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authorDoruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>2026-07-16 21:34:23 +0200
committerJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>2026-07-23 08:12:25 -0700
commitfd3a3f28ed60c6af4b2a39933b151d6b27842c3b (patch)
tree4585f5841d936f1a5cb5c39d3161f8388bc7104f /net
parent18f116931f52e3c3303ad4b15ff41eb89b0e4239 (diff)
downloadlinux-next-fd3a3f28ed60c6af4b2a39933b151d6b27842c3b.tar.gz
linux-next-fd3a3f28ed60c6af4b2a39933b151d6b27842c3b.zip
mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag
llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the AEAD request as assoclen += datalen - authlen; where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen (4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that only spans the real frame. The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction. Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed. Fixes: 4c14a2fb5d14 ("mac802154: add llsec decryption method") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260716193423.32498-1-doruk@0sec.ai Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r--net/mac802154/llsec.c5
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/mac802154/llsec.c b/net/mac802154/llsec.c
index 5e7cc11fab3a..85452ef9a58c 100644
--- a/net/mac802154/llsec.c
+++ b/net/mac802154/llsec.c
@@ -891,6 +891,11 @@ llsec_do_decrypt_auth(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct mac802154_llsec *sec,
data = skb_mac_header(skb) + skb->mac_len;
datalen = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - data;
+ if (datalen < authlen) {
+ kfree_sensitive(req);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
sg_init_one(&sg, skb_mac_header(skb), assoclen + datalen);
if (!(hdr->sec.level & IEEE802154_SCF_SECLEVEL_ENC)) {