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| author | Alexandro Calo <alexandro.calo@nozominetworks.com> | 2026-07-17 12:14:51 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> | 2026-07-27 18:11:31 +0900 |
| commit | 5b4020fbd223c5d84908b12ae5f6def4fd8ac162 (patch) | |
| tree | 1f09881a6b3726b481ddf18a4c79a62d816b1b69 /fs | |
| parent | 7cc56fea68daea52983a863473b6100869e6c5a9 (diff) | |
| download | linux-next-5b4020fbd223c5d84908b12ae5f6def4fd8ac162.tar.gz linux-next-5b4020fbd223c5d84908b12ae5f6def4fd8ac162.zip | |
ntfs: Fix index_root heap OOB write in ntfs_ir_to_ib()
ntfs_ir_to_ib copies all entries from index_root into a freshly allocated
index_block_size-byte buffer without verifying that the entries fit in the
available space. The entries in index_root may be larger than the usable
entry space in the index block.
This can cause OOB writes past the end of the allocation.
The validator ntfs_index_root_inconsistent() checks that entries are
self-consistent within the IR value, but never cross-checks them against
index_block_size. There is no bounds check in ntfs_ir_to_ib() before the
memcpy.
Fixing this at the sink in ntfs_ir_to_ib() since
ntfs_index_root_inconsistent() validates the logical consistency of
index_root as a structure and a root with large entries is a structurally
valid root. The bug is a size conflict of ntfs_ir_to_ib().
Also, the validator is called once per inode load in
ntfs_read_locked_inode() while ntfs_ir_to_ib() is only called during a
reparent, a check there adds no overhead to the common path.
Moreover, even a future call path that bypasses the validator would still
be protected.
With NULL as first parameter of ntfs_error(), the volume error flag is
never set by this call, so the device name will be absent from the error
message. In any case, that the caller, ntfs_ir_reparent(), prints an error
message that includes the device name on NULL returns.
I think this is the best solution available without adding
'struct super_block *sb' as a parameter to ntfs_ir_to_ib().
This heap out-of-bounds write is triggered by a crafted filesystem image,
which is not in the kernel threat model, anyway, fixing memory errors would
be nice to keep things secure.
Fixes: 0a8ac0c1fa0b ("ntfs: update directory operations")
Signed-off-by: Alexandro Calo <alexandro.calo@nozominetworks.com>
Reviewed-by: Hyunchul Lee <hyc.lee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/ntfs/index.c | 11 |
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ntfs/index.c b/fs/ntfs/index.c index faa7ee920a3a..409759eab55d 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs/index.c +++ b/fs/ntfs/index.c @@ -1112,6 +1112,7 @@ static struct index_block *ntfs_ir_to_ib(struct index_root *ir, s64 ib_vcn) struct index_entry *ie_last; char *ies_start, *ies_end; int i; + u32 ib_cap; ntfs_debug("Entering\n"); @@ -1127,6 +1128,16 @@ static struct index_block *ntfs_ir_to_ib(struct index_root *ir, s64 ib_vcn) * as well, which can never have any data. */ i = (char *)ie_last - ies_start + le16_to_cpu(ie_last->length); + + /* Entries must fit in the allocated index block */ + ib_cap = le32_to_cpu(ib->index.allocated_size) - + le32_to_cpu(ib->index.entries_offset); + if ((u32)i > ib_cap) { + ntfs_error(NULL, "Entries (%d B) exceed IB capacity", i); + kvfree(ib); + return NULL; + } + memcpy(ntfs_ie_get_first(&ib->index), ies_start, i); ib->index.flags = ir->index.flags; |
