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"max" is the exclusive upper bound of enum handshake_handler_class, not
a class a handler can ask for, but the spec lists it as a plain entry.
_init_checks() derives the policy limit from the highest entry, so the
generated policy came out as NLA_POLICY_MAX(NLA_U32, 2) and
handshake_nl_accept_doit() takes class 2 all the way into
handshake_req_next(), which walks hn_requests under hn_lock before
returning -EAGAIN instead of the -EINVAL a bad class deserves.
render-max is how YNL spells this, and unlike a hand written limit it
stays correct when a second handler class is added.
It does change what HANDSHAKE_HANDLER_CLASS_MAX means - the highest
valid class rather than one past it, as in every other Netlink/YNL
family - with the count left as __HANDSHAKE_HANDLER_CLASS_MAX.
The constant is uAPI, but I could not find any user space user,
this constant seems to have been added for kernel's benefit.
I think the risk of changing this is worth taking, having MAX
with different semantics than the rest of Netlink is very confusing.
Acked-by: Chuck Lever <cel@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Asbjørn Sloth Tønnesen <ast@fiberby.net>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260904190410.3864660-2-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Add a comment on regeneration to the generated files.
The comment is placed after the YNL-GEN line[1], as to not interfere
with ynl-regen.sh's detection logic.
[1] and after the optional YNL-ARG line.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aR5m174O7pklKrMR@zx2c4.com/
Suggested-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Asbjørn Sloth Tønnesen <ast@fiberby.net>
Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251120174429.390574-3-ast@fiberby.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Add a new netlink parameter 'HANDSHAKE_A_ACCEPT_KEYRING' to provide
the serial number of the keyring to use.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250701144657.104401-1-hare@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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Enable the upper layer protocol to specify the SNI peername. This
avoids the need for tlshd to use a DNS lookup, which can return a
hostname that doesn't match the incoming certificate's SubjectName.
Fixes: 2fd5532044a8 ("net/handshake: Add a kernel API for requesting a TLSv1.3 handshake")
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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To enable kernel consumers of TLS to request a TLS handshake, add
support to net/handshake/ to request a handshake upcall.
This patch also acts as a template for adding handshake upcall
support for other kernel transport layer security providers.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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When a kernel consumer needs a transport layer security session, it
first needs a handshake to negotiate and establish a session. This
negotiation can be done in user space via one of the several
existing library implementations, or it can be done in the kernel.
No in-kernel handshake implementations yet exist. In their absence,
we add a netlink service that can:
a. Notify a user space daemon that a handshake is needed.
b. Once notified, the daemon calls the kernel back via this
netlink service to get the handshake parameters, including an
open socket on which to establish the session.
c. Once the handshake is complete, the daemon reports the
session status and other information via a second netlink
operation. This operation marks that it is safe for the
kernel to use the open socket and the security session
established there.
The notification service uses a multicast group. Each handshake
mechanism (eg, tlshd) adopts its own group number so that the
handshake services are completely independent of one another. The
kernel can then tell via netlink_has_listeners() whether a handshake
service is active and prepared to handle a handshake request.
A new netlink operation, ACCEPT, acts like accept(2) in that it
instantiates a file descriptor in the user space daemon's fd table.
If this operation is successful, the reply carries the fd number,
which can be treated as an open and ready file descriptor.
While user space is performing the handshake, the kernel keeps its
muddy paws off the open socket. A second new netlink operation,
DONE, indicates that the user space daemon is finished with the
socket and it is safe for the kernel to use again. The operation
also indicates whether a session was established successfully.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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