Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20250323' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm

Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:

 - Various minor updates to the LSM Rust bindings

   Changes include marking trivial Rust bindings as inlines and comment
   tweaks to better reflect the LSM hooks.

 - Add LSM/SELinux access controls to io_uring_allowed()

   Similar to the io_uring_disabled sysctl, add a LSM hook to
   io_uring_allowed() to enable LSMs a simple way to enforce security
   policy on the use of io_uring. This pull request includes SELinux
   support for this new control using the io_uring/allowed permission.

 - Remove an unused parameter from the security_perf_event_open() hook

   The perf_event_attr struct parameter was not used by any currently
   supported LSMs, remove it from the hook.

 - Add an explicit MAINTAINERS entry for the credentials code

   We've seen problems in the past where patches to the credentials code
   sent by non-maintainers would often languish on the lists for
   multiple months as there was no one explicitly tasked with the
   responsibility of reviewing and/or merging credentials related code.

   Considering that most of the code under security/ has a vested
   interest in ensuring that the credentials code is well maintained,
   I'm volunteering to look after the credentials code and Serge Hallyn
   has also volunteered to step up as an official reviewer. I posted the
   MAINTAINERS update as a RFC to LKML in hopes that someone else would
   jump up with an "I'll do it!", but beyond Serge it was all crickets.

 - Update Stephen Smalley's old email address to prevent confusion

   This includes a corresponding update to the mailmap file.

* tag 'lsm-pr-20250323' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
  mailmap: map Stephen Smalley's old email addresses
  lsm: remove old email address for Stephen Smalley
  MAINTAINERS: add Serge Hallyn as a credentials reviewer
  MAINTAINERS: add an explicit credentials entry
  cred,rust: mark Credential methods inline
  lsm,rust: reword "destroy" -> "release" in SecurityCtx
  lsm,rust: mark SecurityCtx methods inline
  perf: Remove unnecessary parameter of security check
  lsm: fix a missing security_uring_allowed() prototype
  io_uring,lsm,selinux: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup()
  io_uring: refactor io_uring_allowed()

1 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 5d2221ec6d7c..0bb21659e252 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -4886,7 +4886,7 @@ find_get_context(struct task_struct *task, struct perf_event *event)
 
 	if (!task) {
 		/* Must be root to operate on a CPU event: */
-		err = perf_allow_cpu(&event->attr);
+		err = perf_allow_cpu();
 		if (err)
 			return ERR_PTR(err);
 
@@ -12848,7 +12848,7 @@ static int perf_copy_attr(struct perf_event_attr __user *uattr,
 		}
 		/* privileged levels capture (kernel, hv): check permissions */
 		if (mask & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PERM_PLM) {
-			ret = perf_allow_kernel(attr);
+			ret = perf_allow_kernel();
 			if (ret)
 				return ret;
 		}
@@ -13105,12 +13105,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 		return err;
 
 	/* Do we allow access to perf_event_open(2) ? */
-	err = security_perf_event_open(&attr, PERF_SECURITY_OPEN);
+	err = security_perf_event_open(PERF_SECURITY_OPEN);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
 	if (!attr.exclude_kernel) {
-		err = perf_allow_kernel(&attr);
+		err = perf_allow_kernel();
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 	}
@@ -13130,7 +13130,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 
 	/* Only privileged users can get physical addresses */
 	if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR)) {
-		err = perf_allow_kernel(&attr);
+		err = perf_allow_kernel();
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 	}
@@ -13969,12 +13969,12 @@ const struct perf_event_attr *perf_event_attrs(struct perf_event *event)
 	return &event->attr;
 }
 
-int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
+int perf_allow_kernel(void)
 {
 	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
+	return security_perf_event_open(PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(perf_allow_kernel);