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commit 8d9535b6efd86e6c07da59f97e68f44efb7fe080 upstream.
When opening a file with O_CREAT flag, check to see if the file opened
is an existing directory.
This prevents the directory from being opened which subsequently causes
a crash when the close function for directories cifs_closedir() is called
which frees up the file->private_data memory while the file is still
listed on the open file list for the tcon.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Xiaoli Feng <xifeng@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 9446385f05c9af25fed53dbed3cc75763730be52 upstream.
FUSE_HAS_IOCTL_DIR should be assigned to ->flags, it may be a typo.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 69fe05c90ed5 ("fuse: add missing INIT flags")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit f0fe970df3838c202ef6c07a4c2b36838ef0a88b upstream.
There are legitimate reasons to disallow mmap on certain files, notably
in sysfs or procfs. We shouldn't emulate mmap support on file systems
that don't offer support natively.
CVE-2016-1583
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
[tyhicks: clean up f_op check by using ecryptfs_file_to_lower()]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 78c4e172412de5d0456dc00d2b34050aa0b683b5 upstream.
This reverts commit 2f36db71009304b3f0b95afacd8eba1f9f046b87.
It fixed a local root exploit but also introduced a dependency on
the lower file system implementing an mmap operation just to open a file,
which is a bit of a heavy hammer. The right fix is to have mmap depend
on the existence of the mmap handler instead.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 63d2f95d63396059200c391ca87161897b99e74a upstream.
The value `bytes' comes from the filesystem which is about to be
mounted. We cannot trust that the value is always in the range we
expect it to be.
Check its value before using it to calculate the length for the crc32_le
call. It value must be larger (or equal) sumoff + 4.
This fixes a kernel bug when accidentially mounting an image file which
had the nilfs2 magic value 0x3434 at the right offset 0x406 by chance.
The bytes 0x01 0x00 were stored at 0x408 and were interpreted as a
s_bytes value of 1. This caused an underflow when substracting sumoff +
4 (20) in the call to crc32_le.
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88021e600000
IP: crc32_le+0x36/0x100
...
Call Trace:
nilfs_valid_sb.part.5+0x52/0x60 [nilfs2]
nilfs_load_super_block+0x142/0x300 [nilfs2]
init_nilfs+0x60/0x390 [nilfs2]
nilfs_mount+0x302/0x520 [nilfs2]
mount_fs+0x38/0x160
vfs_kern_mount+0x67/0x110
do_mount+0x269/0xe00
SyS_mount+0x9f/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x71
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466778587-5184-2-git-send-email-konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp
Signed-off-by: Torsten Hilbrich <torsten.hilbrich@secunet.com>
Tested-by: Torsten Hilbrich <torsten.hilbrich@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 4fcd1813e6404dd4420c7d12fb483f9320f0bf93 upstream.
Azure server blocks clients that open a socket and don't do anything on it.
In our reconnect scenarios, we can reconnect the tcp session and
detect the socket is available but we defer the negprot and SMB3 session
setup and tree connect reconnection until the next i/o is requested, but
this looks suspicous to some servers who expect SMB3 negprog and session
setup soon after a socket is created.
In the echo thread, reconnect SMB3 sessions and tree connections
that are disconnected. A later patch will replay persistent (and
resilient) handle opens.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <steve.french@primarydata.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 4ac1c17b2044a1b4b2fbed74451947e905fc2992 upstream.
During page migrations UBIFS might get confused
and the following assert triggers:
[ 213.480000] UBIFS assert failed in ubifs_set_page_dirty at 1451 (pid 436)
[ 213.490000] CPU: 0 PID: 436 Comm: drm-stress-test Not tainted 4.4.4-00176-geaa802524636-dirty #1008
[ 213.490000] Hardware name: Allwinner sun4i/sun5i Families
[ 213.490000] [<c0015e70>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0012cdc>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[ 213.490000] [<c0012cdc>] (show_stack) from [<c02ad834>] (dump_stack+0x8c/0xa0)
[ 213.490000] [<c02ad834>] (dump_stack) from [<c0236ee8>] (ubifs_set_page_dirty+0x44/0x50)
[ 213.490000] [<c0236ee8>] (ubifs_set_page_dirty) from [<c00fa0bc>] (try_to_unmap_one+0x10c/0x3a8)
[ 213.490000] [<c00fa0bc>] (try_to_unmap_one) from [<c00fadb4>] (rmap_walk+0xb4/0x290)
[ 213.490000] [<c00fadb4>] (rmap_walk) from [<c00fb1bc>] (try_to_unmap+0x64/0x80)
[ 213.490000] [<c00fb1bc>] (try_to_unmap) from [<c010dc28>] (migrate_pages+0x328/0x7a0)
[ 213.490000] [<c010dc28>] (migrate_pages) from [<c00d0cb0>] (alloc_contig_range+0x168/0x2f4)
[ 213.490000] [<c00d0cb0>] (alloc_contig_range) from [<c010ec00>] (cma_alloc+0x170/0x2c0)
[ 213.490000] [<c010ec00>] (cma_alloc) from [<c001a958>] (__alloc_from_contiguous+0x38/0xd8)
[ 213.490000] [<c001a958>] (__alloc_from_contiguous) from [<c001ad44>] (__dma_alloc+0x23c/0x274)
[ 213.490000] [<c001ad44>] (__dma_alloc) from [<c001ae08>] (arm_dma_alloc+0x54/0x5c)
[ 213.490000] [<c001ae08>] (arm_dma_alloc) from [<c035cecc>] (drm_gem_cma_create+0xb8/0xf0)
[ 213.490000] [<c035cecc>] (drm_gem_cma_create) from [<c035cf20>] (drm_gem_cma_create_with_handle+0x1c/0xe8)
[ 213.490000] [<c035cf20>] (drm_gem_cma_create_with_handle) from [<c035d088>] (drm_gem_cma_dumb_create+0x3c/0x48)
[ 213.490000] [<c035d088>] (drm_gem_cma_dumb_create) from [<c0341ed8>] (drm_ioctl+0x12c/0x444)
[ 213.490000] [<c0341ed8>] (drm_ioctl) from [<c0121adc>] (do_vfs_ioctl+0x3f4/0x614)
[ 213.490000] [<c0121adc>] (do_vfs_ioctl) from [<c0121d30>] (SyS_ioctl+0x34/0x5c)
[ 213.490000] [<c0121d30>] (SyS_ioctl) from [<c000f2c0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x34)
UBIFS is using PagePrivate() which can have different meanings across
filesystems. Therefore the generic page migration code cannot handle this
case correctly.
We have to implement our own migration function which basically does a
plain copy but also duplicates the page private flag.
UBIFS is not a block device filesystem and cannot use buffer_migrate_page().
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
[rw: Massaged changelog, build fixes, etc...]
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit e547f2628327fec6afd2e03b46f113f614cca05b upstream.
Olga Kornievskaia reports that the following test fails to trigger
an OPEN_DOWNGRADE on the wire, and only triggers the final CLOSE.
fd0 = open(foo, RDRW) -- should be open on the wire for "both"
fd1 = open(foo, RDONLY) -- should be open on the wire for "read"
close(fd0) -- should trigger an open_downgrade
read(fd1)
close(fd1)
The issue is that we're missing a check for whether or not the current
state transitioned from an O_RDWR state as opposed to having transitioned
from a combination of O_RDONLY and O_WRONLY.
Reported-by: Olga Kornievskaia <aglo@umich.edu>
Fixes: cd9288ffaea4 ("NFSv4: Fix another bug in the close/open_downgrade code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.33+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 3d56c25e3bb0726a5c5e16fc2d9e38f8ed763085 upstream.
Ascend-to-parent logics in d_walk() depends on all encountered child
dentries not getting freed without an RCU delay. Unfortunately, in
quite a few cases it is not true, with hard-to-hit oopsable race as
the result.
Fortunately, the fix is simiple; right now the rule is "if it ever
been hashed, freeing must be delayed" and changing it to "if it
ever had a parent, freeing must be delayed" closes that hole and
covers all cases the old rule used to cover. Moreover, pipes and
sockets remain _not_ covered, so we do not introduce RCU delay in
the cases which are the reason for having that delay conditional
in the first place.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[wt: add the required change to __d_materialise_dentry() for kernels
older than v3.17]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 2f36db71009304b3f0b95afacd8eba1f9f046b87 upstream.
This prevents users from triggering a stack overflow through a recursive
invocation of pagefault handling that involves mapping procfs files into
virtual memory.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 7d3aa7fe970791f1a674b14572a411accf2f4d4e upstream.
We don't write back stale inodes so we should skip them in
xfs_iflush_cluster, too.
cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10.x-
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 51b07f30a71c27405259a0248206ed4e22adbee2 upstream.
Some careless idiot(*) wrote crap code in commit 1a3e8f3 ("xfs:
convert inode cache lookups to use RCU locking") back in late 2010,
and so xfs_iflush_cluster checks the wrong inode for whether it is
still valid under RCU protection. Fix it to lock and check the
correct inode.
(*) Careless-idiot: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10.x-
Discovered-by: Brain Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit b1438f477934f5a4d5a44df26f3079a7575d5946 upstream.
When a failure due to an inode buffer occurs, the error handling
fails to abort the inode writeback correctly. This can result in the
inode being reclaimed whilst still in the AIL, leading to
use-after-free situations as well as filesystems that cannot be
unmounted as the inode log items left in the AIL never get removed.
Fix this by ensuring fatal errors from xfs_imap_to_bp() result in
the inode flush being aborted correctly.
Reported-by: Shyam Kaushik <shyam@zadarastorage.com>
Diagnosed-by: Shyam Kaushik <shyam@zadarastorage.com>
Tested-by: Shyam Kaushik <shyam@zadarastorage.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[wt: in kernels < 3.17, the error sign is positive, not negative]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 554a5ccc4e4a20c5f3ec859de0842db4b4b9c77e upstream.
If we hit this error when mounted with errors=continue or
errors=remount-ro:
EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used:2940: comm ext4.exe: Allocating blocks 5090-6081 which overlap fs metadata
then ext4_mb_new_blocks() will call ext4_mb_release_context() and try to
continue. However, ext4_mb_release_context() is the wrong thing to call
here since we are still actually using the allocation context.
Instead, just error out. We could retry the allocation, but there is a
possibility of getting stuck in an infinite loop instead, so this seems
safer.
[ Fixed up so we don't return EAGAIN to userspace. --tytso ]
Fixes: 8556e8f3b6 ("ext4: Don't allow new groups to be added during block allocation")
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[wt: 3.10 doesn't have EFSCORRUPTED, but XFS uses EUCLEAN as does 3.14
on this patch so use this instead]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit c65d5c6c81a1f27dec5f627f67840726fcd146de upstream.
If we encounter a filesystem error during orphan cleanup, we should stop.
Otherwise, we may end up in an infinite loop where the same inode is
processed again and again.
EXT4-fs (loop0): warning: checktime reached, running e2fsck is recommended
EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_mb_generate_buddy:758: group 2, block bitmap and bg descriptor inconsistent: 6117 vs 0 free clusters
Aborting journal on device loop0-8.
EXT4-fs (loop0): Remounting filesystem read-only
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_free_blocks:4895: Journal has aborted
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_do_update_inode:4893: Journal has aborted
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_do_update_inode:4893: Journal has aborted
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_ext_remove_space:3068: IO failure
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_ext_truncate:4667: Journal has aborted
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_orphan_del:2927: Journal has aborted
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_do_update_inode:4893: Journal has aborted
EXT4-fs (loop0): Inode 16 (00000000618192a0): orphan list check failed!
[...]
EXT4-fs (loop0): Inode 16 (0000000061819748): orphan list check failed!
[...]
EXT4-fs (loop0): Inode 16 (0000000061819bf0): orphan list check failed!
[...]
See-also: c9eb13a9105 ("ext4: fix hang when processing corrupted orphaned inode list")
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 6a7fd522a7c94cdef0a3b08acf8e6702056e635c upstream.
If ext4_fill_super() fails early, it's possible for ext4_evict_inode()
to call ext4_should_journal_data() before superblock options and flags
are fully set up. In that case, the iput() on the journal inode can
end up causing a BUG().
Work around this problem by reordering the tests so we only call
ext4_should_journal_data() after we know it's not the journal inode.
Fixes: 2d859db3e4 ("ext4: fix data corruption in inodes with journalled data")
Fixes: 2b405bfa84 ("ext4: fix data=journal fast mount/umount hang")
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit f70749ca42943faa4d4dcce46dfdcaadb1d0c4b6 upstream.
An extent with lblock = 4294967295 and len = 1 will pass the
ext4_valid_extent() test:
ext4_lblk_t last = lblock + len - 1;
if (len == 0 || lblock > last)
return 0;
since last = 4294967295 + 1 - 1 = 4294967295. This would later trigger
the BUG_ON(es->es_lblk + es->es_len < es->es_lblk) in ext4_es_end().
We can simplify it by removing the - 1 altogether and changing the test
to use lblock + len <= lblock, since now if len = 0, then lblock + 0 ==
lblock and it fails, and if len > 0 then lblock + len > lblock in order
to pass (i.e. it doesn't overflow).
Fixes: 5946d0893 ("ext4: check for overlapping extents in ext4_valid_extent_entries()")
Fixes: 2f974865f ("ext4: check for zero length extent explicitly")
Cc: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 7bc9491645118c9461bd21099c31755ff6783593 upstream.
Although the extent tree depth of 5 should enough be for the worst
case of 2*32 extents of length 1, the extent tree code does not
currently to merge nodes which are less than half-full with a sibling
node, or to shrink the tree depth if possible. So it's possible, at
least in theory, for the tree depth to be greater than 5. However,
even in the worst case, a tree depth of 32 is highly unlikely, and if
the file system is maliciously corrupted, an insanely large eh_depth
can cause memory allocation failures that will trigger kernel warnings
(here, eh_depth = 65280):
JBD2: ext4.exe wants too many credits credits:195849 rsv_credits:0 max:256
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 50 at fs/jbd2/transaction.c:293 start_this_handle+0x569/0x580
CPU: 0 PID: 50 Comm: ext4.exe Not tainted 4.7.0-rc5+ #508
Stack:
604a8947 625badd8 0002fd09 00000000
60078643 00000000 62623910 601bf9bc
62623970 6002fc84 626239b0 900000125
Call Trace:
[<6001c2dc>] show_stack+0xdc/0x1a0
[<601bf9bc>] dump_stack+0x2a/0x2e
[<6002fc84>] __warn+0x114/0x140
[<6002fdff>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1f/0x30
[<60165829>] start_this_handle+0x569/0x580
[<60165d4e>] jbd2__journal_start+0x11e/0x220
[<60146690>] __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x60/0xa0
[<60120a81>] ext4_truncate+0x131/0x3a0
[<60123677>] ext4_setattr+0x757/0x840
[<600d5d0f>] notify_change+0x16f/0x2a0
[<600b2b16>] do_truncate+0x76/0xc0
[<600c3e56>] path_openat+0x806/0x1300
[<600c55c9>] do_filp_open+0x89/0xf0
[<600b4074>] do_sys_open+0x134/0x1e0
[<600b4140>] SyS_open+0x20/0x30
[<6001ea68>] handle_syscall+0x88/0x90
[<600295fd>] userspace+0x3fd/0x500
[<6001ac55>] fork_handler+0x85/0x90
---[ end trace 08b0b88b6387a244 ]---
[ Commit message modified and the extent tree depath check changed
from 5 to 32 -- tytso ]
Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 935244cd54b86ca46e69bc6604d2adfb1aec2d42 upstream.
Currently, in ext4_mb_init(), there's a loop like the following:
do {
...
offset += 1 << (sb->s_blocksize_bits - i);
i++;
} while (i <= sb->s_blocksize_bits + 1);
Note that the updated offset is used in the loop's next iteration only.
However, at the last iteration, that is at i == sb->s_blocksize_bits + 1,
the shift count becomes equal to (unsigned)-1 > 31 (c.f. C99 6.5.7(3))
and UBSAN reports
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in fs/ext4/mballoc.c:2621:15
shift exponent 4294967295 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'
[...]
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff818c4d25>] dump_stack+0xbc/0x117
[<ffffffff818c4c69>] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0x169/0x169
[<ffffffff819411ab>] ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x4e
[<ffffffff81941cac>] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1fb/0x254
[<ffffffff81941ab1>] ? __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value+0x158/0x158
[<ffffffff814b6dc1>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x101/0x390
[<ffffffff816fc13b>] ? ext4_mb_init+0x13b/0xfd0
[<ffffffff814293c7>] ? create_cache+0x57/0x1f0
[<ffffffff8142948a>] ? create_cache+0x11a/0x1f0
[<ffffffff821c2168>] ? mutex_lock+0x38/0x60
[<ffffffff821c23ab>] ? mutex_unlock+0x1b/0x50
[<ffffffff814c26ab>] ? put_online_mems+0x5b/0xc0
[<ffffffff81429677>] ? kmem_cache_create+0x117/0x2c0
[<ffffffff816fcc49>] ext4_mb_init+0xc49/0xfd0
[...]
Observe that the mentioned shift exponent, 4294967295, equals (unsigned)-1.
Unless compilers start to do some fancy transformations (which at least
GCC 6.0.0 doesn't currently do), the issue is of cosmetic nature only: the
such calculated value of offset is never used again.
Silence UBSAN by introducing another variable, offset_incr, holding the
next increment to apply to offset and adjust that one by right shifting it
by one position per loop iteration.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=114701
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112161
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit b5cb316cdf3a3f5f6125412b0f6065185240cfdc upstream.
Currently, in mb_find_order_for_block(), there's a loop like the following:
while (order <= e4b->bd_blkbits + 1) {
...
bb += 1 << (e4b->bd_blkbits - order);
}
Note that the updated bb is used in the loop's next iteration only.
However, at the last iteration, that is at order == e4b->bd_blkbits + 1,
the shift count becomes negative (c.f. C99 6.5.7(3)) and UBSAN reports
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in fs/ext4/mballoc.c:1281:11
shift exponent -1 is negative
[...]
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff818c4d35>] dump_stack+0xbc/0x117
[<ffffffff818c4c79>] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0x169/0x169
[<ffffffff819411bb>] ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x4e
[<ffffffff81941cbc>] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1fb/0x254
[<ffffffff81941ac1>] ? __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value+0x158/0x158
[<ffffffff816e93a0>] ? ext4_mb_generate_from_pa+0x590/0x590
[<ffffffff816502c8>] ? ext4_read_block_bitmap_nowait+0x598/0xe80
[<ffffffff816e7b7e>] mb_find_order_for_block+0x1ce/0x240
[...]
Unless compilers start to do some fancy transformations (which at least
GCC 6.0.0 doesn't currently do), the issue is of cosmetic nature only: the
such calculated value of bb is never used again.
Silence UBSAN by introducing another variable, bb_incr, holding the next
increment to apply to bb and adjust that one by right shifting it by one
position per loop iteration.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=114701
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112161
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
|
|
commit c9eb13a9105e2e418f72e46a2b6da3f49e696902 upstream.
If the orphaned inode list contains inode #5, ext4_iget() returns a
bad inode (since the bootloader inode should never be referenced
directly). Because of the bad inode, we end up processing the inode
repeatedly and this hangs the machine.
This can be reproduced via:
mke2fs -t ext4 /tmp/foo.img 100
debugfs -w -R "ssv last_orphan 5" /tmp/foo.img
mount -o loop /tmp/foo.img /mnt
(But don't do this if you are using an unpatched kernel if you care
about the system staying functional. :-)
This bug was found by the port of American Fuzzy Lop into the kernel
to find file system problems[1]. (Since it *only* happens if inode #5
shows up on the orphan list --- 3, 7, 8, etc. won't do it, it's not
surprising that AFL needed two hours before it found it.)
[1] http://events.linuxfoundation.org/sites/events/files/slides/AFL%20filesystem%20fuzzing%2C%20Vault%202016_0.pdf
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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|
commit 759c01142a5d0f364a462346168a56de28a80f52 upstream.
On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an
OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A
typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of
memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to
prevent this from happening.
This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above
which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting
them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may
be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system
against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing
pipes to work correctly though with less data at once.
The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and
pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The
default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024)
to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB
before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited
to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB =
1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by
default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use
of pipes (eg: for splicing).
CVE-2016-2847
Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Chas Williams <3chas3@gmail.com>
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|
commit cfda35d98298131bf38fbad3ce4cd5ecb3cf18db upstream.
See [MS-NLMP] 3.2.5.1.2 Server Receives an AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE from the Client:
...
Set NullSession to FALSE
If (AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE.UserNameLen == 0 AND
AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE.NtChallengeResponse.Length == 0 AND
(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE.LmChallengeResponse == Z(1)
OR
AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE.LmChallengeResponse.Length == 0))
-- Special case: client requested anonymous authentication
Set NullSession to TRUE
...
Only server which map unknown users to guest will allow
access using a non-null NTChallengeResponse.
For Samba it's the "map to guest = bad user" option.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11913
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
|
|
commit 99d825822eade8d827a1817357cbf3f889a552d6 upstream.
Payloads of NM entries are not supposed to contain NUL. When we run
into such, only the part prior to the first NUL goes into the
concatenation (i.e. the directory entry name being encoded by a bunch
of NM entries). We do stop when the amount collected so far + the
claimed amount in the current NM entry exceed 254. So far, so good,
but what we return as the total length is the sum of *claimed*
sizes, not the actual amount collected. And that can grow pretty
large - not unlimited, since you'd need to put CE entries in
between to be able to get more than the maximum that could be
contained in one isofs directory entry / continuation chunk and
we are stop once we'd encountered 32 CEs, but you can get about 8Kb
easily. And that's what will be passed to readdir callback as the
name length. 8Kb __copy_to_user() from a buffer allocated by
__get_free_page()
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 0.98pl6+ (yes, really)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3 upstream.
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
|
|
commit daf647d2dd58cec59570d7698a45b98e580f2076 upstream.
With the internal Quota feature, mke2fs creates empty quota inodes and
quota usage tracking is enabled as soon as the file system is mounted.
Since quotacheck is no longer preallocating all of the blocks in the
quota inode that are likely needed to be written to, we are now seeing
a lockdep false positive caused by needing to allocate a quota block
from inside ext4_map_blocks(), while holding i_data_sem for a data
inode. This results in this complaint:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&ei->i_data_sem);
lock(&s->s_dquot.dqio_mutex);
lock(&ei->i_data_sem);
lock(&s->s_dquot.dqio_mutex);
Google-Bug-Id: 27907753
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
|
|
commit be12b299a83fc807bbaccd2bcb8ec50cbb0cb55c upstream.
When master handles convert request, it queues ast first and then
returns status. This may happen that the ast is sent before the request
status because the above two messages are sent by two threads. And
right after the ast is sent, if master down, it may trigger BUG in
dlm_move_lockres_to_recovery_list in the requested node because ast
handler moves it to grant list without clear lock->convert_pending. So
remove BUG_ON statement and check if the ast is processed in
dlmconvert_remote.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Yiwen Jiang <jiangyiwen@huawei.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
|
|
commit ac7cf246dfdbec3d8fed296c7bf30e16f5099dac upstream.
There is a race window between dlmconvert_remote and
dlm_move_lockres_to_recovery_list, which will cause a lock with
OCFS2_LOCK_BUSY in grant list, thus system hangs.
dlmconvert_remote
{
spin_lock(&res->spinlock);
list_move_tail(&lock->list, &res->converting);
lock->convert_pending = 1;
spin_unlock(&res->spinlock);
status = dlm_send_remote_convert_request();
>>>>>> race window, master has queued ast and return DLM_NORMAL,
and then down before sending ast.
this node detects master down and calls
dlm_move_lockres_to_recovery_list, which will revert the
lock to grant list.
Then OCFS2_LOCK_BUSY won't be cleared as new master won't
send ast any more because it thinks already be authorized.
spin_lock(&res->spinlock);
lock->convert_pending = 0;
if (status != DLM_NORMAL)
dlm_revert_pending_convert(res, lock);
spin_unlock(&res->spinlock);
}
In this case, check if res->state has DLM_LOCK_RES_RECOVERING bit set
(res is still in recovering) or res master changed (new master has
finished recovery), reset the status to DLM_RECOVERING, then it will
retry convert.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Yiwen Jiang <jiangyiwen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
|
|
commit d6785d9152147596f60234157da2b02540c3e60f upstream.
Running the following command:
busybox cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_pipe > /dev/null
with any tracing enabled pretty very quickly leads to various NULL
pointer dereferences and VM BUG_ON()s, such as these:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
IP: [<ffffffff8119df6c>] generic_pipe_buf_release+0xc/0x40
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff811c48a3>] splice_direct_to_actor+0x143/0x1e0
[<ffffffff811c42e0>] ? generic_pipe_buf_nosteal+0x10/0x10
[<ffffffff811c49cf>] do_splice_direct+0x8f/0xb0
[<ffffffff81196869>] do_sendfile+0x199/0x380
[<ffffffff81197600>] SyS_sendfile64+0x90/0xa0
[<ffffffff8192cbee>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6d
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(atomic_read(&page->_count) == 0)
kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:367!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
RIP: [<ffffffff8119df9c>] generic_pipe_buf_release+0x3c/0x40
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff811c48a3>] splice_direct_to_actor+0x143/0x1e0
[<ffffffff811c42e0>] ? generic_pipe_buf_nosteal+0x10/0x10
[<ffffffff811c49cf>] do_splice_direct+0x8f/0xb0
[<ffffffff81196869>] do_sendfile+0x199/0x380
[<ffffffff81197600>] SyS_sendfile64+0x90/0xa0
[<ffffffff8192cd1e>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
(busybox's cat uses sendfile(2), unlike the coreutils version)
This is because tracing_splice_read_pipe() can call splice_to_pipe()
with spd->nr_pages == 0. spd_pages underflows in splice_to_pipe() and
we fill the page pointers and the other fields of the pipe_buffers with
garbage.
All other callers of splice_to_pipe() avoid calling it when nr_pages ==
0, and we could make tracing_splice_read_pipe() do that too, but it
seems reasonable to have splice_to_page() handle this condition
gracefully.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit c0a2ad9b50dd80eeccd73d9ff962234590d5ec93 upstream.
On umount path, jbd2_journal_destroy() writes latest transaction ID
(->j_tail_sequence) to be used at next mount.
The bug is that ->j_tail_sequence is not holding latest transaction ID
in some cases. So, at next mount, there is chance to conflict with
remaining (not overwritten yet) transactions.
mount (id=10)
write transaction (id=11)
write transaction (id=12)
umount (id=10) <= the bug doesn't write latest ID
mount (id=10)
write transaction (id=11)
crash
mount
[recovery process]
transaction (id=11)
transaction (id=12) <= valid transaction ID, but old commit
must not replay
Like above, this bug become the cause of recovery failure, or FS
corruption.
So why ->j_tail_sequence doesn't point latest ID?
Because if checkpoint transactions was reclaimed by memory pressure
(i.e. bdev_try_to_free_page()), then ->j_tail_sequence is not updated.
(And another case is, __jbd2_journal_clean_checkpoint_list() is called
with empty transaction.)
So in above cases, ->j_tail_sequence is not pointing latest
transaction ID at umount path. Plus, REQ_FLUSH for checkpoint is not
done too.
So, to fix this problem with minimum changes, this patch updates
->j_tail_sequence, and issue REQ_FLUSH. (With more complex changes,
some optimizations would be possible to avoid unnecessary REQ_FLUSH
for example though.)
BTW,
journal->j_tail_sequence =
++journal->j_transaction_sequence;
Increment of ->j_transaction_sequence seems to be unnecessary, but
ext3 does this.
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
|
|
commit 5e1021f2b6dff1a86a468a1424d59faae2bc63c1 upstream.
ext4_reserve_inode_write() in ext4_mark_inode_dirty() could fail on
error (e.g. EIO) and iloc.bh can be NULL in this case. But the error is
ignored in the following "if" condition and ext4_expand_extra_isize()
might be called with NULL iloc.bh set, which triggers NULL pointer
dereference.
This is uncovered by commit 8b4953e13f4c ("ext4: reserve code points for
the project quota feature"), which enlarges the ext4_inode size, and
run the following script on new kernel but with old mke2fs:
#/bin/bash
mnt=/mnt/ext4
devname=ext4-error
dev=/dev/mapper/$devname
fsimg=/home/fs.img
trap cleanup 0 1 2 3 9 15
cleanup()
{
umount $mnt >/dev/null 2>&1
dmsetup remove $devname
losetup -d $backend_dev
rm -f $fsimg
exit 0
}
rm -f $fsimg
fallocate -l 1g $fsimg
backend_dev=`losetup -f --show $fsimg`
devsize=`blockdev --getsz $backend_dev`
good_tab="0 $devsize linear $backend_dev 0"
error_tab="0 $devsize error $backend_dev 0"
dmsetup create $devname --table "$good_tab"
mkfs -t ext4 $dev
mount -t ext4 -o errors=continue,strictatime $dev $mnt
dmsetup load $devname --table "$error_tab" && dmsetup resume $devname
echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
ls -l $mnt
exit 0
[ Patch changed to simplify the function a tiny bit. -- Ted ]
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
|
|
Quoting the RHEL advisory:
> It was found that the fix for CVE-2015-1805 incorrectly kept buffer
> offset and buffer length in sync on a failed atomic read, potentially
> resulting in a pipe buffer state corruption. A local, unprivileged user
> could use this flaw to crash the system or leak kernel memory to user
> space. (CVE-2016-0774, Moderate)
The same flawed fix was applied to stable branches from 2.6.32.y to
3.14.y inclusive, and I was able to reproduce the issue on 3.2.y.
We need to give pipe_iov_copy_to_user() a separate offset variable
and only update the buffer offset if it succeeds.
References: https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2016-0103.html
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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|
commit ed8b0de5a33d2a2557dce7f9429dca8cb5bc5879 upstream.
"rm -rf" is bricking some peoples' laptops because of variables being
used to store non-reinitializable firmware driver data that's required
to POST the hardware.
These are 100% bugs, and they need to be fixed, but in the mean time it
shouldn't be easy to *accidentally* brick machines.
We have to have delete working, and picking which variables do and don't
work for deletion is quite intractable, so instead make everything
immutable by default (except for a whitelist), and make tools that
aren't quite so broad-spectrum unset the immutable flag.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit e0d64e6a880e64545ad7d55786aa84ab76bac475 upstream.
Translate EFI's UCS-2 variable names to UTF-8 instead of just assuming
all variable names fit in ASCII.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com>
Tested-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit be629c62a603e5935f8177fd8a19e014100a259e upstream.
When a directory is deleted, we don't take too much care about killing off
all the dirents that belong to it — on the basis that on remount, the scan
will conclude that the directory is dead anyway.
This doesn't work though, when the deleted directory contained a child
directory which was moved *out*. In the early stages of the fs build
we can then end up with an apparent hard link, with the child directory
appearing both in its true location, and as a child of the original
directory which are this stage of the mount process we don't *yet* know
is defunct.
To resolve this, take out the early special-casing of the "directories
shall not have hard links" rule in jffs2_build_inode_pass1(), and let the
normal nlink processing happen for directories as well as other inodes.
Then later in the build process we can set ic->pino_nlink to the parent
inode#, as is required for directories during normal operaton, instead
of the nlink. And complain only *then* about hard links which are still
in evidence even after killing off all the unreachable paths.
Reported-by: Liu Song <liu.song11@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 49e91e7079febe59a20ca885a87dd1c54240d0f1 upstream.
With this fix, all code paths should now be obtaining the page lock before
f->sem.
Reported-by: Szabó Tamás <sztomi89@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Thomas Betker <thomas.betker@rohde-schwarz.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 157078f64b8a9cd7011b6b900b2f2498df850748 upstream.
This reverts commit 5ffd3412ae55
("jffs2: Fix lock acquisition order bug in jffs2_write_begin").
The commit modified jffs2_write_begin() to remove a deadlock with
jffs2_garbage_collect_live(), but this introduced new deadlocks found
by multiple users. page_lock() actually has to be called before
mutex_lock(&c->alloc_sem) or mutex_lock(&f->sem) because
jffs2_write_end() and jffs2_readpage() are called with the page locked,
and they acquire c->alloc_sem and f->sem, resp.
In other words, the lock order in jffs2_write_begin() was correct, and
it is the jffs2_garbage_collect_live() path that has to be changed.
Revert the commit to get rid of the new deadlocks, and to clear the way
for a better fix of the original deadlock.
Reported-by: Deng Chao <deng.chao1@zte.com.cn>
Reported-by: Ming Liu <liu.ming50@gmail.com>
Reported-by: wangzaiwei <wangzaiwei@top-vision.cn>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Betker <thomas.betker@rohde-schwarz.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
commit 6cc3b24235929b54acd5ecc987ef11a425bd209e upstream.
For interim responses we only need to parse a header and update
a number credits. Now it is done for all SMB2+ command except
SMB2_READ which is wrong. Fix this by adding such processing.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Tested-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 7f3697e24dc3820b10f445a4a7d914fc356012d1 upstream.
Dmitry reported that he was able to reproduce the WARN_ON_ONCE that
fires in locks_free_lock_context when the flc_posix list isn't empty.
The problem turns out to be that we're basically rebuilding the
file_lock from scratch in fcntl_setlk when we discover that the setlk
has raced with a close. If the l_whence field is SEEK_CUR or SEEK_END,
then we may end up with fl_start and fl_end values that differ from
when the lock was initially set, if the file position or length of the
file has changed in the interim.
Fix this by just reusing the same lock request structure, and simply
override fl_type value with F_UNLCK as appropriate. That ensures that
we really are unlocking the lock that was initially set.
While we're there, make sure that we do pop a WARN_ON_ONCE if the
removal ever fails. Also return -EBADF in this event, since that's
what we would have returned if the close had happened earlier.
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: c293621bbf67 (stale POSIX lock handling)
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c80567c82ae4814a41287618e315a60ecf513be6 upstream.
... into returning a positive to path_openat(), which would interpret that
as "symlink had been encountered" and proceed to corrupt memory, etc.
It can only happen due to a bug in some ->open() instance or in some LSM
hook, etc., so we report any such event *and* make sure it doesn't trick
us into further unpleasantness.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9f2dfda2f2f1c6181c3732c16b85c59ab2d195e0 upstream.
An inverted return value check in hostfs_mknod() caused the function
to return success after handling it as an error (and cleaning up).
It resulted in the following segfault when trying to bind() a named
unix socket:
Pid: 198, comm: a.out Not tainted 4.4.0-rc4
RIP: 0033:[<0000000061077df6>]
RSP: 00000000daae5d60 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000006092a460 RCX: 00000000dfc54208
RDX: 0000000061073ef1 RSI: 0000000000000070 RDI: 00000000e027d600
RBP: 00000000daae5de0 R08: 00000000da980ac0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 00007fb1ae08f72a R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000006092a460 R14: 00000000daaa97c0 R15: 00000000daaa9a88
Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel mode fault at addr 0x40, ip 0x61077df6
CPU: 0 PID: 198 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.4.0-rc4 #1
Stack:
e027d620 dfc54208 0000006f da981398
61bee000 0000c1ed daae5de0 0000006e
e027d620 dfcd4208 00000005 6092a460
Call Trace:
[<60dedc67>] SyS_bind+0xf7/0x110
[<600587be>] handle_syscall+0x7e/0x80
[<60066ad7>] userspace+0x3e7/0x4e0
[<6006321f>] ? save_registers+0x1f/0x40
[<6006c88e>] ? arch_prctl+0x1be/0x1f0
[<60054985>] fork_handler+0x85/0x90
Let's also get rid of the "cosmic ray protection" while we're at it.
Fixes: e9193059b1b3 "hostfs: fix races in dentry_name() and inode_name()"
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9269d12b2d57d9e3d13036bb750762d1110d425c upstream.
We weren't accounting for the insertion of an inline extent item for the
symlink inode nor that we need to update the parent inode item (through
the call to btrfs_add_nondir()). So fix this by including two more
transaction units.
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a879719b8c90e15c9e7fa7266d5e3c0ca962f9df upstream.
When a symlink is successfully created it always has an inline extent
containing the source path. However if an error happens when creating
the symlink, we can leave in the subvolume's tree a symlink inode without
any such inline extent item - this happens if after btrfs_symlink() calls
btrfs_end_transaction() and before it calls the inode eviction handler
(through the final iput() call), the transaction gets committed and a
crash happens before the eviction handler gets called, or if a snapshot
of the subvolume is made before the eviction handler gets called. Sadly
we can't just avoid this by making btrfs_symlink() call
btrfs_end_transaction() after it calls the eviction handler, because the
later can commit the current transaction before it removes any items from
the subvolume tree (if it encounters ENOSPC errors while reserving space
for removing all the items).
So make send fail more gracefully, with an -EIO error, and print a
message to dmesg/syslog informing that there's an empty symlink inode,
so that the user can delete the empty symlink or do something else
about it.
Reported-by: Stephen R. van den Berg <srb@cuci.nl>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit be7bd730841e69fe8f70120098596f648cd1f3ff upstream.
We hit this panic on a few of our boxes this week where we have an
ordered_extent with an NULL inode. We do an igrab() of the inode in writepages,
but weren't doing it in writepage which can be called directly from the VM on
dirty pages. If the inode has been unlinked then we could have I_FREEING set
which means igrab() would return NULL and we get this panic. Fix this by trying
to igrab in btrfs_writepage, and if it returns NULL then just redirty the page
and return AOP_WRITEPAGE_ACTIVATE; so the VM knows it wasn't successful. Thanks,
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b2acdddfad13c38a1e8b927d83c3cf321f63601a upstream.
Looks like oversight, call brelse() when checksum fails. Further down the
code, in the non error path, we do call brelse() and so we don't see
brelse() in the goto error paths.
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c2489e07c0a71a56fb2c84bc0ee66cddfca7d068 upstream.
The following test program from Dmitry can cause softlockups or RCU
stalls as it copies 1GB from tmpfs into eventfd and we don't have any
scheduling point at that path in sendfile(2) implementation:
int r1 = eventfd(0, 0);
int r2 = memfd_create("", 0);
unsigned long n = 1<<30;
fallocate(r2, 0, 0, n);
sendfile(r1, r2, 0, n);
Add cond_resched() into __splice_from_pipe() to fix the problem.
CC: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0ad95472bf169a3501991f8f33f5147f792a8116 upstream.
Commit cb7323fffa85 ("lockd: create and use per-net NSM
RPC clients on MON/UNMON requests") introduced per-net
NSM RPC clients. Unfortunately this doesn't make any sense
without per-net nsm_handle.
E.g. the following scenario could happen
Two hosts (X and Y) in different namespaces (A and B) share
the same nsm struct.
1. nsm_monitor(host_X) called => NSM rpc client created,
nsm->sm_monitored bit set.
2. nsm_mointor(host-Y) called => nsm->sm_monitored already set,
we just exit. Thus in namespace B ln->nsm_clnt == NULL.
3. host X destroyed => nsm->sm_count decremented to 1
4. host Y destroyed => nsm_unmonitor() => nsm_mon_unmon() => NULL-ptr
dereference of *ln->nsm_clnt
So this could be fixed by making per-net nsm_handles list,
instead of global. Thus different net namespaces will not be able
share the same nsm_handle.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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mount
commit a41cbe86df3afbc82311a1640e20858c0cd7e065 upstream.
A test case is as the description says:
open(foobar, O_WRONLY);
sleep() --> reboot the server
close(foobar)
The bug is because in nfs4state.c in nfs4_reclaim_open_state() a few
line before going to restart, there is
clear_bit(NFS4CLNT_RECLAIM_NOGRACE, &state->flags).
NFS4CLNT_RECLAIM_NOGRACE is a flag for the client states not open
owner states. Value of NFS4CLNT_RECLAIM_NOGRACE is 4 which is the
value of NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE in nfs4_state->flags. So clearing it wipes
out state and when we go to close it, “call_close” doesn’t get set as
state flag is not set and CLOSE doesn’t go on the wire.
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <aglo@umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0ff28d9f4674d781e492bcff6f32f0fe48cf0fed upstream.
Using sendfile with below small program to get MD5 sums of some files,
it appear that big files (over 64kbytes with 4k pages system) get a
wrong MD5 sum while small files get the correct sum.
This program uses sendfile() to send a file to an AF_ALG socket
for hashing.
/* md5sum2.c */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int sk = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
struct stat st;
struct sockaddr_alg sa = {
.salg_family = AF_ALG,
.salg_type = "hash",
.salg_name = "md5",
};
int n;
bind(sk, (struct sockaddr*)&sa, sizeof(sa));
for (n = 1; n < argc; n++) {
int size;
int offset = 0;
char buf[4096];
int fd;
int sko;
int i;
fd = open(argv[n], O_RDONLY);
sko = accept(sk, NULL, 0);
fstat(fd, &st);
size = st.st_size;
sendfile(sko, fd, &offset, size);
size = read(sko, buf, sizeof(buf));
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
printf("%2.2x", buf[i]);
printf(" %s\n", argv[n]);
close(fd);
close(sko);
}
exit(0);
}
Test below is done using official linux patch files. First result is
with a software based md5sum. Second result is with the program above.
root@vgoip:~# ls -l patch-3.6.*
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 64011 Aug 24 12:01 patch-3.6.2.gz
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 94131 Aug 24 12:01 patch-3.6.3.gz
root@vgoip:~# md5sum patch-3.6.*
b3ffb9848196846f31b2ff133d2d6443 patch-3.6.2.gz
c5e8f687878457db77cb7158c38a7e43 patch-3.6.3.gz
root@vgoip:~# ./md5sum2 patch-3.6.*
b3ffb9848196846f31b2ff133d2d6443 patch-3.6.2.gz
5fd77b24e68bb24dcc72d6e57c64790e patch-3.6.3.gz
After investivation, it appears that sendfile() sends the files by blocks
of 64kbytes (16 times PAGE_SIZE). The problem is that at the end of each
block, the SPLICE_F_MORE flag is missing, therefore the hashing operation
is reset as if it was the end of the file.
This patch adds SPLICE_F_MORE to the flags when more data is pending.
With the patch applied, we get the correct sums:
root@vgoip:~# md5sum patch-3.6.*
b3ffb9848196846f31b2ff133d2d6443 patch-3.6.2.gz
c5e8f687878457db77cb7158c38a7e43 patch-3.6.3.gz
root@vgoip:~# ./md5sum2 patch-3.6.*
b3ffb9848196846f31b2ff133d2d6443 patch-3.6.2.gz
c5e8f687878457db77cb7158c38a7e43 patch-3.6.3.gz
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Modify mm_access() calls in fs/proc/task_mmu.c and fs/proc/task_nommu.c to
have the mode include PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS so accessing /proc/pid/maps and
/proc/pid/pagemap is not denied to all users.
In backporting upstream commit caaee623 to pre-3.18 kernel versions it was
overlooked that mm_access() is used in fs/proc/task_*mmu.c as those calls
were removed in 3.18 (by upstream commit 29a40ace) and did not exist at the
time of the original commit.
Signed-off-by: Corey Wright <undefined@pobox.com>
Acked-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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