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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-07-11 18:15:25 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-07-11 18:15:25 -0700
commitce114c866860aa9eae3f50974efc68241186ba60 (patch)
tree2f53b9271be604ab7e30ccd580bc53ce50f3b593 /tools/objtool/builtin-check.c
parent5a29232d870d9e63fe5ff30b081be6ea7cc2465d (diff)
parent4ad3278df6fe2b0852b00d5757fc2ccd8e92c26e (diff)
downloadlinux-next-ce114c866860aa9eae3f50974efc68241186ba60.tar.gz
linux-next-ce114c866860aa9eae3f50974efc68241186ba60.zip
Merge tag 'x86_bugs_retbleed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 retbleed fixes from Borislav Petkov: "Just when you thought that all the speculation bugs were addressed and solved and the nightmare is complete, here's the next one: speculating after RET instructions and leaking privileged information using the now pretty much classical covert channels. It is called RETBleed and the mitigation effort and controlling functionality has been modelled similar to what already existing mitigations provide" * tag 'x86_bugs_retbleed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (54 commits) x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior x86/kexec: Disable RET on kexec x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB-on-entry when IBPB is not supported x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS() back into error_entry x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run() objtool: Re-add UNWIND_HINT_{SAVE_RESTORE} x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n ...
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/objtool/builtin-check.c')
-rw-r--r--tools/objtool/builtin-check.c13
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c
index f4c3a5091737..24fbe803a0d3 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ const struct option check_options[] = {
OPT_BOOLEAN('n', "noinstr", &opts.noinstr, "validate noinstr rules"),
OPT_BOOLEAN('o', "orc", &opts.orc, "generate ORC metadata"),
OPT_BOOLEAN('r', "retpoline", &opts.retpoline, "validate and annotate retpoline usage"),
+ OPT_BOOLEAN(0, "rethunk", &opts.rethunk, "validate and annotate rethunk usage"),
+ OPT_BOOLEAN(0, "unret", &opts.unret, "validate entry unret placement"),
OPT_BOOLEAN('l', "sls", &opts.sls, "validate straight-line-speculation mitigations"),
OPT_BOOLEAN('s', "stackval", &opts.stackval, "validate frame pointer rules"),
OPT_BOOLEAN('t', "static-call", &opts.static_call, "annotate static calls"),
@@ -123,6 +125,7 @@ static bool opts_valid(void)
opts.noinstr ||
opts.orc ||
opts.retpoline ||
+ opts.rethunk ||
opts.sls ||
opts.stackval ||
opts.static_call ||
@@ -135,6 +138,11 @@ static bool opts_valid(void)
return true;
}
+ if (opts.unret && !opts.rethunk) {
+ ERROR("--unret requires --rethunk");
+ return false;
+ }
+
if (opts.dump_orc)
return true;
@@ -163,6 +171,11 @@ static bool link_opts_valid(struct objtool_file *file)
return false;
}
+ if (opts.unret) {
+ ERROR("--unret requires --link");
+ return false;
+ }
+
return true;
}