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authorAamir Ahmed <elb12345@hotmail.co.uk>2026-09-16 11:49:27 +0100
committerNamjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>2026-10-21 10:12:07 +0900
commitde0cffef897c1c232ed973f89928cd6c93d0b1e3 (patch)
treed86b0ac2884e6fec8965d7adcf7908294ab5918e /scripts/Makefile.thinlto
parentda25995071e5e0f3aa9a41160b00b2f833127b3e (diff)
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ksmbd: deny access for an empty DACL instead of granting the request
smb_check_perm_dacl() returns the access mask it computes to the SMB2 CREATE handler, which uses it as the granted access for the open. For a security descriptor whose DACL is present but contains no ACEs, the function is supposed to deny access: an empty (non-NULL) DACL grants no access to anyone except the object owner's implicit READ_CONTROL and WRITE_DAC (MS-DTYP 2.4.5). The empty-DACL branch only denies when both - the DACL has no trailing bytes (pdacl_size == sizeof(struct smb_acl)), and - the request contains bits beyond READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC. In every other case it takes the shared "goto err_out" with rc still 0, which returns success without modifying *pdaccess, so the caller grants the full requested access. Three problems follow: - The READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC carve-out models the owner's implicit rights, but the check runs before is_owner is computed, so those rights are handed to *every* caller, not just the owner. For READ_CONTROL the SMB2 CREATE path does not fall back to inode_permission(), so any user can read the security descriptor of an object whose empty DACL is meant to deny them. - A request of exactly READ_CONTROL and/or WRITE_DAC is granted to any caller. WRITE_DAC lets the handle rewrite the DACL. - A DACL that declares zero ACEs but carries trailing bytes (pdacl_size > sizeof(struct smb_acl)) skips the deny entirely and is granted whatever was requested. On shares where the NT ACL is the authoritative access control -- e.g. "force user" shares, where every client maps to one POSIX identity so POSIX cannot distinguish users -- this is an access-control bypass. Compute is_owner before the empty-DACL branch and deny access from an empty DACL unless the caller is the owner requesting no more than READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC. Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aamir Ahmed <elb12345@hotmail.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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