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| author | Aamir Ahmed <elb12345@hotmail.co.uk> | 2026-09-16 11:49:27 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> | 2026-10-21 10:12:07 +0900 |
| commit | de0cffef897c1c232ed973f89928cd6c93d0b1e3 (patch) | |
| tree | d86b0ac2884e6fec8965d7adcf7908294ab5918e /scripts/Makefile.thinlto | |
| parent | da25995071e5e0f3aa9a41160b00b2f833127b3e (diff) | |
| download | linux-de0cffef897c1c232ed973f89928cd6c93d0b1e3.tar.gz linux-de0cffef897c1c232ed973f89928cd6c93d0b1e3.zip | |
ksmbd: deny access for an empty DACL instead of granting the request
smb_check_perm_dacl() returns the access mask it computes to the SMB2
CREATE handler, which uses it as the granted access for the open. For a
security descriptor whose DACL is present but contains no ACEs, the
function is supposed to deny access: an empty (non-NULL) DACL grants no
access to anyone except the object owner's implicit READ_CONTROL and
WRITE_DAC (MS-DTYP 2.4.5).
The empty-DACL branch only denies when both
- the DACL has no trailing bytes (pdacl_size == sizeof(struct smb_acl)),
and
- the request contains bits beyond READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC.
In every other case it takes the shared "goto err_out" with rc still 0,
which returns success without modifying *pdaccess, so the caller grants
the full requested access. Three problems follow:
- The READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC carve-out models the owner's implicit
rights, but the check runs before is_owner is computed, so those
rights are handed to *every* caller, not just the owner. For
READ_CONTROL the SMB2 CREATE path does not fall back to
inode_permission(), so any user can read the security descriptor of
an object whose empty DACL is meant to deny them.
- A request of exactly READ_CONTROL and/or WRITE_DAC is granted to any
caller. WRITE_DAC lets the handle rewrite the DACL.
- A DACL that declares zero ACEs but carries trailing bytes
(pdacl_size > sizeof(struct smb_acl)) skips the deny entirely and is
granted whatever was requested.
On shares where the NT ACL is the authoritative access control -- e.g.
"force user" shares, where every client maps to one POSIX identity so
POSIX cannot distinguish users -- this is an access-control bypass.
Compute is_owner before the empty-DACL branch and deny access from an
empty DACL unless the caller is the owner requesting no more than
READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC.
Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aamir Ahmed <elb12345@hotmail.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/Makefile.thinlto')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
