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2010-04-01clockevent: Don't remove broadcast device when cpu is deadXiaotian Feng
commit ea9d8e3f45404d411c00ae67b45cc35c58265bb7 upstream. Marc reported that the BUG_ON in clockevents_notify() triggers on his system. This happens because the kernel tries to remove an active clock event device (used for broadcasting) from the device list. The handling of devices which can be used as per cpu device and as a global broadcast device is suboptimal. The simplest solution for now (and for stable) is to check whether the device is used as global broadcast device, but this needs to be revisited. [ tglx: restored the cpuweight check and massaged the changelog ] Reported-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com> Tested-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Xiaotian Feng <dfeng@redhat.com> LKML-Reference: <1262834564-13033-1-git-send-email-dfeng@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2010-04-01futex_lock_pi() key refcnt fixMikael Pettersson
commit 5ecb01cfdf96c5f465192bdb2a4fd4a61a24c6cc upstream. This fixes a futex key reference count bug in futex_lock_pi(), where a key's reference count is incremented twice but decremented only once, causing the backing object to not be released. If the futex is created in a temporary file in an ext3 file system, this bug causes the file's inode to become an "undead" orphan, which causes an oops from a BUG_ON() in ext3_put_super() when the file system is unmounted. glibc's test suite is known to trigger this, see <http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14256>. The bug is a regression from 2.6.28-git3, namely Peter Zijlstra's 38d47c1b7075bd7ec3881141bb3629da58f88dab "[PATCH] futex: rely on get_user_pages() for shared futexes". That commit made get_futex_key() also increment the reference count of the futex key, and updated its callers to decrement the key's reference count before returning. Unfortunately the normal exit path in futex_lock_pi() wasn't corrected: the reference count is incremented by get_futex_key() and queue_lock(), but the normal exit path only decrements once, via unqueue_me_pi(). The fix is to put_futex_key() after unqueue_me_pi(), since 2.6.31 this is easily done by 'goto out_put_key' rather than 'goto out'. Signed-off-by: Mikael Pettersson <mikpe@it.uu.se> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2010-04-01futex: Handle user space corruption gracefullyThomas Gleixner
commit 51246bfd189064079c54421507236fd2723b18f3 upstream. If the owner of a PI futex dies we fix up the pi_state and set pi_state->owner to NULL. When a malicious or just sloppy programmed user space application sets the futex value to 0 e.g. by calling pthread_mutex_init(), then the futex can be acquired again. A new waiter manages to enqueue itself on the pi_state w/o damage, but on unlock the kernel dereferences pi_state->owner and oopses. Prevent this by checking pi_state->owner in the unlock path. If pi_state->owner is not current we know that user space manipulated the futex value. Ignore the mess and return -EINVAL. This catches the above case and also the case where a task hijacks the futex by setting the tid value and then tries to unlock it. Reported-by: Jermome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2010-04-01futex: Handle futex value corruption gracefullyThomas Gleixner
commit 59647b6ac3050dd964bc556fe6ef22f4db5b935c upstream. The WARN_ON in lookup_pi_state which complains about a mismatch between pi_state->owner->pid and the pid which we retrieved from the user space futex is completely bogus. The code just emits the warning and then continues despite the fact that it detected an inconsistent state of the futex. A conveniant way for user space to spam the syslog. Replace the WARN_ON by a consistency check. If the values do not match return -EINVAL and let user space deal with the mess it created. This also fixes the missing task_pid_vnr() when we compare the pi_state->owner pid with the futex value. Reported-by: Jermome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2010-01-18fix more leaks in audit_tree.c tag_chunk()Al Viro
commit b4c30aad39805902cf5b855aa8a8b22d728ad057 upstream. Several leaks in audit_tree didn't get caught by commit 318b6d3d7ddbcad3d6867e630711b8a705d873d7, including the leak on normal exit in case of multiple rules refering to the same chunk. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2010-01-18fix braindamage in audit_tree.c untag_chunk()Al Viro
commit 6f5d51148921c242680a7a1d9913384a30ab3cbe upstream. ... aka "Al had badly fscked up when writing that thing and nobody noticed until Eric had fixed leaks that used to mask the breakage". The function essentially creates a copy of old array sans one element and replaces the references to elements of original (they are on cyclic lists) with those to corresponding elements of new one. After that the old one is fair game for freeing. First of all, there's a dumb braino: when we get to list_replace_init we use indices for wrong arrays - position in new one with the old array and vice versa. Another bug is more subtle - termination condition is wrong if the element to be excluded happens to be the last one. We shouldn't go until we fill the new array, we should go until we'd finished the old one. Otherwise the element we are trying to kill will remain on the cyclic lists... That crap used to be masked by several leaks, so it was not quite trivial to hit. Eric had fixed some of those leaks a while ago and the shit had hit the fan... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2010-01-18kernel/signal.c: fix kernel information leak with print-fatal-signals=1Andi Kleen
commit b45c6e76bc2c72f6426c14bed64fdcbc9bf37cb0 upstream. When print-fatal-signals is enabled it's possible to dump any memory reachable by the kernel to the log by simply jumping to that address from user space. Or crash the system if there's some hardware with read side effects. The fatal signals handler will dump 16 bytes at the execution address, which is fully controlled by ring 3. In addition when something jumps to a unmapped address there will be up to 16 additional useless page faults, which might be potentially slow (and at least is not very efficient) Fortunately this option is off by default and only there on i386. But fix it by checking for kernel addresses and also stopping when there's a page fault. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2010-01-06clockevents: Prevent clockevent_devices list corruption on cpu hotplugThomas Gleixner
commit bb6eddf7676e1c1f3e637aa93c5224488d99036f upstream. Xiaotian Feng triggered a list corruption in the clock events list on CPU hotplug and debugged the root cause. If a CPU registers more than one per cpu clock event device, then only the active clock event device is removed on CPU_DEAD. The unused devices are kept in the clock events device list. On CPU up the clock event devices are registered again, which means that we list_add an already enqueued list_head. That results in list corruption. Resolve this by removing all devices which are associated to the dead CPU on CPU_DEAD. Reported-by: Xiaotian Feng <dfeng@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Xiaotian Feng <dfeng@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-12-18futex: Take mmap_sem for get_user_pages in fault_in_user_writeableAndi Kleen
commit 722d0172377a5697919b9f7e5beb95165b1dec4e upstream. get_user_pages() must be called with mmap_sem held. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> LKML-Reference: <20091208121942.GA21298@basil.fritz.box> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-12-18bsdacct: fix uid/gid misreportingAlexey Dobriyan
commit 4b731d50ff3df6b9141a6c12b088e8eb0109e83c upstream. commit d8e180dcd5bbbab9cd3ff2e779efcf70692ef541 "bsdacct: switch credentials for writing to the accounting file" introduced credential switching during final acct data collecting. However, uid/gid pair continued to be collected from current which became credentials of who created acct file, not who exits. Addresses http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14676 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Reported-by: Juho K. Juopperi <jkj@kapsi.fi> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-12-08perf_event: Adjust frequency and unthrottle for non-group-leader eventsPaul Mackerras
commit 03541f8b69c058162e4cf9675ec9181e6a204d55 upstream. The loop in perf_ctx_adjust_freq checks the frequency of sampling event counters, and adjusts the event interval and unthrottles the event if required, and resets the interrupt count for the event. However, at present it only looks at group leaders. This means that a sampling event that is not a group leader will eventually get throttled, once its interrupt count reaches sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate/HZ --- and that is guaranteed to happen, if the event is active for long enough, since the interrupt count never gets reset. Once it is throttled it never gets unthrottled, so it basically just stops working at that point. This fixes it by making perf_ctx_adjust_freq use ctx->event_list rather than ctx->group_list. The existing spin_lock/spin_unlock around the loop makes it unnecessary to put rcu_read_lock/ rcu_read_unlock around the list_for_each_entry_rcu(). Reported-by: Mark W. Krentel <krentel@cs.rice.edu> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Corey Ashford <cjashfor@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> LKML-Reference: <19157.26731.855609.165622@cargo.ozlabs.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-12-08modules: don't export section names of empty sections via sysfsHelge Deller
commit 35dead4235e2b67da7275b4122fed37099c2f462 upstream. On the parisc architecture we face for each and every loaded kernel module this kernel "badness warning": sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/module/ac97_bus/sections/.text' Badness at fs/sysfs/dir.c:487 Reason for that is, that on parisc all kernel modules do have multiple .text sections due to the usage of the -ffunction-sections compiler flag which is needed to reach all jump targets on this platform. An objdump on such a kernel module gives: Sections: Idx Name Size VMA LMA File off Algn 0 .note.gnu.build-id 00000024 00000000 00000000 00000034 2**2 CONTENTS, ALLOC, LOAD, READONLY, DATA 1 .text 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000058 2**0 CONTENTS, ALLOC, LOAD, READONLY, CODE 2 .text.ac97_bus_match 0000001c 00000000 00000000 00000058 2**2 CONTENTS, ALLOC, LOAD, READONLY, CODE 3 .text 00000000 00000000 00000000 000000d4 2**0 CONTENTS, ALLOC, LOAD, READONLY, CODE ... Since the .text sections are empty (size of 0 bytes) and won't be loaded by the kernel module loader anyway, I don't see a reason why such sections need to be listed under /sys/module/<module_name>/sections/<section_name> either. The attached patch does solve this issue by not exporting section names which are empty. This fixes bugzilla http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14703 Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> CC: rusty@rustcorp.com.au CC: akpm@linux-foundation.org CC: James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com CC: roland@redhat.com CC: dave@hiauly1.hia.nrc.ca Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-12-08sched: Fix isolcpus boot optionRusty Russell
commit bdddd2963c0264c56f18043f6fa829d3c1d3d1c0 upstream. Anton Blanchard wrote: > We allocate and zero cpu_isolated_map after the isolcpus > __setup option has run. This means cpu_isolated_map always > ends up empty and if CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is enabled we write to a > cpumask that hasn't been allocated. I introduced this regression in 49557e620339cb13 (sched: Fix boot crash by zalloc()ing most of the cpu masks). Use the bootmem allocator if they set isolcpus=, otherwise allocate and zero like normal. Reported-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> LKML-Reference: <200912021409.17013.rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Tested-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-12-08sched: Fix boot crash by zalloc()ing most of the cpu masksRusty Russell
commit 49557e620339cb134127b5bfbcfecc06b77d0232 upstream. I got a boot crash when forcing cpumasks offstack on 32 bit, because find_new_ilb() returned 3 on my UP system (nohz.cpu_mask wasn't zeroed). AFAICT the others need to be zeroed too: only nohz.ilb_grp_nohz_mask is initialized before use. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> LKML-Reference: <200911022037.21282.rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-12-08uids: Prevent tear down raceThomas Gleixner
commit b00bc0b237055b4c45816325ee14f0bd83e6f590 upstream. Ingo triggered the following warning: WARNING: at lib/debugobjects.c:255 debug_print_object+0x42/0x50() Hardware name: System Product Name ODEBUG: init active object type: timer_list Modules linked in: Pid: 2619, comm: dmesg Tainted: G W 2.6.32-rc5-tip+ #5298 Call Trace: [<81035443>] warn_slowpath_common+0x6a/0x81 [<8120e483>] ? debug_print_object+0x42/0x50 [<81035498>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x29/0x2c [<8120e483>] debug_print_object+0x42/0x50 [<8120ec2a>] __debug_object_init+0x279/0x2d7 [<8120ecb3>] debug_object_init+0x13/0x18 [<810409d2>] init_timer_key+0x17/0x6f [<81041526>] free_uid+0x50/0x6c [<8104ed2d>] put_cred_rcu+0x61/0x72 [<81067fac>] rcu_do_batch+0x70/0x121 debugobjects warns about an enqueued timer being initialized. If CONFIG_USER_SCHED=y the user management code uses delayed work to remove the user from the hash table and tear down the sysfs objects. free_uid is called from RCU and initializes/schedules delayed work if the usage count of the user_struct is 0. The init/schedule happens outside of the uidhash_lock protected region which allows a concurrent caller of find_user() to reference the about to be destroyed user_struct w/o preventing the work from being scheduled. If the next free_uid call happens before the work timer expired then the active timer is initialized and the work scheduled again. The race was introduced in commit 5cb350ba (sched: group scheduling, sysfs tunables) and made more prominent by commit 3959214f (sched: delayed cleanup of user_struct) Move the init/schedule_delayed_work inside of the uidhash_lock protected region to prevent the race. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Dhaval Giani <dhaval@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@us.ibm.com> Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-11-09param: fix setting arrays of boolRusty Russell
commit 3c7d76e371ac1a3802ae1673f5c63554af59325c upstream. We create a dummy struct kernel_param on the stack for parsing each array element, but we didn't initialize the flags word. This matters for arrays of type "bool", where the flag indicates if it really is an array of bools or unsigned int (old-style). Reported-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-11-09param: fix NULL comparison on oomRusty Russell
commit d553ad864e3b3dde3f1038d491e207021b2d6293 upstream. kp->arg is always true: it's the contents of that pointer we care about. Reported-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-11-09param: fix lots of bugs with writing charp params from sysfs, by leaking mem.Rusty Russell
commit 65afac7d80ab3bc9f81e75eafb71eeb92a3ebdef upstream. e180a6b7759a "param: fix charp parameters set via sysfs" fixed the case where charp parameters written via sysfs were freed, leaving drivers accessing random memory. Unfortunately, storing a flag in the kparam struct was a bad idea: it's rodata so setting it causes an oops on some archs. But that's not all: 1) module_param_array() on charp doesn't work reliably, since we use an uninitialized temporary struct kernel_param. 2) there's a fundamental race if a module uses this parameter and then it's changed: they will still access the old, freed, memory. The simplest fix (ie. for 2.6.32) is to never free the memory. This prevents all these problems, at cost of a memory leak. In practice, there are only 18 places where a charp is writable via sysfs, and all are root-only writable. Reported-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Cc: Sitsofe Wheeler <sitsofe@yahoo.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Christof Schmitt <christof.schmitt@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-11-09futex: Fix spurious wakeup for requeue_pi reallyThomas Gleixner
commit 11df6dddcbc38affb7473aad3d962baf8414a947 upstream. The requeue_pi path doesn't use unqueue_me() (and the racy lock_ptr == NULL test) nor does it use the wake_list of futex_wake() which where the reason for commit 41890f2 (futex: Handle spurious wake up) See debugging discussing on LKML Message-ID: <4AD4080C.20703@us.ibm.com> The changes in this fix to the wait_requeue_pi path were considered to be a likely unecessary, but harmless safety net. But it turns out that due to the fact that for unknown $@#!*( reasons EWOULDBLOCK is defined as EAGAIN we built an endless loop in the code path which returns correctly EWOULDBLOCK. Spurious wakeups in wait_requeue_pi code path are unlikely so we do the easy solution and return EWOULDBLOCK^WEAGAIN to user space and let it deal with the spurious wakeup. Cc: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: John Stultz <johnstul@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dinakar Guniguntala <dino@in.ibm.com> LKML-Reference: <4AE23C74.1090502@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-11-09futex: Move drop_futex_key_refs out of spinlock'ed regionDarren Hart
commit 89061d3d58e1f0742139605dc6a7950aa1ecc019 upstream. When requeuing tasks from one futex to another, the reference held by the requeued task to the original futex location needs to be dropped eventually. Dropping the reference may ultimately lead to a call to "iput_final" and subsequently call into filesystem- specific code - which may be non-atomic. It is therefore safer to defer this drop operation until after the futex_hash_bucket spinlock has been dropped. Originally-From: Helge Bahmann <hcb@chaoticmind.net> Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Dinakar Guniguntala <dino@in.ibm.com> Cc: John Stultz <johnstul@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Sven-Thorsten Dietrich <sdietrich@novell.com> Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com> LKML-Reference: <4AD7A298.5040802@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-11-09futex: Check for NULL keys in match_futexDarren Hart
commit 2bc872036e1c5948b5b02942810bbdd8dbdb9812 upstream. If userspace tries to perform a requeue_pi on a non-requeue_pi waiter, it will find the futex_q->requeue_pi_key to be NULL and OOPS. Check for NULL in match_futex() instead of doing explicit NULL pointer checks on all call sites. While match_futex(NULL, NULL) returning false is a little odd, it's still correct as we expect valid key references. Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> CC: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> CC: Dinakar Guniguntala <dino@in.ibm.com> CC: John Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com> LKML-Reference: <4AD60687.10306@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-11-09futex: Handle spurious wake upThomas Gleixner
commit d58e6576b0deec6f0b9ff8450fe282da18c50883 upstream. The futex code does not handle spurious wake up in futex_wait and futex_wait_requeue_pi. The code assumes that any wake up which was not caused by futex_wake / requeue or by a timeout was caused by a signal wake up and returns one of the syscall restart error codes. In case of a spurious wake up the signal delivery code which deals with the restart error codes is not invoked and we return that error code to user space. That causes applications which actually check the return codes to fail. Blaise reported that on preempt-rt a python test program run into a exception trap. -rt exposed that due to a built in spurious wake up accelerator :) Solve this by checking signal_pending(current) in the wake up path and handle the spurious wake up case w/o returning to user space. Reported-by: Blaise Gassend <blaise@willowgarage.com> Debugged-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-10-22bsdacct: switch credentials for writing to the accounting fileMichal Schmidt
commit d8e180dcd5bbbab9cd3ff2e779efcf70692ef541 upstream. When process accounting is enabled, every exiting process writes a log to the account file. In addition, every once in a while one of the exiting processes checks whether there's enough free space for the log. SELinux policy may or may not allow the exiting process to stat the fs. So unsuspecting processes start generating AVC denials just because someone enabled process accounting. For these filesystem operations, the exiting process's credentials should be temporarily switched to that of the process which enabled accounting, because it's really that process which wanted to have the accounting information logged. Signed-off-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-10-22futex: Fix wakeup race by setting TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE before queue_me()Darren Hart
commit 0729e196147692d84d4c099fcff056eba2ed61d8 upstream. PI futexes do not use the same plist_node_empty() test for wakeup. It was possible for the waiter (in futex_wait_requeue_pi()) to set TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE after the waker assigned the rtmutex to the waiter. The waiter would then note the plist was not empty and call schedule(). The task would not be found by any subsequeuent futex wakeups, resulting in a userspace hang. By moving the setting of TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE to before the call to queue_me(), the race with the waker is eliminated. Since we no longer call get_user() from within queue_me(), there is no need to delay the setting of TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE until after the call to queue_me(). The FUTEX_LOCK_PI operation is not affected as futex_lock_pi() relies entirely on the rtmutex code to handle schedule() and wakeup. The requeue PI code is affected because the waiter starts as a non-PI waiter and is woken on a PI futex. Remove the crusty old comment about holding spinlocks() across get_user() as we no longer do that. Correct the locking statement with a description of why the test is performed. Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Dinakar Guniguntala <dino@in.ibm.com> Cc: John Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com> LKML-Reference: <20090922053038.8717.97838.stgit@Aeon> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-10-22futex: Detect mismatched requeue targetsDarren Hart
commit 84bc4af59081ee974dd80210e694ab59ebe51ce8 upstream. There is currently no check to ensure that userspace uses the same futex requeue target (uaddr2) in futex_requeue() that the waiter used in futex_wait_requeue_pi(). A mismatch here could very unexpected results as the waiter assumes it either wakes on uaddr1 or uaddr2. We could detect this on wakeup in the waiter, but the cleanup is more intense after the improper requeue has occured. This patch stores the waiter's expected requeue target in a new requeue_pi_key pointer in the futex_q which futex_requeue() checks prior to attempting to do a proxy lock acquistion or a requeue when requeue_pi=1. If they don't match, return -EINVAL from futex_requeue, aborting the requeue of any remaining waiters. Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com> Cc: Dinakar Guniguntala <dino@in.ibm.com> Cc: John Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com> LKML-Reference: <20090814003650.14634.63916.stgit@Aeon> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-10-22tracing/filters: Fix memory leak when setting a filterLi Zefan
commit 8ad807318fcd62aba0e18c7c7fbfcc1af3fcdbab upstream. Every time we set a filter, we leak memory allocated by postfix_append_operand() and postfix_append_op(). Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Tom Zanussi <tzanussi@gmail.com> LKML-Reference: <4AD3D7D9.4070400@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-10-12NOHZ: update idle state also when NOHZ is inactiveEero Nurkkala
commit fdc6f192e7e1ae80565af23cc33dc88e3dcdf184 upstream. Commit f2e21c9610991e95621a81407cdbab881226419b had unfortunate side effects with cpufreq governors on some systems. If the system did not switch into NOHZ mode ts->inidle is not set when tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick() is called from the idle routine. Therefor all subsequent calls from irq_exit() to tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick() fail to call tick_nohz_start_idle(). This results in bogus idle accounting information which is passed to cpufreq governors. Set the inidle flag unconditionally of the NOHZ active state to keep the idle time accounting correct in any case. [ tglx: Added comment and tweaked the changelog ] Reported-by: Steven Noonan <steven@uplinklabs.net> Signed-off-by: Eero Nurkkala <ext-eero.nurkkala@nokia.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Venkatesh Pallipadi <venkatesh.pallipadi@intel.com> Cc: Steven Noonan <steven@uplinklabs.net> LKML-Reference: <1254907901.30157.93.camel@eenurkka-desktop> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-10-12futex: Fix locking imbalanceThomas Gleixner
commit eaaea8036d0261d87d7072c5bc88c7ea730c18ac upstream. Rich reported a lock imbalance in the futex code: http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14288 It's caused by the displacement of the retry_private label in futex_wake_op(). The code unlocks the hash bucket locks in the error handling path and retries without locking them again which makes the next unlock fail. Move retry_private so we lock the hash bucket locks when we retry. Reported-by: Rich Ercolany <rercola@acm.jhu.edu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-10-12futex: Nullify robust lists after cleanupPeter Zijlstra
commit fc6b177dee33365ccb29fe6d2092223cf8d679f9 upstream. The robust list pointers of user space held futexes are kept intact over an exec() call. When the exec'ed task exits exit_robust_list() is called with the stale pointer. The risk of corruption is minimal, but still it is incorrect to keep the pointers valid. Actually glibc should uninstall the robust list before calling exec() but we have to deal with it anyway. Nullify the pointers after [compat_]exit_robust_list() has been called. Reported-by: Anirban Sinha <ani@anirban.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-10-12futex: Move exit_pi_state() call to release_mm()Thomas Gleixner
commit 322a2c100a8998158445599ea437fb556aa95b11 upstream. exit_pi_state() is called from do_exit() but not from do_execve(). Move it to release_mm() so it gets called from do_execve() as well. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Cc: Anirban Sinha <ani@anirban.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-10-12futex: fix requeue_pi key imbalanceDarren Hart
commit da085681014fb43d67d9bf6d14bc068e9254bd49 upstream. If futex_wait_requeue_pi() wakes prior to requeue, we drop the reference to the source futex_key twice, once in handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup() and once on our way out. Remove the drop from the handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup() and keep the get/drops together in futex_wait_requeue_pi(). Reported-by: Helge Bahmann <hcb@chaoticmind.net> Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com> Cc: Helge Bahmann <hcb@chaoticmind.net> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Dinakar Guniguntala <dino@in.ibm.com> Cc: John Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com> LKML-Reference: <4ACCE21E.5030805@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-10-12ftrace: check for failure for all conversionsSteven Rostedt
commit 3279ba37db5d65c4ab0dcdee3b211ccb85bb563f upstream. Due to legacy code from back when the dynamic tracer used a daemon, only core kernel code was checking for failures. This is no longer the case. We must check for failures any time we perform text modifications. Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-10-12tracing: correct module boundaries for ftrace_releasejolsa@redhat.com
commit e7247a15ff3bbdab0a8b402dffa1171e5c05a8e0 upstream. When the module is about the unload we release its call records. The ftrace_release function was given wrong values representing the module core boundaries, thus not releasing its call records. Plus making ftrace_release function module specific. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> LKML-Reference: <1254934835-363-3-git-send-email-jolsa@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-10-05perf_counter: Fix perf_copy_attr() pointer arithmeticIan Schram
commit cdf8073d6b2c6c5a3cd6ce0e6c1297157f7f99ba upstream. There is still some weird code in per_copy_attr(). Which supposedly checks that all bytes trailing a struct are zero. It doesn't seem to get pointer arithmetic right. Since it increments an iterating pointer by sizeof(unsigned long) rather than 1. Signed-off-by: Ian Schram <ischram@telenet.be> [ v2: clean up the messy PTR_ALIGN logic as well. ] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> LKML-Reference: <4AB3DEE2.3030600@telenet.be> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-09-24perf_counter: Start counting time enabled when group leader gets enabledPaul Mackerras
commit fa289beca9de9119c7760bd984f3640da21bc94c upstream. Currently, if a group is created where the group leader is initially disabled but a non-leader member is initially enabled, and then the leader is subsequently enabled some time later, the time_enabled for the non-leader member will reflect the whole time since it was created, not just the time since the leader was enabled. This is incorrect, because all of the members are effectively disabled while the leader is disabled, since none of the members can go on the PMU if the leader can't. Thus we have to update the ->tstamp_enabled for all the enabled group members when a group leader is enabled, so that the time_enabled computation only counts the time since the leader was enabled. Similarly, when disabling a group leader we have to update the time_enabled and time_running for all of the group members. Also, in update_counter_times, we have to treat a counter whose group leader is disabled as being disabled. Reported-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> LKML-Reference: <19091.29664.342227.445006@drongo.ozlabs.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-09-24perf_counter: Fix buffer overflow in perf_copy_attr()Xiao Guangrong
commit b3e62e35058fc744ac794611f4e79bcd1c5a4b83 upstream. If we pass a big size data over perf_counter_open() syscall, the kernel will copy this data to a small buffer, it will cause kernel crash. This bug makes the kernel unsafe and non-root local user can trigger it. Signed-off-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@cn.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> LKML-Reference: <4AAF37D4.5010706@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2009-09-05Merge branch 'perfcounters-fixes-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'perfcounters-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: perf_counter/powerpc: Fix cache event codes for POWER7 perf_counter: Fix /0 bug in swcounters perf_counters: Increase paranoia level
2009-08-29perf_counter: Fix /0 bug in swcountersPeter Zijlstra
We have a race in the swcounter stuff where we can start counting a counter that has never been enabled, this leads to a /0 situation. The below avoids the /0 but doesn't close the race, this would need a new counter state. The race is due to perf_swcounter_is_counting() which cannot discern between disabled due to scheduled out, and disabled for any other reason. Such a crash has been seen by Ingo: [ 967.092372] divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 967.096499] last sysfs file: /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu15/cache/index2/shared_cpu_map [ 967.104846] CPU 5 [ 967.106965] Modules linked in: [ 967.110169] Pid: 3351, comm: hackbench Not tainted 2.6.31-rc8-tip-01158-gd940a54-dirty #1568 X8DTN [ 967.119456] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810c0aba>] [<ffffffff810c0aba>] perf_swcounter_ctx_event+0x127/0x1af [ 967.129137] RSP: 0018:ffff8801a95abd70 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 967.134699] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff8801bd645c00 RCX: 0000000000000002 [ 967.142162] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8801bd645d40 [ 967.149584] RBP: ffff8801a95abdb0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8801a95abe00 [ 967.157042] R10: 0000000000000037 R11: ffff8801aa1245f8 R12: ffff8801a95abe00 [ 967.164481] R13: ffff8801a95abe00 R14: ffff8801aa1c0e78 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 967.171953] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffc90000a00000(0063) knlGS:00000000f7f486c0 [ 967.180406] CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 000000008005003b [ 967.186374] CR2: 000000004822c0ac CR3: 00000001b19a2000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 967.193770] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 967.201224] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 967.208692] Process hackbench (pid: 3351, threadinfo ffff8801a95aa000, task ffff8801a96b0000) [ 967.217607] Stack: [ 967.219711] 0000000000000000 0000000000000037 0000000200000001 ffffc90000a1107c [ 967.227296] <0> ffff8801a95abe00 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 0000000000000037 [ 967.235333] <0> ffff8801a95abdf0 ffffffff810c0c20 0000000200a14f30 ffff8801a95abe40 [ 967.243532] Call Trace: [ 967.246103] [<ffffffff810c0c20>] do_perf_swcounter_event+0xde/0xec [ 967.252635] [<ffffffff810c0ca7>] perf_tpcounter_event+0x79/0x7b [ 967.258957] [<ffffffff81037f73>] ftrace_profile_sched_switch+0xc0/0xcb [ 967.265791] [<ffffffff8155f22d>] schedule+0x429/0x4c4 [ 967.271156] [<ffffffff8100c01e>] int_careful+0xd/0x14 Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> LKML-Reference: <1251472247.17617.74.camel@laptop> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-08-28modules: Fix build error in the !CONFIG_KALLSYMS caseIngo Molnar
> James Bottomley (1): > module: workaround duplicate section names -tip testing found that this patch breaks the build on x86 if CONFIG_KALLSYMS is disabled: kernel/module.c: In function ‘load_module’: kernel/module.c:2367: error: ‘struct module’ has no member named ‘sect_attrs’ distcc[8269] ERROR: compile kernel/module.c on ph/32 failed make[1]: *** [kernel/module.o] Error 1 make: *** [kernel] Error 2 make: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs.... Commit 1b364bf misses the fact that section attributes are only built and dealt with if kallsyms is enabled. The patch below fixes this. ( note, technically speaking this should depend on CONFIG_SYSFS as well but this patch is correct too and keeps the #ifdef less intrusive - in the KALLSYMS && !SYSFS case the code is a NOP. ) Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> [ Replaced patch with a slightly cleaner variation by James Bottomley ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-08-28perf_counters: Increase paranoia levelIngo Molnar
Per-cpu counters are an ASLR information leak as they show the execution other tasks do. Increase the paranoia level to 1, which disallows per-cpu counters. (they still allow counting/profiling of own tasks - and admin can profile everything.) Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-08-27module: workaround duplicate section namesJames Bottomley
The root cause is a duplicate section name (.text); is this legal? [ Amerigo Wang: "AFAIK, yes." ] However, there's a problem with commit 6d76013381ed28979cd122eb4b249a88b5e384fa in that if you fail to allocate a mod->sect_attrs (in this case it's null because of the duplication), it still gets used without checking in add_notes_attrs() This should fix it [ This patch leaves other problems, particularly the sections directory, but recent parisc toolchains seem to produce these modules and this prevents a crash and is a minimal change -- RR ] Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-08-27module: fix BUG_ON() for powerpc (and other function descriptor archs)Rusty Russell
The rarely-used symbol_put_addr() needs to use dereference_function_descriptor on powerpc. Reported-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-08-26clone(): fix race between copy_process() and de_thread()Oleg Nesterov
Spotted by Hiroshi Shimamoto who also provided the test-case below. copy_process() uses signal->count as a reference counter, but it is not. This test case #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <errno.h> #include <pthread.h> void *null_thread(void *p) { for (;;) sleep(1); return NULL; } void *exec_thread(void *p) { execl("/bin/true", "/bin/true", NULL); return null_thread(p); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { for (;;) { pid_t pid; int ret, status; pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) break; if (!pid) { pthread_t tid; pthread_create(&tid, NULL, exec_thread, NULL); for (;;) pthread_create(&tid, NULL, null_thread, NULL); } do { ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0); } while (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR); } return 0; } quickly creates an unkillable task. If copy_process(CLONE_THREAD) races with de_thread() copy_signal()->atomic(signal->count) breaks the signal->notify_count logic, and the execing thread can hang forever in kernel space. Change copy_process() to increment count/live only when we know for sure we can't fail. In this case the forked thread will take care of its reference to signal correctly. If copy_process() fails, check CLONE_THREAD flag. If it it set - do nothing, the counters were not changed and current belongs to the same thread group. If it is not set, ->signal must be released in any case (and ->count must be == 1), the forked child is the only thread in the thread group. We need more cleanups here, in particular signal->count should not be used by de_thread/__exit_signal at all. This patch only fixes the bug. Reported-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com> Tested-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-08-25Merge branch 'perfcounters-fixes-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'perfcounters-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: perf_counter: Fix typo in read() output generation perf tools: Check perf.data owner
2009-08-25Merge branch 'timers-fixes-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'timers-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: clockevent: Prevent dead lock on clockevents_lock timers: Drop write permission on /proc/timer_list
2009-08-25Merge branch 'tracing-fixes-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'tracing-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: tracing: Fix too large stack usage in do_one_initcall() tracing: handle broken names in ftrace filter ftrace: Unify effect of writing to trace_options and option/*
2009-08-21perf_counter: Fix typo in read() output generationPeter Zijlstra
When you iterate a list, using the iterator is useful. Before: ID: 5 ID: 5 ID: 5 ID: 5 EVNT: 0x40088b scale: nan ID: 5 CNT: 1006252 ID: 6 CNT: 1011090 ID: 7 CNT: 1011196 ID: 8 CNT: 1011095 EVNT: 0x40088c scale: 1.000000 ID: 5 CNT: 2003065 ID: 6 CNT: 2011671 ID: 7 CNT: 2012620 ID: 8 CNT: 2013479 EVNT: 0x40088c scale: 1.000000 ID: 5 CNT: 3002390 ID: 6 CNT: 3015996 ID: 7 CNT: 3018019 ID: 8 CNT: 3020006 EVNT: 0x40088b scale: 1.000000 ID: 5 CNT: 4002406 ID: 6 CNT: 4021120 ID: 7 CNT: 4024241 ID: 8 CNT: 4027059 After: ID: 1 ID: 2 ID: 3 ID: 4 EVNT: 0x400889 scale: nan ID: 1 CNT: 1005270 ID: 2 CNT: 1009833 ID: 3 CNT: 1010065 ID: 4 CNT: 1010088 EVNT: 0x400898 scale: nan ID: 1 CNT: 2001531 ID: 2 CNT: 2022309 ID: 3 CNT: 2022470 ID: 4 CNT: 2022627 EVNT: 0x400888 scale: 0.489467 ID: 1 CNT: 3001261 ID: 2 CNT: 3027088 ID: 3 CNT: 3027941 ID: 4 CNT: 3028762 Reported-by: stephane eranian <eranian@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Corey J Ashford <cjashfor@us.ibm.com> Cc: perfmon2-devel <perfmon2-devel@lists.sourceforge.net> LKML-Reference: <1250867976.7538.73.camel@twins> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-08-19Merge branch 'perfcounters-fixes-for-linus-2' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'perfcounters-fixes-for-linus-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: perf tools: Make 'make html' work perf annotate: Fix segmentation fault perf_counter: Fix the PARISC build perf_counter: Check task on counter read IPI perf: Rename perf-examples.txt to examples.txt perf record: Fix typo in pid_synthesize_comm_event
2009-08-19clockevent: Prevent dead lock on clockevents_lockSuresh Siddha
Currently clockevents_notify() is called with interrupts enabled at some places and interrupts disabled at some other places. This results in a deadlock in this scenario. cpu A holds clockevents_lock in clockevents_notify() with irqs enabled cpu B waits for clockevents_lock in clockevents_notify() with irqs disabled cpu C doing set_mtrr() which will try to rendezvous of all the cpus. This will result in C and A come to the rendezvous point and waiting for B. B is stuck forever waiting for the spinlock and thus not reaching the rendezvous point. Fix the clockevents code so that clockevents_lock is taken with interrupts disabled and thus avoid the above deadlock. Also call lapic_timer_propagate_broadcast() on the destination cpu so that we avoid calling smp_call_function() in the clockevents notifier chain. This issue left us wondering if we need to change the MTRR rendezvous logic to use stop machine logic (instead of smp_call_function) or add a check in spinlock debug code to see if there are other spinlocks which gets taken under both interrupts enabled/disabled conditions. Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Venkatesh Pallipadi <venkatesh.pallipadi@intel.com> Cc: "Pallipadi Venkatesh" <venkatesh.pallipadi@intel.com> Cc: "Brown Len" <len.brown@intel.com> LKML-Reference: <1250544899.2709.210.camel@sbs-t61.sc.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2009-08-18tracing: handle broken names in ftrace filterJiri Olsa
If one filter item (for set_ftrace_filter and set_ftrace_notrace) is being setup by more than 1 consecutive writes (FTRACE_ITER_CONT flag), it won't be handled corretly. I used following program to test/verify: [snip] #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <string.h> int main(int argc, char **argv) { int fd, i; char *file = argv[1]; if (-1 == (fd = open(file, O_WRONLY))) { perror("open failed"); return -1; } for(i = 0; i < (argc - 2); i++) { int len = strlen(argv[2+i]); int cnt, off = 0; while(len) { cnt = write(fd, argv[2+i] + off, len); len -= cnt; off += cnt; } } close(fd); return 0; } [snip] before change: sh-4.0# echo > ./set_ftrace_filter sh-4.0# /test ./set_ftrace_filter "sys" "_open " sh-4.0# cat ./set_ftrace_filter #### all functions enabled #### sh-4.0# after change: sh-4.0# echo > ./set_ftrace_notrace sh-4.0# test ./set_ftrace_notrace "sys" "_open " sh-4.0# cat ./set_ftrace_notrace sys_open sh-4.0# Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> LKML-Reference: <20090811152904.GA26065@jolsa.lab.eng.brq.redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>