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2023-02-08randstruct: disable Clang 15 supportEric Biggers
The randstruct support released in Clang 15 is unsafe to use due to a bug that can cause miscompilations: "-frandomize-layout-seed inconsistently randomizes all-function-pointers structs" (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/60349). It has been fixed on the Clang 16 release branch, so add a Clang version check. Fixes: 035f7f87b729 ("randstruct: Enable Clang support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230208065133.220589-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
2022-12-14security: Restrict CONFIG_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS to gcc or clang > 15.0.6Nathan Chancellor
A bad bug in clang's implementation of -fzero-call-used-regs can result in NULL pointer dereferences (see the links above the check for more information). Restrict CONFIG_CC_HAS_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS to either a supported GCC version or a clang newer than 15.0.6, which will catch both a theoretical 15.0.7 and the upcoming 16.0.0, which will both have the bug fixed. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.15+ Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221214232602.4118147-1-nathan@kernel.org
2022-10-10Merge tag 'mm-stable-2022-10-08' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton: - Yu Zhao's Multi-Gen LRU patches are here. They've been under test in linux-next for a couple of months without, to my knowledge, any negative reports (or any positive ones, come to that). - Also the Maple Tree from Liam Howlett. An overlapping range-based tree for vmas. It it apparently slightly more efficient in its own right, but is mainly targeted at enabling work to reduce mmap_lock contention. Liam has identified a number of other tree users in the kernel which could be beneficially onverted to mapletrees. Yu Zhao has identified a hard-to-hit but "easy to fix" lockdep splat at [1]. This has yet to be addressed due to Liam's unfortunately timed vacation. He is now back and we'll get this fixed up. - Dmitry Vyukov introduces KMSAN: the Kernel Memory Sanitizer. It uses clang-generated instrumentation to detect used-unintialized bugs down to the single bit level. KMSAN keeps finding bugs. New ones, as well as the legacy ones. - Yang Shi adds a userspace mechanism (madvise) to induce a collapse of memory into THPs. - Zach O'Keefe has expanded Yang Shi's madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE) to support file/shmem-backed pages. - userfaultfd updates from Axel Rasmussen - zsmalloc cleanups from Alexey Romanov - cleanups from Miaohe Lin: vmscan, hugetlb_cgroup, hugetlb and memory-failure - Huang Ying adds enhancements to NUMA balancing memory tiering mode's page promotion, with a new way of detecting hot pages. - memcg updates from Shakeel Butt: charging optimizations and reduced memory consumption. - memcg cleanups from Kairui Song. - memcg fixes and cleanups from Johannes Weiner. - Vishal Moola provides more folio conversions - Zhang Yi removed ll_rw_block() :( - migration enhancements from Peter Xu - migration error-path bugfixes from Huang Ying - Aneesh Kumar added ability for a device driver to alter the memory tiering promotion paths. For optimizations by PMEM drivers, DRM drivers, etc. - vma merging improvements from Jakub Matěn. - NUMA hinting cleanups from David Hildenbrand. - xu xin added aditional userspace visibility into KSM merging activity. - THP & KSM code consolidation from Qi Zheng. - more folio work from Matthew Wilcox. - KASAN updates from Andrey Konovalov. - DAMON cleanups from Kaixu Xia. - DAMON work from SeongJae Park: fixes, cleanups. - hugetlb sysfs cleanups from Muchun Song. - Mike Kravetz fixes locking issues in hugetlbfs and in hugetlb core. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAOUHufZabH85CeUN-MEMgL8gJGzJEWUrkiM58JkTbBhh-jew0Q@mail.gmail.com [1] * tag 'mm-stable-2022-10-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (555 commits) hugetlb: allocate vma lock for all sharable vmas hugetlb: take hugetlb vma_lock when clearing vma_lock->vma pointer hugetlb: fix vma lock handling during split vma and range unmapping mglru: mm/vmscan.c: fix imprecise comments mm/mglru: don't sync disk for each aging cycle mm: memcontrol: drop dead CONFIG_MEMCG_SWAP config symbol mm: memcontrol: use do_memsw_account() in a few more places mm: memcontrol: deprecate swapaccounting=0 mode mm: memcontrol: don't allocate cgroup swap arrays when memcg is disabled mm/secretmem: remove reduntant return value mm/hugetlb: add available_huge_pages() func mm: remove unused inline functions from include/linux/mm_inline.h selftests/vm: add selftest for MADV_COLLAPSE of uffd-minor memory selftests/vm: add file/shmem MADV_COLLAPSE selftest for cleared pmd selftests/vm: add thp collapse shmem testing selftests/vm: add thp collapse file and tmpfs testing selftests/vm: modularize thp collapse memory operations selftests/vm: dedup THP helpers mm/khugepaged: add tracepoint to hpage_collapse_scan_file() mm/madvise: add file and shmem support to MADV_COLLAPSE ...
2022-10-03security: kmsan: fix interoperability with auto-initializationAlexander Potapenko
Heap and stack initialization is great, but not when we are trying uses of uninitialized memory. When the kernel is built with KMSAN, having kernel memory initialization enabled may introduce false negatives. We disable CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN and CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO under CONFIG_KMSAN, making it impossible to auto-initialize stack variables in KMSAN builds. We also disable CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON and CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON to prevent accidental use of heap auto-initialization. We however still let the users enable heap auto-initialization at boot-time (by setting init_on_alloc=1 or init_on_free=1), in which case a warning is printed. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-31-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-29hardening: Remove Clang's enable flag for -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zeroKees Cook
Now that Clang's -enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang option is no longer required, remove it from the command line. Clang 16 and later will warn when it is used, which will cause Kconfig to think it can't use -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero at all. Check for whether it is required and only use it when so. Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: f02003c860d9 ("hardening: Avoid harmless Clang option under CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2022-05-08randstruct: Enable Clang supportKees Cook
Clang 15 will support randstruct via the -frandomize-layout-seed-file=... option. Update the Kconfig and Makefile to recognize this feature. Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-7-keescook@chromium.org
2022-05-08randstruct: Move seed generation into scripts/basic/Kees Cook
To enable Clang randstruct support, move the structure layout randomization seed generation out of scripts/gcc-plugins/ into scripts/basic/ so it happens early enough that it can be used by either compiler implementation. The gcc-plugin still builds its own header file, but now does so from the common "randstruct.seed" file. Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-6-keescook@chromium.org
2022-05-08randstruct: Reorganize Kconfigs and attribute macrosKees Cook
In preparation for Clang supporting randstruct, reorganize the Kconfigs, move the attribute macros, and generalize the feature to be named CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT for on/off, CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT_FULL for the full randomization mode, and CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE for the cache-line sized mode. Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-4-keescook@chromium.org
2022-02-06gcc-plugins/stackleak: Provide verbose modeKees Cook
In order to compare instrumentation between builds, make the verbose mode of the plugin available during the build. This is rarely needed (behind EXPERT) and very noisy (disabled for COMPILE_TEST). Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2021-10-21gcc-plugins: Explicitly document purpose and deprecation scheduleKees Cook
GCC plugins should only exist when some compiler feature needs to be proven but does not exist in either GCC nor Clang. For example, if a desired feature is already in Clang, it should be added to GCC upstream. Document this explicitly. Additionally, mark the plugins with matching upstream GCC features as removable past their respective GCC versions. Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Cc: Michal Marek <michal.lkml@markovi.net> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211020173554.38122-2-keescook@chromium.org
2021-09-25hardening: Avoid harmless Clang option under CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZEROKees Cook
Currently under Clang, CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO requires an extra -enable flag compared to CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN. GCC 12[1] will not, and will happily ignore the Clang-specific flag. However, its presence on the command-line is both cumbersome and confusing. Due to GCC's tolerant behavior, though, we can continue to use a single Kconfig cc-option test for the feature on both compilers, but then drop the Clang-specific option in the Makefile. In other words, this patch does not change anything other than making the compiler command line shorter once GCC supports -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero. [1] https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commitdiff;h=a25e0b5e6ac8a77a71c229e0a7b744603365b0e9 Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev Fixes: dcb7c0b9461c ("hardening: Clarify Kconfig text for auto-var-init") Suggested-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210914102837.6172-1-will@kernel.org/ Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2021-07-20hardening: Clarify Kconfig text for auto-var-initKees Cook
Clarify the details around the automatic variable initialization modes available. Specifically this details the values used for pattern init and expands on the rationale for zero init safety. Additionally makes zero init the default when available. Cc: glider@google.com Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
2021-07-20hardening: Introduce CONFIG_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGSKees Cook
When CONFIG_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS is enabled, build the kernel with "-fzero-call-used-regs=used-gpr" (in GCC 11). This option will zero any caller-used register contents just before returning from a function, ensuring that temporary values are not leaked beyond the function boundary. This means that register contents are less likely to be available for side channel attacks and information exposures. Additionally this helps reduce the number of useful ROP gadgets in the kernel image by about 20%: $ ROPgadget.py --nosys --nojop --binary vmlinux.stock | tail -n1 Unique gadgets found: 337245 $ ROPgadget.py --nosys --nojop --binary vmlinux.zero-call-regs | tail -n1 Unique gadgets found: 267175 and more notably removes simple "write-what-where" gadgets: $ ROPgadget.py --ropchain --binary vmlinux.stock | sed -n '/Step 1/,/Step 2/p' - Step 1 -- Write-what-where gadgets [+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff8102d76c mov qword ptr [rsi], rdx ; ret [+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff81000cf5 pop rsi ; ret [+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff8104d7c8 pop rdx ; ret [-] Can't find the 'xor rdx, rdx' gadget. Try with another 'mov [reg], reg' [+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff814c2b4c mov qword ptr [rsi], rdi ; ret [+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff81000cf5 pop rsi ; ret [+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff81001e51 pop rdi ; ret [-] Can't find the 'xor rdi, rdi' gadget. Try with another 'mov [reg], reg' [+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff81540d61 mov qword ptr [rsi], rdi ; pop rbx ; pop rbp ; ret [+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff81000cf5 pop rsi ; ret [+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff81001e51 pop rdi ; ret [-] Can't find the 'xor rdi, rdi' gadget. Try with another 'mov [reg], reg' [+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff8105341e mov qword ptr [rsi], rax ; ret [+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff81000cf5 pop rsi ; ret [+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff81029a11 pop rax ; ret [+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff811f1c3b xor rax, rax ; ret - Step 2 -- Init syscall number gadgets $ ROPgadget.py --ropchain --binary vmlinux.zero* | sed -n '/Step 1/,/Step 2/p' - Step 1 -- Write-what-where gadgets [-] Can't find the 'mov qword ptr [r64], r64' gadget For an x86_64 parallel build tests, this has a less than 1% performance impact, and grows the image size less than 1%: $ size vmlinux.stock vmlinux.zero-call-regs text data bss dec hex filename 22437676 8559152 14127340 45124168 2b08a48 vmlinux.stock 22453184 8563248 14110956 45127388 2b096dc vmlinux.zero-call-regs Impact for other architectures may vary. For example, arm64 sees a 5.5% image size growth, mainly due to needing to always clear x16 and x17: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210510134503.GA88495@C02TD0UTHF1T.local/ Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2021-04-16kasan: remove redundant config optionWalter Wu
CONFIG_KASAN_STACK and CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE both enable KASAN stack instrumentation, but we should only need one config, so that we remove CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE and make CONFIG_KASAN_STACK workable. see [1]. When enable KASAN stack instrumentation, then for gcc we could do no prompt and default value y, and for clang prompt and default value n. This patch fixes the following compilation warning: include/linux/kasan.h:333:30: warning: 'CONFIG_KASAN_STACK' is not defined, evaluates to 0 [-Wundef] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix merge snafu] Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210221 [1] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210226012531.29231-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Fixes: d9b571c885a8 ("kasan: fix KASAN_STACK dependency for HW_TAGS") Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-16security: allow using Clang's zero initialization for stack variablesglider@google.com
In addition to -ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern (used by CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL now) Clang also supports zero initialization for locals enabled by -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero. The future of this flag is still being debated (see https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=45497). Right now it is guarded by another flag, -enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang, which means it may not be supported by future Clang releases. Another possible resolution is that -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero will persist (as certain users have already started depending on it), but the name of the guard flag will change. In the meantime, zero initialization has proven itself as a good production mitigation measure against uninitialized locals. Unlike pattern initialization, which has a higher chance of triggering existing bugs, zero initialization provides safe defaults for strings, pointers, indexes, and sizes. On the other hand, pattern initialization remains safer for return values. Chrome OS and Android are moving to using zero initialization for production builds. Performance-wise, the difference between pattern and zero initialization is usually negligible, although the generated code for zero initialization is more compact. This patch renames CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL to CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN and introduces another config option, CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO, that enables zero initialization for locals if the corresponding flags are supported by Clang. Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200616083435.223038-1-glider@google.com Reviewed-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-07-28Merge tag 'meminit-v5.3-rc2' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull structleak fix from Kees Cook: "Disable gcc-based stack variable auto-init under KASAN (Arnd Bergmann). This fixes a bunch of build warnings under KASAN and the gcc-plugin-based stack auto-initialization features (which are arguably redundant, so better to let KASAN control this)" * tag 'meminit-v5.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: structleak: disable STRUCTLEAK_BYREF in combination with KASAN_STACK
2019-07-25structleak: disable STRUCTLEAK_BYREF in combination with KASAN_STACKArnd Bergmann
The combination of KASAN_STACK and GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF leads to much larger kernel stack usage, as seen from the warnings about functions that now exceed the 2048 byte limit: drivers/media/i2c/tvp5150.c:253:1: error: the frame size of 3936 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes drivers/media/tuners/r820t.c:1327:1: error: the frame size of 2816 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/phy/phy_n.c:16552:1: error: the frame size of 3144 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=] fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1892:1: error: the frame size of 2088 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c:737:1: error: the frame size of 2088 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes fs/ocfs2/namei.c:1677:1: error: the frame size of 2584 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes fs/ocfs2/super.c:1186:1: error: the frame size of 2640 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:3678:1: error: the frame size of 2176 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7056:1: error: the frame size of 2144 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=] net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c: In function 'l2cap_recv_frame': net/bridge/br_netlink.c:1505:1: error: the frame size of 2448 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes net/ieee802154/nl802154.c:548:1: error: the frame size of 2232 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes net/wireless/nl80211.c:1726:1: error: the frame size of 2224 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes net/wireless/nl80211.c:2357:1: error: the frame size of 4584 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes net/wireless/nl80211.c:5108:1: error: the frame size of 2760 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes net/wireless/nl80211.c:6472:1: error: the frame size of 2112 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes The structleak plugin was previously disabled for CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST, but meant we missed some bugs, so this time we should address them. The frame size warnings are distracting, and risking a kernel stack overflow is generally not beneficial to performance, so it may be best to disallow that particular combination. This can be done by turning off either one. I picked the dependency in GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF and GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL, as this option is designed to make uninitialized stack usage less harmful when enabled on its own, but it also prevents KASAN from detecting those cases in which it was in fact needed. KASAN_STACK is currently implied by KASAN on gcc, but could be made a user selectable option if we want to allow combining (non-stack) KASAN with GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF. Note that it would be possible to specifically address the files that print the warning, but presumably the overall stack usage is still significantly higher than in other configurations, so this would not address the full problem. I could not test this with CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL, which may or may not suffer from a similar problem. Fixes: 81a56f6dcd20 ("gcc-plugins: structleak: Generalize to all variable types") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190722114134.3123901-1-arnd@arndb.de Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-07-12mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot optionsAlexander Potapenko
Patch series "add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options", v10. Provide init_on_alloc and init_on_free boot options. These are aimed at preventing possible information leaks and making the control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic. Enabling either of the options guarantees that the memory returned by the page allocator and SL[AU]B is initialized with zeroes. SLOB allocator isn't supported at the moment, as its emulation of kmem caches complicates handling of SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU caches correctly. Enabling init_on_free also guarantees that pages and heap objects are initialized right after they're freed, so it won't be possible to access stale data by using a dangling pointer. As suggested by Michal Hocko, right now we don't let the heap users to disable initialization for certain allocations. There's not enough evidence that doing so can speed up real-life cases, and introducing ways to opt-out may result in things going out of control. This patch (of 2): The new options are needed to prevent possible information leaks and make control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic. This is expected to be on-by-default on Android and Chrome OS. And it gives the opportunity for anyone else to use it under distros too via the boot args. (The init_on_free feature is regularly requested by folks where memory forensics is included in their threat models.) init_on_alloc=1 makes the kernel initialize newly allocated pages and heap objects with zeroes. Initialization is done at allocation time at the places where checks for __GFP_ZERO are performed. init_on_free=1 makes the kernel initialize freed pages and heap objects with zeroes upon their deletion. This helps to ensure sensitive data doesn't leak via use-after-free accesses. Both init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 guarantee that the allocator returns zeroed memory. The two exceptions are slab caches with constructors and SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU flag. Those are never zero-initialized to preserve their semantics. Both init_on_alloc and init_on_free default to zero, but those defaults can be overridden with CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON and CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON. If either SLUB poisoning or page poisoning is enabled, those options take precedence over init_on_alloc and init_on_free: initialization is only applied to unpoisoned allocations. Slowdown for the new features compared to init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0: hackbench, init_on_free=1: +7.62% sys time (st.err 0.74%) hackbench, init_on_alloc=1: +7.75% sys time (st.err 2.14%) Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +8.38% wall time (st.err 0.39%) Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +24.42% sys time (st.err 0.52%) Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: -0.13% wall time (st.err 0.42%) Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: +0.57% sys time (st.err 0.40%) The slowdown for init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0 compared to the baseline is within the standard error. The new features are also going to pave the way for hardware memory tagging (e.g. arm64's MTE), which will require both on_alloc and on_free hooks to set the tags for heap objects. With MTE, tagging will have the same cost as memory initialization. Although init_on_free is rather costly, there are paranoid use-cases where in-memory data lifetime is desired to be minimized. There are various arguments for/against the realism of the associated threat models, but given that we'll need the infrastructure for MTE anyway, and there are people who want wipe-on-free behavior no matter what the performance cost, it seems reasonable to include it in this series. [glider@google.com: v8] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626121943.131390-2-glider@google.com [glider@google.com: v9] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627130316.254309-2-glider@google.com [glider@google.com: v10] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628093131.199499-2-glider@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617151050.92663-2-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> [page and dmapool parts Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>] Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-05-21treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/KconfigThomas Gleixner
Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which: - Have no license information of any form These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX license identifier is: GPL-2.0-only Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-04-24security: Implement Clang's stack initializationKees Cook
CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL turns on stack initialization based on -ftrivial-auto-var-init in Clang builds, which has greater coverage than CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL. -ftrivial-auto-var-init Clang option provides trivial initializers for uninitialized local variables, variable fields and padding. It has three possible values: pattern - uninitialized locals are filled with a fixed pattern (mostly 0xAA on 64-bit platforms, see https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604 for more details, but 0x000000AA for 32-bit pointers) likely to cause crashes when uninitialized value is used; zero (it's still debated whether this flag makes it to the official Clang release) - uninitialized locals are filled with zeroes; uninitialized (default) - uninitialized locals are left intact. This patch uses only the "pattern" mode when CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL is enabled. Developers have the possibility to opt-out of this feature on a per-variable basis by using __attribute__((uninitialized)), but such use should be well justified in comments. Co-developed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2019-04-24security: Move stackleak config to Kconfig.hardeningKees Cook
This moves the stackleak plugin options to Kconfig.hardening's memory initialization menu. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2019-04-24security: Create "kernel hardening" config areaKees Cook
Right now kernel hardening options are scattered around various Kconfig files. This can be a central place to collect these kinds of options going forward. This is initially populated with the memory initialization options from the gcc-plugins. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>