21 files changed, 197 insertions, 110 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index f10dbf15c294..536061cf33a9 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -164,27 +164,6 @@ config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
 	  this low address space will need the permission specific to the
 	  systems running LSM.
 
-config HARDENED_USERCOPY
-	bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
-	imply STRICT_DEVMEM
-	help
-	  This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
-	  copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
-	  copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
-	  are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
-	  separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
-	  or are part of the kernel text. This prevents entire classes
-	  of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
-
-config FORTIFY_SOURCE
-	bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
-	depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
-	# https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/53645
-	depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || !X86_32
-	help
-	  Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
-	  where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
-
 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
 	bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
 	help
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index b56e001e0c6a..c17366ce8224 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -280,6 +280,39 @@ config ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS
 
 endmenu
 
+menu "Bounds checking"
+
+config FORTIFY_SOURCE
+	bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
+	# https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/53645
+	depends on !X86_32 || !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION >= 160000
+	help
+	  Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
+	  where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
+
+config HARDENED_USERCOPY
+	bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
+	imply STRICT_DEVMEM
+	help
+	  This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
+	  copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
+	  copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
+	  are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
+	  separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
+	  or are part of the kernel text. This prevents entire classes
+	  of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
+
+config HARDENED_USERCOPY_DEFAULT_ON
+	bool "Harden memory copies by default"
+	depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
+	default HARDENED_USERCOPY
+	help
+	  This has the effect of setting "hardened_usercopy=on" on the kernel
+	  command line. This can be disabled with "hardened_usercopy=off".
+
+endmenu
+
 menu "Hardening of kernel data structures"
 
 config LIST_HARDENED
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index c07d150685d7..6039afae4bfc 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -1795,8 +1795,8 @@ fail2:
 	return error;
 }
 
-static int ns_mkdir_op(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
-		       struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
+static struct dentry *ns_mkdir_op(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
+				  struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
 {
 	struct aa_ns *ns, *parent;
 	/* TODO: improve permission check */
@@ -1808,7 +1808,7 @@ static int ns_mkdir_op(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
 				     AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY);
 	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
 	if (error)
-		return error;
+		return ERR_PTR(error);
 
 	parent = aa_get_ns(dir->i_private);
 	AA_BUG(d_inode(ns_subns_dir(parent)) != dir);
@@ -1843,7 +1843,7 @@ out:
 	mutex_unlock(&parent->lock);
 	aa_put_ns(parent);
 
-	return error;
+	return ERR_PTR(error);
 }
 
 static int ns_rmdir_op(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
index 7d687b0962b1..f27223ea4578 100644
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -218,8 +218,10 @@ continue_scanning:
 		key = rb_entry(cursor, struct key, serial_node);
 		cursor = rb_next(cursor);
 
-		if (refcount_read(&key->usage) == 0)
+		if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_FINAL_PUT, &key->flags)) {
+			smp_mb(); /* Clobber key->user after FINAL_PUT seen. */
 			goto found_unreferenced_key;
+		}
 
 		if (unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1)) {
 			if (key->type == key_gc_dead_keytype) {
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 3d7d185019d3..7198cd2ac3a3 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -658,6 +658,8 @@ void key_put(struct key *key)
 				key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
 				spin_unlock_irqrestore(&key->user->lock, flags);
 			}
+			smp_mb(); /* key->user before FINAL_PUT set. */
+			set_bit(KEY_FLAG_FINAL_PUT, &key->flags);
 			schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
 		}
 	}
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 71b9dc331aae..582769ae830e 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -1216,7 +1216,7 @@ static void hook_inode_free_security_rcu(void *inode_security)
 /*
  * Release the inodes used in a security policy.
  *
- * Cf. fsnotify_unmount_inodes() and invalidate_inodes()
+ * Cf. fsnotify_unmount_inodes() and evict_inodes()
  */
 static void hook_sb_delete(struct super_block *const sb)
 {
diff --git a/security/loadpin/Kconfig b/security/loadpin/Kconfig
index 848f8b4a6019..aef63d3e30df 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/Kconfig
+++ b/security/loadpin/Kconfig
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ config SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE
 	depends on SECURITY_LOADPIN
 	# Module compression breaks LoadPin unless modules are decompressed in
 	# the kernel.
-	depends on !MODULES || (MODULE_COMPRESS_NONE || MODULE_DECOMPRESS)
+	depends on !MODULE_COMPRESS || MODULE_DECOMPRESS
 	help
 	  If selected, LoadPin will enforce pinning at boot. If not
 	  selected, it can be enabled at boot with the kernel parameter
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 52db886dbba8..d45651eaefa4 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * common LSM auditing functions
  *
  * Based on code written for SELinux by :
- *			Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ *			Stephen Smalley
  * 			James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  * Author : Etienne Basset, <etienne.basset@ensta.org>
  */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 143561ebc3e8..8aa839232c73 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -5883,16 +5883,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_bdev_setintegrity);
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
 /**
  * security_perf_event_open() - Check if a perf event open is allowed
- * @attr: perf event attribute
  * @type: type of event
  *
  * Check whether the @type of perf_event_open syscall is allowed.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
-int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
+int security_perf_event_open(int type)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, attr, type);
+	return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, type);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5999,6 +5998,18 @@ int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 {
 	return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, ioucmd);
 }
+
+/**
+ * security_uring_allowed() - Check if io_uring_setup() is allowed
+ *
+ * Check whether the current task is allowed to call io_uring_setup().
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_uring_allowed(void)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(uring_allowed);
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 1f2680bcc43a..4b4837a20225 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -936,7 +936,7 @@ static void avc_flush(void)
 
 		spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
 		/*
-		 * With preemptable RCU, the outer spinlock does not
+		 * With preemptible RCU, the outer spinlock does not
 		 * prevent RCU grace periods from ending.
 		 */
 		rcu_read_lock();
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7b867dfec88b..7150c953fec3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3395,6 +3395,9 @@ static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
 	case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
 		perm = FILE__WATCH;
 		break;
+	case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_MNTNS:
+		perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNTNS;
+		break;
 	default:
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -4096,7 +4099,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 			    SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
 }
 
-static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
+static int selinux_kernel_load_from_file(struct file *file, u32 requested)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
@@ -4104,12 +4107,8 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int rc;
 
-	/* init_module */
 	if (file == NULL)
-		return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
-					SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
-
-	/* finit_module */
+		return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, requested, NULL);
 
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
 	ad.u.file = file;
@@ -4122,8 +4121,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
 	}
 
 	isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
-				SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, requested, &ad);
 }
 
 static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
@@ -4132,9 +4130,30 @@ static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(READING_MAX_ID > 7,
+			 "New kernel_read_file_id introduced; update SELinux!");
+
 	switch (id) {
+	case READING_FIRMWARE:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(file, SYSTEM__FIRMWARE_LOAD);
+		break;
 	case READING_MODULE:
-		rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL);
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(file, SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD);
+		break;
+	case READING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(file,
+						   SYSTEM__KEXEC_IMAGE_LOAD);
+		break;
+	case READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(file,
+						SYSTEM__KEXEC_INITRAMFS_LOAD);
+		break;
+	case READING_POLICY:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(file, SYSTEM__POLICY_LOAD);
+		break;
+	case READING_X509_CERTIFICATE:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(file,
+						SYSTEM__X509_CERTIFICATE_LOAD);
 		break;
 	default:
 		break;
@@ -4147,9 +4166,31 @@ static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(LOADING_MAX_ID > 7,
+			 "New kernel_load_data_id introduced; update SELinux!");
+
 	switch (id) {
+	case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(NULL, SYSTEM__FIRMWARE_LOAD);
+		break;
 	case LOADING_MODULE:
-		rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(NULL, SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD);
+		break;
+	case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(NULL,
+						   SYSTEM__KEXEC_IMAGE_LOAD);
+		break;
+	case LOADING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(NULL,
+						SYSTEM__KEXEC_INITRAMFS_LOAD);
+		break;
+	case LOADING_POLICY:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(NULL,
+						   SYSTEM__POLICY_LOAD);
+		break;
+	case LOADING_X509_CERTIFICATE:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_load_from_file(NULL,
+						SYSTEM__X509_CERTIFICATE_LOAD);
 		break;
 	default:
 		break;
@@ -7040,7 +7081,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
-static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
+static int selinux_perf_event_open(int type)
 {
 	u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
 
@@ -7137,6 +7178,19 @@ static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), isec->sid,
 			    SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
 }
+
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_allowed - check if io_uring_setup() can be called
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to call io_uring_setup().
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_allowed(void)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__ALLOWED,
+			    NULL);
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
 
 static const struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = {
@@ -7390,6 +7444,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_allowed, selinux_uring_allowed),
 #endif
 
 	/*
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 03e82477dce9..04a9b480885e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 	COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "unlink", "link", "rename", "execute",   \
 		"quotaon", "mounton", "audit_access", "open", "execmod", \
 		"watch", "watch_mount", "watch_sb", "watch_with_perm",   \
-		"watch_reads"
+		"watch_reads", "watch_mountns"
 
 #define COMMON_SOCK_PERMS                                              \
 	COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "bind", "connect", "listen", "accept", \
@@ -63,7 +63,9 @@ const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	{ "process2", { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", NULL } },
 	{ "system",
 	  { "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod", "syslog_console",
-	    "module_request", "module_load", NULL } },
+	    "module_request", "module_load", "firmware_load",
+	    "kexec_image_load", "kexec_initramfs_load", "policy_load",
+	    "x509_certificate_load", NULL } },
 	{ "capability", { COMMON_CAP_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "filesystem",
 	  { "mount", "remount", "unmount", "getattr", "relabelfrom",
@@ -177,7 +179,7 @@ const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	{ "perf_event",
 	  { "open", "cpu", "kernel", "tracepoint", "read", "write", NULL } },
 	{ "anon_inode", { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
-	{ "io_uring", { "override_creds", "sqpoll", "cmd", NULL } },
+	{ "io_uring", { "override_creds", "sqpoll", "cmd", "allowed", NULL } },
 	{ "user_namespace", { "create", NULL } },
 	/* last one */ { NULL, {} }
 };
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
index 079679fe7254..bd402d3fd3ae 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ enum {
 	POLICYDB_CAP_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC,
 	POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT,
 	POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM,
+	POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD,
 	__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX
 };
 #define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
index e080827408c4..ac1342d6d5bb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ const char *const selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX] = {
 	"ioctl_skip_cloexec",
 	"userspace_initial_context",
 	"netlink_xperm",
+	"netif_wildcard",
 };
 /* clang-format on */
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 8b4c2aa35839..e7827ed7be5f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -202,6 +202,12 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_netlink_xperm(void)
 		selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM]);
 }
 
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_netif_wildcard(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(
+		selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD]);
+}
+
 struct selinux_policy_convert_data;
 
 struct selinux_load_state {
@@ -301,7 +307,7 @@ int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid);
 
 int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid);
+int security_netif_sid(const char *name, u32 *if_sid);
 
 int security_node_sid(u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen, u32 *out_sid);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 8478842fbf9e..e431772c6168 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
 #include <linux/in.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
@@ -2572,13 +2573,14 @@ out:
  * @name: interface name
  * @if_sid: interface SID
  */
-int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
+int security_netif_sid(const char *name, u32 *if_sid)
 {
 	struct selinux_policy *policy;
 	struct policydb *policydb;
 	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	int rc;
 	struct ocontext *c;
+	bool wildcard_support;
 
 	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
 		*if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
@@ -2591,11 +2593,18 @@ retry:
 	policy = rcu_dereference(selinux_state.policy);
 	policydb = &policy->policydb;
 	sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+	wildcard_support = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->policycaps, POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD);
 
 	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
 	while (c) {
-		if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
-			break;
+		if (wildcard_support) {
+			if (match_wildcard(c->u.name, name))
+				break;
+		} else {
+			if (strcmp(c->u.name, name) == 0)
+				break;
+		}
+
 		c = c->next;
 	}
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 4608b07607a3..bf6a6ed3946c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
 
 /*
  * This is the repository for labels seen so that it is
- * not necessary to keep allocating tiny chuncks of memory
+ * not necessary to keep allocating tiny chunks of memory
  * and so that they can be shared.
  *
  * Labels are never modified in place. Anytime a label
@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ struct smk_net4addr {
 	struct smack_known	*smk_label;	/* label */
 };
 
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 /*
  * An entry in the table identifying IPv6 hosts.
  */
@@ -162,7 +163,9 @@ struct smk_net6addr {
 	int			smk_masks;	/* mask size */
 	struct smack_known	*smk_label;	/* label */
 };
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
 
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
 /*
  * An entry in the table identifying ports.
  */
@@ -175,6 +178,7 @@ struct smk_port_label {
 	short			smk_sock_type;	/* Socket type */
 	short			smk_can_reuse;
 };
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
 
 struct smack_known_list_elem {
 	struct list_head	list;
@@ -315,7 +319,9 @@ extern struct smack_known smack_known_web;
 extern struct mutex	smack_known_lock;
 extern struct list_head smack_known_list;
 extern struct list_head smk_net4addr_list;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 extern struct list_head smk_net6addr_list;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
 
 extern struct mutex     smack_onlycap_lock;
 extern struct list_head smack_onlycap_list;
@@ -426,6 +432,12 @@ static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_current(void)
 	return smk_of_task(smack_cred(current_cred()));
 }
 
+void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
+		int request,
+		int result, struct smk_audit_info *auditdata);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
 /*
  * logging functions
  */
@@ -433,12 +445,6 @@ static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_current(void)
 #define SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT 0x2
 extern int log_policy;
 
-void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
-		int request,
-		int result, struct smk_audit_info *auditdata);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
-
 /*
  * some inline functions to set up audit data
  * they do nothing if CONFIG_AUDIT is not set
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 3727379623e2..2e4a0cb22782 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -45,11 +45,13 @@ LIST_HEAD(smack_known_list);
  */
 static u32 smack_next_secid = 10;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 /*
  * what events do we log
  * can be overwritten at run-time by /smack/logging
  */
 int log_policy = SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED;
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
 /**
  * smk_access_entry - look up matching access rule
@@ -242,7 +244,7 @@ int smk_tskacc(struct task_smack *tsp, struct smack_known *obj_known,
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Allow for priviliged to override policy.
+	 * Allow for privileged to override policy.
 	 */
 	if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
 		rc = 0;
@@ -276,7 +278,7 @@ int smk_curacc(struct smack_known *obj_known,
 }
 
 /**
- * smack_str_from_perm : helper to transalate an int to a
+ * smack_str_from_perm : helper to translate an int to a
  * readable string
  * @string : the string to fill
  * @access : the int
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 239773cdcdcf..99833168604e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1934,7 +1934,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	 */
 	file = fown->file;
 
-	/* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
+	/* we don't log here as rc can be overridden */
 	blob = smack_file(file);
 	skp = *blob;
 	rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL);
@@ -2492,6 +2492,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv4host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 /*
  * smk_ipv6_localhost - Check for local ipv6 host address
  * @sip: the address
@@ -2559,6 +2560,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
 
 	return NULL;
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
 
 /**
  * smack_netlbl_add - Set the secattr on a socket
@@ -2663,6 +2665,7 @@ static int smk_ipv4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
 	return rc;
 }
 
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 /**
  * smk_ipv6_check - check Smack access
  * @subject: subject Smack label
@@ -2695,6 +2698,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject,
 	rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 check", subject, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
 	return rc;
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
 
 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
 /**
@@ -3027,7 +3031,9 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
 		return 0;
 	if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
 		return 0;
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && sap->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	if (sap->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
 		struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
 		struct smack_known *rsp = NULL;
 
@@ -3047,6 +3053,8 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
 
 		return rc;
 	}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
 	if (sap->sa_family != AF_INET || addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
 		return 0;
 	rc = smk_ipv4_check(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
@@ -4195,7 +4203,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		/*
 		 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
 		 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
-		 * This is the simplist possible security model
+		 * This is the simplest possible security model
 		 * for networking.
 		 */
 		rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
@@ -4343,29 +4351,6 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
 }
 
 /**
- * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
- * @sk: child sock
- * @parent: parent socket
- *
- * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
- * is creating the new socket.
- */
-static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
-{
-	struct socket_smack *ssp;
-	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
-
-	if (sk == NULL ||
-	    (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
-		return;
-
-	ssp = smack_sock(sk);
-	ssp->smk_in = skp;
-	ssp->smk_out = skp;
-	/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
-}
-
-/**
  * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
  * @sk: socket involved
  * @skb: packet
@@ -4701,7 +4686,7 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
  * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
  *
  * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
- * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
+ * The label to be audited is created if necessary.
  */
 static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
 				 gfp_t gfp)
@@ -5179,7 +5164,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
 #endif
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, smack_sk_clone_security),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 357188f764ce..90a67e410808 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -41,7 +41,9 @@ enum smk_inos {
 	SMK_AMBIENT	= 7,	/* internet ambient label */
 	SMK_NET4ADDR	= 8,	/* single label hosts */
 	SMK_ONLYCAP	= 9,	/* the only "capable" label */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	SMK_LOGGING	= 10,	/* logging */
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 	SMK_LOAD_SELF	= 11,	/* task specific rules */
 	SMK_ACCESSES	= 12,	/* access policy */
 	SMK_MAPPED	= 13,	/* CIPSO level indicating mapped label */
@@ -165,7 +167,7 @@ static int smk_cipso_doi_value = SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT;
 #define SMK_LOADLEN	(SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_ACCESSLEN)
 
 /*
- * Stricly for CIPSO level manipulation.
+ * Strictly for CIPSO level manipulation.
  * Set the category bit number in a smack label sized buffer.
  */
 static inline void smack_catset_bit(unsigned int cat, char *catsetp)
@@ -812,7 +814,7 @@ static int smk_open_cipso(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos, int format)
 {
-	struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *old_cat, *new_cat = NULL;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *old_cat;
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr ncats;
 	char mapcatset[SMK_CIPSOLEN];
@@ -899,22 +901,15 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
 		smack_catset_bit(cat, mapcatset);
 	}
-	ncats.flags = 0;
-	if (catlen == 0) {
-		ncats.attr.mls.cat = NULL;
-		ncats.attr.mls.lvl = maplevel;
-		new_cat = netlbl_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
-		if (new_cat)
-			new_cat->next = ncats.attr.mls.cat;
-		ncats.attr.mls.cat = new_cat;
-		skp->smk_netlabel.flags &= ~(1U << 3);
-		rc = 0;
-	} else {
-		rc = smk_netlbl_mls(maplevel, mapcatset, &ncats, SMK_CIPSOLEN);
-	}
+
+	rc = smk_netlbl_mls(maplevel, mapcatset, &ncats, SMK_CIPSOLEN);
 	if (rc >= 0) {
 		old_cat = skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat;
 		rcu_assign_pointer(skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat, ncats.attr.mls.cat);
+		if (ncats.attr.mls.cat)
+			skp->smk_netlabel.flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
+		else
+			skp->smk_netlabel.flags &= ~(u32)NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
 		skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl = ncats.attr.mls.lvl;
 		synchronize_rcu();
 		netlbl_catmap_free(old_cat);
@@ -2133,6 +2128,7 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_unconfined_ops = {
 };
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 /**
  * smk_read_logging - read() for /smack/logging
  * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
@@ -2197,6 +2193,7 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = {
 	.write		= smk_write_logging,
 	.llseek		= default_llseek,
 };
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
 /*
  * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load-self
@@ -2883,8 +2880,10 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
 			"netlabel", &smk_net4addr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		[SMK_ONLYCAP] = {
 			"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 		[SMK_LOGGING] = {
 			"logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 		[SMK_LOAD_SELF] = {
 			"load-self", &smk_load_self_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
 		[SMK_ACCESSES] = {
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 1971710620c1..3d064dd4e03f 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 			   unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
 {
 	int rc = -ENOSYS;
-	struct task_struct *myself = current;
+	struct task_struct *myself;
 
 	switch (option) {
 	case PR_SET_PTRACER:
@@ -232,11 +232,7 @@ static int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 		 * leader checking is handled later when walking the ancestry
 		 * at the time of PTRACE_ATTACH check.
 		 */
-		rcu_read_lock();
-		if (!thread_group_leader(myself))
-			myself = rcu_dereference(myself->group_leader);
-		get_task_struct(myself);
-		rcu_read_unlock();
+		myself = current->group_leader;
 
 		if (arg2 == 0) {
 			yama_ptracer_del(NULL, myself);
@@ -255,7 +251,6 @@ static int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 			}
 		}
 
-		put_task_struct(myself);
 		break;
 	}