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authorBryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>2026-05-27 15:00:00 -0500
committerKeith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>2026-06-02 03:43:27 -0700
commit53cd102a7a56079b11b897835bd9b94c14e6322c (patch)
treedaf92cd0529ec523d5d4c68e8891f8eca3545709 /drivers/nvme
parent88bac2c1a72b8f4f71e9845699aa872df04e5850 (diff)
downloadlinux-next-53cd102a7a56079b11b897835bd9b94c14e6322c.tar.gz
linux-next-53cd102a7a56079b11b897835bd9b94c14e6322c.zip
nvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page
nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page() validates only the dword alignment of the host-supplied Log Page Offset (lpo). The 64-bit offset is then added to a small kzalloc'd buffer that holds the discovery log page and the result is passed straight to nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), which memcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound check: u64 offset = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req->cmd); /* 64-bit host */ size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req->cmd); /* 32-bit host */ ... if (offset & 0x3) { ... } /* only check */ ... alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req); buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL); ... status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len); The Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmet_host_allowed() returns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call is reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach the nvmet target. With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker requesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloc_len reads the next slab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an empirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81 canonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response). Pointing the offset at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel memcpy and crashes (or panics, on panic_on_oops=1) the target host instead. The attacker-controlled source-side offset pattern "nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + ATTACKER_OFFSET, ...)" is unique to nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page in the entire nvmet codebase: every other Get Log Page handler in admin-cmd.c either ignores lpo (and silently starts every response at offset 0) or tracks a local destination offset with a fixed source pointer. Validate the host-supplied offset against the log page size, cap the copy length to what is actually available, and zero-fill any remainder of the host transfer buffer. The zero-fill matches the existing short-response pattern in nvmet_execute_get_log_changed_ns() (admin-cmd.c) and prevents leaking transport SGL contents when the host asks for more bytes than the log page contains. Fixes: a07b4970f464 ("nvmet: add a generic NVMe target") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/nvme')
-rw-r--r--drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c23
1 files changed, 22 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c b/drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c
index e9b35549e254..114869d16a1f 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c
@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page(struct nvmet_req *req)
u64 offset = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req->cmd);
size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req->cmd);
size_t alloc_len;
+ size_t copy_len;
struct nvmet_subsys_link *p;
struct nvmet_port *r;
u32 numrec = 0;
@@ -242,7 +243,27 @@ static void nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page(struct nvmet_req *req)
up_read(&nvmet_config_sem);
- status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len);
+ /*
+ * Validate the host-supplied log page offset before copying out.
+ * Without this check, the host controls a 64-bit byte offset into
+ * a small kzalloc'd buffer: a value past the log page lets the
+ * subsequent memcpy read adjacent kernel heap, and a value aimed
+ * at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel copy and crashes
+ * the target host. The Discovery controller is unauthenticated,
+ * so the bug is reachable from any reachable fabric peer.
+ */
+ if (offset > alloc_len) {
+ req->error_loc =
+ offsetof(struct nvme_get_log_page_command, lpo);
+ status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
+ goto out_free_buffer;
+ }
+
+ copy_len = min_t(size_t, data_len, alloc_len - offset);
+ status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, copy_len);
+ if (!status && copy_len < data_len)
+ status = nvmet_zero_sgl(req, copy_len, data_len - copy_len);
+out_free_buffer:
kfree(buffer);
out:
nvmet_req_complete(req, status);