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| author | Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> | 2026-09-18 20:50:29 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> | 2026-09-20 11:08:05 +0200 |
| commit | 0889db596a25ecde210e66fa0db70bc6a6d91f6c (patch) | |
| tree | ec1ebff23f21605d0fad839c7a14d2aaf5b852ac /include/trace | |
| parent | 7ad69ac63315506e2091bf46d5c96c49f6ce439e (diff) | |
| download | linux-next-0889db596a25ecde210e66fa0db70bc6a6d91f6c.tar.gz linux-next-0889db596a25ecde210e66fa0db70bc6a6d91f6c.zip | |
landlock: Report the effective signal number
The signal-scope denial callback identifies its target but not the
effective signal. This loses permission-probe signal zero and makes the
file-owner hook's zero sentinel ambiguous.
Append an int signal argument to the typed-BPF callback. Preserve sig,
including zero, in hook_task_kill(). In hook_file_send_sigiotask(),
translate signum zero to SIGIO at the producer, where its meaning is
known.
Carry the effective signal and target domain ID in a private,
stack-backed context consumed synchronously. This requires no allocation
or task reference in the interrupt-capable file-owner path. Gate this
context and the remaining scope-only domain IDs with CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS.
Keep the tracefs record and audit output unchanged.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Fixes: bb91730f16c0 ("landlock: Add tracepoints for ptrace and scope denials")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260918185036.608651-7-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/trace')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/trace/events/landlock.h | 8 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/include/trace/events/landlock.h b/include/trace/events/landlock.h index 8c6ebf958d66..5da0f12ed2c3 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/landlock.h +++ b/include/trace/events/landlock.h @@ -928,12 +928,14 @@ TRACE_EVENT(landlock_deny_ptrace, * * @hierarchy: Denying domain's hierarchy node (never NULL); its id is the * domain field. - * @same_exec: Whether the current task entered the denying domain itself. + * @same_exec: Whether the policy subject entered the denying domain itself. * @logged: The domain's audit-logging decision for this denial. * @target_domain_id: The target's Landlock domain ID, or 0 if the target * is unsandboxed. * @target: The task the signal was aimed at (never NULL). target_pid is * the init-namespace TGID (like audit's opid). + * @signal: The signal selected by the denied check. Zero is a permission + * probe, not an absent value. * * Emitted when a Landlock domain denies signal delivery to a scoped-out * target. @@ -942,9 +944,9 @@ TRACE_EVENT(landlock_deny_scope_signal, TP_PROTO(const struct landlock_hierarchy *hierarchy, bool same_exec, bool logged, u64 target_domain_id, - const struct task_struct *target), + const struct task_struct *target, int signal), - TP_ARGS(hierarchy, same_exec, logged, target_domain_id, target), + TP_ARGS(hierarchy, same_exec, logged, target_domain_id, target, signal), TP_STRUCT__entry( __field( u64, domain_id ) |