| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
# Conflicts:
# drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_migrate.c
# net/ceph/osd_client.c
|
|
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe.git
|
|
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux.git
|
|
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git
|
|
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
|
|
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm.git
|
|
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/modules/linux.git
# Conflicts:
# drivers/gpu/drm/clients/drm_fbdev_helper.c
# drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_log.c
|
|
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux.git
|
|
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next.git
# Conflicts:
# kernel/bpf/token.c
# mm/internal.h
|
|
# Conflicts:
# fs/coredump.c
# fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
# fs/fuse/dax.c
# fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c
|
|
mm-unstable into for-next
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org>
# Conflicts:
# mm/sparse-vmemmap.c
# Conflict resolution:
#
# diff --git a/mm/sparse-vmemmap.c b/mm/sparse-vmemmap.c
# index 11543f4b6304..5d7e982f94d0 100644
# --- a/mm/sparse-vmemmap.c
# +++ b/mm/sparse-vmemmap.c
# @@ -36,11 +36,7 @@
# #include "mm_init.h"
# #include "sparse.h"
#
# -<<<<<<< HEAD
# -void * __meminit vmemmap_alloc_block(unsigned long size, int node)
# -=======
# void __ref *vmemmap_alloc_block(unsigned long size, int node)
# ->>>>>>> akpm/mm-unstable
# {
# /* If the main allocator is up use that, fallback to bootmem. */
# if (slab_is_available()) {
# @@ -60,11 +56,7 @@ void __ref *vmemmap_alloc_block(unsigned long size, int node)
# }
# return NULL;
# } else
# -<<<<<<< HEAD
# return memmap_alloc(size, size, __pa(MAX_DMA_ADDRESS), node);
# -=======
# - return memmap_alloc(size, size, __pa(MAX_DMA_ADDRESS), node, false);
# ->>>>>>> akpm/mm-unstable
# }
#
# static void * __meminit altmap_alloc_block_buf(unsigned long size,
|
|
The policy file has no write method and is exposed read-only (S_IRUGO in
selinux_files[]), yet sel_open_policy() performs no open mode check, so a
CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE caller can open it O_RDWR. Reject FMODE_WRITE at open, as
kernfs does.
The file can then never be mapped with FMODE_WRITE, so do_mmap() always
clears VM_MAYWRITE and VM_SHARED for MAP_SHARED mappings and the VM_SHARED
check in sel_mmap_policy() cannot be reached. Remove it.
This also stops sel_mmap_policy() clearing VM_MAYWRITE on a mapping that is
neither a PFN map nor a mixed map, ahead of the core enforcing that only
such mappings may do so.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20261013-b4-mmap-prepare-vma-flag-sanify-v6-12-1aa3c9b139f9@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <liam@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@cornelisnetworks.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Cc: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Nico Pache <nico.pache@linux.dev>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Dev Jain <dev.jain@arm.com>
Cc: Barry Song <baohua@kernel.org>
Cc: Lance Yang <lance.yang@linux.dev>
Cc: Usama Arif <usama.arif@linux.dev>
Cc: Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>
Cc: Doug Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Cc: Martin K. Petersen <mkp@kernel.org>
Cc: Simona Vetter <simona@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Sebastian Reichel <sre@kernel.org>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Harry Yoo <harry@kernel.org>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@gmail.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Andreas Larsson <andreas@gaisler.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Cc: Joshua Hahn <joshua.hahnjy@gmail.com>
Cc: Rakie Kim <rakie.kim@sk.com>
Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul@sk.com>
Cc: Gregory Price <gourry@gourry.net>
Cc: Ying Huang <ying.huang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
Cc: Chris Li <chrisl@kernel.org>
Cc: Kairui Song <kasong@tencent.com>
Cc: Kemeng Shi <shikemeng@huaweicloud.com>
Cc: Nhat Pham <nphamcs@gmail.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <baoquan.he@linux.dev>
Cc: Youngjun Park <youngjun.park@lge.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Qi Zheng <qi.zheng@linux.dev>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: Yuanchu Xie <yuanchu@google.com>
Cc: Wei Xu <weixugc@google.com>
Cc: Chengming Zhou <chengming.zhou@linux.dev>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Xu Xin <xu.xin@linux.dev>
Cc: Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>
Cc: Bert Karwatzki <spasswolf@web.de>
|
|
|
|
When recovering the IMA measurement list after kexec(), currently, the
counter of violations is not restored. This causes a mismatch between
the real number of violations and the value reported by the
<securityfs>/ima/violations file.
Restore the violations counter during the IMA measurement list recovery.
This mechanism does not take into account false positives. A legit
all-zeros hash is treated as a violation.
Reported-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Closes: https://github.com/linux-integrity/linux/issues/13
Signed-off-by: Enrico Bravi <enrico.bravi@polito.it>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: Fixed patch description line length]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
* dev:
selinux: validate permissive and neveraudit map types at load
selinux: validate user MLS range and default level at load
selinux: bounds-check role and user membership bitmaps at load
selinux: check neveraudit in avc_xperms_audit_required()
selinux: bounds-check filename transition source types at load
selinux: reject duplicate symbol values during policy load
selinux: reject a policy that both rejects and allows unknown classes
selinux: constify avc function parameters
selinux: avoid 64-bit division of inode numbers
selinux: mark status and policy inodes as immutable, drop status mmap write checks
selinux: remove unused mls_setup_user_range()
selinux: convert selinuxfs inode numbers from unsigned long to u64
selinux: tighten policydb_context_isvalid() checks
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux
Pull Landlock fix from Mickaël Salaün:
"This fixes a Clang bug by removing an annotation, which was introduced
mostly for documentation"
* tag 'landlock-7.3-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
landlock: Drop __counted_by from landlock_domain.handled_masks
|
|
With clang 22 and CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE, the second
landlock_restrict_self() call hits a bogus fortify report in
inherit_ruleset():
memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4 byte write of buffer size 0
Call Trace:
__fortify_panic
landlock_merge_ruleset
__se_sys_landlock_restrict_self
handled_masks[] lives in an anonymous struct inside the anonymous union
that overlays work_free. For such a flexible array, clang computes the
address of the __counted_by counter as the start of the array instead of
&num_layers. The bound is then read from handled_masks[0], i.e. from
the first layer's access masks, which is not a count. The same layout
crashes clang itself in a standalone test.
The annotation was added as documentation, so drop it rather than
restructure the union. Keep the information in the member comment.
Reported-by: syzbot+a0eecb22de4d821a9e5d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a0eecb22de4d821a9e5d
Fixes: bd3a19800dd1 ("landlock: Add counted_by in landlock_domain")
Signed-off-by: Nguyen Ngoc Thang <ngocthang2710.1999@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261010164450.194439-1-ngocthang2710.1999@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio@oss.qualcomm.com>
Reported-by: Mike Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261009115108.17819-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
[mic: Rebased on master, where the array is handled_masks[], updated the
fortify report, added the clang bug link and the other reports]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
|
|
ipe_audit_enforce() starts an audit buffer but writes the state change
with audit_log(), which logs its own record. Ending the unused buffer
then emits an extra empty AUDIT_MAC_STATUS record.
Remove the unused buffer and log the state change with audit_log()
alone.
Fixes: a68916eaedcd ("ipe: add permissive toggle")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
|
|
Policy text is separately allocated only when p->pkcs7 is NULL.
Correct the comment to match the existing free logic.
No functional changes.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
|
|
The parser token tables contain one entry for each enum value followed
by a terminator. Add static assertions so adding an enum value without a
corresponding token fails the build.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
|
|
The audit name tables are indexed by enum values but initialized
positionally. Adding an enum value in the middle can associate the
following names with the wrong values.
Use designated initializers to bind each name to its enum value.
No functional changes.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
|
|
token_default() does not modify its argument, so make it const.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull keys fixes from Jarkko Sakkinen:
- key_get_persistent() created a new persistent keyring if one did not
exist, but failed to set a timeout on it in an error path, preventing
GC.
Call key_set_timeout() regardless of key_link() result if a
persistent keyring was created.
- __key_create_or_update() made a copy of keyring->restrict_link before
holding keyring->sem, which could cause add_key() to be executed
against stale keyring restrictions. Fix it by copying the value only
after taking keyring->sem
* tag 'keys-v7.3-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
KEYS: Fix add_key() race with keyring restriction
keys: finalize persistent keyring timeout after link attempt
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
- Preserve SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS when reusing superblocks
Similar to a previous fix (see the commit description of Stephen's
fix) we need to check to see if we have already mounted/setup the
superblock passed into the security_sb_set_mnt_opts() LSM hook so we
don't mistakenly unset SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS.
- Fix a potential AVC sequence number data race
* tag 'selinux-pr-20261005' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: preserve NATIVE_LABELS on already-initialized sb in set_mnt_opts
selinux: fix data race on AVC latest_notif
|
|
__key_create_or_update() snapshots keyring->restrict_link before taking
the destination keyring's semaphore. keyring_restrict() installs a
restriction while holding that semaphore.
This allows a writer to observe no restriction, wait for the keyring
owner to install a reject-all restriction and return successfully, and
then link a key using the stale NULL snapshot. The writer only needs
write permission on the destination keyring.
Move the restrict_link read after __key_link_lock() and
__key_link_begin(). The read and the subsequent restriction check are
then serialized with restriction installation by keyring->sem.
The race was reproduced on v7.2.8 in 19 executions where restriction
installation returned before the link completed. All 19 linked the key
despite the reject-all restriction. With this change, 312 executions
reached the same ordering and every add_key() call failed with -EPERM.
The issue was found by manual concurrency analysis assisted by AI-based
analysis and independently verified with a QEMU reproducer and kernel
instrumentation.
Fixes: 5ac7eace2d00 ("KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: 성병찬 <tjdqudcks0424@naver.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260930041802.6114-1-tjdqudcks0424@naver.com
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
|
|
When no keyring exists for the requested UID, KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT
creates and registers one before linking it to the requested destination.
The configured timeout is set only after the destination link succeeds.
A destination restricted with KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING makes that link fail
with -EPERM. With persistent_keyring_expiry set to 60 seconds, /proc/keys
still reports the registered keyring's expiry as "perm".
The failed call therefore leaves a quota-exempt keyring in the namespace's
hidden register, where it may remain until namespace teardown.
Rename the write-locked helper to key_get_or_create_persistent() and return
the key reference through a result parameter. Return 0 when it creates a
keyring and 1 when the retry finds an existing one. Return a negative error
on failure. Another caller may create the keyring between the initial
read-locked lookup and the retry under the write lock.
Set the timeout after permission checking and linking. Do this on success,
or on failure if the call allocated the keyring. This leaves a new keyring
collectible after failure without starting its timeout while linking is
still in progress.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Fixes: f36f8c75ae2e ("KEYS: Add per-user_namespace registers for persistent per-UID kerberos caches")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Karl Mehltretter <kmehltretter@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260912095440.79864-1-kmehltretter@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
|
|
Cross-merge BPF and other fixes after downstream PR.
Conflicts:
arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
The permissive and neveraudit maps are read as ebitmaps and indexed by
type value, but their set bits are never checked. A bit that is not a
defined, non-attribute type is silently accepted. Validate every set bit
of both maps in policydb_index() with policydb_simpletype_isvalid().
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
user_read() reads each user's MLS range and default level but, unlike
range transitions and security contexts, never validates them.
Validate usr->range and usr->dfltlevel in user_index_check() when MLS is
enabled, once the level and category symbol tables are populated.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
role->dominates, role->types and user->roles are read as ebitmaps but
their set bits are never checked against the role and type symbol
tables. A bit naming an undefined value is silently accepted, and an
out-of-range one is used to index those tables later; in particular
role_bounds_sanity_check() passes such a bit straight to sym_name(),
reading p->sym_val_to_name[] out of bounds on a crafted bounded role.
Validate the three bitmaps in policydb_index() once every symbol table
is populated (roles are read before types, so this cannot be done in
role_read()).
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
When an NFSv4 filesystem exported with security_label is mounted a
second time, sget_fc() returns the existing superblock and
nfs_get_root() calls security_sb_set_mnt_opts() again on it. Since the
superblock is already SB_INITIALIZED, selinux_set_mnt_opts() takes an
early exit without setting SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS in
*set_kern_flags. nfs_get_root() then sees kflags without
SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS set and clears NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL on
the shared nfs_server, silently disabling per-file labeling for both
the new and the original mount.
Commit 3815a245b501 ("security/selinux: fix SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
on reused superblock") fixed the same problem in
selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(). The reused-superblock path for a plain
second mount now goes through sb_set_mnt_opts rather than
sb_clone_mnt_opts, so it needs the same treatment: on both
SE_SBINITIALIZED early exits, set SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS in
*set_kern_flags when the superblock was already using
SECURITY_FS_USE_NATVE.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Closes: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/69
Closes: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/70
Closes: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite/issues/91
Closes: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite/issues/92
Fixes: eb9ae686507b ("SELinux: Add new labeling type native labels")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Clear the hmac_sha1_ctx structure via __cleanup(hmac_sha1_zeroize_ctx)
to make sure that the function does not leak sensitive data on the stack
when returning without calling hmac_sha1_final().
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260916095022.604354-10-thuth@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
|
|
Since commit 5137e583ba26 ("lsm: cleanup the debug and console output
in lsm_init.c"), the NULL check for lsm_order_legacy in security_init()
has no effect.
So remove the check.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Sang-Heon Jeon <ekffu200098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Now that integrity_audit_msg() accepts an errno parameter, it is
equivalent to integrity_audit_message(). Replace the remaining
integrity_audit_message() call sites with integrity_audit_msg() and remove
integrity_audit_message().
Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
integrity_audit_msg() hides error codes by wrapping
integrity_audit_message() which obfuscates the underlying reason for the
failure.
Update integrity_audit_msg() to take a errno argument, and pass that
through to integrity_audit_message(). Then update call sites to
take caller's respective error codes.
ima_appraise_measurement() stores xattr_len as the return code, but
can replace it with a error code later. Therefore conditionally use
a code if rc < 0, otherwise report zero. Lastly, conditionally use
-EINVAL for ima_release_policy().
Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Bravi <enrico.bravi@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe
Pull IPE fixes from Fan Wu:
"Two fixes for use-after-free issues found by recent LLM-assisted code
analysis.
- move successful policy load auditing under the new policy
directory's inode lock, preventing a concurrent policy deletion
from freeing the policy while it is still being audited
- protect the dm-verity root hash with RCU, preventing policy
evaluation from racing with root hash replacement during preresume"
* tag 'ipe-pr-20260925' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe:
ipe: protect the dm-verity root hash with RCU
ipe: fix use-after-free when auditing a newly loaded policy
|
|
ipe_bdev_setintegrity() frees the old root hash when dm-verity publishes
a new one on ->preresume, while policy evaluation can still be
dereferencing it.
Protect the root hash with RCU. The evaluation path already runs under
rcu_read_lock().
Fixes: e155858dd995 ("ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
[FW: remove model name according to latest guideline]
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
|
|
new_policy() audits the policy after ipe_new_policyfs_node() publishes it
and drops the new directory's inode lock. A concurrent delete can free
the policy while ipe_audit_policy_load() is still using it.
Audit the successful load under that lock.
Fixes: f44554b5067b ("audit,ipe: add IPE auditing support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
[FW: remove model name according to latest guideline]
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
|
|
avc_policy_seqno() reads latest_notif without holding notif_lock, while
avc_latest_notif_update() can update it under that lock. KCSAN reports
these concurrent accesses during policy boolean updates and permission
checks.
Use READ_ONCE() for the lockless read and WRITE_ONCE() for the update.
The spinlock continues to serialize the comparison and update against
other writers. Reads made while holding notif_lock cannot race with a
writer and can remain plain accesses.
This marks both sides of the intentional concurrent access and constrains
compiler transformations, without suppressing checking with data_race().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 788e7dd4c22e ("SELinux: Improve read/write performance")
Reported-by: syzbot+a7f7cb0737bd91aa698c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a7f7cb0737bd91aa698c
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
CAP_FS_SET is exactly the set of capabilities that an fsuid of 0
historically granted (see CAP_FS_MASK in include/linux/capability.h),
so cap_task_fix_setuid() drops that set from the effective set when
fsuid leaves 0. Replace the stale FIXME with this explanation.
Signed-off-by: Adriano Cordova <adrianox@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>
|
|
avc_audit_required() returns early for a neveraudit domain, while
avc_xperms_audit_required() instead relies on security_compute_av()
(and security_compute_av_user()) having already zeroed
avd->auditallow and avd->auditdeny for such a domain. That leaves
its "else if (result)" branch as the only way left to audit a
neveraudit domain, and makes the two helpers read differently for
the same rule.
Add the same early return to avc_xperms_audit_required(), so both
audit gates state the neveraudit rule directly and the extended
permission audit path no longer depends on the auditallow/auditdeny
mask having been zeroed elsewhere.
No behavior changes today: avc_has_extended_perms() only reaches the
"result" branch once the identically computed "denied" is already
nonzero, so that branch was already unreachable in practice.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
filename_trans_read_helper() validates the target type, target class and
each datum's otype, but the per-datum stypes ebitmap is read without any
bound on its set bits.
Reject a stypes bitmap whose highest set bit is not a defined type.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
The symbol index functions assign unconditionally, so two symbols that
share a value silently overwrite each other and leave another value with
no entry.
Reject a value whose slot is already populated, for commons, classes,
roles, types, users, sensitivities and categories;
booleans already have their own "declared but not defined" check.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
handle-unknown is a single three-valued choice - deny, reject or allow -
but the policydb header spells it as two independent bits and
policydb_read() takes any combination of them.
libsepol writes exactly one of the three values
(POLICYDB_CONFIG_UNKNOWN_MASK & p->handle_unknown), so no policy built by
the reference toolchain carries this combination.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Constify read-only decision structs to ease reasoning where decisions
are actually modified, and where only processed.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: fixed line length issues]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux
Pull Landlock fixes from Mickaël Salaün:
"This mainly fixes the Landlock tracepoint support merged this cycle so
that denial and rule events report the intended policy context,
whether through tracefs or BTF-visible callbacks.
The size of this all is mainly from propagating the corrected contract
through event definitions and producers, adding new tests for the
reported context, and updating the documentation.
Also improve annotation and fix a GCC 16 build warning"
* tag 'landlock-7.3-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
landlock: Widen ruleset versions to 64 bits
landlock: Add counted_by in landlock_domain
landlock: Fix tracepoint contract documentation
selftests/landlock: Test network denial context
selftests/landlock: Test filesystem denial blockers
landlock: Report the effective signal number
landlock: Report the actual ptrace tracer
landlock: Fix network denial trace context
landlock: Fix rule tracepoint context
landlock: Fix filesystem denial blocker reporting
landlock: Fix tracepoint fixed-width type names
landlock: Work around gcc-16 -Wuninitialized warning
|
|
Cross-merge BPF and other fixes after downstream PR.
Conflicts:
kernel/bpf/helpers.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cb_refs.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
Now that everything takes a mnt_idmap as const store a const pointer in
struct vfsmount, struct mount_kattr and struct kstatmount and return one
from mnt_idmap(), file_mnt_idmap() and ovl_upper_mnt_idmap(). Finally,
also make mnt_idmap_get() return a const pointer. Also convert the
remaining local variables that are initialized from the accessors.
alloc_mnt_idmap() keeps returning a non-const pointer. It is the only
place where an idmapping is actually written to.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-26-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
Convert to const struct mnt_idmap.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing that is allowed to be
modified afterwards is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only ever reads
from the idmapping. This is the same model that struct cred uses and the
idmapping is also rather sensitive.
So make the idmap argument const wherever we can. The conversion is done
from the bottom up so callers can continue to pass a non-const pointer
to a const parameter until the conversion is finished.
No functional changes.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-24-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
Convert to const struct mnt_idmap.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing that is allowed to be
modified afterwards is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only ever reads
from the idmapping. This is the same model that struct cred uses and the
idmapping is also rather sensitive.
So make the idmap argument const wherever we can. The conversion is done
from the bottom up so callers can continue to pass a non-const pointer
to a const parameter until the conversion is finished.
No functional changes.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-20-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
|
