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authorChris Mason <clm@meta.com>2026-05-23 21:02:11 -0400
committerChuck Lever <cel@kernel.org>2026-07-27 08:49:57 -0400
commitf4fc98458d2072f2286836dd69f0e12b5c9d7ce5 (patch)
tree54b56671be2cc9cb2a88ee7c2db2a44289cefd49 /net
parentabfafd4a26b020e39db3166bb521f8a96ab7a132 (diff)
downloadlinux-next-f4fc98458d2072f2286836dd69f0e12b5c9d7ce5.tar.gz
linux-next-f4fc98458d2072f2286836dd69f0e12b5c9d7ce5.zip
SUNRPC: harden gss_unwrap_resp_priv length checks
gss_unwrap_resp_priv() validates the RPCSEC_GSS opaque length with offset = (u8 *)(p) - (u8 *)head->iov_base; if (offset + opaque_len > rcv_buf->len) goto unwrap_failed; maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset, offset + opaque_len, rcv_buf); Both operands are u32 and the sum is computed in u32. A reply with opaque_len near 0xffffffff makes offset + opaque_len wrap to a small value that is below rcv_buf->len, so the bound check passes and gss_unwrap() is called with end < begin. The check also lacks a lower bound, so any opaque_len in [0, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN) is accepted and forwarded to gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), whose pre-decrypt header reads at ptr+4 and ptr+6 then run past the token. A krb5p NFS server returning a crafted RPCSEC_GSS reply can drive the client into out-of-bounds reads in gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() and the rotate_left() loop that follows. Fix by replacing the single combined check with three guards that are safe in u32 arithmetic and that enforce the RFC 4121 minimum outer token length: if (offset > rcv_buf->len) goto unwrap_failed; if (opaque_len > rcv_buf->len - offset) goto unwrap_failed; if (opaque_len < GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN) goto unwrap_failed; The first guard makes the subtraction in the second guard unconditionally safe; offset is derived from a successful xdr_inline_decode() in the head kvec, so in practice it already satisfies the bound. The floor mirrors the server-side check added in commit 5b757c2e57a5 ("SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token minimum length"). Fixes: 2d2da60c63b6 ("RPCSEC_GSS: client-side privacy support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: kres (claude-opus-4-7) Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260524010213.557424-3-cel@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c6
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
index 9d3fb6848f40..8ddc65e894da 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
@@ -2072,7 +2072,11 @@ gss_unwrap_resp_priv(struct rpc_task *task, struct rpc_cred *cred,
goto unwrap_failed;
opaque_len = be32_to_cpup(p++);
offset = (u8 *)(p) - (u8 *)head->iov_base;
- if (offset + opaque_len > rcv_buf->len)
+ if (offset > rcv_buf->len)
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+ if (opaque_len > rcv_buf->len - offset)
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+ if (opaque_len <= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN)
goto unwrap_failed;
maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset,