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commit c7ac8679bec9397afe8918f788cbcef88c38da54 upstream.
The message size allocated for rtnl ifinfo dumps was limited to
a single page. This is not enough for additional interface info
available with devices that support SR-IOV and caused a bug in
which VF info would not be displayed if more than approximately
40 VFs were created per interface.
Implement a new function pointer for the rtnl_register service that will
calculate the amount of data required for the ifinfo dump and allocate
enough data to satisfy the request.
Signed-off-by: Greg Rose <gregory.v.rose@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 354e4aa391ed50a4d827ff6fc11e0667d0859b25 ]
RFC 5961 5.2 [Blind Data Injection Attack].[Mitigation]
All TCP stacks MAY implement the following mitigation. TCP stacks
that implement this mitigation MUST add an additional input check to
any incoming segment. The ACK value is considered acceptable only if
it is in the range of ((SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND) <= SEG.ACK <=
SND.NXT). All incoming segments whose ACK value doesn't satisfy the
above condition MUST be discarded and an ACK sent back.
Move tcp_send_challenge_ack() before tcp_ack() to avoid a forward
declaration.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit bd090dfc634ddd711a5fbd0cadc6e0ab4977bcaf ]
We added support for RFC 5961 in latest kernels but TCP fails
to perform exhaustive check of ACK sequence.
We can update our view of peer tsval from a frame that is
later discarded by tcp_ack()
This makes timestamps enabled sessions vulnerable to injection of
a high tsval : peers start an ACK storm, since the victim
sends a dupack each time it receives an ACK from the other peer.
As tcp_validate_incoming() is called before tcp_ack(), we should
not peform tcp_replace_ts_recent() from it, and let callers do it
at the right time.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com>
Cc: H.K. Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com>
Cc: Romain Francoise <romain@orebokech.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e371589917011efe6ff8c7dfb4e9e81934ac5855 ]
Followup of commit 0c24604b68fc (tcp: implement RFC 5961 4.2)
As reported by Vijay Subramanian, we should send a challenge ACK
instead of a dup ack if a SYN flag is set on a packet received out of
window.
This permits the ratelimiting to work as intended, and to increase
correct SNMP counters.
Suggested-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com>
Cc: Kiran Kumar Kella <kkiran@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0c24604b68fc7810d429d6c3657b6f148270e528 ]
Implement the RFC 5691 mitigation against Blind
Reset attack using SYN bit.
Section 4.2 of RFC 5961 advises to send a Challenge ACK and drop
incoming packet, instead of resetting the session.
Add a new SNMP counter to count number of challenge acks sent
in response to SYN packets.
(netstat -s | grep TCPSYNChallenge)
Remove obsolete TCPAbortOnSyn, since we no longer abort a TCP session
because of a SYN flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kiran Kumar Kella <kkiran@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 282f23c6ee343126156dd41218b22ece96d747e3 ]
Implement the RFC 5691 mitigation against Blind
Reset attack using RST bit.
Idea is to validate incoming RST sequence,
to match RCV.NXT value, instead of previouly accepted
window : (RCV.NXT <= SEG.SEQ < RCV.NXT+RCV.WND)
If sequence is in window but not an exact match, send
a "challenge ACK", so that the other part can resend an
RST with the appropriate sequence.
Add a new sysctl, tcp_challenge_ack_limit, to limit
number of challenge ACK sent per second.
Add a new SNMP counter to count number of challenge acks sent.
(netstat -s | grep TCPChallengeACK)
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kiran Kumar Kella <kkiran@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Stable-3.0 commit 42ab5316 (ipv4: fix redirect handling) was
backport of mainline commit 9cc20b26 from 3.2-rc3 where hh
member of struct dst_entry was already gone.
However, in 3.0 we still have it and we have to clean it as
well, otherwise it keeps pointing to the cleaned up (and
unusable) hh_cache entry and packets cannot be sent out.
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 38fe36a248ec3228f8e6507955d7ceb0432d2000 upstream.
ICMP tuples have id in src and type/code in dst.
So comparing src.u.all with dst.u.all will always fail here
and ip_xfrm_me_harder() is called for every ICMP packet,
even if there was no NAT.
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weber <ulrich.weber@sophos.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0c9f79be295c99ac7e4b569ca493d75fdcc19e4e ]
(1<<optname) is undefined behavior in C with a negative optname or
optname larger than 31. In those cases the result of the shift is
not necessarily zero (e.g., on x86).
This patch simplifies the code with a switch statement on optname.
It also allows the compiler to generate better code (e.g., using a
64-bit mask).
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8f363b77ee4fbf7c3bbcf5ec2c5ca482d396d664 ]
Reading TCP stats when using TCP Illinois congestion control algorithm
can cause a divide by zero kernel oops.
The division by zero occur in tcp_illinois_info() at:
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
where ca->cnt_rtt can become zero (when rtt_reset is called)
Steps to Reproduce:
1. Register tcp_illinois:
# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=illinois
2. Monitor internal TCP information via command "ss -i"
# watch -d ss -i
3. Establish new TCP conn to machine
Either it fails at the initial conn, or else it needs to wait
for a loss or a reset.
This is only related to reading stats. The function avg_delay() also
performs the same divide, but is guarded with a (ca->cnt_rtt > 0) at its
calling point in update_params(). Thus, simply fix tcp_illinois_info().
Function tcp_illinois_info() / get_info() is called without
socket lock. Thus, eliminate any race condition on ca->cnt_rtt
by using a local stack variable. Simply reuse info.tcpv_rttcnt,
as its already set to ca->cnt_rtt.
Function avg_delay() is not affected by this race condition, as
its called with the socket lock.
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a3374c42aa5f7237e87ff3b0622018636b0c847e ]
tcp_ioctl() tries to take into account if tcp socket received a FIN
to report correct number bytes in receive queue.
But its flaky because if the application ate the last skb,
we return 1 instead of 0.
Correct way to detect that FIN was received is to test SOCK_DONE.
Reported-by: Elliot Hughes <enh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4c67525849e0b7f4bd4fab2487ec9e43ea52ef29 ]
After commit e2446eaa ("tcp_v4_send_reset: binding oif to iif in no
sock case").. tcp resets are always lost, when routing is asymmetric.
Yes, backing out that patch will result in misrouting of resets for
dead connections which used interface binding when were alive, but we
actually cannot do anything here. What's died that's died and correct
handling normal unbound connections is obviously a priority.
Comment to comment:
> This has few benefits:
> 1. tcp_v6_send_reset already did that.
It was done to route resets for IPv6 link local addresses. It was a
mistake to do so for global addresses. The patch fixes this as well.
Actually, the problem appears to be even more serious than guaranteed
loss of resets. As reported by Sergey Soloviev <sol@eqv.ru>, those
misrouted resets create a lot of arp traffic and huge amount of
unresolved arp entires putting down to knees NAT firewalls which use
asymmetric routing.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f22eb25cf5b1157b29ef88c793b71972efc47143 upstream.
Via-headers are parsed beginning at the first character after the Via-address.
When the address is translated first and its length decreases, the offset to
start parsing at is incorrect and header parameters might be missed.
Update the offset after translating the Via-address to fix this.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3f509c689a07a4aa989b426893d8491a7ffcc410 upstream.
We're hitting bug while trying to reinsert an already existing
expectation:
kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:895!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa0069563>] nf_ct_expect_related_report+0x4a0/0x57a [nf_conntrack]
[<ffffffff812d423a>] ? in4_pton+0x72/0x131
[<ffffffffa00ca69e>] ip_nat_sdp_media+0xeb/0x185 [nf_nat_sip]
[<ffffffffa00b5b9b>] set_expected_rtp_rtcp+0x32d/0x39b [nf_conntrack_sip]
[<ffffffffa00b5f15>] process_sdp+0x30c/0x3ec [nf_conntrack_sip]
[<ffffffff8103f1eb>] ? irq_exit+0x9a/0x9c
[<ffffffffa00ca738>] ? ip_nat_sdp_media+0x185/0x185 [nf_nat_sip]
We have to remove the RTP expectation if the RTCP expectation hits EBUSY
since we keep trying with other ports until we succeed.
Reported-by: Rafal Fitt <rafalf@aplusc.com.pl>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 07153c6ec074257ade76a461429b567cff2b3a1e upstream.
It was reported that the Linux kernel sometimes logs:
klogd: [2629147.402413] kernel BUG at net / netfilter /
nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c: 447!
klogd: [1072212.887368] kernel BUG at net / netfilter /
nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c: 392
ipv4_get_l4proto() in nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c and tcp_error() in
nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c should catch malformed packets, so the errors
at the indicated lines - TCP options parsing - should not happen.
However, tcp_error() relies on the "dataoff" offset to the TCP header,
calculated by ipv4_get_l4proto(). But ipv4_get_l4proto() does not check
bogus ihl values in IPv4 packets, which then can slip through tcp_error()
and get caught at the TCP options parsing routines.
The patch fixes ipv4_get_l4proto() by invalidating packets with bogus
ihl value.
The patch closes netfilter bugzilla id 771.
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ab43ed8b7490cb387782423ecf74aeee7237e591 ]
icmp_filter() should not modify its input, or else its caller
would need to recompute ip_hdr() if skb->head is reallocated.
Use skb_header_pointer() instead of pskb_may_pull() and
change the prototype to make clear both sk and skb are const.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 15c041759bfcd9ab0a4e43f1c16e2644977d0467 ]
If recv() syscall is called for a TCP socket so that
- IOAT DMA is used
- MSG_WAITALL flag is used
- requested length is bigger than sk_rcvbuf
- enough data has already arrived to bring rcv_wnd to zero
then when tcp_recvmsg() gets to calling sk_wait_data(), receive
window can be still zero while sk_async_wait_queue exhausts
enough space to keep it zero. As this queue isn't cleaned until
the tcp_service_net_dma() call, sk_wait_data() cannot receive
any data and blocks forever.
If zero receive window and non-empty sk_async_wait_queue is
detected before calling sk_wait_data(), process the queue first.
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit acbb219d5f53821b2d0080d047800410c0420ea1 ]
When tearing down a net namespace, ipv4 mr_table structures are freed
without first deactivating their timers. This can result in a crash in
run_timer_softirq.
This patch mimics the corresponding behaviour in ipv6.
Locking and synchronization seem to be adequate.
We are about to kfree mrt, so existing code should already make sure that
no other references to mrt are pending or can be created by incoming traffic.
The functions invoked here do not cause new references to mrt or other
race conditions to be created.
Invoking del_timer_sync guarantees that ipmr_expire_timer is inactive.
Both ipmr_expire_process (whose completion we may have to wait in
del_timer_sync) and mroute_clean_tables internally use mfc_unres_lock
or other synchronizations when needed, and they both only modify mrt.
Tested in Linux 3.4.8.
Signed-off-by: Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri@aristanetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1485348d2424e1131ea42efc033cbd9366462b01 ]
Cache the device gso_max_segs in sock::sk_gso_max_segs and use it to
limit the size of TSO skbs. This avoids the need to fall back to
software GSO for local TCP senders.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 59ea33a68a9083ac98515e4861c00e71efdc49a1 ]
Back in 2006, commit 1a2449a87b ("[I/OAT]: TCP recv offload to I/OAT")
added support for receive offloading to IOAT dma engine if available.
The code in tcp_rcv_established() tries to perform early DMA copy if
applicable. It however does so without checking whether the userspace
task is actually expecting the data in the buffer.
This is not a problem under normal circumstances, but there is a corner
case where this doesn't work -- and that's when MSG_TRUNC flag to
recvmsg() is used.
If the IOAT dma engine is not used, the code properly checks whether
there is a valid ucopy.task and the socket is owned by userspace, but
misses the check in the dmaengine case.
This problem can be observed in real trivially -- for example 'tbench' is a
good reproducer, as it makes a heavy use of MSG_TRUNC. On systems utilizing
IOAT, you will soon find tbench waiting indefinitely in sk_wait_data(), as they
have been already early-copied in tcp_rcv_established() using dma engine.
This patch introduces the same check we are performing in the simple
iovec copy case to the IOAT case as well. It fixes the indefinite
recvmsg(MSG_TRUNC) hangs.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 42493570100b91ef663c4c6f0c0fdab238f9d3c2 ]
TCP_USER_TIMEOUT is a TCP level socket option that takes an unsigned int. But
patch "tcp: Add TCP_USER_TIMEOUT socket option"(dca43c75) didn't check the negative
values. If a user assign -1 to it, the socket will set successfully and wait
for 4294967295 miliseconds. This patch add a negative value check to avoid
this issue.
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 89d7ae34cdda4195809a5a987f697a517a2a3177 ]
As reported by Alan Cox, and verified by Lin Ming, when a user
attempts to add a CIPSO option to a socket using the CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL
tag the kernel dies a terrible death when it attempts to follow a NULL
pointer (the skb argument to cipso_v4_validate() is NULL when called via
the setsockopt() syscall).
This patch fixes this by first checking to ensure that the skb is
non-NULL before using it to find the incoming network interface. In
the unlikely case where the skb is NULL and the user attempts to add
a CIPSO option with the _TAG_LOCAL tag we return an error as this is
not something we want to allow.
A simple reproducer, kindly supplied by Lin Ming, although you must
have the CIPSO DOI #3 configure on the system first or you will be
caught early in cipso_v4_validate():
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <string.h>
struct local_tag {
char type;
char length;
char info[4];
};
struct cipso {
char type;
char length;
char doi[4];
struct local_tag local;
};
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int sockfd;
struct cipso cipso = {
.type = IPOPT_CIPSO,
.length = sizeof(struct cipso),
.local = {
.type = 128,
.length = sizeof(struct local_tag),
},
};
memset(cipso.doi, 0, 4);
cipso.doi[3] = 3;
sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
#define SOL_IP 0
setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_OPTIONS,
&cipso, sizeof(struct cipso));
return 0;
}
CC: Lin Ming <mlin@ss.pku.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fdf5af0daf8019cec2396cdef8fb042d80fe71fa upstream.
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 91657eafb64b4cb53ec3a2fbc4afc3497f735788 ]
Corrects the function that determines the esp payload size. The calculations
done in esp{4,6}_get_mtu() lead to overlength frames in transport mode for
certain mtu values and suboptimal frames for others.
According to what is done, mainly in esp{,6}_output() and tcp_mtu_to_mss(),
net_header_len must be taken into account before doing the alignment
calculation.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e49cc0da7283088c5e03d475ffe2fdcb24a6d5b1 ]
We hit a kernel OOPS.
<3>[23898.789643] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at
/data/buildbot/workdir/ics/hardware/intel/linux-2.6/arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1103
<3>[23898.862215] in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 10526, name:
Thread-6683
<4>[23898.967805] HSU serial 0000:00:05.1: 0000:00:05.2:HSU serial prevented me
to suspend...
<4>[23899.258526] Pid: 10526, comm: Thread-6683 Tainted: G W
3.0.8-137685-ge7742f9 #1
<4>[23899.357404] HSU serial 0000:00:05.1: 0000:00:05.2:HSU serial prevented me
to suspend...
<4>[23899.904225] Call Trace:
<4>[23899.989209] [<c1227f50>] ? pgtable_bad+0x130/0x130
<4>[23900.000416] [<c1238c2a>] __might_sleep+0x10a/0x110
<4>[23900.007357] [<c1228021>] do_page_fault+0xd1/0x3c0
<4>[23900.013764] [<c18e9ba9>] ? restore_all+0xf/0xf
<4>[23900.024024] [<c17c007b>] ? napi_complete+0x8b/0x690
<4>[23900.029297] [<c1227f50>] ? pgtable_bad+0x130/0x130
<4>[23900.123739] [<c1227f50>] ? pgtable_bad+0x130/0x130
<4>[23900.128955] [<c18ea0c3>] error_code+0x5f/0x64
<4>[23900.133466] [<c1227f50>] ? pgtable_bad+0x130/0x130
<4>[23900.138450] [<c17f6298>] ? __ip_route_output_key+0x698/0x7c0
<4>[23900.144312] [<c17f5f8d>] ? __ip_route_output_key+0x38d/0x7c0
<4>[23900.150730] [<c17f63df>] ip_route_output_flow+0x1f/0x60
<4>[23900.156261] [<c181de58>] ip4_datagram_connect+0x188/0x2b0
<4>[23900.161960] [<c18e981f>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x1f/0x30
<4>[23900.167834] [<c18298d6>] inet_dgram_connect+0x36/0x80
<4>[23900.173224] [<c14f9e88>] ? _copy_from_user+0x48/0x140
<4>[23900.178817] [<c17ab9da>] sys_connect+0x9a/0xd0
<4>[23900.183538] [<c132e93c>] ? alloc_file+0xdc/0x240
<4>[23900.189111] [<c123925d>] ? sub_preempt_count+0x3d/0x50
Function free_fib_info resets nexthop_nh->nh_dev to NULL before releasing
fi. Other cpu might be accessing fi. Fixing it by delaying the releasing.
With the patch, we ran MTBF testing on Android mobile for 12 hours
and didn't trigger the issue.
Thank Eric for very detailed review/checking the issue.
Signed-off-by: Yanmin Zhang <yanmin_zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kun Jiang <kunx.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit dccd9ecc374462e5d6a5b8f8110415a86c2213d8 ]
Due to RCU lookups and RCU based release, fib_info objects can
be found during lookup which have fi->fib_dead set.
We must ignore these entries, otherwise we risk dereferencing
the parts of the entry which are being torn down.
Reported-by: Yevgen Pronenko <yevgen.pronenko@sonymobile.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bad115cfe5b509043b684d3a007ab54b80090aa1 upstream.
Since recent changes on TCP splicing (starting with commits 2f533844
"tcp: allow splice() to build full TSO packets" and 35f9c09f "tcp:
tcp_sendpages() should call tcp_push() once"), I started seeing
massive stalls when forwarding traffic between two sockets using
splice() when pipe buffers were larger than socket buffers.
Latest changes (net: netdev_alloc_skb() use build_skb()) made the
problem even more apparent.
The reason seems to be that if do_tcp_sendpages() fails on out of memory
condition without being able to send at least one byte, tcp_push() is not
called and the buffers cannot be flushed.
After applying the attached patch, I cannot reproduce the stalls at all
and the data rate it perfectly stable and steady under any condition
which previously caused the problem to be permanent.
The issue seems to have been there since before the kernel migrated to
git, which makes me think that the stalls I occasionally experienced
with tux during stress-tests years ago were probably related to the
same issue.
This issue was first encountered on 3.0.31 and 3.2.17, so please backport
to -stable.
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b49960a05e32121d29316cfdf653894b88ac9190 ]
tcp_adv_win_scale default value is 2, meaning we expect a good citizen
skb to have skb->len / skb->truesize ratio of 75% (3/4)
In 2.6 kernels we (mis)accounted for typical MSS=1460 frame :
1536 + 64 + 256 = 1856 'estimated truesize', and 1856 * 3/4 = 1392.
So these skbs were considered as not bloated.
With recent truesize fixes, a typical MSS=1460 frame truesize is now the
more precise :
2048 + 256 = 2304. But 2304 * 3/4 = 1728.
So these skb are not good citizen anymore, because 1460 < 1728
(GRO can escape this problem because it build skbs with a too low
truesize.)
This also means tcp advertises a too optimistic window for a given
allocated rcvspace : When receiving frames, sk_rmem_alloc can hit
sk_rcvbuf limit and we call tcp_prune_queue()/tcp_collapse() too often,
especially when application is slow to drain its receive queue or in
case of losses (netperf is fast, scp is slow). This is a major latency
source.
We should adjust the len/truesize ratio to 50% instead of 75%
This patch :
1) changes tcp_adv_win_scale default to 1 instead of 2
2) increase tcp_rmem[2] limit from 4MB to 6MB to take into account
better truesize tracking and to allow autotuning tcp receive window to
reach same value than before. Note that same amount of kernel memory is
consumed compared to 2.6 kernels.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4d846f02392a710f9604892ac3329e628e60a230 ]
tcp_grow_window() has to grow rcv_ssthresh up to window_clamp, allowing
sender to increase its window.
tcp_grow_window() still assumes a tcp frame is under MSS, but its no
longer true with LRO/GRO.
This patch fixes one of the performance issue we noticed with GRO on.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 18a223e0b9ec8979320ba364b47c9772391d6d05 ]
Fix a code path in tcp_rcv_rtt_update() that was comparing scaled and
unscaled RTT samples.
The intent in the code was to only use the 'm' measurement if it was a
new minimum. However, since 'm' had not yet been shifted left 3 bits
but 'new_sample' had, this comparison would nearly always succeed,
leading us to erroneously set our receive-side RTT estimate to the 'm'
sample when that sample could be nearly 8x too high to use.
The overall effect is to often cause the receive-side RTT estimate to
be significantly too large (up to 40% too large for brief periods in
my tests).
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ This combines upstream commit
2f53384424251c06038ae612e56231b96ab610ee and the follow-on bug fix
commit 35f9c09fe9c72eb8ca2b8e89a593e1c151f28fc2 ]
vmsplice()/splice(pipe, socket) call do_tcp_sendpages() one page at a
time, adding at most 4096 bytes to an skb. (assuming PAGE_SIZE=4096)
The call to tcp_push() at the end of do_tcp_sendpages() forces an
immediate xmit when pipe is not already filled, and tso_fragment() try
to split these skb to MSS multiples.
4096 bytes are usually split in a skb with 2 MSS, and a remaining
sub-mss skb (assuming MTU=1500)
This makes slow start suboptimal because many small frames are sent to
qdisc/driver layers instead of big ones (constrained by cwnd and packets
in flight of course)
In fact, applications using sendmsg() (adding an additional memory copy)
instead of vmsplice()/splice()/sendfile() are a bit faster because of
this anomaly, especially if serving small files in environments with
large initial [c]wnd.
Call tcp_push() only if MSG_MORE is not set in the flags parameter.
This bit is automatically provided by splice() internals but for the
last page, or on all pages if user specified SPLICE_F_MORE splice()
flag.
In some workloads, this can reduce number of sent logical packets by an
order of magnitude, making zero-copy TCP actually faster than
one-copy :)
Reported-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Cc: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: H.K. Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com>
Cc: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Cc: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com>
Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit dfd25ffffc132c00070eed64200e8950da5d7e9d ]
commit ea4fc0d619 (ipv4: Don't use rt->rt_{src,dst} in ip_queue_xmit())
added a serious regression on synflood handling.
Simon Kirby discovered a successful connection was delayed by 20 seconds
before being responsive.
In my tests, I discovered that xmit frames were lost, and needed ~4
retransmits and a socket dst rebuild before being really sent.
In case of syncookie initiated connection, we use a different path to
initialize the socket dst, and inet->cork.fl.u.ip4 is left cleared.
As ip_queue_xmit() now depends on inet flow being setup, fix this by
copying the temp flowi4 we use in cookie_v4_check().
Reported-by: Simon Kirby <sim@netnation.com>
Bisected-by: Simon Kirby <sim@netnation.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4648dc97af9d496218a05353b0e442b3dfa6aaab ]
This commit fixes tcp_shift_skb_data() so that it does not shift
SACKed data below snd_una.
This fixes an issue whose symptoms exactly match reports showing
tp->sacked_out going negative since 3.3.0-rc4 (see "WARNING: at
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3418" thread on netdev).
Since 2008 (832d11c5cd076abc0aa1eaf7be96c81d1a59ce41)
tcp_shift_skb_data() had been shifting SACKed ranges that were below
snd_una. It checked that the *end* of the skb it was about to shift
from was above snd_una, but did not check that the end of the actual
shifted range was above snd_una; this commit adds that check.
Shifting SACKed ranges below snd_una is problematic because for such
ranges tcp_sacktag_one() short-circuits: it does not declare anything
as SACKed and does not increase sacked_out.
Before the fixes in commits cc9a672ee522d4805495b98680f4a3db5d0a0af9
and daef52bab1fd26e24e8e9578f8fb33ba1d0cb412, shifting SACKed ranges
below snd_una happened to work because tcp_shifted_skb() was always
(incorrectly) passing in to tcp_sacktag_one() an skb whose end_seq
tcp_shift_skb_data() had already guaranteed was beyond snd_una. Hence
tcp_sacktag_one() never short-circuited and always increased
tp->sacked_out in this case.
After those two fixes, my testing has verified that shifting SACKed
ranges below snd_una could cause tp->sacked_out to go negative with
the following sequence of events:
(1) tcp_shift_skb_data() sees an skb whose end_seq is beyond snd_una,
then shifts a prefix of that skb that is below snd_una
(2) tcp_shifted_skb() increments the packet count of the
already-SACKed prev sk_buff
(3) tcp_sacktag_one() sees the end of the new SACKed range is below
snd_una, so it short-circuits and doesn't increase tp->sacked_out
(5) tcp_clean_rtx_queue() sees the SACKed skb has been ACKed,
decrements tp->sacked_out by this "inflated" pcount that was
missing a matching increase in tp->sacked_out, and hence
tp->sacked_out underflows to a u32 like 0xFFFFFFFF, which casted
to s32 is negative.
(6) this leads to the warnings seen in the recent "WARNING: at
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3418" thread on the netdev list; e.g.:
tcp_input.c:3418 WARN_ON((int)tp->sacked_out < 0);
More generally, I think this bug can be tickled in some cases where
two or more ACKs from the receiver are lost and then a DSACK arrives
that is immediately above an existing SACKed skb in the write queue.
This fix changes tcp_shift_skb_data() to abort this sequence at step
(1) in the scenario above by noticing that the bytes are below snd_una
and not shifting them.
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c0638c247f559e1a16ee79e54df14bca2cb679ea ]
In tcp_mark_head_lost() we should not attempt to fragment a SACKed skb
to mark the first portion as lost. This is for two primary reasons:
(1) tcp_shifted_skb() coalesces adjacent regions of SACKed skbs. When
doing this, it preserves the sum of their packet counts in order to
reflect the real-world dynamics on the wire. But given that skbs can
have remainders that do not align to MSS boundaries, this packet count
preservation means that for SACKed skbs there is not necessarily a
direct linear relationship between tcp_skb_pcount(skb) and
skb->len. Thus tcp_mark_head_lost()'s previous attempts to fragment
off and mark as lost a prefix of length (packets - oldcnt)*mss from
SACKed skbs were leading to occasional failures of the WARN_ON(len >
skb->len) in tcp_fragment() (which used to be a BUG_ON(); see the
recent "crash in tcp_fragment" thread on netdev).
(2) there is no real point in fragmenting off part of a SACKed skb and
calling tcp_skb_mark_lost() on it, since tcp_skb_mark_lost() is a NOP
for SACKed skbs.
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4c90d3b30334833450ccbb02f452d4972a3c3c3f ]
When tcp_shifted_skb() shifts bytes from the skb that is currently
pointed to by 'highest_sack' then the increment of
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq implicitly advances tcp_highest_sack_seq(). This
implicit advancement, combined with the recent fix to pass the correct
SACKed range into tcp_sacktag_one(), caused tcp_sacktag_one() to think
that the newly SACKed range was before the tcp_highest_sack_seq(),
leading to a call to tcp_update_reordering() with a degree of
reordering matching the size of the newly SACKed range (typically just
1 packet, which is a NOP, but potentially larger).
This commit fixes this by simply calling tcp_sacktag_one() before the
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq advancement that can advance our notion of the
highest SACKed sequence.
Correspondingly, we can simplify the code a little now that
tcp_shifted_skb() should update the lost_cnt_hint in all cases where
skb == tp->lost_skb_hint.
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 03606895cd98c0a628b17324fd7b5ff15db7e3cd ]
Niccolo Belli reported ipsec crashes in case we handle a frame without
mac header (atm in his case)
Before copying mac header, better make sure it is present.
Bugzilla reference: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=42809
Reported-by: Niccolò Belli <darkbasic@linuxsystems.it>
Tested-by: Niccolò Belli <darkbasic@linuxsystems.it>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9cc20b268a5a14f5e57b8ad405a83513ab0d78dc ]
commit f39925dbde77 (ipv4: Cache learned redirect information in
inetpeer.) introduced a regression in ICMP redirect handling.
It assumed ipv4_dst_check() would be called because all possible routes
were attached to the inetpeer we modify in ip_rt_redirect(), but thats
not true.
commit 7cc9150ebe (route: fix ICMP redirect validation) tried to fix
this but solution was not complete. (It fixed only one route)
So we must lookup existing routes (including different TOS values) and
call check_peer_redir() on them.
Reported-by: Ivan Zahariev <famzah@icdsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
CC: Flavio Leitner <fbl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7cc9150ebe8ec06cafea9f1c10d92ddacf88d8ae ]
The commit f39925dbde7788cfb96419c0f092b086aa325c0f
(ipv4: Cache learned redirect information in inetpeer.)
removed some ICMP packet validations which are required by
RFC 1122, section 3.2.2.2:
...
A Redirect message SHOULD be silently discarded if the new
gateway address it specifies is not on the same connected
(sub-) net through which the Redirect arrived [INTRO:2,
Appendix A], or if the source of the Redirect is not the
current first-hop gateway for the specified destination (see
Section 3.3.1).
Signed-off-by: Flavio Leitner <fbl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0af2a0d0576205dda778d25c6c344fc6508fc81d ]
This commit ensures that lost_cnt_hint is correctly updated in
tcp_shifted_skb() for FACK TCP senders. The lost_cnt_hint adjustment
in tcp_sacktag_one() only applies to non-FACK senders, so FACK senders
need their own adjustment.
This applies the spirit of 1e5289e121372a3494402b1b131b41bfe1cf9b7f -
except now that the sequence range passed into tcp_sacktag_one() is
correct we need only have a special case adjustment for FACK.
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit daef52bab1fd26e24e8e9578f8fb33ba1d0cb412 ]
Fix the newly-SACKed range to be the range of newly-shifted bytes.
Previously - since 832d11c5cd076abc0aa1eaf7be96c81d1a59ce41 -
tcp_shifted_skb() incorrectly called tcp_sacktag_one() with the start
and end sequence numbers of the skb it passes in set to the range just
beyond the range that is newly-SACKed.
This commit also removes a special-case adjustment to lost_cnt_hint in
tcp_shifted_skb() since the pre-existing adjustment of lost_cnt_hint
in tcp_sacktag_one() now properly handles this things now that the
correct start sequence number is passed in.
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit cc9a672ee522d4805495b98680f4a3db5d0a0af9 ]
This commit allows callers of tcp_sacktag_one() to pass in sequence
ranges that do not align with skb boundaries, as tcp_shifted_skb()
needs to do in an upcoming fix in this patch series.
In fact, now tcp_sacktag_one() does not need to depend on an input skb
at all, which makes its semantics and dependencies more clear.
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e2446eaab5585555a38ea0df4e01ff313dbb4ac9 ]
Binding RST packet outgoing interface to incoming interface
for tcp v4 when there is no socket associate with it.
when sk is not NULL, using sk->sk_bound_dev_if instead.
(suggested by Eric Dumazet).
This has few benefits:
1. tcp_v6_send_reset already did that.
2. This helps tcp connect with SO_BINDTODEVICE set. When
connection is lost, we still able to sending out RST using
same interface.
3. we are sending reply, it is most likely to be succeed
if iif is used
Signed-off-by: Shawn Lu <shawn.lu@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 70620c46ac2b45c24b0f22002fdf5ddd1f7daf81 ]
Commit 653241 (net: RFC3069, private VLAN proxy arp support) changed
the behavior of arp proxy to send arp replies back out on the interface
the request came in even if the private VLAN feature is disabled.
Previously we checked rt->dst.dev != skb->dev for in scenarios, when
proxy arp is enabled on for the netdevice and also when individual proxy
neighbour entries have been added.
This patch adds the check back for the pneigh_lookup() scenario.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@comx.dk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5dc7883f2a7c25f8df40d7479687153558cd531b ]
This patch fix a bug which introduced by commit ac8a4810 (ipv4: Save
nexthop address of LSRR/SSRR option to IPCB.).In that patch, we saved
the nexthop of SRR in ip_option->nexthop and update iph->daddr until
we get to ip_forward_options(), but we need to update it before
ip_rt_get_source(), otherwise we may get a wrong src.
Signed-off-by: Li Wei <lw@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ac8a48106be49c422575ddc7531b776f8eb49610 ]
We can not update iph->daddr in ip_options_rcv_srr(), It is too early.
When some exception ocurred later (eg. in ip_forward() when goto
sr_failed) we need the ip header be identical to the original one as
ICMP need it.
Add a field 'nexthop' in struct ip_options to save nexthop of LSRR
or SSRR option.
Signed-off-by: Li Wei <lw@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b12f62efb8ec0b9523bdb6c2d412c07193086de9 ]
When opt->srr_is_hit is set skb_rtable(skb) has been updated for
'nexthop' and iph->daddr should always equals to skb_rtable->rt_dst
holds, We need update iph->daddr either.
Signed-off-by: Li Wei <lw@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d3aaeb38c40e5a6c08dd31a1b64da65c4352be36, along
with dependent backports of commits:
69cce1d1404968f78b177a0314f5822d5afdbbfb
9de79c127cccecb11ae6a21ab1499e87aa222880
218fa90f072e4aeff9003d57e390857f4f35513e
580da35a31f91a594f3090b7a2c39b85cb051a12
f7e57044eeb1841847c24aa06766c8290c202583
e049f28883126c689cf95859480d9ee4ab23b7fa ]
Gergely Kalman reported crashes in check_peer_redir().
It appears commit f39925dbde778 (ipv4: Cache learned redirect
information in inetpeer.) added a race, leading to possible NULL ptr
dereference.
Since we can now change dst neighbour, we should make sure a reader can
safely use a neighbour.
Add RCU protection to dst neighbour, and make sure check_peer_redir()
can be called safely by different cpus in parallel.
As neighbours are already freed after one RCU grace period, this patch
should not add typical RCU penalty (cache cold effects)
Many thanks to Gergely for providing a pretty report pointing to the
bug.
Reported-by: Gergely Kalman <synapse@hippy.csoma.elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8a622e71f58ec9f092fc99eacae0e6cf14f6e742 ]
md5 key is added in socket through remote address.
remote address should be used in finding md5 key when
sending out reset packet.
Signed-off-by: shawnlu <shawn.lu@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5b35e1e6e9ca651e6b291c96d1106043c9af314a ]
This commit fixes tcp_trim_head() to recalculate the number of
segments in the skb with the skb's existing MSS, so trimming the head
causes the skb segment count to be monotonically non-increasing - it
should stay the same or go down, but not increase.
Previously tcp_trim_head() used the current MSS of the connection. But
if there was a decrease in MSS between original transmission and ACK
(e.g. due to PMTUD), this could cause tcp_trim_head() to
counter-intuitively increase the segment count when trimming bytes off
the head of an skb. This violated assumptions in tcp_tso_acked() that
tcp_trim_head() only decreases the packet count, so that packets_acked
in tcp_tso_acked() could underflow, leading tcp_clean_rtx_queue() to
pass u32 pkts_acked values as large as 0xffffffff to
ca_ops->pkts_acked().
As an aside, if tcp_trim_head() had really wanted the skb to reflect
the current MSS, it should have called tcp_set_skb_tso_segs()
unconditionally, since a decrease in MSS would mean that a
single-packet skb should now be sliced into multiple segments.
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com>
Acked-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4b90a603a1b21d63cf743cc833680cb195a729f6 upstream.
When the ahash driver returns -EBUSY, AH4/6 input functions return
NET_XMIT_DROP, presumably copied from the output code path. But
returning transmit codes on input doesn't make a lot of sense.
Since NET_XMIT_DROP is a positive int, this gets interpreted as
the next header type (i.e., success). As that can only end badly,
remove the check.
Signed-off-by: Nick Bowler <nbowler@elliptictech.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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