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| author | Sagar Taunk <sagartaunk@proton.me> | 2026-09-25 08:55:04 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> | 2026-09-29 12:28:03 +0200 |
| commit | 0923198be4ae714b46350f742cb19ccd75bfeafa (patch) | |
| tree | 28da8a6bbc408cbe2216fa1e10087a9a2b033cf8 /rust | |
| parent | f8932b2c0c9ae6fb577bcc05a2080c8498f91c0d (diff) | |
| download | linux-next-0923198be4ae714b46350f742cb19ccd75bfeafa.tar.gz linux-next-0923198be4ae714b46350f742cb19ccd75bfeafa.zip | |
rust: net: netlink: validate attribute length before casting to `c_int`
`put()` trusted an unchecked `as` cast from `usize` to `c_int`.
When the length exceeds `i32::MAX` that cast wraps around to a
negative value.
This ultimately resulted in a kernel panic when the reinterpreted
value via `__nla_reserve()` and `skb_put()` became enormous.
Validate payload and header both fit together in a `u16`, rejecting
any payload that wouldn't leave room for `NLA_HDRLEN`.
Fixes: 5eaa5fbb6e6c ("rust: netlink: add raw netlink abstraction")
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net>
Signed-off-by: Sagar Taunk <sagartaunk@proton.me>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260925085449.22553-1-sagartaunk@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'rust')
| -rw-r--r-- | rust/kernel/net/netlink.rs | 9 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/rust/kernel/net/netlink.rs b/rust/kernel/net/netlink.rs index 22ef3dde36fa..2f8733a694a9 100644 --- a/rust/kernel/net/netlink.rs +++ b/rust/kernel/net/netlink.rs @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ use kernel::{ alloc::{self, AllocError}, error::to_result, + num::casts::u16_as_usize, prelude::*, transmute::AsBytes, types::Opaque, @@ -86,9 +87,17 @@ impl GenlMsg { where T: ?Sized + AsBytes, { + // `nla_len` is a 16-bit field that encodes the total attribute length + // (header + payload). Subtracting the header size from `u16::MAX` gives + // the largest payload that still fits within that field. + const MAX_PAYLOAD_LEN: usize = u16_as_usize(u16::MAX) - size_of::<bindings::nlattr>(); + let skb = self.skb.skb.as_ptr(); let len = size_of_val(value); let ptr = core::ptr::from_ref(value).cast::<c_void>(); + if len > MAX_PAYLOAD_LEN { + return Err(EMSGSIZE); + } // SAFETY: `skb` is valid by `NetlinkSkBuff` type invariants, and the provided value is // readable and initialized for its `size_of` bytes. to_result(unsafe { bindings::nla_put(skb, attrtype, len as c_int, ptr) }) |
