diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/capability.c | 56 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/include/capability.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/lsm.c | 11 |
3 files changed, 62 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c index 7ca489ee1054..25b6219cdeb6 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/capability.c +++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", AA_SFS_CAPS_MASK), + AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("extended", 1), { } }; @@ -123,8 +124,31 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, { struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); + aa_state_t state; int error; + state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, ad->class); + if (state) { + struct aa_perms perms = { }; + u32 request; + + /* caps broken into 256 x 32 bit permission chunks */ + state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa, state, cap >> 5); + request = 1 << (cap & 0x1f); + perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state); + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); + + if (opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) { + if (perms.complain & request) + ad->info = "optional: no audit"; + else + ad = NULL; + } + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, + audit_cb); + } + + /* fallback to old caps mediation that doesn't support conditionals */ if (cap_raised(rules->caps.allow, cap) && !cap_raised(rules->caps.denied, cap)) error = 0; @@ -168,3 +192,35 @@ int aa_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, return error; } + +kernel_cap_t aa_profile_capget(struct aa_profile *profile) +{ + struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, + typeof(*rules), list); + aa_state_t state; + + state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_CAP); + if (state) { + kernel_cap_t caps = CAP_EMPTY_SET; + int i; + + /* caps broken into up to 256, 32 bit permission chunks */ + for (i = 0; i < (CAP_LAST_CAP >> 5); i++) { + struct aa_perms perms = { }; + aa_state_t tmp; + + tmp = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa, state, i); + perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, tmp); + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); + caps.val |= ((u64)(perms.allow)) << (i * 5); + caps.val |= ((u64)(perms.complain)) << (i * 5); + } + return caps; + } + + /* fallback to old caps */ + if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) + return CAP_FULL_SET; + + return rules->caps.allow; +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h index d6dcc604ec0c..1ddcec2d1160 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ struct aa_caps { extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[]; +kernel_cap_t aa_profile_capget(struct aa_profile *profile); int aa_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts); diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 72c3d1536f69..479bfea064af 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -177,14 +177,13 @@ static int apparmor_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effec label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) { struct aa_ruleset *rules; - if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) - continue; + kernel_cap_t allowed; + rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); - *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, - rules->caps.allow); - *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, - rules->caps.allow); + allowed = aa_profile_capget(profile); + *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, allowed); + *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, allowed); } } rcu_read_unlock(); |
