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| author | Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> | 2026-07-15 02:31:43 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> | 2026-07-15 02:33:45 -0700 |
| commit | 4967bd533db2dc947574ee55ba44b3306ef3b7b1 (patch) | |
| tree | f6673d2ceae4a0fb17bdfcb26a5de8b0a32bdcd2 /kernel | |
| parent | 2d8af4e633d3dea7269f2dad724977ce48034fd4 (diff) | |
| parent | 6f59deb32efa4673fc3b1fef9f3a0da48e9d8494 (diff) | |
| download | linux-4967bd533db2dc947574ee55ba44b3306ef3b7b1.tar.gz linux-4967bd533db2dc947574ee55ba44b3306ef3b7b1.zip | |
Merge branch 'bpf-reject-negative-const-offsets-for-buffer-pointers'
Sun Jian says:
====================
bpf: Reject negative const offsets for buffer pointers
Reject negative effective offsets for PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER and PTR_TO_BUF
accesses. Calculate the effective access start using signed arithmetic
to prevent unsigned access-end accounting from wrapping, and cover both
load-time rejection and the raw tracepoint writable attach-time path.
---
Changes in v5:
- Simplify __check_buffer_access() to reject a negative effective start
after confirming that var_off is constant. Validate the combined
offset instead of rejecting negative instruction offsets separately.
Drop the duplicate BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF check because pointer arithmetic
already bounds constant offsets, and remove the redundant size < 0
check.
- Switch the raw tracepoint writable attach tests from nbd_send_request
to bpf_testmod_test_writable_bare_tp, avoiding the NBD configuration
dependency and its false-pass condition.
- Split the attach coverage into named subtests and require
bpf_raw_tracepoint_open() to return -EINVAL.
- Add verifier coverage for a negative constant PTR_TO_BUF offset.
Changes in v4:
- Correct the Fixes tag to point to 022ac0750883, where pointer offsets
were folded into reg->var_off.
- Drop the end > U32_MAX check, which is unreachable after bounding const
var_off with BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF while keeping instruction offsets and
access sizes bounded.
Changes in v3:
- Check constant var_off against +/-BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF before computing
the effective access range, matching the existing verifier pointer
offset convention.
- Keep explicit rejection of negative instruction offsets and keep
bounded negative constant var_off valid when the effective offset is
non-negative.
Changes in v2:
- Split the kernel fix and selftests into separate patches.
- Add an attach-time raw tracepoint writable test that exercises
max_tp_access against nbd_send_request's writable size.
- Adjust selftest formatting to use the 100 character line width.
Tested:
- ./test_progs -v -t verifier_raw_tp_writable
- ./test_progs -v -t verifier_ptr_to_buf
- ./test_progs -v -t raw_tp_writable_reject_bad_access
- ./test_progs -v -t raw_tp_writable_test_run
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260708090151.151729-1-sun.jian.kdev@gmail.com/
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260708040715.116680-1-sun.jian.kdev@gmail.com/
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260707060804.93561-1-sun.jian.kdev@gmail.com/
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260703035137.109608-1-sun.jian.kdev@gmail.com/
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714093846.18159-1-sun.jian.kdev@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 31 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 6515d4d3c003..9f1333676365 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -5326,14 +5326,11 @@ static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const char *buf_info, const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, - argno_t argno, int off, int size) + argno_t argno, int off, int size, + u32 *access_end) { - if (off < 0) { - verbose(env, - "%s invalid %s buffer access: off=%d, size=%d\n", - reg_arg_name(env, argno), buf_info, off, size); - return -EACCES; - } + s64 start; + if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { char tn_buf[48]; @@ -5344,6 +5341,15 @@ static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, return -EACCES; } + start = (s64)reg->var_off.value + off; + if (start < 0) { + verbose(env, + "%s invalid negative %s buffer offset: off=%d, var_off=%lld\n", + reg_arg_name(env, argno), buf_info, off, (s64)reg->var_off.value); + return -EACCES; + } + + *access_end = start + size; return 0; } @@ -5351,14 +5357,14 @@ static int check_tp_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, argno_t argno, int off, int size) { + u32 access_end; int err; - err = __check_buffer_access(env, "tracepoint", reg, argno, off, size); + err = __check_buffer_access(env, "tracepoint", reg, argno, off, size, &access_end); if (err) return err; - env->prog->aux->max_tp_access = max(reg->var_off.value + off + size, - env->prog->aux->max_tp_access); + env->prog->aux->max_tp_access = max(access_end, env->prog->aux->max_tp_access); return 0; } @@ -5370,13 +5376,14 @@ static int check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 *max_access) { const char *buf_info = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type) ? "rdonly" : "rdwr"; + u32 access_end; int err; - err = __check_buffer_access(env, buf_info, reg, argno, off, size); + err = __check_buffer_access(env, buf_info, reg, argno, off, size, &access_end); if (err) return err; - *max_access = max(reg->var_off.value + off + size, *max_access); + *max_access = max(access_end, *max_access); return 0; } |
