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commit b6ed5498601df40489606dbc14a9c7011c16630b upstream.
batman tries to search dev->iflink to check if it's a batman interface,
but ->iflink could be 0, which is not a valid ifindex. It should just
avoid iflink == 0 case.
Reported-by: Jet Chen <jet.chen@intel.com>
Tested-by: Jet Chen <jet.chen@intel.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Antonio Quartulli <antonio@open-mesh.com>
Cc: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 91a0b603469069cdcce4d572b7525ffc9fd352a6 upstream.
ping_lookup() may return a wrong sock if sk_buff's and sock's protocols
dont' match. For example, sk_buff's protocol is ETH_P_IPV6, but sock's
sk_family is AF_INET, in that case, if sk->sk_bound_dev_if is zero, a wrong
sock will be returned.
the fix is to "continue" the searching, if no matching, return NULL.
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jane Zhou <a17711@motorola.com>
Signed-off-by: Yiwei Zhao <gbjc64@motorola.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 01462405f0c093b2f8dfddafcadcda6c9e4c5cdf ]
This fixes an old regression introduced by commit
b0d0d915 (ipx: remove the BKL).
When a recvmsg syscall blocks waiting for new data, no data can be sent on the
same socket with sendmsg because ipx_recvmsg() sleeps with the socket locked.
This breaks mars-nwe (NetWare emulator):
- the ncpserv process reads the request using recvmsg
- ncpserv forks and spawns nwconn
- ncpserv calls a (blocking) recvmsg and waits for new requests
- nwconn deadlocks in sendmsg on the same socket
Commit b0d0d915 has simply replaced BKL locking with
lock_sock/release_sock. Unlike now, BKL got unlocked while
sleeping, so a blocking recvmsg did not block a concurrent
sendmsg.
Only keep the socket locked while actually working with the socket data and
release it prior to calling skb_recv_datagram().
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 49dd18ba4615eaa72f15c9087dea1c2ab4744cf5 ]
Trying to add an unreachable route incorrectly returns -ESRCH if
if custom FIB rules are present:
[root@localhost ~]# ip route add 74.125.31.199 dev eth0 via 1.2.3.4
RTNETLINK answers: Network is unreachable
[root@localhost ~]# ip rule add to 55.66.77.88 table 200
[root@localhost ~]# ip route add 74.125.31.199 dev eth0 via 1.2.3.4
RTNETLINK answers: No such process
[root@localhost ~]#
Commit 83886b6b636173b206f475929e58fac75c6f2446 ("[NET]: Change "not found"
return value for rule lookup") changed fib_rules_lookup()
to use -ESRCH as a "not found" code internally, but for user space it
should be translated into -ENETUNREACH. Handle the translation centrally in
ipv4-specific fib_lookup(), leaving the DECnet case alone.
On a related note, commit b7a71b51ee37d919e4098cd961d59a883fd272d8
("ipv4: removed redundant conditional") removed a similar translation from
ip_route_input_slow() prematurely AIUI.
Fixes: b7a71b51ee37 ("ipv4: removed redundant conditional")
Signed-off-by: Panu Matilainen <pmatilai@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9de7922bc709eee2f609cd01d98aaedc4cf5ea74 upstream.
Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:
skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
end:0x440 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
[<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
[<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
[<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
[<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60
This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>
... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...
1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)
... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.
The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.
In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.
When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...
length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.
Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b69040d8e39f20d5215a03502a8e8b4c6ab78395 upstream.
When receiving a e.g. semi-good formed connection scan in the
form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---------------- ASCONF_a; ASCONF_b ----------------->
... where ASCONF_a equals ASCONF_b chunk (at least both serials
need to be equal), we panic an SCTP server!
The problem is that good-formed ASCONF chunks that we reply with
ASCONF_ACK chunks are cached per serial. Thus, when we receive a
same ASCONF chunk twice (e.g. through a lost ASCONF_ACK), we do
not need to process them again on the server side (that was the
idea, also proposed in the RFC). Instead, we know it was cached
and we just resend the cached chunk instead. So far, so good.
Where things get nasty is in SCTP's side effect interpreter, that
is, sctp_cmd_interpreter():
While incoming ASCONF_a (chunk = event_arg) is being marked
!end_of_packet and !singleton, and we have an association context,
we do not flush the outqueue the first time after processing the
ASCONF_ACK singleton chunk via SCTP_CMD_REPLY. Instead, we keep it
queued up, although we set local_cork to 1. Commit 2e3216cd54b1
changed the precedence, so that as long as we get bundled, incoming
chunks we try possible bundling on outgoing queue as well. Before
this commit, we would just flush the output queue.
Now, while ASCONF_a's ASCONF_ACK sits in the corked outq, we
continue to process the same ASCONF_b chunk from the packet. As
we have cached the previous ASCONF_ACK, we find it, grab it and
do another SCTP_CMD_REPLY command on it. So, effectively, we rip
the chunk->list pointers and requeue the same ASCONF_ACK chunk
another time. Since we process ASCONF_b, it's correctly marked
with end_of_packet and we enforce an uncork, and thus flush, thus
crashing the kernel.
Fix it by testing if the ASCONF_ACK is currently pending and if
that is the case, do not requeue it. When flushing the output
queue we may relink the chunk for preparing an outgoing packet,
but eventually unlink it when it's copied into the skb right
before transmission.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 26b87c7881006311828bb0ab271a551a62dcceb4 upstream.
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7965ee93719921ea5978f331da653dfa2d7b99f5 upstream.
The code looks for an already loaded target, and the correct list to search
is nft_target_list, not nft_match_list.
Signed-off-by: Arturo Borrero Gonzalez <arturo.borrero.glez@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b51d3fa364885a2c1e1668f88776c67c95291820 upstream.
The kernel should reserve enough room in the skb so that the DONE
message can always be appended. However, in case of e.g. new attribute
erronously not being size-accounted for, __nfulnl_send() will still
try to put next nlmsg into this full skbuf, causing the skb to be stuck
forever and blocking delivery of further messages.
Fix issue by releasing skb immediately after nlmsg_put error and
WARN() so we can track down the cause of such size mismatch.
[ fw@strlen.de: add tailroom/len info to WARN ]
Signed-off-by: Houcheng Lin <houcheng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c1e7dc91eed0ed1a51c9b814d648db18bf8fc6e9 upstream.
don't try to queue payloads > 0xffff - NLA_HDRLEN, it does not work.
The nla length includes the size of the nla struct, so anything larger
results in u16 integer overflow.
This patch is similar to
9cefbbc9c8f9abe (netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: cleanup copy_range usage).
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9dfa1dfe4d5e5e66a991321ab08afe69759d797a upstream.
We currently neither account for the nlattr size, nor do we consider
the size of the trailing NLMSG_DONE when allocating nlmsg skb.
This can result in nflog to stop working, as __nfulnl_send() re-tries
sending forever if it failed to append NLMSG_DONE (which will never
work if buffer is not large enough).
Reported-by: Houcheng Lin <houcheng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0f9f5e1b83abd2b37c67658e02a6fc9001831fa5 upstream.
The ->ip_set_list[] array is initialized in ip_set_net_init() and it
has ->ip_set_max elements so this check should be >= instead of >
otherwise we are off by one.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b8fff407a180286aa683d543d878d98d9fc57b13 upstream.
Upon receiving the last fragment, all but the first fragment
are freed, but the multicast check for statistics at the end
of the function refers to the current skb (the last fragment)
causing a use-after-free bug.
Since multicast frames cannot be fragmented and we check for
this early in the function, just modify that check to also
do the accounting to fix the issue.
Reported-by: Yosef Khyal <yosefx.khyal@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ff1e417c7c239b7abfe70aa90460a77eaafc7f83 upstream.
Due to the time it takes to process the beacon that started the CSA
process, we may be late for the switch if we try to reach exactly
beacon 0. To avoid that, use count - 1 when calculating the switch time.
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 84469a45a1bedec9918e94ab2f78c5dc0739e4a7 upstream.
If we are switching from an HT40+ to an HT40- channel (or vice-versa),
we need the secondary channel offset IE to specify what is the
post-CSA offset to be used. This applies both to beacons and to probe
responses.
In ieee80211_parse_ch_switch_ie() we were ignoring this IE from
beacons and using the *current* HT information IE instead. This was
causing us to use the same offset as before the switch.
Fix that by using the secondary channel offset IE also for beacons and
don't ever use the pre-switch offset. Additionally, remove the
"beacon" argument from ieee80211_parse_ch_switch_ie(), since it's not
needed anymore.
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 46238845bd609a5c0fbe076e1b82b4c5b33360b2 upstream.
When an interface is deleted, an ongoing hardware scan is canceled and
the driver must abort the scan, at the very least reporting completion
while the interface is removed.
However, if it scheduled the work that might only run after everything
is said and done, which leads to cfg80211 warning that the scan isn't
reported as finished yet; this is no fault of the driver, it already
did, but mac80211 hasn't processed it.
To fix this situation, flush the delayed work when the interface being
removed is the one that was executing the scan.
Reported-by: Sujith Manoharan <sujith@msujith.org>
Tested-by: Sujith Manoharan <sujith@msujith.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit aaef31703a0cf6a733e651885bfb49edc3ac6774 upstream.
Large (greater than 32k, the value of PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER) auth
tickets will have their buffers vmalloc'ed, which leads to the
following crash in crypto:
[ 28.685082] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffeb04000032c0
[ 28.686032] IP: [<ffffffff81392b42>] scatterwalk_pagedone+0x22/0x80
[ 28.686032] PGD 0
[ 28.688088] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 28.688088] Modules linked in:
[ 28.688088] CPU: 0 PID: 878 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 3.17.0-vm+ #305
[ 28.688088] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007
[ 28.688088] Workqueue: ceph-msgr con_work
[ 28.688088] task: ffff88011a7f9030 ti: ffff8800d903c000 task.ti: ffff8800d903c000
[ 28.688088] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81392b42>] [<ffffffff81392b42>] scatterwalk_pagedone+0x22/0x80
[ 28.688088] RSP: 0018:ffff8800d903f688 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 28.688088] RAX: ffffeb04000032c0 RBX: ffff8800d903f718 RCX: ffffeb04000032c0
[ 28.688088] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8800d903f750
[ 28.688088] RBP: ffff8800d903f688 R08: 00000000000007de R09: ffff8800d903f880
[ 28.688088] R10: 18df467c72d6257b R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000010
[ 28.688088] R13: ffff8800d903f750 R14: ffff8800d903f8a0 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 28.688088] FS: 00007f50a41c7700(0000) GS:ffff88011fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 28.688088] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 28.688088] CR2: ffffeb04000032c0 CR3: 00000000da3f3000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
[ 28.688088] Stack:
[ 28.688088] ffff8800d903f698 ffffffff81392ca8 ffff8800d903f6e8 ffffffff81395d32
[ 28.688088] ffff8800dac96000 ffff880000000000 ffff8800d903f980 ffff880119b7e020
[ 28.688088] ffff880119b7e010 0000000000000000 0000000000000010 0000000000000010
[ 28.688088] Call Trace:
[ 28.688088] [<ffffffff81392ca8>] scatterwalk_done+0x38/0x40
[ 28.688088] [<ffffffff81392ca8>] scatterwalk_done+0x38/0x40
[ 28.688088] [<ffffffff81395d32>] blkcipher_walk_done+0x182/0x220
[ 28.688088] [<ffffffff813990bf>] crypto_cbc_encrypt+0x15f/0x180
[ 28.688088] [<ffffffff81399780>] ? crypto_aes_set_key+0x30/0x30
[ 28.688088] [<ffffffff8156c40c>] ceph_aes_encrypt2+0x29c/0x2e0
[ 28.688088] [<ffffffff8156d2a3>] ceph_encrypt2+0x93/0xb0
[ 28.688088] [<ffffffff8156d7da>] ceph_x_encrypt+0x4a/0x60
[ 28.688088] [<ffffffff8155b39d>] ? ceph_buffer_new+0x5d/0xf0
[ 28.688088] [<ffffffff8156e837>] ceph_x_build_authorizer.isra.6+0x297/0x360
[ 28.688088] [<ffffffff8112089b>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11b/0x1c0
[ 28.688088] [<ffffffff8156b496>] ? ceph_auth_create_authorizer+0x36/0x80
[ 28.688088] [<ffffffff8156ed83>] ceph_x_create_authorizer+0x63/0xd0
[ 28.688088] [<ffffffff8156b4b4>] ceph_auth_create_authorizer+0x54/0x80
[ 28.688088] [<ffffffff8155f7c0>] get_authorizer+0x80/0xd0
[ 28.688088] [<ffffffff81555a8b>] prepare_write_connect+0x18b/0x2b0
[ 28.688088] [<ffffffff81559289>] try_read+0x1e59/0x1f10
This is because we set up crypto scatterlists as if all buffers were
kmalloc'ed. Fix it.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4184b2a79a7612a9272ce20d639934584a1f3786 ]
A very minimal and simple user space application allocating an SCTP
socket, setting SCTP_AUTH_KEY setsockopt(2) on it and then closing
the socket again will leak the memory containing the authentication
key from user space:
unreferenced object 0xffff8800837047c0 (size 16):
comm "a.out", pid 2789, jiffies 4296954322 (age 192.258s)
hex dump (first 16 bytes):
01 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff816d7e8e>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
[<ffffffff811c88d8>] __kmalloc+0xe8/0x270
[<ffffffffa0870c23>] sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa08718b1>] sctp_auth_set_key+0xa1/0x140 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa086b383>] sctp_setsockopt+0xd03/0x1180 [sctp]
[<ffffffff815bfd94>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff815beb61>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
[<ffffffff816e58a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
This is bad because of two things, we can bring down a machine from
user space when auth_enable=1, but also we would leave security sensitive
keying material in memory without clearing it after use. The issue is
that sctp_auth_create_key() already sets the refcount to 1, but after
allocation sctp_auth_set_key() does an additional refcount on it, and
thus leaving it around when we free the socket.
Fixes: 65b07e5d0d0 ("[SCTP]: API updates to suport SCTP-AUTH extensions.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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packet
[ Upstream commit e40607cbe270a9e8360907cb1e62ddf0736e4864 ]
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f03eb128e3f4276f46442d14f3b8f864f3775821 ]
Otherwise it gets overwritten by register_netdev().
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ebe084aafb7e93adf210e80043c9f69adf56820d ]
ipip6_tunnel_init() sets the dev->iflink via a call to
ipip6_tunnel_bind_dev(). After that, register_netdevice()
sets dev->iflink = -1. So we loose the iflink configuration
for ipv6 tunnels. Fix this by using ipip6_tunnel_init() as the
ndo_init function. Then ipip6_tunnel_init() is called after
dev->iflink is set to -1 from register_netdevice().
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 16a0231bf7dc3fb37e9b1f1cb1a277dc220b5c5e ]
vti6_dev_init() sets the dev->iflink via a call to
vti6_link_config(). After that, register_netdevice()
sets dev->iflink = -1. So we loose the iflink configuration
for vti6 tunnels. Fix this by using vti6_dev_init() as the
ndo_init function. Then vti6_dev_init() is called after
dev->iflink is set to -1 from register_netdevice().
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6c6151daaf2d8dc2046d9926539feed5f66bf74e ]
ip6_tnl_dev_init() sets the dev->iflink via a call to
ip6_tnl_link_config(). After that, register_netdevice()
sets dev->iflink = -1. So we loose the iflink configuration
for ipv6 tunnels. Fix this by using ip6_tnl_dev_init() as the
ndo_init function. Then ip6_tnl_dev_init() is called after
dev->iflink is set to -1 from register_netdevice().
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c7abf25af0f41be4b50d44c5b185d52eea360cb8 upstream.
It affects non-(V)HT rates and can lead to selecting an rts_cts rate
that is not a basic rate or way superior to the reference rate (ATM
rates[0] used for the 1st attempt of the protected frame data).
E.g, assuming drivers register growing (bitrate) sorted tables of
ieee80211_rate-s, having :
- rates[0].idx == d'2 and basic_rates == b'10100
will select rts_cts idx b'10011 & ~d'(BIT(2)-1), i.e. 1, likewise
- rates[0].idx == d'2 and basic_rates == b'10001
will select rts_cts idx b'10000
The first is not a basic rate and the second is > rates[0].
Also, wrt severity of the addressed misbehavior, ATM we only have one
rts_cts_rate_idx rather than one per rate table entry, so this idx might
still point to bitrates > rates[1..MAX_RATES].
Fixes: 5253ffb8c9e1 ("mac80211: always pick a basic rate to tx RTS/CTS for pre-HT rates")
Signed-off-by: Karl Beldan <karl.beldan@rivierawaves.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f9865f06f7f18c6661c88d0511f05c48612319cc upstream.
Commit f363e45fd118 ("net/ceph: make ceph_msgr_wq non-reentrant")
effectively removed WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag from ceph_msgr_wq. This is
wrong - libceph is very much a memory reclaim path, so restore it.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Micha Krause <micha@krausam.de>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 24dff96a37a2ca319e75a74d3929b2de22447ca6 upstream.
we used to check for "nobody else could start doing anything with
that opened file" by checking that refcount was 2 or less - one
for descriptor table and one we'd acquired in fget() on the way to
wherever we are. That was race-prone (somebody else might have
had a reference to descriptor table and do fget() just as we'd
been checking) and it had become flat-out incorrect back when
we switched to fget_light() on those codepaths - unlike fget(),
it doesn't grab an extra reference unless the descriptor table
is shared. The same change allowed a race-free check, though -
we are safe exactly when refcount is less than 2.
It was a long time ago; pre-2.6.12 for ioctl() (the codepath leading
to ppp one) and 2.6.17 for sendmsg() (netlink one). OTOH,
netlink hadn't grown that check until 3.9 and ppp used to live
in drivers/net, not drivers/net/ppp until 3.1. The bug existed
well before that, though, and the same fix used to apply in old
location of file.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2aca5b869ace67a63aab895659e5dc14c33a4d6e upstream.
The flag RPC_CLNT_CREATE_NO_RETRANS_TIMEOUT was intended introduced in
order to allow NFSv4 clients to disable resend timeouts. Since those
cause the RPC layer to break the connection, they mess up the duplicate
reply caches that remain indexed on the port number in NFSv4..
This patch includes the code that was missing in the original to
set the appropriate flag in struct rpc_clnt, when the caller of
rpc_create() sets RPC_CLNT_CREATE_NO_RETRANS_TIMEOUT.
Fixes: 8a19a0b6cb2e (SUNRPC: Add RPC task and client level options to...)
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a743419f420a64d442280845c0377a915b76644f upstream.
When aborting a connection to preserve source ports, don't wake the task in
xs_error_report. This allows tasks with RPC_TASK_SOFTCONN to succeed if the
connection needs to be re-established since it preserves the task's status
instead of setting it to the status of the aborting kernel_connect().
This may also avoid a potential conflict on the socket's lock.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5188cd44c55db3e92cd9e77a40b5baa7ed4340f7 ]
UFO is now disabled on all drivers that work with virtio net headers,
but userland may try to send UFO/IPv6 packets anyway. Instead of
sending with ID=0, we should select identifiers on their behalf (as we
used to).
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: 916e4cf46d02 ("ipv6: reuse ip6_frag_id from ip6_ufo_append_data")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4062090e3e5caaf55bed4523a69f26c3265cc1d2 ]
ip_setup_cork() called inside ip_append_data() steals dst entry from rt to cork
and in case errors in __ip_append_data() nobody frees stolen dst entry
Fixes: 2e77d89b2fa8 ("net: avoid a pair of dst_hold()/dst_release() in ip_append_data()")
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 14051f0452a2c26a3f4791e6ad6a435e8f1945ff ]
Currently, skb_inner_network_header is used but this does not account
for Ethernet header for ETH_P_TEB. Use skb_inner_mac_header which
handles TEB and also should work with IP encapsulation in which case
inner mac and inner network headers are the same.
Tested: Ran TCP_STREAM over GRE, worked as expected.
Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 349ce993ac706869d553a1816426d3a4bfda02b1 ]
percpu tcp_md5sig_pool contains memory blobs that ultimately
go through sg_set_buf().
-> sg_set_page(sg, virt_to_page(buf), buflen, offset_in_page(buf));
This requires that whole area is in a physically contiguous portion
of memory. And that @buf is not backed by vmalloc().
Given that alloc_percpu() can use vmalloc() areas, this does not
fit the requirements.
Replace alloc_percpu() by a static DEFINE_PER_CPU() as tcp_md5sig_pool
is small anyway, there is no gain to dynamically allocate it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: 765cf9976e93 ("tcp: md5: remove one indirection level in tcp_md5sig_pool")
Reported-by: Crestez Dan Leonard <cdleonard@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1245dfc8cadb258386fcd27df38215a0eccb1f17 ]
pskb_may_pull() maybe change skb->data and make eth pointer oboslete,
so set eth after pskb_may_pull()
Fixes:3d7b46cd("ip_tunnel: push generic protocol handling to ip_tunnel module")
Cc: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <roy.qing.li@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f76936d07c4eeb36d8dbb64ebd30ab46ff85d9f7 ]
fib_nh_match does not match nexthops correctly. Example:
ip route add 172.16.10/24 nexthop via 192.168.122.12 dev eth0 \
nexthop via 192.168.122.13 dev eth0
ip route del 172.16.10/24 nexthop via 192.168.122.14 dev eth0 \
nexthop via 192.168.122.15 dev eth0
Del command is successful and route is removed. After this patch
applied, the route is correctly matched and result is:
RTNETLINK answers: No such process
Please consider this for stable trees as well.
Fixes: 4e902c57417c4 ("[IPv4]: FIB configuration using struct fib_config")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 72c6fb915ff2d30ae14053edee4f0d30019bad76 upstream.
The l2cap_create_le_flowctl_pdu() function that l2cap_segment_le_sdu()
calls is perfectly capable of doing packet fragmentation if given bigger
PDUs than the HCI buffers allow. Forcing the PDU length based on the HCI
MTU (conn->mtu) would therefore needlessly strict operation on hardware
with limited LE buffers (e.g. both Intel and Broadcom seem to have this
set to just 27 bytes).
This patch removes the restriction and makes it possible to send PDUs of
the full length that the remote MPS value allows.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit bef1909ee3ed1ca39231b260a8d3b4544ecd0c8f ]
Fix to a problem observed when losing a FIN segment that does not
contain data. In such situations, TLP is unable to recover from
*any* tail loss and instead adds at least PTO ms to the
retransmission process, i.e., RTO = RTO + PTO.
Signed-off-by: Per Hurtig <per.hurtig@kau.se>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit bdf6fa52f01b941d4a80372d56de465bdbbd1d23 ]
Currently association restarts do not take into consideration the
state of the socket. When a restart happens, the current assocation
simply transitions into established state. This creates a condition
where a remote system, through a the restart procedure, may create a
local association that is no way reachable by user. The conditions
to trigger this are as follows:
1) Remote does not acknoledge some data causing data to remain
outstanding.
2) Local application calls close() on the socket. Since data
is still outstanding, the association is placed in SHUTDOWN_PENDING
state. However, the socket is closed.
3) The remote tries to create a new association, triggering a restart
on the local system. The association moves from SHUTDOWN_PENDING
to ESTABLISHED. At this point, it is no longer reachable by
any socket on the local system.
This patch addresses the above situation by moving the newly ESTABLISHED
association into SHUTDOWN-SENT state and bundling a SHUTDOWN after
the COOKIE-ACK chunk. This way, the restarted associate immidiately
enters the shutdown procedure and forces the termination of the
unreachable association.
Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3be07244b7337760a3269d56b2f4a63e72218648 ]
In xmit path, we build a flowi6 which will be used for the output route lookup.
We are sending a GRE packet, neither IPv4 nor IPv6 encapsulated packet, thus the
protocol should be IPPROTO_GRE.
Fixes: c12b395a4664 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6")
Reported-by: Matthieu Ternisien d'Ouville <matthieu.tdo@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 73d3fe6d1c6d840763ceafa9afae0aaafa18c4b5 ]
In commit 8a29111c7ca6 ("net: gro: allow to build full sized skb")
I added a regression for linear skb that traditionally force GRO
to use the frag_list fallback.
Erez Shitrit found that at most two segments were aggregated and
the "if (skb_gro_len(p) != pinfo->gso_size)" test was failing.
This is because pinfo at this spot still points to the last skb in the
chain, instead of the first one, where we find the correct gso_size
information.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: 8a29111c7ca6 ("net: gro: allow to build full sized skb")
Reported-by: Erez Shitrit <erezsh@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b8c203b2d2fc961bafd53b41d5396bbcdec55998 ]
Currently we genarate a queueing route if we have matching policies
but can not resolve the states and the sysctl xfrm_larval_drop is
disabled. Here we assume that dst_output() is called to kill the
queued packets. Unfortunately this assumption is not true in all
cases, so it is possible that these packets leave the system unwanted.
We fix this by generating queueing routes only from the
route lookup functions, here we can guarantee a call to
dst_output() afterwards.
Fixes: a0073fe18e71 ("xfrm: Add a state resolution packet queue")
Reported-by: Konstantinos Kolelis <k.kolelis@sirrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f92ee61982d6da15a9e49664ecd6405a15a2ee56 ]
Currently we genarate a blackhole route route whenever we have
matching policies but can not resolve the states. Here we assume
that dst_output() is called to kill the balckholed packets.
Unfortunately this assumption is not true in all cases, so
it is possible that these packets leave the system unwanted.
We fix this by generating blackhole routes only from the
route lookup functions, here we can guarantee a call to
dst_output() afterwards.
Fixes: 2774c131b1d ("xfrm: Handle blackhole route creation via afinfo.")
Reported-by: Konstantinos Kolelis <k.kolelis@sirrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c095f248e63ada504dd90c90baae673ae10ee3fe ]
As Toshiaki Makita pointed out, the BRIDGE_INPUT_SKB_CB will
not be initialized in br_should_learn() as that function
is called only from br_handle_local_finish(). That is
an input handler for link-local ethernet traffic so it perfectly
correct to check br->vlan_enabled here.
Reported-by: Toshiaki Makita<toshiaki.makita1@gmail.com>
Fixes: 20adfa1 bridge: Check if vlan filtering is enabled only once.
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 20adfa1a81af00bf2027644507ad4fa9cd2849cf ]
The bridge code checks if vlan filtering is enabled on both
ingress and egress. When the state flip happens, it
is possible for the bridge to currently be forwarding packets
and forwarding behavior becomes non-deterministic. Bridge
may drop packets on some interfaces, but not others.
This patch solves this by caching the filtered state of the
packet into skb_cb on ingress. The skb_cb is guaranteed to
not be over-written between the time packet entres bridge
forwarding path and the time it leaves it. On egress, we
can then check the cached state to see if we need to
apply filtering information.
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit de185ab46cb02df9738b0d898b0c3a89181c5526 ]
It is possible that the interface is already gone after joining
the list of anycast on this interface as we don't hold a refcount
for the device, in this case we are safe to ignore the error.
What's more important, for API compatibility we should not
change this behavior for applications even if it were correct.
Fixes: commit a9ed4a2986e13011 ("ipv6: fix rtnl locking in setsockopt for anycast and multicast")
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a9ed4a2986e13011fcf4ed2d1a1647c53112f55b ]
Calling setsockopt with IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST or IPV6_LEAVE_ANYCAST
triggers the assertion in addrconf_join_solict()/addrconf_leave_solict()
ipv6_sock_ac_join(), ipv6_sock_ac_drop(), ipv6_sock_ac_close() need to
take RTNL before calling ipv6_dev_ac_inc/dec. Same thing with
ipv6_sock_mc_join(), ipv6_sock_mc_drop(), ipv6_sock_mc_close() before
calling ipv6_dev_mc_inc/dec.
This patch moves ASSERT_RTNL() up a level in the call stack.
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit eed4d839b0cdf9d84b0a9bc63de90fd5e1e886fb ]
Use dst_entry held by sk_dst_get() to retrieve tunnel's PMTU.
The dst_mtu(__sk_dst_get(tunnel->sock)) call was racy. __sk_dst_get()
could return NULL if tunnel->sock->sk_dst_cache was reset just before the
call, thus making dst_mtu() dereference a NULL pointer:
[ 1937.661598] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
[ 1937.664005] IP: [<ffffffffa049db88>] pppol2tp_connect+0x33d/0x41e [l2tp_ppp]
[ 1937.664005] PGD daf0c067 PUD d9f93067 PMD 0
[ 1937.664005] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 1937.664005] Modules linked in: l2tp_ppp l2tp_netlink l2tp_core ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter ip_tables ebtable_nat ebtables x_tables udp_tunnel pppoe pppox ppp_generic slhc deflate ctr twofish_generic twofish_x86_64_3way xts lrw gf128mul glue_helper twofish_x86_64 twofish_common blowfish_generic blowfish_x86_64 blowfish_common des_generic cbc xcbc rmd160 sha512_generic hmac crypto_null af_key xfrm_algo 8021q garp bridge stp llc tun atmtcp clip atm ext3 mbcache jbd iTCO_wdt coretemp kvm_intel iTCO_vendor_support kvm pcspkr evdev ehci_pci lpc_ich mfd_core i5400_edac edac_core i5k_amb shpchp button processor thermal_sys xfs crc32c_generic libcrc32c dm_mod usbhid sg hid sr_mod sd_mod cdrom crc_t10dif crct10dif_common ata_generic ahci ata_piix tg3 libahci libata uhci_hcd ptp ehci_hcd pps_core usbcore scsi_mod libphy usb_common [last unloaded: l2tp_core]
[ 1937.664005] CPU: 0 PID: 10022 Comm: l2tpstress Tainted: G O 3.17.0-rc1 #1
[ 1937.664005] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL160 G5, BIOS O12 08/22/2008
[ 1937.664005] task: ffff8800d8fda790 ti: ffff8800c43c4000 task.ti: ffff8800c43c4000
[ 1937.664005] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa049db88>] [<ffffffffa049db88>] pppol2tp_connect+0x33d/0x41e [l2tp_ppp]
[ 1937.664005] RSP: 0018:ffff8800c43c7de8 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 1937.664005] RAX: ffff8800da8a7240 RBX: ffff8800d8c64600 RCX: 000001c325a137b5
[ 1937.664005] RDX: 8c6318c6318c6320 RSI: 000000000000010c RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 1937.664005] RBP: ffff8800c43c7ea8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1937.664005] R10: ffffffffa048e2c0 R11: ffff8800d8c64600 R12: ffff8800ca7a5000
[ 1937.664005] R13: ffff8800c439bf40 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000009
[ 1937.664005] FS: 00007fd7f610f700(0000) GS:ffff88011a600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1937.664005] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 1937.664005] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 00000000d9d75000 CR4: 00000000000027e0
[ 1937.664005] Stack:
[ 1937.664005] ffffffffa049da80 ffff8800d8fda790 000000000000005b ffff880000000009
[ 1937.664005] ffff8800daf3f200 0000000000000003 ffff8800c43c7e48 ffffffff81109b57
[ 1937.664005] ffffffff81109b0e ffffffff8114c566 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 1937.664005] Call Trace:
[ 1937.664005] [<ffffffffa049da80>] ? pppol2tp_connect+0x235/0x41e [l2tp_ppp]
[ 1937.664005] [<ffffffff81109b57>] ? might_fault+0x9e/0xa5
[ 1937.664005] [<ffffffff81109b0e>] ? might_fault+0x55/0xa5
[ 1937.664005] [<ffffffff8114c566>] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x1c/0x26
[ 1937.664005] [<ffffffff81309196>] SYSC_connect+0x87/0xb1
[ 1937.664005] [<ffffffff813e56f7>] ? sysret_check+0x1b/0x56
[ 1937.664005] [<ffffffff8107590d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x145/0x1a1
[ 1937.664005] [<ffffffff81213dee>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
[ 1937.664005] [<ffffffff8114c262>] ? spin_lock+0x9/0xb
[ 1937.664005] [<ffffffff813092b4>] SyS_connect+0x9/0xb
[ 1937.664005] [<ffffffff813e56d2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 1937.664005] Code: 10 2a 84 81 e8 65 76 bd e0 65 ff 0c 25 10 bb 00 00 4d 85 ed 74 37 48 8b 85 60 ff ff ff 48 8b 80 88 01 00 00 48 8b b8 10 02 00 00 <48> 8b 47 20 ff 50 20 85 c0 74 0f 83 e8 28 89 83 10 01 00 00 89
[ 1937.664005] RIP [<ffffffffa049db88>] pppol2tp_connect+0x33d/0x41e [l2tp_ppp]
[ 1937.664005] RSP <ffff8800c43c7de8>
[ 1937.664005] CR2: 0000000000000020
[ 1939.559375] ---[ end trace 82d44500f28f8708 ]---
Fixes: f34c4a35d879 ("l2tp: take PMTU from tunnel UDP socket")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2ba5af42a7b59ef01f9081234d8855140738defd ]
When there are multiple vlan headers present in a received frame, the first
one is put into vlan_tci and protocol is set to ETH_P_8021Q. Anything in the
skb beyond the VLAN TPID may be still non-linear, including the inner TCI
and ethertype. While ovs_flow_extract takes care of IP and IPv6 headers, it
does nothing with ETH_P_8021Q. Later, if OVS_ACTION_ATTR_POP_VLAN is
executed, __pop_vlan_tci pulls the next vlan header into vlan_tci.
This leads to two things:
1. Part of the resulting ethernet header is in the non-linear part of the
skb. When eth_type_trans is called later as the result of
OVS_ACTION_ATTR_OUTPUT, kernel BUGs in __skb_pull. Also, __pop_vlan_tci
is in fact accessing random data when it reads past the TPID.
2. network_header points into the ethernet header instead of behind it.
mac_len is set to a wrong value (10), too.
Reported-by: Yulong Pei <ypei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit dc808110bb62b64a448696ecac3938902c92e1ab ]
af_packet can currently overwrite kernel memory by out of bound
accesses, because it assumed a [new] block can always hold one frame.
This is not generally the case, even if most existing tools do it right.
This patch clamps too long frames as API permits, and issue a one time
error on syslog.
[ 394.357639] tpacket_rcv: packet too big, clamped from 5042 to 3966. macoff=82
In this example, packet header tp_snaplen was set to 3966,
and tp_len was set to 5042 (skb->len)
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0c9ab09223fe9922baeb22546c9a90d774a4bde6 ]
Fix TCP FRTO logic so that it always notices when snd_una advances,
indicating that any RTO after that point will be a new and distinct
loss episode.
Previously there was a very specific sequence that could cause FRTO to
fail to notice a new loss episode had started:
(1) RTO timer fires, enter FRTO and retransmit packet 1 in write queue
(2) receiver ACKs packet 1
(3) FRTO sends 2 more packets
(4) RTO timer fires again (should start a new loss episode)
The problem was in step (3) above, where tcp_process_loss() returned
early (in the spot marked "Step 2.b"), so that it never got to the
logic to clear icsk_retransmits. Thus icsk_retransmits stayed
non-zero. Thus in step (4) tcp_enter_loss() would see the non-zero
icsk_retransmits, decide that this RTO is not a new episode, and
decide not to cut ssthresh and remember the current cwnd and ssthresh
for undo.
There were two main consequences to the bug that we have
observed. First, ssthresh was not decreased in step (4). Second, when
there was a series of such FRTO (1-4) sequences that happened to be
followed by an FRTO undo, we would restore the cwnd and ssthresh from
before the entire series started (instead of the cwnd and ssthresh
from before the most recent RTO). This could result in cwnd and
ssthresh being restored to values much bigger than the proper values.
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Fixes: e33099f96d99c ("tcp: implement RFC5682 F-RTO")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4fab9071950c2021d846e18351e0f46a1cffd67b ]
Make sure we use the correct address-family-specific function for
handling MTU reductions from within tcp_release_cb().
Previously AF_INET6 sockets were incorrectly always using the IPv6
code path when sometimes they were handling IPv4 traffic and thus had
an IPv4 dst.
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Diagnosed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Fixes: 563d34d057862 ("tcp: dont drop MTU reduction indications")
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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