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authorPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>2026-07-08 11:40:14 -0700
committerBorislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>2026-07-20 10:04:45 -0700
commita4c714fe9746bf5a434bb798b26ebba278b798c1 (patch)
tree64c70f028cd57a5fd60b3fca023b44b0737f270a /arch
parent3eaa50e1e255ec261c757b9eea811ef3bac10d1e (diff)
downloadlinux-next-a4c714fe9746bf5a434bb798b26ebba278b798c1.tar.gz
linux-next-a4c714fe9746bf5a434bb798b26ebba278b798c1.zip
x86/bugs: Don't use cpu-type matching in cpu_vuln_blacklist
Thomas Gleixner pointed out that cpu-type is a per-CPU property while hybrid is a system property; conflating the two in the CPU matching infrastructure is wrong. Currently, on a hybrid system x86_match_cpu() matches any cpu-type. This works if the intent is to find the possibility of a cpu-type in a system. But fails if matching for the cpu-type of a given CPU. Borislav posted a cleanup here: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260703193222.GFakgORjvxwnZTPRnI@fat_crate.local To make way for the cleanup stop matching cpu-type in cpu_vuln_blacklist. RFDS is the only user, so drop the VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE entries and fold their RFDS bit into the base Alder Lake (0x97) and Raptor Lake (0xB7) blacklist entries. For now open-code cpu-type check in vulnerable_to_rfds(). In the future, if more vulnerabilities need cpu-type matching a helper can be added. No functional change intended. Fixes: 722fa0dba74f ("x86/rfds: Exclude P-only parts from the RFDS affected list") Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260708-cpu-type-vuln-v1-1-85c1d3c704db@linux.intel.com
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c25
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index a3df21d26460..b38126199a5b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1251,9 +1251,6 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
#define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(vfm, max_stepping, issues) \
X86_MATCH_VFM_STEPS(vfm, X86_STEP_MIN, max_stepping, issues)
-#define VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(vfm, cpu_type, issues) \
- X86_MATCH_VFM_CPU_TYPE(vfm, INTEL_CPU_TYPE_##cpu_type, issues)
-
#define VULNBL_AMD(family, blacklist) \
VULNBL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist)
@@ -1316,11 +1313,9 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_LAKEFIELD, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
- VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_ALDERLAKE, ATOM, RFDS | VMSCAPE),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS | VMSCAPE),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS | VMSCAPE),
- VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE, ATOM, RFDS | VMSCAPE),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS | VMSCAPE),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE_P, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS | VMSCAPE),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE_S, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS | VMSCAPE),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_METEORLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE),
@@ -1388,7 +1383,21 @@ static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 x86_arch_cap_msr)
return true;
/* Only consult the blacklist when there is no enumeration: */
- return cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RFDS);
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RFDS))
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * ADL and RPL are affected only if they have Atom CPUs. Hybrids have
+ * both Core and Atom CPUs. Mark unaffected when Atom CPUs are not
+ * present.
+ */
+ if ((boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 0x97 ||
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 0xB7) &&
+ boot_cpu_data.topo.intel_type != INTEL_CPU_TYPE_ATOM &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYBRID_CPU))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
}
static bool __init vulnerable_to_its(u64 x86_arch_cap_msr)