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| author | Chris Mason <clm@meta.com> | 2026-05-23 21:02:11 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Chuck Lever <cel@kernel.org> | 2026-07-27 08:49:57 -0400 |
| commit | f4fc98458d2072f2286836dd69f0e12b5c9d7ce5 (patch) | |
| tree | 54b56671be2cc9cb2a88ee7c2db2a44289cefd49 /net | |
| parent | abfafd4a26b020e39db3166bb521f8a96ab7a132 (diff) | |
| download | linux-next-f4fc98458d2072f2286836dd69f0e12b5c9d7ce5.tar.gz linux-next-f4fc98458d2072f2286836dd69f0e12b5c9d7ce5.zip | |
SUNRPC: harden gss_unwrap_resp_priv length checks
gss_unwrap_resp_priv() validates the RPCSEC_GSS opaque length with
offset = (u8 *)(p) - (u8 *)head->iov_base;
if (offset + opaque_len > rcv_buf->len)
goto unwrap_failed;
maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset,
offset + opaque_len, rcv_buf);
Both operands are u32 and the sum is computed in u32. A reply with
opaque_len near 0xffffffff makes offset + opaque_len wrap to a small
value that is below rcv_buf->len, so the bound check passes and
gss_unwrap() is called with end < begin. The check also lacks a
lower bound, so any opaque_len in [0, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN) is
accepted and forwarded to gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), whose pre-decrypt
header reads at ptr+4 and ptr+6 then run past the token.
A krb5p NFS server returning a crafted RPCSEC_GSS reply can drive
the client into out-of-bounds reads in gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() and the
rotate_left() loop that follows.
Fix by replacing the single combined check with three guards that
are safe in u32 arithmetic and that enforce the RFC 4121 minimum
outer token length:
if (offset > rcv_buf->len)
goto unwrap_failed;
if (opaque_len > rcv_buf->len - offset)
goto unwrap_failed;
if (opaque_len < GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN)
goto unwrap_failed;
The first guard makes the subtraction in the second guard
unconditionally safe; offset is derived from a successful
xdr_inline_decode() in the head kvec, so in practice it already
satisfies the bound. The floor mirrors the server-side check added
in commit 5b757c2e57a5 ("SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token
minimum length").
Fixes: 2d2da60c63b6 ("RPCSEC_GSS: client-side privacy support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: kres (claude-opus-4-7)
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260524010213.557424-3-cel@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c index 9d3fb6848f40..8ddc65e894da 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c @@ -2072,7 +2072,11 @@ gss_unwrap_resp_priv(struct rpc_task *task, struct rpc_cred *cred, goto unwrap_failed; opaque_len = be32_to_cpup(p++); offset = (u8 *)(p) - (u8 *)head->iov_base; - if (offset + opaque_len > rcv_buf->len) + if (offset > rcv_buf->len) + goto unwrap_failed; + if (opaque_len > rcv_buf->len - offset) + goto unwrap_failed; + if (opaque_len <= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN) goto unwrap_failed; maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset, |
