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commit b485342bd79af363c77ef1a421c4a0aef2de9812 upstream.
Commit a074335a370e ("x86, um: Mark system call tables readonly") was
supposed to mark the sys_call_table in UML as RO by adding the const,
but it doesn't have the desired effect as it's nevertheless being placed
into the data section since __cacheline_aligned enforces sys_call_table
being placed into .data..cacheline_aligned instead. We need to use
the ____cacheline_aligned version instead to fix this issue.
Before:
$ nm -v arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.o | grep -1 "sys_call_table"
U sys_writev
0000000000000000 D sys_call_table
0000000000000000 D syscall_table_size
After:
$ nm -v arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.o | grep -1 "sys_call_table"
U sys_writev
0000000000000000 R sys_call_table
0000000000000000 D syscall_table_size
Fixes: a074335a370e ("x86, um: Mark system call tables readonly")
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f911d731054ab3d82ee72a16b889e17ca3a2332a upstream.
futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() does not work on UML because
it triggers a copy_from_user() in kernel context.
On UML copy_from_user() can only be used if the kernel was called
by a real user space process such that UML can use ptrace()
to fetch the value.
Reported-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Suggested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Tested-by: Daniel Walter <d.walter@0x90.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b0ddb319db3d7a1943445f0de0a45c07a7f3457a upstream.
The sh73a0 INTC can't mask interrupts properly most likely due to a
hardware bug. Set the .control_parent flag to delegate masking to the
parent interrupt controller, like was already done for irqpin1.
Without this, accessing the three-axis digital accelerometer ADXL345
on kzm9g through /dev/input/event1 causes an interrupt storm, which
requires a power-cycle to recover from.
This was inspired by a patch for arch/arm/boot/dts/sh73a0.dtsi from
Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas@ideasonboard.com>.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Fixes: 341eb5465f67437a ("ARM: shmobile: INTC External IRQ pin driver on sh73a0")
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms+renesas@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 572b24e6d85d98cdc552f07e9fb9870d9460d81b upstream.
The switch statement of the possible list of SYSCLK1 frequencies is
missing a 0 in 4 out of the 7 frequencies.
Fixes: fa6d79d27614 ("ARM: OMAP: Add initialisation for the real-time counter")
Signed-off-by: Len Sorensen <lsorense@csclub.uwaterloo.ca>
Reviewed-by: Lokesh Vutla <lokeshvutla@ti.com>
Acked-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 81ef447950bf0955aca46f4a7617d8ce435cf0ce upstream.
The post dividers do not work on i.MX6Q rev T0 1.0 so they must be fixed
to 1. As the table index was wrong, a divider a of 4 could still be
requested which implied the clock not to be set properly. This is the
root cause of the HDMI not working at high resolution on rev T0 1.0 of
the SoC.
Signed-off-by: Gary Bisson <bisson.gary@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d2a10a1727b3948019128e83162f22c65859f1fd upstream.
Drop unnecessary semicolon after closing curly bracket.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Voytik <voytikd@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7a87e9cbc3a2f0ff0955815335e08c9862359130 upstream.
From Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/imx25-clock.txt:
cspi1_ipg 78
cspi2_ipg 79
cspi3_ipg 80
, so fix the SPI1 clocks accordingly to avoid a kernel hang when trying to
access SPI1.
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 237d28db036e411f22c03cfd5b0f6dc2aa9bf3bc upstream.
If the function graph tracer traces a jprobe callback, the system will
crash. This can easily be demonstrated by compiling the jprobe
sample module that is in the kernel tree, loading it and running the
function graph tracer.
# modprobe jprobe_example.ko
# echo function_graph > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer
# ls
The first two commands end up in a nice crash after the first fork.
(do_fork has a jprobe attached to it, so "ls" just triggers that fork)
The problem is caused by the jprobe_return() that all jprobe callbacks
must end with. The way jprobes works is that the function a jprobe
is attached to has a breakpoint placed at the start of it (or it uses
ftrace if fentry is supported). The breakpoint handler (or ftrace callback)
will copy the stack frame and change the ip address to return to the
jprobe handler instead of the function. The jprobe handler must end
with jprobe_return() which swaps the stack and does an int3 (breakpoint).
This breakpoint handler will then put back the saved stack frame,
simulate the instruction at the beginning of the function it added
a breakpoint to, and then continue on.
For function tracing to work, it hijakes the return address from the
stack frame, and replaces it with a hook function that will trace
the end of the call. This hook function will restore the return
address of the function call.
If the function tracer traces the jprobe handler, the hook function
for that handler will not be called, and its saved return address
will be used for the next function. This will result in a kernel crash.
To solve this, pause function tracing before the jprobe handler is called
and unpause it before it returns back to the function it probed.
Some other updates:
Used a variable "saved_sp" to hold kcb->jprobe_saved_sp. This makes the
code look a bit cleaner and easier to understand (various tries to fix
this bug required this change).
Note, if fentry is being used, jprobes will change the ip address before
the function graph tracer runs and it will not be able to trace the
function that the jprobe is probing.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150114154329.552437962@goodmis.org
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e8ef060b37c2d3cc5fd0c0edbe4e42ec1cb9768b upstream.
This allows the sdplite/Zebu images to run on OSCI simulation platform
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit af91568e762d04931dcbdd6bef4655433d8b9418 upstream.
The uncore_collect_events functions assumes that event group
might contain only uncore events which is wrong, because it
might contain any type of events.
This bug leads to uncore framework touching 'not' uncore events,
which could end up all sorts of bugs.
One was triggered by Vince's perf fuzzer, when the uncore code
touched breakpoint event private event space as if it was uncore
event and caused BUG:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffff82822068
IP: [<ffffffff81020338>] uncore_assign_events+0x188/0x250
...
The code in uncore_assign_events() function was looking for
event->hw.idx data while the event was initialized as a
breakpoint with different members in event->hw union.
This patch forces uncore_collect_events() to collect only uncore
events.
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vince@deater.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Yan, Zheng <zheng.z.yan@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1418243031-20367-2-git-send-email-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e55355453600a33bb5ca4f71f2d7214875f3b061 upstream.
Enabling the hardware I/O coherency on Armada 370, Armada 375, Armada
38x and Armada XP requires a certain number of conditions:
- On Armada 370, the cache policy must be set to write-allocate.
- On Armada 375, 38x and XP, the cache policy must be set to
write-allocate, the pages must be mapped with the shareable
attribute, and the SMP bit must be set
Currently, on Armada XP, when CONFIG_SMP is enabled, those conditions
are met. However, when Armada XP is used in a !CONFIG_SMP kernel, none
of these conditions are met. With Armada 370, the situation is worse:
since the processor is single core, regardless of whether CONFIG_SMP
or !CONFIG_SMP is used, the cache policy will be set to write-back by
the kernel and not write-allocate.
Since solving this problem turns out to be quite complicated, and we
don't want to let users with a mainline kernel known to have
infrequent but existing data corruptions, this commit proposes to
simply disable hardware I/O coherency in situations where it is known
not to work.
And basically, the is_smp() function of the kernel tells us whether it
is OK to enable hardware I/O coherency or not, so this commit slightly
refactors the coherency_type() function to return
COHERENCY_FABRIC_TYPE_NONE when is_smp() is false, or the appropriate
type of the coherency fabric in the other case.
Thanks to this, the I/O coherency fabric will no longer be used at all
in !CONFIG_SMP configurations. It will continue to be used in
CONFIG_SMP configurations on Armada XP, Armada 375 and Armada 38x
(which are multiple cores processors), but will no longer be used on
Armada 370 (which is a single core processor).
In the process, it simplifies the implementation of the
coherency_type() function, and adds a missing call to of_node_put().
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Fixes: e60304f8cb7bb545e79fe62d9b9762460c254ec2 ("arm: mvebu: Add hardware I/O Coherency support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+
Acked-by: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@free-electrons.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1415871540-20302-3-git-send-email-thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com
Signed-off-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1ddf0b1b11aa8a90cef6706e935fc31c75c406ba upstream.
In Linux 3.18 and below, GCC hoists the lsl instructions in the
pvclock code all the way to the beginning of __vdso_clock_gettime,
slowing the non-paravirt case significantly. For unknown reasons,
presumably related to the removal of a branch, the performance issue
is gone as of
e76b027e6408 x86,vdso: Use LSL unconditionally for vgetcpu
but I don't trust GCC enough to expect the problem to stay fixed.
There should be no correctness issue, because the __getcpu calls in
__vdso_vlock_gettime were never necessary in the first place.
Note to stable maintainers: In 3.18 and below, depending on
configuration, gcc 4.9.2 generates code like this:
9c3: 44 0f 03 e8 lsl %ax,%r13d
9c7: 45 89 eb mov %r13d,%r11d
9ca: 0f 03 d8 lsl %ax,%ebx
This patch won't apply as is to any released kernel, but I'll send a
trivial backported version if needed.
[
Backported by Andy Lutomirski. Should apply to all affected
versions. This fixes a functionality bug as well as a performance
bug: buggy kernels can infinite loop in __vdso_clock_gettime on
affected compilers. See, for exammple:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1178975
]
Fixes: 51c19b4f5927 x86: vdso: pvclock gettime support
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 394f56fe480140877304d342dec46d50dc823d46 upstream.
The theory behind vdso randomization is that it's mapped at a random
offset above the top of the stack. To avoid wasting a page of
memory for an extra page table, the vdso isn't supposed to extend
past the lowest PMD into which it can fit. Other than that, the
address should be a uniformly distributed address that meets all of
the alignment requirements.
The current algorithm is buggy: the vdso has about a 50% probability
of being at the very end of a PMD. The current algorithm also has a
decent chance of failing outright due to incorrect handling of the
case where the top of the stack is near the top of its PMD.
This fixes the implementation. The paxtest estimate of vdso
"randomisation" improves from 11 bits to 18 bits. (Disclaimer: I
don't know what the paxtest code is actually calculating.)
It's worth noting that this algorithm is inherently biased: the vdso
is more likely to end up near the end of its PMD than near the
beginning. Ideally we would either nix the PMD sharing requirement
or jointly randomize the vdso and the stack to reduce the bias.
In the mean time, this is a considerable improvement with basically
no risk of compatibility issues, since the allowed outputs of the
algorithm are unchanged.
As an easy test, doing this:
for i in `seq 10000`
do grep -P vdso /proc/self/maps |cut -d- -f1
done |sort |uniq -d
used to produce lots of output (1445 lines on my most recent run).
A tiny subset looks like this:
7fffdfffe000
7fffe01fe000
7fffe05fe000
7fffe07fe000
7fffe09fe000
7fffe0bfe000
7fffe0dfe000
Note the suspicious fe000 endings. With the fix, I get a much more
palatable 76 repeated addresses.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7ff4d90b4c24a03666f296c3d4878cd39001e81e upstream.
Today there are 3 instances of setgroups and due to an oversight their
permission checking has diverged. Add a common function so that
they may all share the same permission checking code.
This corrects the current oversight in the current permission checks
and adds a helper to avoid this in the future.
A user namespace security fix will update this new helper, shortly.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3fb2f4237bb452eb4e98f6a5dbd5a445b4fed9d0 upstream.
It turns out that there's a lurking ABI issue. GCC, when
compiling this in a 32-bit program:
struct user_desc desc = {
.entry_number = idx,
.base_addr = base,
.limit = 0xfffff,
.seg_32bit = 1,
.contents = 0, /* Data, grow-up */
.read_exec_only = 0,
.limit_in_pages = 1,
.seg_not_present = 0,
.useable = 0,
};
will leave .lm uninitialized. This means that anything in the
kernel that reads user_desc.lm for 32-bit tasks is unreliable.
Revert the .lm check in set_thread_area(). The value never did
anything in the first place.
Fixes: 0e58af4e1d21 ("x86/tls: Disallow unusual TLS segments")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d7875b60e28c512f6a6fc0baf5714d58e7eaadbb.1418856405.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 29fa6825463c97e5157284db80107d1bfac5d77b upstream.
paravirt_enabled has the following effects:
- Disables the F00F bug workaround warning. There is no F00F bug
workaround any more because Linux's standard IDT handling already
works around the F00F bug, but the warning still exists. This
is only cosmetic, and, in any event, there is no such thing as
KVM on a CPU with the F00F bug.
- Disables 32-bit APM BIOS detection. On a KVM paravirt system,
there should be no APM BIOS anyway.
- Disables tboot. I think that the tboot code should check the
CPUID hypervisor bit directly if it matters.
- paravirt_enabled disables espfix32. espfix32 should *not* be
disabled under KVM paravirt.
The last point is the purpose of this patch. It fixes a leak of the
high 16 bits of the kernel stack address on 32-bit KVM paravirt
guests. Fixes CVE-2014-8134.
Suggested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f647d7c155f069c1a068030255c300663516420e upstream.
Otherwise, if buggy user code points DS or ES into the TLS
array, they would be corrupted after a context switch.
This also significantly improves the comments and documents some
gotchas in the code.
Before this patch, the both tests below failed. With this
patch, the es test passes, although the gsbase test still fails.
----- begin es test -----
/*
* Copyright (c) 2014 Andy Lutomirski
* GPL v2
*/
static unsigned short GDT3(int idx)
{
return (idx << 3) | 3;
}
static int create_tls(int idx, unsigned int base)
{
struct user_desc desc = {
.entry_number = idx,
.base_addr = base,
.limit = 0xfffff,
.seg_32bit = 1,
.contents = 0, /* Data, grow-up */
.read_exec_only = 0,
.limit_in_pages = 1,
.seg_not_present = 0,
.useable = 0,
};
if (syscall(SYS_set_thread_area, &desc) != 0)
err(1, "set_thread_area");
return desc.entry_number;
}
int main()
{
int idx = create_tls(-1, 0);
printf("Allocated GDT index %d\n", idx);
unsigned short orig_es;
asm volatile ("mov %%es,%0" : "=rm" (orig_es));
int errors = 0;
int total = 1000;
for (int i = 0; i < total; i++) {
asm volatile ("mov %0,%%es" : : "rm" (GDT3(idx)));
usleep(100);
unsigned short es;
asm volatile ("mov %%es,%0" : "=rm" (es));
asm volatile ("mov %0,%%es" : : "rm" (orig_es));
if (es != GDT3(idx)) {
if (errors == 0)
printf("[FAIL]\tES changed from 0x%hx to 0x%hx\n",
GDT3(idx), es);
errors++;
}
}
if (errors) {
printf("[FAIL]\tES was corrupted %d/%d times\n", errors, total);
return 1;
} else {
printf("[OK]\tES was preserved\n");
return 0;
}
}
----- end es test -----
----- begin gsbase test -----
/*
* gsbase.c, a gsbase test
* Copyright (c) 2014 Andy Lutomirski
* GPL v2
*/
static unsigned char *testptr, *testptr2;
static unsigned char read_gs_testvals(void)
{
unsigned char ret;
asm volatile ("movb %%gs:%1, %0" : "=r" (ret) : "m" (*testptr));
return ret;
}
int main()
{
int errors = 0;
testptr = mmap((void *)0x200000000UL, 1, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
if (testptr == MAP_FAILED)
err(1, "mmap");
testptr2 = mmap((void *)0x300000000UL, 1, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
if (testptr2 == MAP_FAILED)
err(1, "mmap");
*testptr = 0;
*testptr2 = 1;
if (syscall(SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_SET_GS,
(unsigned long)testptr2 - (unsigned long)testptr) != 0)
err(1, "ARCH_SET_GS");
usleep(100);
if (read_gs_testvals() == 1) {
printf("[OK]\tARCH_SET_GS worked\n");
} else {
printf("[FAIL]\tARCH_SET_GS failed\n");
errors++;
}
asm volatile ("mov %0,%%gs" : : "r" (0));
if (read_gs_testvals() == 0) {
printf("[OK]\tWriting 0 to gs worked\n");
} else {
printf("[FAIL]\tWriting 0 to gs failed\n");
errors++;
}
usleep(100);
if (read_gs_testvals() == 0) {
printf("[OK]\tgsbase is still zero\n");
} else {
printf("[FAIL]\tgsbase was corrupted\n");
errors++;
}
return errors == 0 ? 0 : 1;
}
----- end gsbase test -----
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/509d27c9fec78217691c3dad91cec87e1006b34a.1418075657.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0e58af4e1d2166e9e33375a0f121e4867010d4f8 upstream.
Users have no business installing custom code segments into the
GDT, and segments that are not present but are otherwise valid
are a historical source of interesting attacks.
For completeness, block attempts to set the L bit. (Prior to
this patch, the L bit would have been silently dropped.)
This is an ABI break. I've checked glibc, musl, and Wine, and
none of them look like they'll have any trouble.
Note to stable maintainers: this is a hardening patch that fixes
no known bugs. Given the possibility of ABI issues, this
probably shouldn't be backported quickly.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 41bdc78544b8a93a9c6814b8bbbfef966272abbe upstream.
Installing a 16-bit RW data segment into the GDT defeats espfix.
AFAICT this will not affect glibc, Wine, or dosemu at all.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 152d44a853e42952f6c8a504fb1f8eefd21fd5fd upstream.
I used some 64 bit instructions when adding the 32 bit getcpu VDSO
function. Fix it.
Fixes: 18ad51dd342a ("powerpc: Add VDSO version of getcpu")
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 336ae1180df5f69b9e0fb6561bec01c5f64361cf upstream.
There is a small race between when the cycle count is read from
the hardware and when the epoch stabilizes. Consider this
scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
cyc = read_sched_clock()
cyc_to_sched_clock()
update_sched_clock()
...
cd.epoch_cyc = cyc;
epoch_cyc = cd.epoch_cyc;
...
epoch_ns + cyc_to_ns((cyc - epoch_cyc)
The cyc on cpu0 was read before the epoch changed. But we
calculate the nanoseconds based on the new epoch by subtracting
the new epoch from the old cycle count. Since epoch is most likely
larger than the old cycle count we calculate a large number that
will be converted to nanoseconds and added to epoch_ns, causing
time to jump forward too much.
Fix this problem by reading the hardware after the epoch has
stabilized.
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e upstream.
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Adjust context, filename
- Simplify handle_invept() as recommended by Paolo - nEPT is not
supported so we always raise #UD]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Vinson Lee <vlee@twopensource.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 360743814c4082515581aa23ab1d8e699e1fbe88 upstream.
Instead of the arch specific quirk which we are deprecating
and that drivers don't understand.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 995ab5189d1d7264e79e665dfa032a19b3ac646e upstream.
Under extremely rare conditions, in an MPCore node consisting of at
least 3 CPUs, two CPUs trying to perform a STREX to data on the same
shared cache line can enter a livelock situation.
This patch enables the HW mechanism that overcomes the bug. This fixes
the incorrect setup of the STREX backoff delay bit due to a wrong
description in the specification.
Note that enabling the STREX backoff delay mechanism is done by
leaving the bit *cleared*, while the bit was currently being set by
the proc-v7.S code.
[Thomas: adapt to latest mainline, slightly reword the commit log, add
stable markers.]
Fixes: de4901933f6d ("arm: mm: Add support for PJ4B cpu and init routines")
Signed-off-by: Nadav Haklai <nadavh@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Acked-by: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@free-electrons.com>
Acked-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ef59a20ba375aeb97b3150a118318884743452a8 upstream.
According to the manuals I have, XScale auxiliary register should be
reached with opc_2 = 1 instead of crn = 1. cpu_xscale_proc_init
correctly uses c1, c0, 1 arguments, but cpu_xscale_do_suspend and
cpu_xscale_do_resume use c1, c1, 0. Correct suspend/resume functions to
also use c1, c0, 1.
The issue was primarily noticed thanks to qemu reporing "unsupported
instruction" on the pxa suspend path. Confirmed in PXA210/250 and PXA255
XScale Core manuals and in PXA270 and PXA320 Developers Guides.
Harware tested by me on tosa (pxa255). Robert confirmed on pxa270 board.
Tested-by: Robert Jarzmik <robert.jarzmik@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dbaryshkov@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Robert Jarzmik <robert.jarzmik@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3b8a3c01096925a824ed3272601082289d9c23a5 upstream.
On pseries system (LPAR) xmon failed to enter when running in LE mode,
system is hunging. Inititating xmon will lead to such an output on the
console:
SysRq : Entering xmon
cpu 0x15: Vector: 0 at [c0000003f39ffb10]
pc: c00000000007ed7c: sysrq_handle_xmon+0x5c/0x70
lr: c00000000007ed7c: sysrq_handle_xmon+0x5c/0x70
sp: c0000003f39ffc70
msr: 8000000000009033
current = 0xc0000003fafa7180
paca = 0xc000000007d75e80 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 14617, comm = bash
Bad kernel stack pointer fafb4b0 at eca7cc4
cpu 0x15: Vector: 300 (Data Access) at [c000000007f07d40]
pc: 000000000eca7cc4
lr: 000000000eca7c44
sp: fafb4b0
msr: 8000000000001000
dar: 10000000
dsisr: 42000000
current = 0xc0000003fafa7180
paca = 0xc000000007d75e80 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 14617, comm = bash
cpu 0x15: Exception 300 (Data Access) in xmon, returning to main loop
xmon: WARNING: bad recursive fault on cpu 0x15
The root cause is that xmon is calling RTAS to turn off the surveillance
when entering xmon, and RTAS is requiring big endian parameters.
This patch is byte swapping the RTAS arguments when running in LE mode.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 415072a041bf50dbd6d56934ffc0cbbe14c97be8 upstream.
Instead of the arch specific quirk which we are deprecating
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5a2b59d3993e8ca4f7788a48a23e5cb303f26954 ]
We are reading the memory location, so we have to have a memory
constraint in there purely for the sake of showing the data flow
to the compiler.
Reported-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 82975bc6a6df743b9a01810fb32cb65d0ec5d60b upstream.
x86 call do_notify_resume on paranoid returns if TIF_UPROBE is set but
not on non-paranoid returns. I suspect that this is a mistake and that
the code only works because int3 is paranoid.
Setting _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME in the uprobe code was probably a workaround
for the x86 bug. With that bug fixed, we can remove _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME
from the uprobes code.
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 45e2a9d4701d8c624d4a4bcdd1084eae31e92f58 upstream.
When setting up permissions on kernel memory at boot, the end of the
PMD that was split from bss remained executable. It should be NX like
the rest. This performs a PMD alignment instead of a PAGE alignment to
get the correct span of memory.
Before:
---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
...
0xffffffff8202d000-0xffffffff82200000 1868K RW GLB NX pte
0xffffffff82200000-0xffffffff82c00000 10M RW PSE GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff82c00000-0xffffffff82df5000 2004K RW GLB NX pte
0xffffffff82df5000-0xffffffff82e00000 44K RW GLB x pte
0xffffffff82e00000-0xffffffffc0000000 978M pmd
After:
---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
...
0xffffffff8202d000-0xffffffff82200000 1868K RW GLB NX pte
0xffffffff82200000-0xffffffff82e00000 12M RW PSE GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff82e00000-0xffffffffc0000000 978M pmd
[ tglx: Changed it to roundup(_brk_end, PMD_SIZE) and added a comment.
We really should unmap the reminder along with the holes
caused by init,initdata etc. but thats a different issue ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141114194737.GA3091@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2cd3949f702692cf4c5d05b463f19cd706a92dd3 upstream.
We have some very similarly named command-line options:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:__setup("noxsave", x86_xsave_setup);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:__setup("noxsaveopt", x86_xsaveopt_setup);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:__setup("noxsaves", x86_xsaves_setup);
__setup() is designed to match options that take arguments, like
"foo=bar" where you would have:
__setup("foo", x86_foo_func...);
The problem is that "noxsave" actually _matches_ "noxsaves" in
the same way that "foo" matches "foo=bar". If you boot an old
kernel that does not know about "noxsaves" with "noxsaves" on the
command line, it will interpret the argument as "noxsave", which
is not what you want at all.
This makes the "noxsave" handler only return success when it finds
an *exact* match.
[ tglx: We really need to make __setup() more robust. ]
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141111220133.FE053984@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b645af2d5905c4e32399005b867987919cbfc3ae upstream.
It's possible for iretq to userspace to fail. This can happen because
of a bad CS, SS, or RIP.
Historically, we've handled it by fixing up an exception from iretq to
land at bad_iret, which pretends that the failed iret frame was really
the hardware part of #GP(0) from userspace. To make this work, there's
an extra fixup to fudge the gs base into a usable state.
This is suboptimal because it loses the original exception. It's also
buggy because there's no guarantee that we were on the kernel stack to
begin with. For example, if the failing iret happened on return from an
NMI, then we'll end up executing general_protection on the NMI stack.
This is bad for several reasons, the most immediate of which is that
general_protection, as a non-paranoid idtentry, will try to deliver
signals and/or schedule from the wrong stack.
This patch throws out bad_iret entirely. As a replacement, it augments
the existing swapgs fudge into a full-blown iret fixup, mostly written
in C. It's should be clearer and more correct.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6f442be2fb22be02cafa606f1769fa1e6f894441 upstream.
On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks.
On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret
to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a
genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code. The first two
cases don't need IST, and the latter two cases are unlikely fatal bugs,
and promoting them to double faults would be fine.
This fixes a bug in which the espfix64 code mishandles a stack segment
violation.
This saves 4k of memory per CPU and a tiny bit of code.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit af726f21ed8af2cdaa4e93098dc211521218ae65 upstream.
There's nothing special enough about the espfix64 double fault fixup to
justify writing it in assembly. Move it to C.
This also fixes a bug: if the double fault came from an IST stack, the
old asm code would return to a partially uninitialized stack frame.
Fixes: 3891a04aafd668686239349ea58f3314ea2af86b
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 26927f76499849e095714452b8a4e09350f6a3b9 upstream.
If SERIAL_8250 is compiled as a module, the platform specific setup
for Loongson will be a module too, and it will not work very well.
At least on Loongson 3 it will trigger a build failure,
since loongson_sysconf is not exported to modules.
Fix by making the platform specific serial code always built-in.
Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Reported-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com>
Cc: Markos Chandras <Markos.Chandras@imgtec.com>
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/8533/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bbaf113a481b6ce32444c125807ad3618643ce57 upstream.
Fix incorrect cast that always results in wrong address for the new
frame on 64-bit kernels.
Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nsn.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/8110/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3a13c4d761b4b979ba8767f42345fed3274991b0 upstream.
The x86 fault handler bails in the middle of error handling when the
task has a fatal signal pending. For a subsequent patch this is a
problem in OOM situations because it relies on pagefault_out_of_memory()
being called even when the task has been killed, to perform proper
per-task OOM state unwinding.
Shortcutting the fault like this is a rather minor optimization that
saves a few instructions in rare cases. Just remove it for
user-triggered faults.
Use the opportunity to split the fault retry handling from actual fault
errors and add locking documentation that reads suprisingly similar to
ARM's.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: azurIt <azurit@pobox.sk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 759496ba6407c6994d6a5ce3a5e74937d7816208 upstream.
Unlike global OOM handling, memory cgroup code will invoke the OOM killer
in any OOM situation because it has no way of telling faults occuring in
kernel context - which could be handled more gracefully - from
user-triggered faults.
Pass a flag that identifies faults originating in user space from the
architecture-specific fault handlers to generic code so that memcg OOM
handling can be improved.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: azurIt <azurit@pobox.sk>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 871341023c771ad233620b7a1fb3d9c7031c4e5c upstream.
Kernel faults are expected to handle OOM conditions gracefully (gup,
uaccess etc.), so they should never invoke the OOM killer. Reserve this
for faults triggered in user context when it is the only option.
Most architectures already do this, fix up the remaining few.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: azurIt <azurit@pobox.sk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 94bce453c78996cc4373d5da6cfabe07fcc6d9f9 upstream.
The memcg code can trap tasks in the context of the failing allocation
until an OOM situation is resolved. They can hold all kinds of locks
(fs, mm) at this point, which makes it prone to deadlocking.
This series converts memcg OOM handling into a two step process that is
started in the charge context, but any waiting is done after the fault
stack is fully unwound.
Patches 1-4 prepare architecture handlers to support the new memcg
requirements, but in doing so they also remove old cruft and unify
out-of-memory behavior across architectures.
Patch 5 disables the memcg OOM handling for syscalls, readahead, kernel
faults, because they can gracefully unwind the stack with -ENOMEM. OOM
handling is restricted to user triggered faults that have no other
option.
Patch 6 reworks memcg's hierarchical OOM locking to make it a little
more obvious wth is going on in there: reduce locked regions, rename
locking functions, reorder and document.
Patch 7 implements the two-part OOM handling such that tasks are never
trapped with the full charge stack in an OOM situation.
This patch:
Back before smart OOM killing, when faulting tasks were killed directly on
allocation failures, the arch-specific fault handlers needed special
protection for the init process.
Now that all fault handlers call into the generic OOM killer (see commit
609838cfed97: "mm: invoke oom-killer from remaining unconverted page
fault handlers"), which already provides init protection, the
arch-specific leftovers can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: azurIt <azurit@pobox.sk>
Acked-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> [arch/arc bits]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 609838cfed972d49a65aac7923a9ff5cbe482e30 upstream.
A few remaining architectures directly kill the page faulting task in an
out of memory situation. This is usually not a good idea since that
task might not even use a significant amount of memory and so may not be
the optimal victim to resolve the situation.
Since 2.6.29's 1c0fe6e ("mm: invoke oom-killer from page fault") there
is a hook that architecture page fault handlers are supposed to call to
invoke the OOM killer and let it pick the right task to kill. Convert
the remaining architectures over to this hook.
To have the previous behavior of simply taking out the faulting task the
vm.oom_kill_allocating_task sysctl can be set to 1.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> [arch/arc bits]
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se>
Cc: Chen Liqin <liqin.chen@sunplusct.com>
Cc: Lennox Wu <lennox.wu@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a2b9e6c1a35afcc0973acb72e591c714e78885ff upstream.
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 63328070eff2f4fd730c86966a0dbc976147c39f upstream.
Currently BUG() uses .word or .hword to create the necessary illegal
instructions. However if we are building BE8 then these get swapped
by the linker into different illegal instructions in the text. This
means that the BUG() macro does not get trapped properly.
Change to using <asm/opcodes.h> to provide the necessary ARM instruction
building as we cannot rely on gcc/gas having the `.inst` instructions
which where added to try and resolve this issue (reported by Dave Martin
<Dave.Martin@arm.com>).
Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1996388e9f4e3444db8273bc08d25164d2967c21 upstream.
This was discussed back in February:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/2/18/956
But I never saw a patch come out of it.
On IvyBridge we share the SandyBridge cache event tables, but the
dTLB-load-miss event is not compatible. Patch it up after
the fact to the proper DTLB_LOAD_MISSES.DEMAND_LD_MISS_CAUSES_A_WALK
Signed-off-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.11.1407141528200.17214@vincent-weaver-1.umelst.maine.edu
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Hou Pengyang <houpengyang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5596b0b245fb9d2cefb5023b11061050351c1398 upstream.
[ 1.904000] BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/1/0x00000002
[ 1.908000] Modules linked in:
[ 1.916000] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.12.0-rc2-lemote-los.git-5318619-dirty #1
[ 1.920000] Stack : 0000000031aac000 ffffffff810d0000 0000000000000052 ffffffff802730a4
0000000000000000 0000000000000001 ffffffff810cdf90 ffffffff810d0000
ffffffff8068b968 ffffffff806f5537 ffffffff810cdf90 980000009f0782e8
0000000000000001 ffffffff80720000 ffffffff806b0000 980000009f078000
980000009f290000 ffffffff805f312c 980000009f05b5d8 ffffffff80233518
980000009f05b5e8 ffffffff80274b7c 980000009f078000 ffffffff8068b968
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
0000000000000000 980000009f05b520 0000000000000000 ffffffff805f2f6c
0000000000000000 ffffffff80700000 ffffffff80700000 ffffffff806fc758
ffffffff80700000 ffffffff8020be98 ffffffff806fceb0 ffffffff805f2f6c
...
[ 2.028000] Call Trace:
[ 2.032000] [<ffffffff8020be98>] show_stack+0x80/0x98
[ 2.036000] [<ffffffff805f2f6c>] __schedule_bug+0x44/0x6c
[ 2.040000] [<ffffffff805fac58>] __schedule+0x518/0x5b0
[ 2.044000] [<ffffffff805f8a58>] schedule_timeout+0x128/0x1f0
[ 2.048000] [<ffffffff80240314>] msleep+0x3c/0x60
[ 2.052000] [<ffffffff80495400>] do_probe+0x238/0x3a8
[ 2.056000] [<ffffffff804958b0>] ide_probe_port+0x340/0x7e8
[ 2.060000] [<ffffffff80496028>] ide_host_register+0x2d0/0x7a8
[ 2.064000] [<ffffffff8049c65c>] ide_pci_init_two+0x4e4/0x790
[ 2.068000] [<ffffffff8049f9b8>] amd74xx_probe+0x148/0x2c8
[ 2.072000] [<ffffffff803f571c>] pci_device_probe+0xc4/0x130
[ 2.076000] [<ffffffff80478f60>] driver_probe_device+0x98/0x270
[ 2.080000] [<ffffffff80479298>] __driver_attach+0xe0/0xe8
[ 2.084000] [<ffffffff80476ab0>] bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xe0
[ 2.088000] [<ffffffff80478468>] bus_add_driver+0x230/0x310
[ 2.092000] [<ffffffff80479b44>] driver_register+0x84/0x158
[ 2.096000] [<ffffffff80200504>] do_one_initcall+0x104/0x160
Signed-off-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@linux-mips.org>
Reported-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Tested-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/5941/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Alexandre Oliva <lxoliva@fsfla.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 888be25402021a425da3e85e2d5a954d7509286e upstream.
If we are running BE8, the data and instruction endianness do not
match, so use <asm/opcodes.h> to correctly translate memory accesses
into ARM instructions.
Acked-by: Jon Medhurst <tixy@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk>
[taras.kondratiuk@linaro.org: fixed Thumb instruction fetch order]
Signed-off-by: Taras Kondratiuk <taras.kondratiuk@linaro.org>
[wangnan: backport to 3.10 and 3.14:
- adjust context
- backport all changes on arch/arm/kernel/probes.c to
arch/arm/kernel/kprobes-common.c since we don't have
commit c18377c303787ded44b7decd7dee694db0f205e9.
- After the above adjustments, becomes same to Taras Kondratiuk's
original patch:
http://lists.linaro.org/pipermail/linaro-kernel/2014-January/010346.html
]
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2fe749f50b0bec07650ef135b29b1f55bf543869 upstream.
Switch over the msgctl, shmat, shmctl and semtimedop syscalls to use the compat
layer. The problem was found with the debian procenv package, which called
shmctl(0, SHM_INFO, &info);
in which the shmctl syscall then overwrote parts of the surrounding areas on
the stack on which the info variable was stored and thus lead to a segfault
later on.
Additionally fix the definition of struct shminfo64 to use unsigned longs like
the other architectures. This has no impact on userspace since we only have a
32bit userspace up to now.
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 97fc15436b36ee3956efad83e22a557991f7d19d upstream.
ARM64 currently doesn't fix up faults on the single-byte (strb) case of
__clear_user... which means that we can cause a nasty kernel panic as an
ordinary user with any multiple PAGE_SIZE+1 read from /dev/zero.
i.e.: dd if=/dev/zero of=foo ibs=1 count=1 (or ibs=65537, etc.)
This is a pretty obscure bug in the general case since we'll only
__do_kernel_fault (since there's no extable entry for pc) if the
mmap_sem is contended. However, with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM enabled, we'll
always fault.
if (!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) {
if (!user_mode(regs) && !search_exception_tables(regs->pc))
goto no_context;
retry:
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
} else {
/*
* The above down_read_trylock() might have succeeded in
* which
* case, we'll have missed the might_sleep() from
* down_read().
*/
might_sleep();
if (!user_mode(regs) && !search_exception_tables(regs->pc))
goto no_context;
}
Fix that by adding an extable entry for the strb instruction, since it
touches user memory, similar to the other stores in __clear_user.
Signed-off-by: Kyle McMartin <kyle@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Miloš Prchlík <mprchlik@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 08b964ff3c51b10aaf2e6ba639f40054c09f0f7a upstream.
The kuser helpers page is not set up on non-MMU systems, so it does
not make sense to allow CONFIG_KUSER_HELPERS to be enabled when
CONFIG_MMU=n. Allowing it to be set on !MMU results in an oops in
set_tls (used in execve and the arm_syscall trap handler):
Unhandled exception: IPSR = 00000005 LR = fffffff1
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.18.0-rc1-00041-ga30465a #216
task: 8b838000 ti: 8b82a000 task.ti: 8b82a000
PC is at flush_thread+0x32/0x40
LR is at flush_thread+0x21/0x40
pc : [<8f00157a>] lr : [<8f001569>] psr: 4100000b
sp : 8b82be20 ip : 00000000 fp : 8b83c000
r10: 00000001 r9 : 88018c84 r8 : 8bb85000
r7 : 8b838000 r6 : 00000000 r5 : 8bb77400 r4 : 8b82a000
r3 : ffff0ff0 r2 : 8b82a000 r1 : 00000000 r0 : 88020354
xPSR: 4100000b
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.18.0-rc1-00041-ga30465a #216
[<8f002bc1>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<8f002033>] (show_stack+0xb/0xc)
[<8f002033>] (show_stack) from [<8f00265b>] (__invalid_entry+0x4b/0x4c)
As best I can tell this issue existed for the set_tls ARM syscall
before commit fbfb872f5f41 "ARM: 8148/1: flush TLS and thumbee
register state during exec" consolidated the TLS manipulation code
into the set_tls helper function, but now that we're using it to flush
register state during execve, !MMU users encounter the oops at the
first exec.
Prevent CONFIG_MMU=n configurations from enabling
CONFIG_KUSER_HELPERS.
Fixes: fbfb872f5f41 (ARM: 8148/1: flush TLS and thumbee register state during exec)
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathan_lynch@mentor.com>
Reported-by: Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch>
Acked-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2651cc6974d47fc43bef1cd8cd26966e4f5ba306 upstream.
Userspace actually passes single parameter (path name) to the umount
syscall, so new umount just fails. Fix it by requesting old umount
syscall implementation and re-wiring umount to it.
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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