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2024-10-16x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init()Nikunj A Dadhania
Address the ignored failures from snp_init() in sme_enable(). Add error handling for scenarios where snp_init() fails to retrieve the SEV-SNP CC blob or encounters issues while parsing the CC blob. Ensure that SNP guests will error out early, preventing delayed error reporting or undefined behavior. Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009092850.197575-3-nikunj@amd.com
2024-03-14Merge tag 'mm-stable-2024-03-13-20-04' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton: - Sumanth Korikkar has taught s390 to allocate hotplug-time page frames from hotplugged memory rather than only from main memory. Series "implement "memmap on memory" feature on s390". - More folio conversions from Matthew Wilcox in the series "Convert memcontrol charge moving to use folios" "mm: convert mm counter to take a folio" - Chengming Zhou has optimized zswap's rbtree locking, providing significant reductions in system time and modest but measurable reductions in overall runtimes. The series is "mm/zswap: optimize the scalability of zswap rb-tree". - Chengming Zhou has also provided the series "mm/zswap: optimize zswap lru list" which provides measurable runtime benefits in some swap-intensive situations. - And Chengming Zhou further optimizes zswap in the series "mm/zswap: optimize for dynamic zswap_pools". Measured improvements are modest. - zswap cleanups and simplifications from Yosry Ahmed in the series "mm: zswap: simplify zswap_swapoff()". - In the series "Add DAX ABI for memmap_on_memory", Vishal Verma has contributed several DAX cleanups as well as adding a sysfs tunable to control the memmap_on_memory setting when the dax device is hotplugged as system memory. - Johannes Weiner has added the large series "mm: zswap: cleanups", which does that. - More DAMON work from SeongJae Park in the series "mm/damon: make DAMON debugfs interface deprecation unignorable" "selftests/damon: add more tests for core functionalities and corner cases" "Docs/mm/damon: misc readability improvements" "mm/damon: let DAMOS feeds and tame/auto-tune itself" - In the series "mm/mempolicy: weighted interleave mempolicy and sysfs extension" Rakie Kim has developed a new mempolicy interleaving policy wherein we allocate memory across nodes in a weighted fashion rather than uniformly. This is beneficial in heterogeneous memory environments appearing with CXL. - Christophe Leroy has contributed some cleanup and consolidation work against the ARM pagetable dumping code in the series "mm: ptdump: Refactor CONFIG_DEBUG_WX and check_wx_pages debugfs attribute". - Luis Chamberlain has added some additional xarray selftesting in the series "test_xarray: advanced API multi-index tests". - Muhammad Usama Anjum has reworked the selftest code to make its human-readable output conform to the TAP ("Test Anything Protocol") format. Amongst other things, this opens up the use of third-party tools to parse and process out selftesting results. - Ryan Roberts has added fork()-time PTE batching of THP ptes in the series "mm/memory: optimize fork() with PTE-mapped THP". Mainly targeted at arm64, this significantly speeds up fork() when the process has a large number of pte-mapped folios. - David Hildenbrand also gets in on the THP pte batching game in his series "mm/memory: optimize unmap/zap with PTE-mapped THP". It implements batching during munmap() and other pte teardown situations. The microbenchmark improvements are nice. - And in the series "Transparent Contiguous PTEs for User Mappings" Ryan Roberts further utilizes arm's pte's contiguous bit ("contpte mappings"). Kernel build times on arm64 improved nicely. Ryan's series "Address some contpte nits" provides some followup work. - In the series "mm/hugetlb: Restore the reservation" Breno Leitao has fixed an obscure hugetlb race which was causing unnecessary page faults. He has also added a reproducer under the selftest code. - In the series "selftests/mm: Output cleanups for the compaction test", Mark Brown did what the title claims. - Kinsey Ho has added the series "mm/mglru: code cleanup and refactoring". - Even more zswap material from Nhat Pham. The series "fix and extend zswap kselftests" does as claimed. - In the series "Introduce cpu_dcache_is_aliasing() to fix DAX regression" Mathieu Desnoyers has cleaned up and fixed rather a mess in our handling of DAX on archiecctures which have virtually aliasing data caches. The arm architecture is the main beneficiary. - Lokesh Gidra's series "per-vma locks in userfaultfd" provides dramatic improvements in worst-case mmap_lock hold times during certain userfaultfd operations. - Some page_owner enhancements and maintenance work from Oscar Salvador in his series "page_owner: print stacks and their outstanding allocations" "page_owner: Fixup and cleanup" - Uladzislau Rezki has contributed some vmalloc scalability improvements in his series "Mitigate a vmap lock contention". It realizes a 12x improvement for a certain microbenchmark. - Some kexec/crash cleanup work from Baoquan He in the series "Split crash out from kexec and clean up related config items". - Some zsmalloc maintenance work from Chengming Zhou in the series "mm/zsmalloc: fix and optimize objects/page migration" "mm/zsmalloc: some cleanup for get/set_zspage_mapping()" - Zi Yan has taught the MM to perform compaction on folios larger than order=0. This a step along the path to implementaton of the merging of large anonymous folios. The series is named "Enable >0 order folio memory compaction". - Christoph Hellwig has done quite a lot of cleanup work in the pagecache writeback code in his series "convert write_cache_pages() to an iterator". - Some modest hugetlb cleanups and speedups in Vishal Moola's series "Handle hugetlb faults under the VMA lock". - Zi Yan has changed the page splitting code so we can split huge pages into sizes other than order-0 to better utilize large folios. The series is named "Split a folio to any lower order folios". - David Hildenbrand has contributed the series "mm: remove total_mapcount()", a cleanup. - Matthew Wilcox has sought to improve the performance of bulk memory freeing in his series "Rearrange batched folio freeing". - Gang Li's series "hugetlb: parallelize hugetlb page init on boot" provides large improvements in bootup times on large machines which are configured to use large numbers of hugetlb pages. - Matthew Wilcox's series "PageFlags cleanups" does that. - Qi Zheng's series "minor fixes and supplement for ptdesc" does that also. S390 is affected. - Cleanups to our pagemap utility functions from Peter Xu in his series "mm/treewide: Replace pXd_large() with pXd_leaf()". - Nico Pache has fixed a few things with our hugepage selftests in his series "selftests/mm: Improve Hugepage Test Handling in MM Selftests". - Also, of course, many singleton patches to many things. Please see the individual changelogs for details. * tag 'mm-stable-2024-03-13-20-04' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (435 commits) mm/zswap: remove the memcpy if acomp is not sleepable crypto: introduce: acomp_is_async to expose if comp drivers might sleep memtest: use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE in memory scanning mm: prohibit the last subpage from reusing the entire large folio mm: recover pud_leaf() definitions in nopmd case selftests/mm: skip the hugetlb-madvise tests on unmet hugepage requirements selftests/mm: skip uffd hugetlb tests with insufficient hugepages selftests/mm: dont fail testsuite due to a lack of hugepages mm/huge_memory: skip invalid debugfs new_order input for folio split mm/huge_memory: check new folio order when split a folio mm, vmscan: retry kswapd's priority loop with cache_trim_mode off on failure mm: add an explicit smp_wmb() to UFFDIO_CONTINUE mm: fix list corruption in put_pages_list mm: remove folio from deferred split list before uncharging it filemap: avoid unnecessary major faults in filemap_fault() mm,page_owner: drop unnecessary check mm,page_owner: check for null stack_record before bumping its refcount mm: swap: fix race between free_swap_and_cache() and swapoff() mm/treewide: align up pXd_leaf() retval across archs mm/treewide: drop pXd_large() ...
2024-03-06mm/treewide: replace pud_large() with pud_leaf()Peter Xu
pud_large() is always defined as pud_leaf(). Merge their usages. Chose pud_leaf() because pud_leaf() is a global API, while pud_large() is not. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240305043750.93762-9-peterx@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev> Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-03-06mm/treewide: replace pmd_large() with pmd_leaf()Peter Xu
pmd_large() is always defined as pmd_leaf(). Merge their usages. Chose pmd_leaf() because pmd_leaf() is a global API, while pmd_large() is not. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240305043750.93762-8-peterx@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev> Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-03-04x86/sme: Move early SME kernel encryption handling into .head.textArd Biesheuvel
The .head.text section is the initial primary entrypoint of the core kernel, and is entered with the CPU executing from a 1:1 mapping of memory. Such code must never access global variables using absolute references, as these are based on the kernel virtual mapping which is not active yet at this point. Given that the SME startup code is also called from this early execution context, move it into .head.text as well. This will allow more thorough build time checks in the future to ensure that early startup code only uses RIP-relative references to global variables. Also replace some occurrences of __pa_symbol() [which relies on the compiler generating an absolute reference, which is not guaranteed] and an open coded RIP-relative access with RIP_REL_REF(). Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227151907.387873-18-ardb+git@google.com
2024-03-04x86/boot: Move mem_encrypt= parsing to the decompressorArd Biesheuvel
The early SME/SEV code parses the command line very early, in order to decide whether or not memory encryption should be enabled, which needs to occur even before the initial page tables are created. This is problematic for a number of reasons: - this early code runs from the 1:1 mapping provided by the decompressor or firmware, which uses a different translation than the one assumed by the linker, and so the code needs to be built in a special way; - parsing external input while the entire kernel image is still mapped writable is a bad idea in general, and really does not belong in security minded code; - the current code ignores the built-in command line entirely (although this appears to be the case for the entire decompressor) Given that the decompressor/EFI stub is an intrinsic part of the x86 bootable kernel image, move the command line parsing there and out of the core kernel. This removes the need to build lib/cmdline.o in a special way, or to use RIP-relative LEA instructions in inline asm blocks. This involves a new xloadflag in the setup header to indicate that mem_encrypt=on appeared on the kernel command line. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227151907.387873-17-ardb+git@google.com
2024-02-06x86/sev: Fix position dependent variable references in startup codeArd Biesheuvel
The early startup code executes from a 1:1 mapping of memory, which differs from the mapping that the code was linked and/or relocated to run at. The latter mapping is not active yet at this point, and so symbol references that rely on it will fault. Given that the core kernel is built without -fPIC, symbol references are typically emitted as absolute, and so any such references occuring in the early startup code will therefore crash the kernel. While an attempt was made to work around this for the early SEV/SME startup code, by forcing RIP-relative addressing for certain global SEV/SME variables via inline assembly (see snp_cpuid_get_table() for example), RIP-relative addressing must be pervasively enforced for SEV/SME global variables when accessed prior to page table fixups. __startup_64() already handles this issue for select non-SEV/SME global variables using fixup_pointer(), which adjusts the pointer relative to a `physaddr` argument. To avoid having to pass around this `physaddr` argument across all functions needing to apply pointer fixups, introduce a macro RIP_RELATIVE_REF() which generates a RIP-relative reference to a given global variable. It is used where necessary to force RIP-relative accesses to global variables. For backporting purposes, this patch makes no attempt at cleaning up other occurrences of this pattern, involving either inline asm or fixup_pointer(). Those will be addressed later. [ bp: Call it "rip_rel_ref" everywhere like other code shortens "rIP-relative reference" and make the asm wrapper __always_inline. ] Co-developed-by: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240130220845.1978329-1-kevinloughlin@google.com
2024-02-03x86/Kconfig: Remove CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULTBorislav Petkov (AMD)
It was meant well at the time but nothing's using it so get rid of it. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240202163510.GDZb0Zvj8qOndvFOiZ@fat_crate.local
2024-01-29x86/sme: Fix memory encryption setting if enabled by default and not overriddenArd Biesheuvel
Commit cbebd68f59f0 ("x86/mm: Fix use of uninitialized buffer in sme_enable()") 'fixed' an issue in sme_enable() detected by static analysis, and broke the common case in the process. cmdline_find_option() will return < 0 on an error, or when the command line argument does not appear at all. In this particular case, the latter is not an error condition, and so the early exit is wrong. Instead, without mem_encrypt= on the command line, the compile time default should be honoured, which could be to enable memory encryption, and this is currently broken. Fix it by setting sme_me_mask to a preliminary value based on the compile time default, and only omitting the command line argument test when cmdline_find_option() returns an error. [ bp: Drop active_by_default while at it. ] Fixes: cbebd68f59f0 ("x86/mm: Fix use of uninitialized buffer in sme_enable()") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126163918.2908990-2-ardb+git@google.com
2023-06-28Merge tag 'mm-stable-2023-06-24-19-15' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Pull mm updates from Andrew Morton: - Yosry Ahmed brought back some cgroup v1 stats in OOM logs - Yosry has also eliminated cgroup's atomic rstat flushing - Nhat Pham adds the new cachestat() syscall. It provides userspace with the ability to query pagecache status - a similar concept to mincore() but more powerful and with improved usability - Mel Gorman provides more optimizations for compaction, reducing the prevalence of page rescanning - Lorenzo Stoakes has done some maintanance work on the get_user_pages() interface - Liam Howlett continues with cleanups and maintenance work to the maple tree code. Peng Zhang also does some work on maple tree - Johannes Weiner has done some cleanup work on the compaction code - David Hildenbrand has contributed additional selftests for get_user_pages() - Thomas Gleixner has contributed some maintenance and optimization work for the vmalloc code - Baolin Wang has provided some compaction cleanups, - SeongJae Park continues maintenance work on the DAMON code - Huang Ying has done some maintenance on the swap code's usage of device refcounting - Christoph Hellwig has some cleanups for the filemap/directio code - Ryan Roberts provides two patch series which yield some rationalization of the kernel's access to pte entries - use the provided APIs rather than open-coding accesses - Lorenzo Stoakes has some fixes to the interaction between pagecache and directio access to file mappings - John Hubbard has a series of fixes to the MM selftesting code - ZhangPeng continues the folio conversion campaign - Hugh Dickins has been working on the pagetable handling code, mainly with a view to reducing the load on the mmap_lock - Catalin Marinas has reduced the arm64 kmalloc() minimum alignment from 128 to 8 - Domenico Cerasuolo has improved the zswap reclaim mechanism by reorganizing the LRU management - Matthew Wilcox provides some fixups to make gfs2 work better with the buffer_head code - Vishal Moola also has done some folio conversion work - Matthew Wilcox has removed the remnants of the pagevec code - their functionality is migrated over to struct folio_batch * tag 'mm-stable-2023-06-24-19-15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (380 commits) mm/hugetlb: remove hugetlb_set_page_subpool() mm: nommu: correct the range of mmap_sem_read_lock in task_mem() hugetlb: revert use of page_cache_next_miss() Revert "page cache: fix page_cache_next/prev_miss off by one" mm/vmscan: fix root proactive reclaim unthrottling unbalanced node mm: memcg: rename and document global_reclaim() mm: kill [add|del]_page_to_lru_list() mm: compaction: convert to use a folio in isolate_migratepages_block() mm: zswap: fix double invalidate with exclusive loads mm: remove unnecessary pagevec includes mm: remove references to pagevec mm: rename invalidate_mapping_pagevec to mapping_try_invalidate mm: remove struct pagevec net: convert sunrpc from pagevec to folio_batch i915: convert i915_gpu_error to use a folio_batch pagevec: rename fbatch_count() mm: remove check_move_unevictable_pages() drm: convert drm_gem_put_pages() to use a folio_batch i915: convert shmem_sg_free_table() to use a folio_batch scatterlist: add sg_set_folio() ...
2023-06-19x86: sme_populate_pgd() use pte_offset_kernel()Hugh Dickins
sme_populate_pgd() is an __init function for sme_encrypt_kernel(): it should use pte_offset_kernel() instead of pte_offset_map(), to avoid the question of whether a pte_unmap() will be needed to balance. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/497d7777-736e-85f2-c37-aa6bcf155e4@google.com Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net> Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-09x86/coco: Get rid of accessor functionsBorislav Petkov (AMD)
cc_vendor is __ro_after_init and thus can be used directly. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230508121957.32341-1-bp@alien8.de
2023-03-16x86/mm: Fix use of uninitialized buffer in sme_enable()Nikita Zhandarovich
cmdline_find_option() may fail before doing any initialization of the buffer array. This may lead to unpredictable results when the same buffer is used later in calls to strncmp() function. Fix the issue by returning early if cmdline_find_option() returns an error. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with static analysis tool SVACE. Fixes: aca20d546214 ("x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption") Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230306160656.14844-1-n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru
2022-12-15x86/mm: Remove P*D_PAGE_MASK and P*D_PAGE_SIZE macrosPasha Tatashin
Other architectures and the common mm/ use P*D_MASK, and P*D_SIZE. Remove the duplicated P*D_PAGE_MASK and P*D_PAGE_SIZE which are only used in x86/*. Signed-off-by: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220516185202.604654-1-tatashin@google.com
2022-04-07x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setupMichael Roth
Initial/preliminary detection of SEV-SNP is done via the Confidential Computing blob. Check for it prior to the normal SEV/SME feature initialization, and add some sanity checks to confirm it agrees with SEV-SNP CPUID/MSR bits. Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-39-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2022-02-23x86/coco: Add API to handle encryption maskKirill A. Shutemov
AMD SME/SEV uses a bit in the page table entries to indicate that the page is encrypted and not accessible to the VMM. TDX uses a similar approach, but the polarity of the mask is opposite to AMD: if the bit is set the page is accessible to VMM. Provide vendor-neutral API to deal with the mask: cc_mkenc() and cc_mkdec() modify given address to make it encrypted/decrypted. It can be applied to phys_addr_t, pgprotval_t or page table entry value. pgprot_encrypted() and pgprot_decrypted() reimplemented using new helpers. The implementation will be extended to cover TDX. pgprot_decrypted() is used by drivers (i915, virtio_gpu, vfio). cc_mkdec() called by pgprot_decrypted(). Export cc_mkdec(). Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220222185740.26228-5-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
2022-02-23x86/coco: Explicitly declare type of confidential computing platformKirill A. Shutemov
The kernel derives the confidential computing platform type it is running as from sme_me_mask on AMD or by using hv_is_isolation_supported() on HyperV isolation VMs. This detection process will be more complicated as more platforms get added. Declare a confidential computing vendor variable explicitly and set it via cc_set_vendor() on the respective platform. [ bp: Massage commit message, fixup HyperV check. ] Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220222185740.26228-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
2021-11-01Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.16_rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov: - Export sev_es_ghcb_hv_call() so that HyperV Isolation VMs can use it too - Non-urgent fixes and cleanups * tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/sev: Expose sev_es_ghcb_hv_call() for use by HyperV x86/sev: Allow #VC exceptions on the VC2 stack x86/sev: Fix stack type check in vc_switch_off_ist() x86/sme: Use #define USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 in mem_encrypt_identity.c x86/sev: Carve out HV call's return value verification
2021-10-19x86/sme: Use #define USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 in mem_encrypt_identity.cTom Lendacky
When runtime support for converting between 4-level and 5-level pagetables was added to the kernel, the SME code that built pagetables was updated to use the pagetable functions, e.g. p4d_offset(), etc., in order to simplify the code. However, the use of the pagetable functions in early boot code requires the use of the USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 #define in order to ensure that the proper definition of pgtable_l5_enabled() is used. Without the #define, pgtable_l5_enabled() is #defined as cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LA57). In early boot, the CPU features have not yet been discovered and populated, so pgtable_l5_enabled() will return false even when 5-level paging is enabled. This causes the SME code to always build 4-level pagetables to perform the in-place encryption. If 5-level paging is enabled, switching to the SME pagetables results in a page-fault that kills the boot. Adding the #define results in pgtable_l5_enabled() using the __pgtable_l5_enabled variable set in early boot and the SME code building pagetables for the proper paging level. Fixes: aad983913d77 ("x86/mm/encrypt: Simplify sme_populate_pgd() and sme_populate_pgd_large()") Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.18.x Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2cb8329655f5c753905812d951e212022a480475.1634318656.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
2021-10-04x86/sme: Replace occurrences of sme_active() with cc_platform_has()Tom Lendacky
Replace uses of sme_active() with the more generic cc_platform_has() using CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT. If future support is added for other memory encryption technologies, the use of CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT can be updated, as required. This also replaces two usages of sev_active() that are really geared towards detecting if SME is active. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210928191009.32551-6-bp@alien8.de
2021-06-04x86/sev: Check SME/SEV support in CPUID firstPu Wen
The first two bits of the CPUID leaf 0x8000001F EAX indicate whether SEV or SME is supported, respectively. It's better to check whether SEV or SME is actually supported before accessing the MSR_AMD64_SEV to check whether SEV or SME is enabled. This is both a bare-metal issue and a guest/VM issue. Since the first generation Hygon Dhyana CPU doesn't support the MSR_AMD64_SEV, reading that MSR results in a #GP - either directly from hardware in the bare-metal case or via the hypervisor (because the RDMSR is actually intercepted) in the guest/VM case, resulting in a failed boot. And since this is very early in the boot phase, rdmsrl_safe()/native_read_msr_safe() can't be used. So check the CPUID bits first, before accessing the MSR. [ tlendacky: Expand and improve commit message. ] [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: eab696d8e8b9 ("x86/sev: Do not require Hypervisor CPUID bit for SEV guests") Signed-off-by: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.10+ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210602070207.2480-1-puwen@hygon.cn
2021-05-10x86/msr: Rename MSR_K8_SYSCFG to MSR_AMD64_SYSCFGBrijesh Singh
The SYSCFG MSR continued being updated beyond the K8 family; drop the K8 name from it. Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210427111636.1207-4-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2021-05-01Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvmLinus Torvalds
Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini: "This is a large update by KVM standards, including AMD PSP (Platform Security Processor, aka "AMD Secure Technology") and ARM CoreSight (debug and trace) changes. ARM: - CoreSight: Add support for ETE and TRBE - Stage-2 isolation for the host kernel when running in protected mode - Guest SVE support when running in nVHE mode - Force W^X hypervisor mappings in nVHE mode - ITS save/restore for guests using direct injection with GICv4.1 - nVHE panics now produce readable backtraces - Guest support for PTP using the ptp_kvm driver - Performance improvements in the S2 fault handler x86: - AMD PSP driver changes - Optimizations and cleanup of nested SVM code - AMD: Support for virtual SPEC_CTRL - Optimizations of the new MMU code: fast invalidation, zap under read lock, enable/disably dirty page logging under read lock - /dev/kvm API for AMD SEV live migration (guest API coming soon) - support SEV virtual machines sharing the same encryption context - support SGX in virtual machines - add a few more statistics - improved directed yield heuristics - Lots and lots of cleanups Generic: - Rework of MMU notifier interface, simplifying and optimizing the architecture-specific code - a handful of "Get rid of oprofile leftovers" patches - Some selftests improvements" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (379 commits) KVM: selftests: Speed up set_memory_region_test selftests: kvm: Fix the check of return value KVM: x86: Take advantage of kvm_arch_dy_has_pending_interrupt() KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of sev_flush_asids() KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup() KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown() KVM: SVM: Enable SEV/SEV-ES functionality by default (when supported) KVM: SVM: Condition sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control variables KVM: SEV: Mask CPUID[0x8000001F].eax according to supported features KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c KVM: SVM: Disable SEV/SEV-ES if NPT is disabled KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled' KVM: x86: Move reverse CPUID helpers to separate header file KVM: x86: Rename GPR accessors to make mode-aware variants the defaults ...
2021-04-26x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled'Sean Christopherson
Drop the sev_enabled flag and switch its one user over to sev_active(). sev_enabled was made redundant with the introduction of sev_status in commit b57de6cd1639 ("x86/sev-es: Add SEV-ES Feature Detection"). sev_enabled and sev_active() are guaranteed to be equivalent, as each is true iff 'sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED' is true, and are only ever written in tandem (ignoring compressed boot's version of sev_status). Removing sev_enabled avoids confusion over whether it refers to the guest or the host, and will also allow KVM to usurp "sev_enabled" for its own purposes. No functional change intended. Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210422021125.3417167-7-seanjc@google.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-03-18x86/sev: Do not require Hypervisor CPUID bit for SEV guestsJoerg Roedel
A malicious hypervisor could disable the CPUID intercept for an SEV or SEV-ES guest and trick it into the no-SEV boot path, where it could potentially reveal secrets. This is not an issue for SEV-SNP guests, as the CPUID intercept can't be disabled for those. Remove the Hypervisor CPUID bit check from the SEV detection code to protect against this kind of attack and add a Hypervisor bit equals zero check to the SME detection path to prevent non-encrypted guests from trying to enable SME. This handles the following cases: 1) SEV(-ES) guest where CPUID intercept is disabled. The guest will still see leaf 0x8000001f and the SEV bit. It can retrieve the C-bit and boot normally. 2) Non-encrypted guests with intercepted CPUID will check the SEV_STATUS MSR and find it 0 and will try to enable SME. This will fail when the guest finds MSR_K8_SYSCFG to be zero, as it is emulated by KVM. But we can't rely on that, as there might be other hypervisors which return this MSR with bit 23 set. The Hypervisor bit check will prevent that the guest tries to enable SME in this case. 3) Non-encrypted guests on SEV capable hosts with CPUID intercept disabled (by a malicious hypervisor) will try to boot into the SME path. This will fail, but it is also not considered a problem because non-encrypted guests have no protection against the hypervisor anyway. [ bp: s/non-SEV/non-encrypted/g ] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210312123824.306-3-joro@8bytes.org
2020-12-10x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Fix definition of PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WPArvind Sankar
The PAT bit is in different locations for 4k and 2M/1G page table entries. Add a definition for _PAGE_LARGE_CACHE_MASK to represent the three caching bits (PWT, PCD, PAT), similar to _PAGE_CACHE_MASK for 4k pages, and use it in the definition of PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WP to get the correct PAT index for write-protected pages. Fixes: 6ebcb060713f ("x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place") Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201111160946.147341-1-nivedita@alum.mit.edu
2020-10-25treewide: Convert macro and uses of __section(foo) to __section("foo")Joe Perches
Use a more generic form for __section that requires quotes to avoid complications with clang and gcc differences. Remove the quote operator # from compiler_attributes.h __section macro. Convert all unquoted __section(foo) uses to quoted __section("foo"). Also convert __attribute__((section("foo"))) uses to __section("foo") even if the __attribute__ has multiple list entry forms. Conversion done using the script at: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/75393e5ddc272dc7403de74d645e6c6e0f4e70eb.camel@perches.com/2-convert_section.pl Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@gooogle.com> Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-09-07x86/sev-es: Add SEV-ES Feature DetectionJoerg Roedel
Add a sev_es_active() function for checking whether SEV-ES is enabled. Also cache the value of MSR_AMD64_SEV at boot to speed up the feature checking in the running code. [ bp: Remove "!!" in sev_active() too. ] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-37-joro@8bytes.org
2019-07-09Merge branch 'x86-kdump-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x865 kdump updates from Thomas Gleixner: "Yet more kexec/kdump updates: - Properly support kexec when AMD's memory encryption (SME) is enabled - Pass reserved e820 ranges to the kexec kernel so both PCI and SME can work" * 'x86-kdump-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: fs/proc/vmcore: Enable dumping of encrypted memory when SEV was active x86/kexec: Set the C-bit in the identity map page table when SEV is active x86/kexec: Do not map kexec area as decrypted when SEV is active x86/crash: Add e820 reserved ranges to kdump kernel's e820 table x86/mm: Rework ioremap resource mapping determination x86/e820, ioport: Add a new I/O resource descriptor IORES_DESC_RESERVED x86/mm: Create a workarea in the kernel for SME early encryption x86/mm: Identify the end of the kernel area to be reserved
2019-06-20x86/mm: Create a workarea in the kernel for SME early encryptionThomas Lendacky
In order for the kernel to be encrypted "in place" during boot, a workarea outside of the kernel must be used. This SME workarea used during early encryption of the kernel is situated on a 2MB boundary after the end of the kernel text, data, etc. sections (_end). This works well during initial boot of a compressed kernel because of the relocation used for decompression of the kernel. But when performing a kexec boot, there's a chance that the SME workarea may not be mapped by the kexec pagetables or that some of the other data used by kexec could exist in this range. Create a section for SME in vmlinux.lds.S. Position it after "_end", which is after "__end_of_kernel_reserve", so that the memory will be reclaimed during boot and since this area is all zeroes, it compresses well. This new section will be part of the kernel image, so kexec will account for it in pagetable mappings and placement of data after the kernel. Here's an example of a kernel size without and with the SME section: without: vmlinux: 36,501,616 bzImage: 6,497,344 100000000-47f37ffff : System RAM 1e4000000-1e47677d4 : Kernel code (0x7677d4) 1e47677d5-1e4e2e0bf : Kernel data (0x6c68ea) 1e5074000-1e5372fff : Kernel bss (0x2fefff) with: vmlinux: 44,419,408 bzImage: 6,503,136 880000000-c7ff7ffff : System RAM 8cf000000-8cf7677d4 : Kernel code (0x7677d4) 8cf7677d5-8cfe2e0bf : Kernel data (0x6c68ea) 8d0074000-8d0372fff : Kernel bss (0x2fefff) Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Tested-by: Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: "Rafael Ávila de Espíndola" <rafael@espindo.la> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3c483262eb4077b1654b2052bd14a8d011bffde3.1560969363.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
2019-06-19treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 500Thomas Gleixner
Based on 2 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as published by the free software foundation this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as published by the free software foundation # extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net> Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-01-15x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Fix erroneous sizeof()Peng Hao
Using sizeof(pointer) for determining the size of a memset() only works when the size of the pointer and the size of type to which it points are the same. For pte_t this is only true for 64bit and 32bit-NONPAE. On 32bit PAE systems this is wrong as the pointer size is 4 byte but the PTE entry is 8 bytes. It's actually not a real world issue as this code depends on 64bit, but it's wrong nevertheless. Use sizeof(*p) for correctness sake. Fixes: aad983913d77 ("x86/mm/encrypt: Simplify sme_populate_pgd() and sme_populate_pgd_large()") Signed-off-by: Peng Hao <peng.hao2@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: luto@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1546065252-97996-1-git-send-email-peng.hao2@zte.com.cn
2018-09-03x86/paravirt: Introduce new config option PARAVIRT_XXLJuergen Gross
A large amount of paravirt ops is used by Xen PV guests only. Add a new config option PARAVIRT_XXL which is selected by XEN_PV. Later we can put the Xen PV only paravirt ops under the PARAVIRT_XXL umbrella. Since irq related paravirt ops are used only by VSMP and Xen PV, let VSMP select PARAVIRT_XXL, too, in order to enable moving the irq ops under PARAVIRT_XXL. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: akataria@vmware.com Cc: rusty@rustcorp.com.au Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Cc: hpa@zytor.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828074026.820-11-jgross@suse.com
2018-06-06x86/mm: Decouple dynamic __PHYSICAL_MASK from AMD SMEKirill A. Shutemov
AMD SME claims one bit from physical address to indicate whether the page is encrypted or not. To achieve that we clear out the bit from __PHYSICAL_MASK. The capability to adjust __PHYSICAL_MASK is required beyond AMD SME. For instance for upcoming Intel Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption. Factor it out into a separate feature with own Kconfig handle. It also helps with overhead of AMD SME. It saves more than 3k in .text on defconfig + AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT: add/remove: 3/2 grow/shrink: 5/110 up/down: 189/-3753 (-3564) We would need to return to this once we have infrastructure to patch constants in code. That's good candidate for it. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180518113028.79825-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
2018-02-28x86/mm/sme: Disable stack protection for mem_encrypt_identity.cTom Lendacky
Stack protection is not compatible with early boot code. All of the early SME boot code is now isolated in a separate file, mem_encrypt_identity.c, so arch/x86/mm/Makefile can be updated to turn off stack protection for the entire file. This eliminates the need to worry about other functions within the file being instrumented with stack protection (as was seen when a newer version of GCC instrumented sme_encrypt_kernel() where an older version hadn't). It also allows removal of the __nostackprotector attribute from individual functions. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180226232554.14108.16881.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
2018-02-13x86/mm/encrypt: Simplify sme_pgtable_calc()Kirill A. Shutemov
sme_pgtable_calc() is unnecessary complex. It can be re-written in a more stream-lined way. As a side effect, we would get the code ready to boot-time switching between paging modes. Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180131135404.40692-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-02-13x86/mm/encrypt: Simplify sme_populate_pgd() and sme_populate_pgd_large()Kirill A. Shutemov
sme_populate_pgd() and sme_populate_pgd_large() operate on the identity mapping, which means they want virtual addresses to be equal to physical one, without PAGE_OFFSET shift. We also need to avoid paravirtualization call there. Getting this done is tricky. We cannot use usual page table helpers. It forces us to open-code a lot of things. It makes code ugly and hard to modify. We can get it work with the page table helpers, but it requires few preprocessor tricks. - Define __pa() and __va() to be compatible with identity mapping. - Undef CONFIG_PARAVIRT and CONFIG_PARAVIRT_SPINLOCKS before including any file. This way we can avoid paravirtualization calls. Now we can user normal page table helpers just fine. Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180131135404.40692-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-02-13x86/mm/encrypt: Move page table helpers into separate translation unitKirill A. Shutemov
There are bunch of functions in mem_encrypt.c that operate on the identity mapping, which means they want virtual addresses to be equal to physical one, without PAGE_OFFSET shift. We also need to avoid paravirtualizaion call there. Getting this done is tricky. We cannot use usual page table helpers. It forces us to open-code a lot of things. It makes code ugly and hard to modify. We can get it work with the page table helpers, but it requires few preprocessor tricks. These tricks may have side effects for the rest of the file. Let's isolate such functions into own translation unit. Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180131135404.40692-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>