in the message is greater than the size of the memory buffer
allocated for the front segment, an out-of-bounds access occurs, and
the content of the memory region beyond this buffer is sent out.
This patch fixes the issue by treating only negative values in the
result field as errors. Positive values are therefore treated as success
in the same way as a zero value. Additionally, a BUG_ON is added to
__send_prepared_auth_request() comparing the len parameter to
front_alloc_len to prevent sending the message if it exceeds the bounds
of the allocation and to make it easier to catch any logic flaws leading
to this.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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Commit 41ebcc0907c5 ("crush: remove forcefeed functionality") from
May 7, 2012 (linux-next), leads to the following Smatch static
checker warning:
net/ceph/crush/mapper.c:1015 crush_do_rule()
warn: iterator 'j' not incremented
Before commit 41ebcc0907c5 ("crush: remove forcefeed functionality"),
we had this logic:
j = 0;
if (osize == 0 && force_pos >= 0) {
o[osize] = force_context[force_pos];
if (recurse_to_leaf)
c[osize] = force_context[0];
j++; /* <-- this was the only increment, now gone */
force_pos--;
}
/* then crush_choose_*(..., o+osize, j, ...) */
Now, the variable j is dead code — a variable that is set
and never meaningfully varied. This patch simply removes
the dead code.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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The function try_write() was renamed to ceph_con_v1_try_write()
in commit 566050e17e53 ("libceph: separate msgr1 protocol
implementation") and subsequently moved to net/ceph/messenger_v1.c
in commit 2f713615ddd9 ("libceph: move msgr1 protocol implementation
to its own file"). Update the comment in ceph_sock_write_space()
accordingly.
[ idryomov: account for msgr2 in the updated comment as well ]
Signed-off-by: kexinsun <kexinsun@smail.nju.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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Since the call to crypto_shash_setkey() was replaced with
hmac_sha256_preparekey() which doesn't allocate memory regardless of the
alignment of the input key, remove the session key alignment logic from
process_auth_done(). Also remove the inclusion of crypto/hash.h, which
is no longer needed since crypto_shash is no longer used.
[ idryomov: rewrap comment ]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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If a message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY contains a zero value for both
protocol and result, this is currently not treated as an error. In case
of ac->negotiating == true and ac->protocol > 0, this leads to setting
ac->protocol = 0 and ac->ops = NULL. Thereafter, the check for
ac->protocol != protocol returns false, and init_protocol() is not
called. Subsequently, ac->ops->handle_reply() is called, which leads to
a null pointer dereference, because ac->ops is still NULL.
This patch changes the check for ac->protocol != protocol to
!ac->protocol, as this also includes the case when the protocol was set
to zero in the message. This causes the message to be treated as
containing a bad auth protocol.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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This patch fixes an out-of-bounds access in ceph_handle_auth_reply()
that can be triggered by a message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY. In
ceph_handle_auth_reply(), the value of the payload_len field of such a
message is stored in a variable of type int. A value greater than
INT_MAX leads to an integer overflow and is interpreted as a negative
value. This leads to decrementing the pointer address by this value and
subsequently accessing it because ceph_decode_need() only checks that
the memory access does not exceed the end address of the allocation.
This patch fixes the issue by changing the data type of payload_len to
u32. Additionally, the data type of result_msg_len is changed to u32,
as it is also a variable holding a non-negative length.
Also, an additional layer of sanity checks is introduced, ensuring that
directly after reading it from the message, payload_len and
result_msg_len are not greater than the overall segment length.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811404df14 by task kworker/20:1/262
CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 262 Comm: kworker/20:1 Not tainted 6.19.2 #5 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn [libceph]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0
print_report+0xd1/0x620
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x72/0x210
kasan_report+0xe7/0x130
? ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]
? ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]
__asan_report_load_n_noabort+0xf/0x20
ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]
mon_dispatch+0x973/0x23d0 [libceph]
? apparmor_socket_recvmsg+0x6b/0xa0
? __pfx_mon_dispatch+0x10/0x10 [libceph]
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30i
? mutex_unlock+0x7f/0xd0
? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_do_recvmsg+0x10/0x10 [libceph]
ceph_con_process_message+0x1f1/0x650 [libceph]
process_message+0x1e/0x450 [libceph]
ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x2e48/0x6c80 [libceph]
? __pfx_ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x10/0x10 [libceph]
? save_fpregs_to_fpstate+0xb0/0x230
? raw_spin_rq_unlock+0x17/0xa0
? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x13b/0x760
? __switch_to+0x385/0xda0
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0
? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
ceph_con_workfn+0x248/0x10c0 [libceph]
process_one_work+0x629/0xf80
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
worker_thread+0x87f/0x1570
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_try_to_wake_up+0x10/0x10
? kasan_print_address_stack_frame+0x1f7/0x280
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x396/0x830
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
? recalc_sigpending+0x180/0x210
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x3f7/0x610
? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
? __switch_to+0x385/0xda0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
[ idryomov: replace if statements with ceph_decode_need() for
payload_len and result_msg_len ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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This patch fixes unnecessary implicit conversions that change signedness
of blob_len and num_mon in ceph_monmap_decode().
Currently blob_len and num_mon are (signed) int variables. They are used
to hold values that are always non-negative and get assigned in
ceph_decode_32_safe(), which is meant to assign u32 values. Both
variables are subsequently used as unsigned values, and the value of
num_mon is further assigned to monmap->num_mon, which is of type u32.
Therefore, both variables should be of type u32. This is especially
relevant for num_mon. If the value read from the incoming message is
very large, it is interpreted as a negative value, and the check for
num_mon > CEPH_MAX_MON does not catch it. This leads to the attempt to
allocate a very large chunk of memory for monmap, which will most likely
fail. In this case, an unnecessary attempt to allocate memory is
performed, and -ENOMEM is returned instead of -EINVAL.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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While head_onwire_len() has a branch to handle ctrl_len == 0 case,
prepare_read_control() always sets up a kvec for the CRC meaning that
a non-empty control segment is effectively assumed. All frames that
clients deal with meet that assumption, so let's make it official and
treat the preamble with an empty control segment as malformed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
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Similar checks are performed for all control frames, but an early check
for message frames was missing. process_message() is already set up to
terminate the loop in case the state changes while con->ops->dispatch()
handler is being executed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
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If the message frame is (maliciously) corrupted in a way that the
length of the control segment ends up being less than the size of the
message header or a different frame is made to look like a message
frame, out-of-bounds reads may ensue in process_message_header().
Perform an explicit bounds check before decoding the message header.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
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This converts some of the visually simpler cases that have been split
over multiple lines. I only did the ones that are easy to verify the
resulting diff by having just that final GFP_KERNEL argument on the next
line.
Somebody should probably do a proper coccinelle script for this, but for
me the trivial script actually resulted in an assertion failure in the
middle of the script. I probably had made it a bit _too_ trivial.
So after fighting that far a while I decided to just do some of the
syntactically simpler cases with variations of the previous 'sed'
scripts.
The more syntactically complex multi-line cases would mostly really want
whitespace cleanup anyway.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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