From d824548dae220820bdf69b2d1561b7c4b072783f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 00:37:21 +0100 Subject: netfilter: ebtables: remove BUGPRINT messages They are however frequently triggered by syzkaller, so remove them. ebtables userspace should never trigger any of these, so there is little value in making them pr_debug (or ratelimited). Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 131 ++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/bridge') diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c index 6693e209efe8..f77888ec93f1 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c @@ -31,10 +31,6 @@ /* needed for logical [in,out]-dev filtering */ #include "../br_private.h" -#define BUGPRINT(format, args...) printk("kernel msg: ebtables bug: please "\ - "report to author: "format, ## args) -/* #define BUGPRINT(format, args...) */ - /* Each cpu has its own set of counters, so there is no need for write_lock in * the softirq * For reading or updating the counters, the user context needs to @@ -466,8 +462,6 @@ static int ebt_verify_pointers(const struct ebt_replace *repl, /* we make userspace set this right, * so there is no misunderstanding */ - BUGPRINT("EBT_ENTRY_OR_ENTRIES shouldn't be set " - "in distinguisher\n"); return -EINVAL; } if (i != NF_BR_NUMHOOKS) @@ -485,18 +479,14 @@ static int ebt_verify_pointers(const struct ebt_replace *repl, offset += e->next_offset; } } - if (offset != limit) { - BUGPRINT("entries_size too small\n"); + if (offset != limit) return -EINVAL; - } /* check if all valid hooks have a chain */ for (i = 0; i < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS; i++) { if (!newinfo->hook_entry[i] && - (valid_hooks & (1 << i))) { - BUGPRINT("Valid hook without chain\n"); + (valid_hooks & (1 << i))) return -EINVAL; - } } return 0; } @@ -523,26 +513,20 @@ ebt_check_entry_size_and_hooks(const struct ebt_entry *e, /* this checks if the previous chain has as many entries * as it said it has */ - if (*n != *cnt) { - BUGPRINT("nentries does not equal the nr of entries " - "in the chain\n"); + if (*n != *cnt) return -EINVAL; - } + if (((struct ebt_entries *)e)->policy != EBT_DROP && ((struct ebt_entries *)e)->policy != EBT_ACCEPT) { /* only RETURN from udc */ if (i != NF_BR_NUMHOOKS || - ((struct ebt_entries *)e)->policy != EBT_RETURN) { - BUGPRINT("bad policy\n"); + ((struct ebt_entries *)e)->policy != EBT_RETURN) return -EINVAL; - } } if (i == NF_BR_NUMHOOKS) /* it's a user defined chain */ (*udc_cnt)++; - if (((struct ebt_entries *)e)->counter_offset != *totalcnt) { - BUGPRINT("counter_offset != totalcnt"); + if (((struct ebt_entries *)e)->counter_offset != *totalcnt) return -EINVAL; - } *n = ((struct ebt_entries *)e)->nentries; *cnt = 0; return 0; @@ -550,15 +534,13 @@ ebt_check_entry_size_and_hooks(const struct ebt_entry *e, /* a plain old entry, heh */ if (sizeof(struct ebt_entry) > e->watchers_offset || e->watchers_offset > e->target_offset || - e->target_offset >= e->next_offset) { - BUGPRINT("entry offsets not in right order\n"); + e->target_offset >= e->next_offset) return -EINVAL; - } + /* this is not checked anywhere else */ - if (e->next_offset - e->target_offset < sizeof(struct ebt_entry_target)) { - BUGPRINT("target size too small\n"); + if (e->next_offset - e->target_offset < sizeof(struct ebt_entry_target)) return -EINVAL; - } + (*cnt)++; (*totalcnt)++; return 0; @@ -678,18 +660,15 @@ ebt_check_entry(struct ebt_entry *e, struct net *net, if (e->bitmask == 0) return 0; - if (e->bitmask & ~EBT_F_MASK) { - BUGPRINT("Unknown flag for bitmask\n"); + if (e->bitmask & ~EBT_F_MASK) return -EINVAL; - } - if (e->invflags & ~EBT_INV_MASK) { - BUGPRINT("Unknown flag for inv bitmask\n"); + + if (e->invflags & ~EBT_INV_MASK) return -EINVAL; - } - if ((e->bitmask & EBT_NOPROTO) && (e->bitmask & EBT_802_3)) { - BUGPRINT("NOPROTO & 802_3 not allowed\n"); + + if ((e->bitmask & EBT_NOPROTO) && (e->bitmask & EBT_802_3)) return -EINVAL; - } + /* what hook do we belong to? */ for (i = 0; i < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS; i++) { if (!newinfo->hook_entry[i]) @@ -748,13 +727,11 @@ ebt_check_entry(struct ebt_entry *e, struct net *net, t->u.target = target; if (t->u.target == &ebt_standard_target) { if (gap < sizeof(struct ebt_standard_target)) { - BUGPRINT("Standard target size too big\n"); ret = -EFAULT; goto cleanup_watchers; } if (((struct ebt_standard_target *)t)->verdict < -NUM_STANDARD_TARGETS) { - BUGPRINT("Invalid standard target\n"); ret = -EFAULT; goto cleanup_watchers; } @@ -813,10 +790,9 @@ static int check_chainloops(const struct ebt_entries *chain, struct ebt_cl_stack if (strcmp(t->u.name, EBT_STANDARD_TARGET)) goto letscontinue; if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct ebt_standard_target) > - e->next_offset) { - BUGPRINT("Standard target size too big\n"); + e->next_offset) return -1; - } + verdict = ((struct ebt_standard_target *)t)->verdict; if (verdict >= 0) { /* jump to another chain */ struct ebt_entries *hlp2 = @@ -825,14 +801,12 @@ static int check_chainloops(const struct ebt_entries *chain, struct ebt_cl_stack if (hlp2 == cl_s[i].cs.chaininfo) break; /* bad destination or loop */ - if (i == udc_cnt) { - BUGPRINT("bad destination\n"); + if (i == udc_cnt) return -1; - } - if (cl_s[i].cs.n) { - BUGPRINT("loop\n"); + + if (cl_s[i].cs.n) return -1; - } + if (cl_s[i].hookmask & (1 << hooknr)) goto letscontinue; /* this can't be 0, so the loop test is correct */ @@ -865,24 +839,21 @@ static int translate_table(struct net *net, const char *name, i = 0; while (i < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS && !newinfo->hook_entry[i]) i++; - if (i == NF_BR_NUMHOOKS) { - BUGPRINT("No valid hooks specified\n"); + if (i == NF_BR_NUMHOOKS) return -EINVAL; - } - if (newinfo->hook_entry[i] != (struct ebt_entries *)newinfo->entries) { - BUGPRINT("Chains don't start at beginning\n"); + + if (newinfo->hook_entry[i] != (struct ebt_entries *)newinfo->entries) return -EINVAL; - } + /* make sure chains are ordered after each other in same order * as their corresponding hooks */ for (j = i + 1; j < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS; j++) { if (!newinfo->hook_entry[j]) continue; - if (newinfo->hook_entry[j] <= newinfo->hook_entry[i]) { - BUGPRINT("Hook order must be followed\n"); + if (newinfo->hook_entry[j] <= newinfo->hook_entry[i]) return -EINVAL; - } + i = j; } @@ -900,15 +871,11 @@ static int translate_table(struct net *net, const char *name, if (ret != 0) return ret; - if (i != j) { - BUGPRINT("nentries does not equal the nr of entries in the " - "(last) chain\n"); + if (i != j) return -EINVAL; - } - if (k != newinfo->nentries) { - BUGPRINT("Total nentries is wrong\n"); + + if (k != newinfo->nentries) return -EINVAL; - } /* get the location of the udc, put them in an array * while we're at it, allocate the chainstack @@ -942,7 +909,6 @@ static int translate_table(struct net *net, const char *name, ebt_get_udc_positions, newinfo, &i, cl_s); /* sanity check */ if (i != udc_cnt) { - BUGPRINT("i != udc_cnt\n"); vfree(cl_s); return -EFAULT; } @@ -1042,7 +1008,6 @@ static int do_replace_finish(struct net *net, struct ebt_replace *repl, goto free_unlock; if (repl->num_counters && repl->num_counters != t->private->nentries) { - BUGPRINT("Wrong nr. of counters requested\n"); ret = -EINVAL; goto free_unlock; } @@ -1118,15 +1083,12 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp)) != 0) return -EFAULT; - if (len != sizeof(tmp) + tmp.entries_size) { - BUGPRINT("Wrong len argument\n"); + if (len != sizeof(tmp) + tmp.entries_size) return -EINVAL; - } - if (tmp.entries_size == 0) { - BUGPRINT("Entries_size never zero\n"); + if (tmp.entries_size == 0) return -EINVAL; - } + /* overflow check */ if (tmp.nentries >= ((INT_MAX - sizeof(struct ebt_table_info)) / NR_CPUS - SMP_CACHE_BYTES) / sizeof(struct ebt_counter)) @@ -1153,7 +1115,6 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, } if (copy_from_user( newinfo->entries, tmp.entries, tmp.entries_size) != 0) { - BUGPRINT("Couldn't copy entries from userspace\n"); ret = -EFAULT; goto free_entries; } @@ -1194,10 +1155,8 @@ int ebt_register_table(struct net *net, const struct ebt_table *input_table, if (input_table == NULL || (repl = input_table->table) == NULL || repl->entries == NULL || repl->entries_size == 0 || - repl->counters != NULL || input_table->private != NULL) { - BUGPRINT("Bad table data for ebt_register_table!!!\n"); + repl->counters != NULL || input_table->private != NULL) return -EINVAL; - } /* Don't add one table to multiple lists. */ table = kmemdup(input_table, sizeof(struct ebt_table), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -1235,13 +1194,10 @@ int ebt_register_table(struct net *net, const struct ebt_table *input_table, ((char *)repl->hook_entry[i] - repl->entries); } ret = translate_table(net, repl->name, newinfo); - if (ret != 0) { - BUGPRINT("Translate_table failed\n"); + if (ret != 0) goto free_chainstack; - } if (table->check && table->check(newinfo, table->valid_hooks)) { - BUGPRINT("The table doesn't like its own initial data, lol\n"); ret = -EINVAL; goto free_chainstack; } @@ -1252,7 +1208,6 @@ int ebt_register_table(struct net *net, const struct ebt_table *input_table, list_for_each_entry(t, &net->xt.tables[NFPROTO_BRIDGE], list) { if (strcmp(t->name, table->name) == 0) { ret = -EEXIST; - BUGPRINT("Table name already exists\n"); goto free_unlock; } } @@ -1320,7 +1275,6 @@ static int do_update_counters(struct net *net, const char *name, goto free_tmp; if (num_counters != t->private->nentries) { - BUGPRINT("Wrong nr of counters\n"); ret = -EINVAL; goto unlock_mutex; } @@ -1447,10 +1401,8 @@ static int copy_counters_to_user(struct ebt_table *t, if (num_counters == 0) return 0; - if (num_counters != nentries) { - BUGPRINT("Num_counters wrong\n"); + if (num_counters != nentries) return -EINVAL; - } counterstmp = vmalloc(array_size(nentries, sizeof(*counterstmp))); if (!counterstmp) @@ -1496,15 +1448,11 @@ static int copy_everything_to_user(struct ebt_table *t, void __user *user, (tmp.num_counters ? nentries * sizeof(struct ebt_counter) : 0)) return -EINVAL; - if (tmp.nentries != nentries) { - BUGPRINT("Nentries wrong\n"); + if (tmp.nentries != nentries) return -EINVAL; - } - if (tmp.entries_size != entries_size) { - BUGPRINT("Wrong size\n"); + if (tmp.entries_size != entries_size) return -EINVAL; - } ret = copy_counters_to_user(t, oldcounters, tmp.counters, tmp.num_counters, nentries); @@ -1576,7 +1524,6 @@ static int do_ebt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len) } mutex_unlock(&ebt_mutex); if (copy_to_user(user, &tmp, *len) != 0) { - BUGPRINT("c2u Didn't work\n"); ret = -EFAULT; break; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 11d4dd0b20041289e60f0642d458b96389b3125d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Li RongQing Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 21:45:52 +0800 Subject: netfilter: convert the proto argument from u8 to u16 The proto in struct xt_match and struct xt_target is u16, when calling xt_check_target/match, their proto argument is u8, and will cause truncation, it is harmless to ip packet, since ip proto is u8 if a etable's match/target has proto that is u16, will cause the check failure. and convert be16 to short in bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c Signed-off-by: Zhang Yu Signed-off-by: Li RongQing Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h | 4 ++-- net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 6 +++--- net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/bridge') diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h b/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h index 9077b3ebea08..bf384b3eedb8 100644 --- a/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h +++ b/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h @@ -289,9 +289,9 @@ bool xt_find_jump_offset(const unsigned int *offsets, int xt_check_proc_name(const char *name, unsigned int size); -int xt_check_match(struct xt_mtchk_param *, unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto, +int xt_check_match(struct xt_mtchk_param *, unsigned int size, u16 proto, bool inv_proto); -int xt_check_target(struct xt_tgchk_param *, unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto, +int xt_check_target(struct xt_tgchk_param *, unsigned int size, u16 proto, bool inv_proto); int xt_match_to_user(const struct xt_entry_match *m, diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c index f77888ec93f1..eb15891f8b9f 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c @@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ ebt_check_match(struct ebt_entry_match *m, struct xt_mtchk_param *par, par->match = match; par->matchinfo = m->data; ret = xt_check_match(par, m->match_size, - e->ethproto, e->invflags & EBT_IPROTO); + ntohs(e->ethproto), e->invflags & EBT_IPROTO); if (ret < 0) { module_put(match->me); return ret; @@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ ebt_check_watcher(struct ebt_entry_watcher *w, struct xt_tgchk_param *par, par->target = watcher; par->targinfo = w->data; ret = xt_check_target(par, w->watcher_size, - e->ethproto, e->invflags & EBT_IPROTO); + ntohs(e->ethproto), e->invflags & EBT_IPROTO); if (ret < 0) { module_put(watcher->me); return ret; @@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ ebt_check_entry(struct ebt_entry *e, struct net *net, tgpar.target = target; tgpar.targinfo = t->data; ret = xt_check_target(&tgpar, t->target_size, - e->ethproto, e->invflags & EBT_IPROTO); + ntohs(e->ethproto), e->invflags & EBT_IPROTO); if (ret < 0) { module_put(target->me); goto cleanup_watchers; diff --git a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c index 13e1ac333fa4..e5e5c64df8d1 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c +++ b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c @@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ int xt_check_proc_name(const char *name, unsigned int size) EXPORT_SYMBOL(xt_check_proc_name); int xt_check_match(struct xt_mtchk_param *par, - unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto, bool inv_proto) + unsigned int size, u16 proto, bool inv_proto) { int ret; @@ -984,7 +984,7 @@ bool xt_find_jump_offset(const unsigned int *offsets, EXPORT_SYMBOL(xt_find_jump_offset); int xt_check_target(struct xt_tgchk_param *par, - unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto, bool inv_proto) + unsigned int size, u16 proto, bool inv_proto) { int ret; -- cgit v1.2.3 From cd6428988bf4fcc41d1deb7dae0e92e62c075c57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Ahern Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 16:21:14 -0800 Subject: netfilter: bridge: Don't sabotage nf_hook calls for an l3mdev slave Followup to a173f066c7cf ("netfilter: bridge: Don't sabotage nf_hook calls from an l3mdev"). Some packets (e.g., ndisc) do not have the skb device flipped to the l3mdev (e.g., VRF) device. Update ip_sabotage_in to not drop packets for slave devices too. Currently, neighbor solicitation packets for 'dev -> bridge (addr) -> vrf' setups are getting dropped. This patch enables IPv6 communications for bridges with an address that are enslaved to a VRF. Fixes: 73e20b761acf ("net: vrf: Add support for PREROUTING rules on vrf device") Signed-off-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/bridge') diff --git a/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c b/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c index 40d058378b52..9d34de68571b 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c @@ -831,7 +831,8 @@ static unsigned int ip_sabotage_in(void *priv, struct nf_bridge_info *nf_bridge = nf_bridge_info_get(skb); if (nf_bridge && !nf_bridge->in_prerouting && - !netif_is_l3_master(skb->dev)) { + !netif_is_l3_master(skb->dev) && + !netif_is_l3_slave(skb->dev)) { state->okfn(state->net, state->sk, skb); return NF_STOLEN; } -- cgit v1.2.3