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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Pull bpf updates from Alexei Starovoitov:
"Major changes:
- Introduce scalar evolution (SCEV) analysis in the verifier.
It infers how registers and stack slots change in a loop and lets
the verifier check bounded loops with induction variables as ranges
instead of walking every iteration. The number of processed insns
drops ten fold in programs with loops (Eduard Zingerman)
- Add 'callx' instruction: indirect call of a static BPF subprogram.
The address is taken with ld_imm64 or loaded from read-only data.
Supported by x86-64, arm64 and riscv64 JITs (Alexei Starovoitov, Pu
Lehui)
- Add unwind_goto and unwind_exit instructions, so that Rust panic or
C++ exception can run destructors of every frame it passes through.
The normal path is free of unwind code. Supported by x86-64 and
arm64 JITs (Alexei Starovoitov)
- Support programs compiled by rust-bpf: treat load and store through
a number as arena access with BPF_F_ARENA_SCALAR, accept rust names
in BTF (Alexei Starovoitov)
- Raise BPF program stack size from 512 bytes to 2 KiB on x86-64 and
arm64 (Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi)
- Support struct, union and __int128 up to 16 bytes passed and
returned by value in BPF subprograms and kfuncs, and fix x86-64 and
arm64 trampolines for such arguments (Yonghong Song)
- Introduce a common way to attach struct_ops to a cgroup via
bpf_link. bpf_tcp_ops is the first user and mirrors TCP sock_ops
callbacks (Martin KaFai Lau, Amery Hung)
- Describe inlined functions in BTF. New kinds tell where the inline
sites are and how to fetch the arguments there.
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF_INLINE keeps it apart from the main BTF in
.BTF.inline section or in btf_vmlinux_inline.ko (Alan Maguire)
- Fix many memory safety, lifetime and locking bugs in BPF core,
verifier, iterators, local storage, dynptr, devmap, cpumap and
seg6local (Josef Bacik, Alexei Starovoitov)
- Diff stat is dominated by selftests and by removal of
lib/test_bpf.c. Its 16k lines of instruction tests were converted
to BPF selftests that BPF CI runs on every architecture it covers
(Daniel Borkmann)
Other features and fixes:
- Add KASAN checks to memory accesses of JITed programs on x86-64
(Alexis Lothoré)
- Complete unification of helper, kfunc and subprog argument checks
in the verifier (Amery Hung)
- Add bpf_copy_from_user_mm[_str]() kfuncs (Anastasios Papagiannis)
- Various features and fixes (Daniel Borkmann):
- Add .bpf keyring for program signature verification, modelled
after dm-verity keyring, and support ML-DSA in signing tools
- Emit shorter and faster code in x86-64 JIT for patterns that
LLVM generates
- Fix various issues in gotox handling
- Let BPF LSM set xattrs at inode creation with bpf_inode_init_xattr()
(David Windsor, Daniel Borkmann)
- Use sleepable page allocation in sleepable arena paths. Fix races
between arena free, allocation and user page fault (Emil Tsalapatis)
- Switch BPF crypto from lskcipher to AES-CBC and AES-ECB libraries
(Eric Biggers)
- Add bpf_proactive_reclaim() kfunc (Hui Zhu)
- Render decl_tags in libbpf btf_dump and add tests for bpftool C
dump (Ihor Solodrai)
- Speed up tracing_multi attach on x86 (Jiri Olsa)
- Various features and fixes (Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi):
- Add BPF_PROG_STREAM_OPEN command to read BPF streams through a
file descriptor with poll support
- Let kernel structs publish arena pointers with __arena type tag
- Fix __uninit kfunc output buffers and fastcall rewrite with
indirect stack accesses
- Refuse CO-RE relocations for signed programs
- Add enqueue_rcvq and dequeue_rcvq hooks to bpf_tcp_ops to adjust
sk_rcvlowat and avoid unnecessary wakeups (Kuniyuki Iwashima)
- Add bpf_ksock_sendto() kfunc and allow ksock connect and send from
bpf_wq (Mahe Tardy)
- Fix racy plt target update in arm64 bpf_arch_text_poke()
(Matthew Wood)
- Restructure BPF selftests Makefile as a layered build
(Mykola Lysenko)
- Speed up hash map lookups for u32 and u64 keys (Mykyta Yatsenko)
- Add signed div/mod, movsx, bswap and gotol to MIPS JITs, signed
div/mod to parisc JITs (Nicholas Dudar, Johan Almbladh)
- Fix stack overflow in build ID parser on 32-bit (Nickolai
Zeldovich)
- Add stack arguments, signed arena loads and gotox to riscv64 JIT.
Pu Lehui is now co-maintainer of riscv BPF JITs (Pu Lehui, Chen
Pei, Feng Jiang)
- Add bpf_call_rcu() and bpf_call_rcu_tasks_trace() kfuncs. Support
fetching and/or/xor atomics in arena on x86-64 (Puranjay Mohan)
- Fix flaky selftests, selftests with clang 23 and bpf-gcc
(Qiliang Yuan, KaFai Wan, Vineet Gupta)
- Fix builds broken by fatal resolve_btfids warnings, BTF generation
on ARC, and define arch_cmpxchg_local() on arc, hexagon and
openrisc (Sasha Levin)
- Reduce memory use of hash maps by up to 50% per element
(T.J. Mercier)
- Mark pointer fields of sched_ext ops arguments as trusted (Tejun
Heo)
- Remove legacy bpf_asm, bpf_dbg and bpf_jit_disasm tools (Xia Yan)
- Fix index overflow in queue and stack maps, arena range tree after
allocation failure, tail call loop after freplace detach, lost
signal in bpf_send_signal() (Yuan Chen)
- Many more fixes and cleanups"
* tag 'bpf-next-7.4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (660 commits)
selftests/bpf: Time tc_edt from its first packet with data
selftests/bpf: Test unwind_exit of an exception callback
selftests/bpf: Tests for 32-bit scalar evolution bounds computation
bpf: Reject unwind_goto and unwind_exit in offloaded progs
bpf: Support 32-bit linear scalar evolution
bpf: Make unwind_exit of an exception callback exit in JITs
selftests/bpf: Test forbidden bpf_ksock_sendto() LSM attach
selftests/bpf: Test ksock sendto()
bpf: Add bpf_ksock_sendto() kfunc
selftests/bpf: Test unwinding from R0: R2 subprog
selftests/bpf: Add a C++ prog with exceptions
selftests/bpf: Add tests for unwind_goto and unwind_exit
bpf, arm64: Support unwind_goto and unwind_exit
bpf, x86: Support unwind_goto and unwind_exit
bpf: Add unwind_goto and unwind_exit insns
tools/bpf: Remove legacy BPF tools
bpf: Annotate data races on bpf_lru_node type
selftests/bpf: Add arena allocation race tests
bpf: Fix arena race between page free and alloc leading to incoherency
bpf: Revalidate faulted arena pages before installing user mappings
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Fix algif_skcipher source SG overrun
- Allow hmac(sha512) for non-root users
Algorithms:
- Add wrapper for zeroing AES key context
- Avoid redundant stream initialisations in zstd
Drivers:
- Remove hisilicon/sec.
- Handle digest-only authenc requests in atmel
- Handle zero-length skcipher requests in mxs-dcp
- Lower the default priority of caam/qi2
Others:
- Optimise key comparison in rhashtable lookup that uses constant
parameters"
* tag 'v7.4-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (146 commits)
crypto: atmel-tdes - consolidate error paths in atmel_tdes_dma_init()
crypto: atmel-tdes - reuse fast in atmel_tdes_crypt_start()
crypto: atmel-tdes - use separate DMA scatterlists
MAINTAINERS: delete entry for John Allen
hwrng: amd - use PMBASE_OFFSET consistently
hwrng: cctrng - simplify cctrng_probe()
hwrng: intel - simplify intel_rng_mod_init()
crypto: qat - fix use of destroyed vf2pf_lock on VF restart
crypto: qat - initialise state_lock on every path in adf_devmgr_add_dev()
hwrng: imx-rngc - Use optional clock
crypto: talitos - init tasklets before requesting IRQs
crypto: algif_skcipher - rewind rounded output bytes
crypto: algif_hash - Allow hmac(sha512) for unpriviledged users
crypto: sa2ul - Remove unused fields
hwrng: stm32 - use devm_platform_ioremap_resource() in stm32_rng_probe()
hwrng: stm32 - drop redundant initializations
hwrng: amd - simplify control flow in amd_rng_mod_init()
hwrng: stm32 - reuse clock rate in stm32_rng_clock_freq_restrain()
hwrng: stm32 - use swap() in stm32_rng_probe()
hwrng: cctrng - drop redundant initializations
...
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af_alg_get_rsgl() advances the receive iterator by the unrounded RX
scatterlist length. For a continuing skcipher request,
_skcipher_recvmsg() then rounds its local length down to a whole chunksize
without restoring the iterator.
A later chunk starts after bytes which the provider never wrote, while the
syscall returns only the processed length. When copy_splice_read()
supplies non-zeroed pages and publishes that return as a dense prefix, the
gap exposes stale bytes from a previous page lifetime.
With unprivileged xts(aes), a 31-byte MSG_MORE request followed by one
final byte advances a 47-byte destination while returning 32 bytes. A
hardened v7.2-rc5 image retained all 15 seeded stale bytes in 4,829 of
4,829 records. With init_on_alloc enabled, all 72,345 gap bytes observed
were zero.
Rewind the iterator by the tail excluded during rounding, before rejecting
a zero processed length. The crypto request uses only the rounded length;
af_alg_free_resources() releases the entire RX list before another receive
iteration.
The fixed target-like kernel returned byte-identical dense 48-byte output
in 4,771 of 4,771 rounds. The unmodified kernel returned the vulnerable
32-byte short record in 2,409 of 2,409 rounds.
Fixes: e870456d8e7c ("crypto: algif_skcipher - overhaul memory management")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Daehyeon Ko <4ncienth@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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By default users cannot run sha512hmac with the current set up. This
is problematic because our kernel builds call this for FIPS compliance.
Rather than have anyone turn off af_alg_restrict all together, let's
allow a common use case.
Signed-off-by: Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Implement aes_xts_encrypt_arch() and aes_xts_decrypt_arch() with the AES
opcodes, for AES-128 and AES-256, two blocks per iteration. AES-192,
which IEEE 1619 does not specify, and data that is not 8-byte aligned
are left to the generic code.
The tweak is kept as little-endian words, so that multiplying it by x is
a 128-bit shift done with addcc and the VIS3 addxc. A little-endian
store and an ordinary load through a stack slot give it in the byte
order of the data, and the slot is cleared on return. The routines open
a register window, as %g4-%g6 belong to the kernel.
With that, xts-aes-lib no longer has to be kept off SPARC. Register it
there again, with the priority x86 and RISC-V use, so that it also
outranks an xts(ecb-aes-sparc64) instance (priority 300).
On a T7-1 (M7), MiB/s unless noted:
xts(ecb-aes-sparc64) xts-aes-lib
AF_ALG, 64 KiB, AES-128 415 1092
AF_ALG, 64 KiB, AES-256 390 936
dm-crypt on brd, AES-256:
sequential read 1399 2559
sequential write 1472 3480
4 KiB write latency, QD1 (us) 40.6 32.7
dm-crypt now matches aes-cbc-essiv on the same ramdisk.
On a T4-1, AF_ALG AES-256 goes from 238 to 544 MiB/s, and AES-128
from 252 to 616.
Tested with CONFIG_CRYPTO_SELFTESTS_FULL, and against OpenSSL over
random keys, tweaks and lengths, on both machines.
Link: https://github.com/sparclinux/issues/issues/106
Signed-off-by: Stian Halseth <stian@itx.no>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261004192812.4145406-1-stian@itx.no
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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Cross-merge BPF and other fixes after downstream PR.
Conflicts:
arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Shamir multiplication mishandles equal points, opposite points and the
point at infinity. This rejects valid ECDSA signatures and can accept
invalid digest/signature tuples when the public key is G or -G. The
kernel incorrectly rejects 16 valid signatures from Wycheproof.
Handle doubling, cancellation and the point at infinity in precomputation
and accumulation. Add regression tests for P-256 ECDSA and 256/512-bit
EC-RDSA. The valid vectors are Wycheproof P1363 secp256r1/SHA-256 cases
60 and 210 converted to X9.62, two constructed ECDSA signatures for
Q = +/-G with k = 2, and six constructed EC-RDSA signatures for Q = G,
-G and -2G. Also add two invalid P-256 digest/signature tuples for
Q = +/-G that must return -EKEYREJECTED.
Fixes: 0d7a78643f69 ("crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
Reviewed-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@linux.win>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Once a request has been submitted to the Crypto API, the value
of req->base.data must not be read by the caller as it may change
while the request is processed.
Avoid reading it in tcrypt by combining the crypto_wait struct
with the request object into a tcrypt request object and pass that
around instead of the request object.
Reported-by: T Pratham <t-pratham@ti.com>
Fixes: beb63da739f7 ("crypto: tcrypt - Add speed tests for async hashing")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Use memcpy_and_pad() instead of separate memcpy() and memset() calls to
simplify __cast6_setkey().
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <blum@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Use memcpy_and_pad() instead of separate memcpy() and memset() calls to
simplify cast5_setkey().
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <blum@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Fix a regression where drivers/crypto/ccp/ (priority 300) and
drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c (priority 400) started being able to
override the AES-NI and/or VAES optimized code (previously priority
400-800).
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260930170542.140403-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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Instead of exposing the riscv-optimized AES-XTS code via a
riscv-specific crypto_skcipher algorithm, just implement the AES-XTS
library functions. This is simpler, it makes the AES-XTS library
functions be riscv-optimized, and it also fixes the longstanding issue
where the riscv-optimized AES-XTS code was disabled by default. AES-XTS
support still remains available through crypto_skcipher via
crypto/aes.c, but individual architectures no longer need to handle it.
To match what the library expects, update the assembly functions to
operate on struct aes_key rather than struct crypto_aes_ctx, adjust the
argument order, and remove the redundant ciphertext stealing support
which is already implemented in a generic way in the library.
Bump up the priority of the corresponding library-based algorithm on
riscv now that it no longer has to be lower than arch/riscv/crypto/.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260927224418.109759-21-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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Instead of exposing the riscv-optimized AES-CTR code via a
riscv-specific crypto_skcipher algorithm, just implement the AES-CTR
library functions. This is simpler, it makes the AES-CTR library
functions be riscv-optimized, and it also fixes the longstanding issue
where the riscv-optimized AES-CTR code was disabled by default. AES-CTR
support still remains available through crypto_skcipher via
crypto/aes.c, but individual architectures no longer need to handle it.
To match what the library expects, update the assembly functions to
operate on struct aes_enckey rather than struct crypto_aes_ctx, and
adjust the argument order.
Bump up the priority of the corresponding library-based algorithm on
riscv now that it no longer has to be lower than arch/riscv/crypto/.
Also re-enable the library-based "ccm(aes)" and "gcm(aes)".
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260927224418.109759-20-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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Instead of exposing the riscv-optimized AES-CBC and AES-CBC-CTS code via
a riscv-specific crypto_skcipher algorithm, just implement the AES-CBC
and AES-CBC-CTS library functions. This is simpler, it makes the
AES-CBC and AES-CBC-CTS library functions be riscv-optimized, and it
also fixes the longstanding issue where the riscv-optimized AES-CBC and
AES-CBC-CTS code was disabled by default. AES-CBC and AES-CBC-CTS
support still remains available through crypto_skcipher via
crypto/aes.c, but individual architectures no longer need to handle it.
To match what the library expects, update the assembly functions to
operate on struct aes_enckey or struct aes_key rather than struct
crypto_aes_ctx, and adjust the argument order.
Remove the single-block special case from the assembly code, since it's
already handled by lib/crypto/aes.c before calling aes_cbc_cts_*_arch().
Bump up the priority of the corresponding library-based algorithms on
riscv now that they no longer have to be lower than arch/riscv/crypto/.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260927224418.109759-19-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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Instead of exposing the riscv-optimized AES-ECB code via a
riscv-specific crypto_skcipher algorithm, just implement the AES-ECB
library functions. This is simpler, it makes the AES-ECB library
functions be riscv-optimized, and it also fixes the longstanding issue
where the riscv-optimized AES-ECB code was disabled by default. AES-ECB
support still remains available through crypto_skcipher via
crypto/aes.c, but individual architectures no longer need to handle it.
To match what the library expects, update the assembly functions to
operate on struct aes_enckey or struct aes_key rather than struct
crypto_aes_ctx, and adjust the argument order.
Bump up the priority of the corresponding library-based algorithm on
riscv now that it no longer has to be lower than arch/riscv/crypto/.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260927224418.109759-18-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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Migrate aes-xts-avx-x86_64.S into lib/crypto/, wiring it up to the XTS
library functions instead of the crypto_skcipher API. It still remains
available through crypto_skcipher via crypto/aes.c.
Some adjustments to the assembly code were needed:
- Take 'struct aes_key' instead of 'struct crypto_aes_ctx'.
- Remove the ciphertext stealing support from the assembly code, as the
library implements it in a generic way instead. (This does slightly
reduce performance when the length isn't a multiple of 16 bytes;
however, that case seems to never be reached in practice in the
kernel. So it makes sense to not extensively optimize for it yet.)
- Change 'int len' to 'long nblocks' for compatibility with the
library's use of size_t lengths.
- Remove the CFI stubs, as the functions are now called directly.
- Adjust the argument order to match the caller. Not strictly required,
but it's easiest to handle this now when changing the function
prototypes anyway and adding the new glue code.
This makes the remaining code in aesni-intel_asm.S (which just handled
key expansion) unused, so remove that too.
Don't remove the selection of CRYPTO_SKCIPHER from CRYPTO_AES_NI_INTEL
yet, since it's still needed for the "skcipher_walk" functions.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260927224418.109759-15-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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Migrate aes-ctr-avx-x86_64.S into lib/crypto/, wiring it up to the CTR
and XCTR library functions instead of the crypto_skcipher API. It still
remains available through crypto_skcipher via crypto/aes.c.
Some slight adjustments to the assembly code were needed:
- Take 'struct aes_enckey' instead of 'struct crypto_aes_ctx'.
- Upgrade the length argument from 32-bit to 64-bit so that it's
compatible with the library's use of size_t (at least assuming no
lengths over S64_MAX, which seems quite safe to assume...)
- Remove the CFI stubs, as the functions are now called directly.
- Adjust the argument order to match the caller. Not strictly required,
but it's easiest to handle this now when changing the function
prototypes anyway and adding the new glue code.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260927224418.109759-14-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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Optimize the crypto library's AES-CBC and AES-CBC-CTS support with
AES-NI, bringing their performance on par with the "cbc-aes-aesni" and
"cts-cbc-aes-aesni" skcipher algorithms they will supersede.
The new assembly functions are written from scratch to fit well into the
crypto library. However, they are functionally very similar to the
functions in arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S that they will supersede
and are intended to provide parity with those -- including supporting
32-bit mode, having the inner loops do 4 AES blocks per iteration, etc.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260927224418.109759-6-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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Optimize the crypto library's AES-ECB support with AES-NI, bringing its
performance on par with the "ecb-aes-aesni" skcipher algorithm it will
supersede.
The new assembly functions are written from scratch to fit well into the
crypto library. However, they are functionally very similar to the
functions in arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S that they will supersede
and are intended to provide parity with those -- including supporting
32-bit mode, having the inner loops do 4 AES blocks per iteration, etc.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260927224418.109759-5-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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The new library APIs for AES encryption modes were wired up to the
traditional crypto API via crypto/aes.c. However, for now the kernel is
still in a transitional state where various architectures still have
architecture-optimized implementations of AES modes in arch/*/crypto/,
wired up to the traditional crypto API only. Because of that, the
crypto/aes.c algorithms were given a cra_priority of only 110 to prevent
them from overriding arch/*/crypto/ in the traditional crypto API.
However, because of how the traditional crypto API works, the
cra_priority trick doesn't work in cases where the relevant algorithm
isn't directly implemented by arch/*/crypto/ but rather is provided by a
template instance using other code in arch/*/crypto/.
For example, x86 doesn't have its own "ccm(aes)" but rather relies on
the "ccm" template constructing it from the x86-optimized "ctr(aes)".
The existence of the library-based "ccm(aes)" prevents that, even though
its priority is lower than what the template would produce.
Thus, "ccm(aes)" ends up using the slower single-block AES code.
Therefore, skip wiring up the relevant library-based code to the
traditional crypto API on architectures where this problem can occur, as
determined by what exists in arch/*/crypto/ for each architecture.
This is ugly, but it's also temporary: these conditions will go away as
architecture-optimized implementations of AES modes are migrated into
the library. But until then, we need to prevent performance regressions
by ensuring that the optimized code continues to be used.
Fixes: 20df21a482aa ("crypto: aes - Add CBC and CBC-CTS support using library")
Fixes: 8ca62072faa1 ("crypto: aes - Add GCM support using library")
Fixes: f70ad727d1d6 ("crypto: aes - Add CCM support using library")
Fixes: 94efa0c9fb36 ("crypto: aes - Add XTS support using library")
Closes: https://github.com/sparclinux/issues/issues/106
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Stian Halseth <stian@itx.no>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260929222752.36427-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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BPF crypto was implemented using the lskcipher API, which doesn't seem
to be going anywhere. lskcipher supports only ARC4 and block ciphers in
CBC and ECB mode, and only with unoptimized implementations.
Library APIs also have been found to be a much better approach, for a
variety of reasons, including reduced overhead, greater flexibility, and
having to be explicit about the crypto algorithms that are supported.
We can safely ignore the theoretical ARC4 and non-AES block cipher
support in BPF crypto as unused, which leaves AES-CBC and AES-ECB.
AES-CBC was stated to be needed for decrypting packets using a homebrew
UDP-based protocol
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/d1cdfc23-b336-49a9-8833-29f05b5b9fec@linux.dev/).
AES-ECB is used by the BPF self-tests, and it was stated to maybe be
used in the future for QUIC-LB
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/5f9c3aab-5339-463c-a86d-edac297e1e95@linux.dev/).
Those reasons don't make much sense either, especially AES-ECB which
isn't appropriate in new systems and should be dropped. Regardless,
let's assume that both AES-CBC and AES-ECB need to be kept for now.
There are library APIs for both of these now, which are much easier to
use and more efficient. Reimplement BPF crypto on top of them, greatly
simplifying the code. As part of this, the bpf_crypto_type abstraction
layer is removed, as it's not useful.
This removes the only user of the lskcipher API, so follow-up patches
will be able to remove that code as well.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260924184254.142720-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
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The flag CRYPTO_ALG_DUP_FIRST is buggy because upon unregistration
it tries to unregister the original algorithm rather than the
duplicate which was allocated during registration.
Fix this by locating the duplicated algorithm and unregistering
that instead of the original.
Also remove the duplicate crypto_destroy_alg call.
Reported-by: Chenghai Huang <huangchenghai2@huawei.com>
Fixes: f1440a90465b ("crypto: api - Add support for duplicating algorithms before registration")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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rejection
pkcs7_check_authattrs() only looks at the first SignerInfo when deciding
whether rejection of authenticated attributes may be waived. For the
remaining signers it checks only that authenticated attributes are either
present on all signers or absent from all of them.
This means an unmatched ML-DSA signer can be placed first, followed by a
trusted RSA, ECDSA, or ECRDSA signer. Verification skips the unmatched
signature and accepts the later trusted signer. The first signer still
leaves the waiver enabled for the whole message, so the non-ML-DSA signer
can use an exception intended only for ML-DSA.
Check each SignerInfo's public-key algorithm before leaving the waiver
enabled.
Fixes: 91db696adea4 ("pkcs7: Allow authenticatedAttributes for ML-DSA")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5
Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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For signature algorithms operating on a message rather than a digest,
x509_get_sig_params() points sig->m directly into cert->tbs.
cert->tbs is the preparsed add_key() payload. The syscall wipes and frees
it on return, while the instantiated key retains public_key_signature.
A later KEYCTL_LINK into an asymmetric restricted keyring therefore passes
a dangling message pointer to ML-DSA. KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free
in mldsa_verify(), with allocation and free provenance both leading to
__do_sys_add_key(). Reuse is also an integrity issue: bytes occupying the
freed object become the authenticated message instead of the certificate's
own TBSCertificate.
Give the signature object its own copy of the TBS, as is already done for
a precomputed digest, and release it through the existing m_free contract.
Fixes: f3eccecd782d ("pkcs7: Allow the signing algo to do whatever digestion it wants itself")
Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The PKCS#8 parser deliberately leaves the asym_key_ids payload slot
empty. key_or_keyring_common() unconditionally dereferences that slot
when a PKCS#8 key is supplied to a key_or_keyring restriction. Both the
plain and :chain forms reach this branch, allowing an unprivileged caller
to trigger a NULL pointer dereference through KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
followed by add_key().
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:key_or_keyring_common (crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:205 crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:279)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:884)
key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:1021)
__do_sys_add_key (security/keys/keyctl.c:134)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
</TASK>
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Reject an asymmetric restriction key without key IDs. A PKCS#8 private
key cannot identify the signer of a candidate certificate and is not a
valid trust anchor.
Fixes: 3c58b2362ba8 ("KEYS: Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key parser [ver #2]")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260429181629.110802-2-bestswngs@gmail.com
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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crypto_lskcipher_crypt_unaligned() splits a request into page-sized
chunks but never sets CRYPTO_LSKCIPHER_FLAG_CONT, so a stateful algorithm
restarts from its keyed state at every page boundary. It also marks every
chunk CRYPTO_LSKCIPHER_FLAG_FINAL, which is wrong but harmless: chunks are
trimmed to a multiple of the chunk size, so the trailing partial block that
FINAL guards against is caught after the loop instead.
ARC4 is the only lskcipher with internal state, and cbc, the other
in-tree user of the direct API, never passes more than one block, so
this went unnoticed. bpf_crypto_crypt() however hands
__bpf_dynptr_data() to crypto_lskcipher_encrypt() unchecked, leaving
both alignment and length to the BPF program. An 8192-byte ARC4 request
offset by one byte comes back with its second page identical to its
first: the keystream is reused.
Set FINAL only on the last chunk and CONT after the first, mirroring the
progression used by crypto_lskcipher_crypt_sg().
Fixes: 0ae4dcc1ebf6 ("crypto: skcipher - Add internal state support")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Karl Mehltretter <kmehltretter@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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rsassa_pkcs1_verify() accepts any nonzero key size.
With a one-byte key and a zero RSA result, the leading-zero handling
decrements dst_len to zero and advances out_buf past the allocation.
The next out_buf[0] access reads out of bounds.
KASAN reports:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rsassa_pkcs1_verify+0x79d/0x900
Read of size 1 at addr ...
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 73-byte region [...]
Reject keys shorter than the minimum PKCS#1 v1.5 encoded message size.
Fixes: 3d5b1ecdea6f ("crypto: rsa - RSA padding algorithm")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5
Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
Reviewed-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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rsassa_pkcs1_sign() subtracts 11 from the unsigned key size before
checking that the key is large enough for PKCS#1 v1.5 padding:
if (slen + hash_prefix->size > ctx->key_size - 11)
return -EOVERFLOW;
If the RSA modulus is shorter than 11 bytes, the subtraction wraps.
With a one-byte key and hash=none, the padding memset() writes past
the output buffer.
KASAN reports:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rsassa_pkcs1_sign+0x1ad/0x3b0
Write of size 4294967294 at addr ...
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 1-byte region [...]
Reject keys shorter than the minimum encoded message size.
Fixes: 3d5b1ecdea6f ("crypto: rsa - RSA padding algorithm")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5
Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
Reviewed-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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zstd_decompress() initializes the shared workspace as a DStream before
entering the walk loop. If the first source and destination fragments
each span the whole request it then hands off to zstd_decompress_one(),
which initializes that same ctx->wksp as a DCtx, discarding the DStream
setup without having decompressed a byte. The two are in fact the same
routine, as ZSTD_initStaticDStream() is a tail call to
ZSTD_initStaticDCtx() and zstd_init_dstream() discards its
max_window_size argument, so the work was done twice byte for byte.
zswap takes this path whenever the stored object lies within a single
zsmalloc page, which is the common case; an object straddling a page
boundary comes back from zs_obj_read_sg_begin() as a two-entry source
scatterlist and streams instead.
Defer the DStream initialization to the first walk iteration that reaches
the streaming path, guarded by a flag because that iteration can be
reached more than once. Within this function ctx->dctx is read only by
the zstd_decompress_stream() call immediately below, so no stale context
can be picked up. As in the previous patch the new call site runs with
the walk's fragments mapped and has to release them before failing.
For a 4 KB crypto_acomp benchmark for decompression, twelve runs of nine
30K operation rounds, on the bare-metal host the median per-round mean
request time fell from 2,317 ns to 1,998 ns (13.8%).
In the one-vCPU KVM guest it fell from 3,516 ns to 2,265 ns (35.6%).
Signed-off-by: Usama Arif <usama.arif@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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zstd_compress() initializes the shared workspace as a CStream before
entering the walk loop. If the first source and destination fragments
each span the whole request it then hands off to zstd_compress_one(),
which initializes that same ctx->wksp as a CCtx, discarding the CStream
setup without having compressed a byte. zswap always takes this one-shot
path when storing, so every page it stores paid for both.
Neither is cheap: zstd_init_cstream() redoes the cwksp layout, zeroes the
ZSTD_CCtx, probes for BMI2 through ZSTD_cpuid(), then resets the session
and parameters and replays ten validated ZSTD_CCtx_setParameter() calls.
Defer the CStream initialization to the first walk iteration that needs
it, guarded by a flag because that iteration can be reached more than
once. The first inner iteration either takes the one-shot path and
returns or initializes the CStream, so the trailing zstd_end_stream()
cannot pick up the stale context left in ctx->cctx by an earlier request.
Unlike the old call site the new one runs with the walk's fragments
mapped, so it has to release them before failing.
For a 4 KB crypto_acomp benchmark for compression, twelve runs of nine
30K operation rounds, on the bare-metal host the median per-round mean
request time fell from 52,283 ns to 51,038 ns (2.4%). In the one-vCPU
KVM guest it fell from 16,675 ns to 15,050 ns (9.8%).
The larger improvement in guest is because of the pair of CPUID
instructions in ZSTD_cpuid() that the removed initialization runs.
Signed-off-by: Usama Arif <usama.arif@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add self-contained KUnit tests for pefile_parse_binary(), exercised
through verify_pefile_signature() -- which parses the image before any
signature check, so no keyring or real signature is needed. The cases
build small malformed PE images in memory:
- a PE declaring 0 data-directory entries: the certificate table entry
at fixed index 4 is absent and must be rejected (-ELIBBAD), not read
out of bounds;
- a PE declaring 5 entries with a zero (unsigned) certificate entry
gets past the directory bound and is rejected as unsigned (-ENODATA).
verify_pefile_signature() is not exported, so the test is built-in only
(bool, not tristate).
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Derepas <fabrice.derepas@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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pefile_parse_binary() reads the size field of the certificate table's
data-directory entry, which sits at fixed index 4 of the PE optional
header's data directory:
ctx->certs_size = ddir->certs.size;
but nothing ensures index 4 is present. n_data_dirents (the untrusted
NumberOfRvaAndSizes) is only upper-bounded against header_size and may be
0, and header_size need only satisfy cursor < header_size < datalen. A
crafted PE with n_data_dirents = 0 and a tiny header_size therefore causes
the ddir->certs.size read to land past the end of the image (CWE-125). The
chkaddr() that bounds the certificate blob runs only after this read.
verify_pefile_signature() is reached from kexec_file_load() (the
lockdown/secure-boot enforced PE-image signature path), and the image is
parsed before its signature is checked. The trigger needs CAP_SYS_BOOT and
the access is out-of-bounds read only (no write).
Require the certificate table's data-directory entry (index 4) to be
present; the existing upper-bound check then keeps ddir->certs within
[cursor, header_size).
Fixes: 26d1164be37f ("pefile: Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature contained therein")
Assisted-by: copilot-cli:claude-opus-4-6 frama-c
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Derepas <fabrice.derepas@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto fix from Herbert Xu:
"Fix a memory allocation overrun in crypto acomp"
* tag 'v7.3-p2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
crypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning
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ACOMP_REQUEST_ON_STACK() reserves only enough storage for the
synchronous fallback. When an async implementation is selected, callers
clone that stack request before retrying, but acomp_request_clone()
currently copies only the stack-sized object. The clone therefore has no
storage for the async provider request context, and providers such as QAT
write past the allocation through acomp_request_ctx(). KASAN does report
a slab OOB write.
Allocate a zeroed clone large enough for the runtime acomp request size,
copy only the bytes present in the source object, and preserve the
existing fallback-on-allocation-failure behavior. Use the runtime reqsize
because an implementation may adjust it during tfm initialization.
Fixes: 097c432caaa6 ("crypto: acomp - Add ACOMP_REQUEST_CLONE")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5
Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add af_alg_restrict sysctl and white list
- Fix potential suspend/resume races in hwrng
Algorithms:
- Optimize vli additive operations using compiler builtins in ecc
Drivers:
- Remove unsafe/deprecated algorithms from qce
- Mark qce as BROKEN
- Add runtime PM and interconnect bandwidth scaling support to qce
- Remove crypto_rng from qcom, sun8i and caam
- Fix SG list issues in iaa
- Fix SEV init path bugs in ccp"
* tag 'v7.3-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (122 commits)
crypto: lskcipher - propagate errors from unaligned crypt
crypto: keembay - use crypto_memneq() to compare CCM AEAD tags
crypto: keembay - use crypto_memneq() to compare GCM AEAD tags
crypto: sa2ul - use crypto_memneq() to compare AEAD tag
hwrng: drivers - use named initializers for acpi_device_id
crypto: qce - fix CCM AAD buffer underallocation
crypto: iaa - unmap dst before software fallback on decompress
crypto: iaa - use bounce buffer for multi-sg decompress input
crypto: iaa - avoid counting fallback decompression bytes
crypto: iaa - fall back to software for multi-entry scatterlists
hwrng: core - Stop/start hwrng_fillfn() kthread before/after suspend-resume
crypto: hisilicon/sec2 - fix CCM algorithm long packet failure
crypto: eip93 - use struct_size() and flexible array for ring allocation
crypto: krb5 - use kfree_sensitive() for derived key buffers
crypto: af_alg - Stop after finding name in allowlist
crypto: af_alg - Replace 'bool privileged' with flags
crypto: af_alg - Make cbc(paes) privileged-only
hwrng: imx-rngc - Disable clock on registration failure
crypto: qat - remove dead ADF_HEX code
crypto: qce - simplify qce_handle_request
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux
Pull crypto library updates from Eric Biggers:
"Add library APIs for most AES encryption modes that are used in the
kernel (ECB, CBC, CBC-CTS, CTR, XCTR, XTS, GCM, CCM).
These AES modes have many in-kernel users that are currently using the
crypto_skcipher or crypto_aead APIs. These existing APIs are difficult
to use and inefficient. Until now, the lack of proper library support
for these has been the main gap in the crypto library.
This set of changes is the next stage of addressing it:
- Implement the new APIs on top of the existing support for
single-block AES in the library.
- Fully document the new APIs.
- Migrate the only user of the old AES-GCM library API to the new,
more flexible API; then remove the old API and its implementation.
- Wire up the new APIs to the traditional crypto API by adding
crypto_skcipher and crypto_aead algorithms.
This makes the new APIs be covered by the traditional crypto API's
self-tests. It also makes them be already used for real on systems
that don't have architecture-optimized code for these modes.
But most importantly, this is a prerequisite for migrating the
architecture-optimized code for these AES modes (i.e.
arch/*/crypto/aes*) into the library, which as usual will eliminate
a lot of redundant "glue" code.
Note that unlike some of the other algorithms that have been migrated
to the library, e.g. SHA-512, for these AES modes there was too much
to get done in one cycle. Nor did it make sense to handle these modes
one at a time, because they tend to be coupled together or depend on
each other, especially in the architecture-optimized AES code.
Thus, most of the benefits (reductions in lines of code, performance
improvements, etc.) will follow in later cycles when
architecture-optimized code is migrated into the library and users of
crypto_skcipher and crypto_aead are updated to use the new APIs.
The design of the new APIs was informed by writing proof-of-concept
patches for many kernel subsystems currently accessing these same
algorithms via crypto_skcipher or crypto_aead (patches 18-33 of
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260707053503.209874-1-ebiggers@kernel.org/).
While those patches will be resent for real later, the total diffstat
for them was negative 1905 lines. So clearly the new APIs are quite a
bit easier to use and align better with what users actually need.
Besides the new AES encryption APIs, there are also a few changes for
improved AES-CMAC key and context zeroization"
* tag 'libcrypto-updates-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux:
mac80211: fils_aead: Use __cleanup() instead of memzero_explicit()
Bluetooth: SMP: clear the aes_cmac_key when done
smb: clear the aes_cmac_key and aes_cmac_ctx when done
lib/crypto: aes-cmac: Add zeroization functions
lib/crypto: aesgcm: Remove old AES-GCM library
x86/sev: Remove obsolete virtual address check
x86/sev: Use new AES-GCM library
crypto: aes - Add CCM support using library
crypto: aes - Add GCM support using library
crypto: aes - Add XTS support using library
crypto: aes - Add CTR and XCTR support using library
crypto: aes - Add CBC and CBC-CTS support using library
crypto: aes - Add ECB support using library
lib/crypto: aes: Add CCM support
lib/crypto: aes: Add GCM support
lib/crypto: aes: Add XTS support
lib/crypto: aes: Add CTR and XCTR support
lib/crypto: aes: Add CBC and CBC-CTS support
lib/crypto: aes: Add ECB support
crypto: xts - Split out __xts_verify_key() helper
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The while loop declares a second err variable that shadows the outer
one. When the crypt callback fails, the goto out path returns the outer
err, which still holds the -ENOMEM value assigned before the successful
allocation check. The real error from the cipher is discarded and the
caller sees -ENOMEM instead.
Drop the inner declaration so the callback error reaches the caller.
Verified with a test module that registers an lskcipher whose encrypt
callback fails with -EIO and calls it through a misaligned buffer.
An unpatched kernel returns -ENOMEM, a patched kernel returns -EIO.
Found with Clang's -Wshadow.
Fixes: 31865c4c4db2b ("crypto: skcipher - Add lskcipher")
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5
Signed-off-by: Karl Mehltretter <kmehltretter@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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crypto_krb5_prepare_encryption() and crypto_krb5_prepare_checksum()
free the buffer holding the freshly derived keys with plain kfree(),
leaving the key material behind in the freed slab object.
Fixes: 3936f02bf2d3 ("crypto/krb5: Implement Kerberos crypto core")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Sebastian Götte <linux@jaseg.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu:
- Fix lockdep warning regression in rhashtable
- Fix default authsize in rfc4309
- Fix gcm cryptlen calculation in tegra
- Fix qce registration error-path bug
- Fix incorrect use of sg_dma_len before mapping in starfive
- Allow cbc(paes) to be used with af_alg
* tag 'v7.2-p3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
crypto: af_alg - Allow cbc(paes)
crypto: starfive - use scatterlist length before DMA mapping
crypto: qce - fix error path in devm_qce_register_algs
rhashtable: fix false-positive lockdep splat on rhltable destruction
crypto: tegra - fix rctx->cryptlen calculation in tegra_gcm_do_one_req()
crypto: ccm - Set rfc4309 maxauthsize from child
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If the algorithm name is found in the allowlist and the privilege check
doesn't pass, there's no need to consider remaining entries since the
list contains (and is intended to contain) at most one entry per name.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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It isn't obvious what false/true mean at the definition sites, so let's
replace it with flags instead. Also flip the polarity to make the
default zero-initialized value be the secure (privileged-only) value.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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So far the only reported use cases for cbc(paes) have involved processes
running as root. Therefore, make af_alg_restrict=1 allow only
privileged use of this algorithm for now.
Fixes: 947d62c09436 ("Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Merge crypto tree to pick up the af_alg cbc(paes) patch. In the
merge commit add cbc(paes) to the algorithm white-list.
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Commit 7524070f26d8 ("crypto: af_alg - Drop support for off-CPU cryptography")
breaks a special use case. The cbc-paes-caam driver implements the
algorithm cbc(paes), it offers a way to use AES in CBC mode with key
material unknown to userspace. Instead of an AES key a CAAM BLOB is
passed to the kernel. So, this crypto operation cannot be
implemented in a userspace library and needs always help from the
kernel.
Explicitly allow this use case.
Cc: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Fixes: 7524070f26d8 ("crypto: af_alg - Drop support for off-CPU cryptography")
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Set the maxauthsize of rfc4309 using that of the child algorithm.
Fixes: 4a49b499dfa0 ("[CRYPTO] ccm: Added CCM mode")
Reported-by: Seohyeon Maeng <bioloidgp@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Implement the "ccm(aes)" crypto_aead algorithm using the corresponding
library functions.
Among other benefits, this allows the architecture-optimized AES-CCM
code to be migrated into the library while still leaving it accessible
via crypto_aead, eliminating lots of boilerplate code.
For now the cra_priority is set to just 110, since the
architecture-optimized implementations of this algorithm haven't yet
been migrated into the library. It will be boosted once that happens.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260715221153.246410-14-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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Implement the "gcm(aes)" and "rfc4106(gcm(aes))" crypto_aead algorithms
using the corresponding library functions.
Among other benefits, this allows the architecture-optimized AES-GCM
code to be migrated into the library while still leaving it accessible
via crypto_aead, eliminating lots of boilerplate code.
For now the cra_priority is set to just 110, since the
architecture-optimized implementations of these algorithms haven't yet
been migrated into the library. It will be boosted once that happens.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260715221153.246410-13-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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Implement the "xts(aes)" crypto_skcipher algorithm using the
corresponding library functions.
Among other benefits, this allows the architecture-optimized AES-XTS
code to be migrated into the library while still leaving it accessible
via crypto_skcipher, eliminating lots of boilerplate code.
Fast paths similar to what x86_64 uses (to eliminate the scatterlist
walking overhead) are included. So we'll get that optimization for all
architectures.
For now the cra_priority is set to just 110, since the
architecture-optimized implementations of this algorithm haven't yet
been migrated into the library. It will be boosted once that happens.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260715221153.246410-12-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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Implement the "ctr(aes)" and "xctr(aes)" crypto_skcipher algorithms
using the corresponding library functions.
Among other benefits, this allows the architecture-optimized AES-CTR and
AES-XCTR code to be migrated into the library while still leaving it
accessible via crypto_skcipher, eliminating lots of boilerplate code.
For now the cra_priority is set to just 110, since the
architecture-optimized implementations of these algorithms haven't yet
been migrated into the library. It will be boosted once that happens.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260715221153.246410-11-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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Implement the "cbc(aes)" and "cts(cbc(aes))" crypto_skcipher algorithms
using the corresponding library functions.
Among other benefits, this allows the architecture-optimized AES-CBC and
AES-CBC-CTS code to be migrated into the library while still leaving it
accessible via crypto_skcipher, eliminating lots of boilerplate code.
For now the cra_priority is set to just 110, since the
architecture-optimized implementations of these algorithms haven't yet
been migrated into the library. It will be boosted once that happens.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260715221153.246410-10-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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