summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/include/keys/system_keyring.h
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-05-24 13:16:50 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-05-24 13:16:50 -0700
commit7cf6a8a17f5b134b7e783c2d45c53298faef82a7 (patch)
treee5a6346abf5d9efbe49b91e6291349afcacfb7d3 /include/keys/system_keyring.h
parenta9d1046a846571422a92d2b8fbf8a8b24221b9a3 (diff)
parent7f3113e3b9f7207f0bd57b5fdae1a1b9c8215e08 (diff)
downloadlwn-7cf6a8a17f5b134b7e783c2d45c53298faef82a7.tar.gz
lwn-7cf6a8a17f5b134b7e783c2d45c53298faef82a7.zip
Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen: - Tightened validation of key hashes for SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST. An invalid hash format causes a compilation error. Previously, they got included to the kernel binary but were silently ignored at run-time. - Allow root user to append new hashes to the blacklist keyring. - Trusted keys backed with Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM), which part of some of the new NXP's SoC's. Now there is total three hardware backends for trusted keys: TPM, ARM TEE and CAAM. - A scattered set of fixes and small improvements for the TPM driver. * tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd: MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-TRUSTED-CAAM doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator crypto: caam - determine whether CAAM supports blob encap/decap KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material KEYS: trusted: allow use of TEE as backend without TCG_TPM support tpm: Add field upgrade mode support for Infineon TPM2 modules tpm: Fix buffer access in tpm2_get_tpm_pt() char: tpm: cr50_i2c: Suppress duplicated error message in .remove() tpm: cr50: Add new device/vendor ID 0x504a6666 tpm: Remove read16/read32/write32 calls from tpm_tis_phy_ops tpm: ibmvtpm: Correct the return value in tpm_ibmvtpm_probe() tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee: Return true/false (not 1/0) from bool functions certs: Explain the rationale to call panic() certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
Diffstat (limited to 'include/keys/system_keyring.h')
-rw-r--r--include/keys/system_keyring.h14
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
index 2419a735420f..91e080efb918 100644
--- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
@@ -10,6 +10,13 @@
#include <linux/key.h>
+enum blacklist_hash_type {
+ /* TBSCertificate hash */
+ BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS = 1,
+ /* Raw data hash */
+ BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY = 2,
+};
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *keyring,
@@ -54,13 +61,14 @@ static inline void __init set_machine_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring)
extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
-extern int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash);
+extern int mark_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type);
extern int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
- const char *type);
+ enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type);
extern int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len);
#else
static inline int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
- const char *type)
+ enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
{
return 0;
}