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authorEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>2026-06-05 11:21:34 +0000
committerJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>2026-06-08 15:37:10 -0700
commit5d39580f68e6ddeedd15e587282207489dfb3da2 (patch)
tree84053803c7ec09af0bcfa7d8bd21441ddb11bf85 /net/core
parent9772589b57e44aedc240211c5c3f7a684a034d3a (diff)
downloadlinux-next-5d39580f68e6ddeedd15e587282207489dfb3da2.tar.gz
linux-next-5d39580f68e6ddeedd15e587282207489dfb3da2.zip
tcp: restrict SO_ATTACH_FILTER to priv users
This patch restricts the use of SO_ATTACH_FILTER (cBPF) on TCP sockets to users with CAP_NET_ADMIN capability. This blocks potential side-channel attack where an unprivileged application attaches a filter to leak TCP sequence/acknowledgment numbers. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Tamir Shahar <tamirthesis@gmail.com> Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev> Cc: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Cc: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Cc: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/core')
-rw-r--r--net/core/sock.c5
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index d097025c116a..cab041b57d28 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -1465,6 +1465,11 @@ set_sndbuf:
case SO_ATTACH_FILTER: {
struct sock_fprog fprog;
+ if (sk_is_tcp(sk) &&
+ !sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ break;
+ }
ret = copy_bpf_fprog_from_user(&fprog, optval, optlen);
if (!ret)
ret = sk_attach_filter(&fprog, sk);