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authorErwin Pawliczek <pawliczekerwin@gmail.com>2026-10-25 22:44:29 -0500
committerHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>2026-11-12 17:35:33 +0800
commitcd65eaf17841ac76f93a0c0806215cbd0e1cd980 (patch)
tree080911f7c9bbae9e672de50f8104ecd1b8083769 /crypto
parent99f506c86bf8b6909564fff64eeaa64dec5996b9 (diff)
downloadlinux-next-cd65eaf17841ac76f93a0c0806215cbd0e1cd980.tar.gz
linux-next-cd65eaf17841ac76f93a0c0806215cbd0e1cd980.zip
crypto: ecc - Randomize the initial Z in ecc_make_pub_key()
ecc_make_pub_key() calls ecc_point_mult() without an initial Z, so the final Z, and therefore the input to vli_mod_inv(), is a deterministic function of the private key. vli_mod_inv() is not constant time, so key generation leaks information about the private key through its running time. crypto_ecdh_shared_secret() already passes a random initial Z, which blinds the inversion input. Do the same in ecc_make_pub_key(). Key generation is used in the kernel by Bluetooth SMP and TPM2 HMAC sessions, which generate ephemeral P-256 keys. crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(), KVM guest on an i7-1165G7 (median over 4 boots of the best of 9 runs of 300 calls): P-256: 744.9 us -> 753.2 us (+1.1%; within noise) P-384: 1674.2 us -> 1651.6 us (-1.4%; within noise) Suggested-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@linux.win> Signed-off-by: Erwin Pawliczek <pawliczekerwin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@linux.win> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r--crypto/ecc.c11
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/ecc.c b/crypto/ecc.c
index c7366eb7ce1f..6696bf0d90a6 100644
--- a/crypto/ecc.c
+++ b/crypto/ecc.c
@@ -1614,20 +1614,26 @@ int ecc_make_pub_key(unsigned int curve_id, unsigned int ndigits,
{
int ret = 0;
struct ecc_point *pk;
+ u64 rand_z[ECC_MAX_DIGITS];
+ unsigned int nbytes;
const struct ecc_curve *curve = ecc_get_curve(curve_id);
- if (!private_key) {
+ if (!private_key || ndigits > ARRAY_SIZE(rand_z)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
+ nbytes = ndigits << ECC_DIGITS_TO_BYTES_SHIFT;
+
+ get_random_bytes(rand_z, nbytes);
+
pk = ecc_alloc_point(ndigits);
if (!pk) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
- ecc_point_mult(pk, &curve->g, private_key, NULL, curve, ndigits);
+ ecc_point_mult(pk, &curve->g, private_key, rand_z, curve, ndigits);
/* SP800-56A rev 3 5.6.2.1.3 key check */
if (ecc_is_pubkey_valid_full(curve, pk)) {
@@ -1641,6 +1647,7 @@ int ecc_make_pub_key(unsigned int curve_id, unsigned int ndigits,
err_free_point:
ecc_free_point(pk);
out:
+ memzero_explicit(rand_z, sizeof(rand_z));
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ecc_make_pub_key);