diff options
author | Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> | 2022-05-05 13:03:18 -0700 |
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committer | Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> | 2022-05-05 13:03:18 -0700 |
commit | c8227d568ddf2f38a8806fdcd2e20b9e11747d9a (patch) | |
tree | c49664124eb6d39839107f0e116499deef8ff5c5 /net/ipv4 | |
parent | 1c1ed5a48411e1686997157c21633653fbe045c6 (diff) | |
parent | 68533eb1fb197a413fd8612ebb88e111ade3beac (diff) | |
download | lwn-c8227d568ddf2f38a8806fdcd2e20b9e11747d9a.tar.gz lwn-c8227d568ddf2f38a8806fdcd2e20b9e11747d9a.zip |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/Makefile
f62c5acc800e ("selftests/net/forwarding: add missing tests to Makefile")
50fe062c806e ("selftests: forwarding: new test, verify host mdb entries")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220502111539.0b7e4621@canb.auug.org.au/
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4')
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/igmp.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 42 |
2 files changed, 33 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/igmp.c b/net/ipv4/igmp.c index 1ba8ebc439f3..b65d074d9620 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c @@ -2403,9 +2403,10 @@ int ip_mc_source(int add, int omode, struct sock *sk, struct /* decrease mem now to avoid the memleak warning */ atomic_sub(struct_size(psl, sl_addr, psl->sl_max), &sk->sk_omem_alloc); - kfree_rcu(psl, rcu); } rcu_assign_pointer(pmc->sflist, newpsl); + if (psl) + kfree_rcu(psl, rcu); psl = newpsl; } rv = 1; /* > 0 for insert logic below if sl_count is 0 */ @@ -2507,11 +2508,13 @@ int ip_mc_msfilter(struct sock *sk, struct ip_msfilter *msf, int ifindex) /* decrease mem now to avoid the memleak warning */ atomic_sub(struct_size(psl, sl_addr, psl->sl_max), &sk->sk_omem_alloc); - kfree_rcu(psl, rcu); - } else + } else { (void) ip_mc_del_src(in_dev, &msf->imsf_multiaddr, pmc->sfmode, 0, NULL, 0); + } rcu_assign_pointer(pmc->sflist, newpsl); + if (psl) + kfree_rcu(psl, rcu); pmc->sfmode = msf->imsf_fmode; err = 0; done: diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c index 17440840a791..a5d57fa679ca 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c @@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ not_unique: return -EADDRNOTAVAIL; } -static u32 inet_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk) +static u64 inet_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk) { const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk); @@ -726,15 +726,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash); * Note that we use 32bit integers (vs RFC 'short integers') * because 2^16 is not a multiple of num_ephemeral and this * property might be used by clever attacker. - * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, - * we use 256 instead to really give more isolation and - * privacy, this only consumes 1 KB of kernel memory. + * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, though + * attacks were since demonstrated, thus we use 65536 instead to really + * give more isolation and privacy, at the expense of 256kB of kernel + * memory. */ -#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 8 -static u32 table_perturb[1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT]; +#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 16 +#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE (1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT) +static u32 *table_perturb; int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row, - struct sock *sk, u32 port_offset, + struct sock *sk, u64 port_offset, int (*check_established)(struct inet_timewait_death_row *, struct sock *, __u16, struct inet_timewait_sock **)) { @@ -774,10 +776,13 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row, if (likely(remaining > 1)) remaining &= ~1U; - net_get_random_once(table_perturb, sizeof(table_perturb)); - index = hash_32(port_offset, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT); + net_get_random_once(table_perturb, + INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE * sizeof(*table_perturb)); + index = port_offset & (INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE - 1); + + offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + (port_offset >> 32); + offset %= remaining; - offset = (READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + port_offset) % remaining; /* In first pass we try ports of @low parity. * inet_csk_get_port() does the opposite choice. */ @@ -831,11 +836,12 @@ next_port: return -EADDRNOTAVAIL; ok: - /* If our first attempt found a candidate, skip next candidate - * in 1/16 of cases to add some noise. + /* Here we want to add a little bit of randomness to the next source + * port that will be chosen. We use a max() with a random here so that + * on low contention the randomness is maximal and on high contention + * it may be inexistent. */ - if (!i && !(prandom_u32() % 16)) - i = 2; + i = max_t(int, i, (prandom_u32() & 7) * 2); WRITE_ONCE(table_perturb[index], READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + i + 2); /* Head lock still held and bh's disabled */ @@ -859,7 +865,7 @@ ok: int inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row, struct sock *sk) { - u32 port_offset = 0; + u64 port_offset = 0; if (!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num) port_offset = inet_sk_port_offset(sk); @@ -909,6 +915,12 @@ void __init inet_hashinfo2_init(struct inet_hashinfo *h, const char *name, low_limit, high_limit); init_hashinfo_lhash2(h); + + /* this one is used for source ports of outgoing connections */ + table_perturb = kmalloc_array(INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE, + sizeof(*table_perturb), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!table_perturb) + panic("TCP: failed to alloc table_perturb"); } int inet_hashinfo2_init_mod(struct inet_hashinfo *h) |