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2023-10-30Merge tag 'x86-core-2023-10-29-v2' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 core updates from Thomas Gleixner: - Limit the hardcoded topology quirk for Hygon CPUs to those which have a model ID less than 4. The newer models have the topology CPUID leaf 0xB correctly implemented and are not affected. - Make SMT control more robust against enumeration failures SMT control was added to allow controlling SMT at boottime or runtime. The primary purpose was to provide a simple mechanism to disable SMT in the light of speculation attack vectors. It turned out that the code is sensible to enumeration failures and worked only by chance for XEN/PV. XEN/PV has no real APIC enumeration which means the primary thread mask is not set up correctly. By chance a XEN/PV boot ends up with smp_num_siblings == 2, which makes the hotplug control stay at its default value "enabled". So the mask is never evaluated. The ongoing rework of the topology evaluation caused XEN/PV to end up with smp_num_siblings == 1, which sets the SMT control to "not supported" and the empty primary thread mask causes the hotplug core to deny the bringup of the APS. Make the decision logic more robust and take 'not supported' and 'not implemented' into account for the decision whether a CPU should be booted or not. - Fake primary thread mask for XEN/PV Pretend that all XEN/PV vCPUs are primary threads, which makes the usage of the primary thread mask valid on XEN/PV. That is consistent with because all of the topology information on XEN/PV is fake or even non-existent. - Encapsulate topology information in cpuinfo_x86 Move the randomly scattered topology data into a separate data structure for readability and as a preparatory step for the topology evaluation overhaul. - Consolidate APIC ID data type to u32 It's fixed width hardware data and not randomly u16, int, unsigned long or whatever developers decided to use. - Cure the abuse of cpuinfo for persisting logical IDs. Per CPU cpuinfo is used to persist the logical package and die IDs. That's really not the right place simply because cpuinfo is subject to be reinitialized when a CPU goes through an offline/online cycle. Use separate per CPU data for the persisting to enable the further topology management rework. It will be removed once the new topology management is in place. - Provide a debug interface for inspecting topology information Useful in general and extremly helpful for validating the topology management rework in terms of correctness or "bug" compatibility. * tag 'x86-core-2023-10-29-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (23 commits) x86/apic, x86/hyperv: Use u32 in hv_snp_boot_ap() too x86/cpu: Provide debug interface x86/cpu/topology: Cure the abuse of cpuinfo for persisting logical ids x86/apic: Use u32 for wakeup_secondary_cpu[_64]() x86/apic: Use u32 for [gs]et_apic_id() x86/apic: Use u32 for phys_pkg_id() x86/apic: Use u32 for cpu_present_to_apicid() x86/apic: Use u32 for check_apicid_used() x86/apic: Use u32 for APIC IDs in global data x86/apic: Use BAD_APICID consistently x86/cpu: Move cpu_l[l2]c_id into topology info x86/cpu: Move logical package and die IDs into topology info x86/cpu: Remove pointless evaluation of x86_coreid_bits x86/cpu: Move cu_id into topology info x86/cpu: Move cpu_core_id into topology info hwmon: (fam15h_power) Use topology_core_id() scsi: lpfc: Use topology_core_id() x86/cpu: Move cpu_die_id into topology info x86/cpu: Move phys_proc_id into topology info x86/cpu: Encapsulate topology information in cpuinfo_x86 ...
2023-10-30Merge tag 'x86-mm-2023-10-28' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 mm handling updates from Ingo Molnar: - Add new NX-stack self-test - Improve NUMA partial-CFMWS handling - Fix #VC handler bugs resulting in SEV-SNP boot failures - Drop the 4MB memory size restriction on minimal NUMA nodes - Reorganize headers a bit, in preparation to header dependency reduction efforts - Misc cleanups & fixes * tag 'x86-mm-2023-10-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mm: Drop the 4 MB restriction on minimal NUMA node memory size selftests/x86/lam: Zero out buffer for readlink() x86/sev: Drop unneeded #include x86/sev: Move sev_setup_arch() to mem_encrypt.c x86/tdx: Replace deprecated strncpy() with strtomem_pad() selftests/x86/mm: Add new test that userspace stack is in fact NX x86/sev: Make boot_ghcb_page[] static x86/boot: Move x86_cache_alignment initialization to correct spot x86/sev-es: Set x86_virt_bits to the correct value straight away, instead of a two-phase approach x86/sev-es: Allow copy_from_kernel_nofault() in earlier boot x86_64: Show CR4.PSE on auxiliaries like on BSP x86/iommu/docs: Update AMD IOMMU specification document URL x86/sev/docs: Update document URL in amd-memory-encryption.rst x86/mm: Move arch_memory_failure() and arch_is_platform_page() definitions from <asm/processor.h> to <asm/pgtable.h> ACPI/NUMA: Apply SRAT proximity domain to entire CFMWS window x86/numa: Introduce numa_fill_memblks()
2023-10-10x86/apic: Use u32 for APIC IDs in global dataThomas Gleixner
APIC IDs are used with random data types u16, u32, int, unsigned int, unsigned long. Make it all consistently use u32 because that reflects the hardware register width and fixup the most obvious usage sites of that. The APIC callbacks will be addressed separately. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814085112.922905727@linutronix.de
2023-10-10x86/cpu: Move cpu_l[l2]c_id into topology infoThomas Gleixner
The topology IDs which identify the LLC and L2 domains clearly belong to the per CPU topology information. Move them into cpuinfo_x86::cpuinfo_topo and get rid of the extra per CPU data and the related exports. This also paves the way to do proper topology evaluation during early boot because it removes the only per CPU dependency for that. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814085112.803864641@linutronix.de
2023-10-10x86/cpu: Move logical package and die IDs into topology infoThomas Gleixner
Yet another topology related data pair. Rename logical_proc_id to logical_pkg_id so it fits the common naming conventions. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814085112.745139505@linutronix.de
2023-10-10x86/cpu: Move cu_id into topology infoThomas Gleixner
No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814085112.628405546@linutronix.de
2023-10-10x86/cpu: Move cpu_core_id into topology infoThomas Gleixner
Rename it to core_id and stick it to the other ID fields. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814085112.566519388@linutronix.de
2023-10-10x86/cpu: Move cpu_die_id into topology infoThomas Gleixner
Move the next member. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814085112.388185134@linutronix.de
2023-10-10x86/cpu: Move phys_proc_id into topology infoThomas Gleixner
Rename it to pkg_id which is the terminology used in the kernel. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814085112.329006989@linutronix.de
2023-10-10x86/cpu: Encapsulate topology information in cpuinfo_x86Thomas Gleixner
The topology related information is randomly scattered across cpuinfo_x86. Create a new structure cpuinfo_topo and move in a first step initial_apicid and apicid into it. Aside of being better readable this is in preparation for replacing the horribly fragile CPU topology evaluation code further down the road. Consolidate APIC ID fields to u32 as that represents the hardware type. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814085112.269787744@linutronix.de
2023-10-05Merge tag 'v6.6-rc4' into x86/entry, to pick up fixesIngo Molnar
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2023-09-22x86/mm: Move arch_memory_failure() and arch_is_platform_page() definitions ↵Ingo Molnar
from <asm/processor.h> to <asm/pgtable.h> <linux/mm.h> relies on these definitions being included first, which is true currently due to historic header spaghetti, but in the future <asm/processor.h> will not guaranteed to be included by the MM code. Move these definitions over into a suitable MM header. This is a preparatory patch for x86 header dependency simplifications and reductions. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
2023-09-19x86/srso: Set CPUID feature bits independently of bug or mitigation statusJosh Poimboeuf
Booting with mitigations=off incorrectly prevents the X86_FEATURE_{IBPB_BRTYPE,SBPB} CPUID bits from getting set. Also, future CPUs without X86_BUG_SRSO might still have IBPB with branch type prediction flushing, in which case SBPB should be used instead of IBPB. The current code doesn't allow for that. Also, cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode() has some surprising side effects and the setting of these feature bits really doesn't belong in the mitigation code anyway. Move it to earlier. Fixes: fb3bd914b3ec ("x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation") Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/869a1709abfe13b673bdd10c2f4332ca253a40bc.1693889988.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
2023-09-14x86/entry: Rename ignore_sysret()Nikolay Borisov
The SYSCALL instruction cannot really be disabled in compatibility mode. The best that can be done is to configure the CSTAR msr to point to a minimal handler. Currently this handler has a rather misleading name - ignore_sysret() as it's not really doing anything with sysret. Give it a more descriptive name. Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230623111409.3047467-3-nik.borisov@suse.com
2023-08-31Merge tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 shadow stack support from Dave Hansen: "This is the long awaited x86 shadow stack support, part of Intel's Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). CET consists of two related security features: shadow stacks and indirect branch tracking. This series implements just the shadow stack part of this feature, and just for userspace. The main use case for shadow stack is providing protection against return oriented programming attacks. It works by maintaining a secondary (shadow) stack using a special memory type that has protections against modification. When executing a CALL instruction, the processor pushes the return address to both the normal stack and to the special permission shadow stack. Upon RET, the processor pops the shadow stack copy and compares it to the normal stack copy. For more information, refer to the links below for the earlier versions of this patch set" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230613001108.3040476-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/ * tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (47 commits) x86/shstk: Change order of __user in type x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm x86/shstk: Don't retry vm_munmap() on -EINTR x86/kbuild: Fix Documentation/ reference x86/shstk: Move arch detail comment out of core mm x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall x86/shstk: Check that signal frame is shadow stack mem x86/shstk: Check that SSP is aligned on sigreturn x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support ...
2023-08-30Merge tag 'x86_apic_for_6.6-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 apic updates from Dave Hansen: "This includes a very thorough rework of the 'struct apic' handlers. Quite a variety of them popped up over the years, especially in the 32-bit days when odd apics were much more in vogue. The end result speaks for itself, which is a removal of a ton of code and static calls to replace indirect calls. If there's any breakage here, it's likely to be around the 32-bit museum pieces that get light to no testing these days. Summary: - Rework apic callbacks, getting rid of unnecessary ones and coalescing lots of silly duplicates. - Use static_calls() instead of indirect calls for apic->foo() - Tons of cleanups an crap removal along the way" * tag 'x86_apic_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (64 commits) x86/apic: Turn on static calls x86/apic: Provide static call infrastructure for APIC callbacks x86/apic: Wrap IPI calls into helper functions x86/apic: Mark all hotpath APIC callback wrappers __always_inline x86/xen/apic: Mark apic __ro_after_init x86/apic: Convert other overrides to apic_update_callback() x86/apic: Replace acpi_wake_cpu_handler_update() and apic_set_eoi_cb() x86/apic: Provide apic_update_callback() x86/xen/apic: Use standard apic driver mechanism for Xen PV x86/apic: Provide common init infrastructure x86/apic: Wrap apic->native_eoi() into a helper x86/apic: Nuke ack_APIC_irq() x86/apic: Remove pointless arguments from [native_]eoi_write() x86/apic/noop: Tidy up the code x86/apic: Remove pointless NULL initializations x86/apic: Sanitize APIC ID range validation x86/apic: Prepare x2APIC for using apic::max_apic_id x86/apic: Simplify X2APIC ID validation x86/apic: Add max_apic_id member x86/apic: Wrap APIC ID validation into an inline ...
2023-08-28Merge tag 'x86-cleanups-2023-08-28' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull misc x86 cleanups from Ingo Molnar: "The following commit deserves special mention: 22dc02f81cddd Revert "sched/fair: Move unused stub functions to header" This is in x86/cleanups, because the revert is a re-application of a number of cleanups that got removed inadvertedly" [ This also effectively undoes the amd_check_microcode() microcode declaration change I had done in my microcode loader merge in commit 42a7f6e3ffe0 ("Merge tag 'x86_microcode_for_v6.6_rc1' [...]"). I picked the declaration change by Arnd from this branch instead, which put it in <asm/processor.h> instead of <asm/microcode.h> like I had done in my merge resolution - Linus ] * tag 'x86-cleanups-2023-08-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/platform/uv: Refactor code using deprecated strncpy() interface to use strscpy() x86/hpet: Refactor code using deprecated strncpy() interface to use strscpy() x86/platform/uv: Refactor code using deprecated strcpy()/strncpy() interfaces to use strscpy() x86/qspinlock-paravirt: Fix missing-prototype warning x86/paravirt: Silence unused native_pv_lock_init() function warning x86/alternative: Add a __alt_reloc_selftest() prototype x86/purgatory: Include header for warn() declaration x86/asm: Avoid unneeded __div64_32 function definition Revert "sched/fair: Move unused stub functions to header" x86/apic: Hide unused safe_smp_processor_id() on 32-bit UP x86/cpu: Fix amd_check_microcode() declaration
2023-08-12locking: remove spin_lock_prefetchMateusz Guzik
The only remaining consumer is new_inode, where it showed up in 2001 as commit c37fa164f793 ("v2.4.9.9 -> v2.4.9.10") in a historical repo [1] with a changelog which does not mention it. Since then the line got only touched up to keep compiling. While it may have been of benefit back in the day, it is guaranteed to at best not get in the way in the multicore setting -- as the code performs *a lot* of work between the prefetch and actual lock acquire, any contention means the cacheline is already invalid by the time the routine calls spin_lock(). It adds spurious traffic, for short. On top of it prefetch is notoriously tricky to use for single-threaded purposes, making it questionable from the get go. As such, remove it. I admit upfront I did not see value in benchmarking this change, but I can do it if that is deemed appropriate. Removal from new_inode and of the entire thing are in the same patch as requested by Linus, so whatever weird looks can be directed at that guy. Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git/commit/fs/inode.c?id=c37fa164f793735b32aa3f53154ff1a7659e6442 [1] Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2023-08-10x86: Move gds_ucode_mitigated() declaration to headerArnd Bergmann
The declaration got placed in the .c file of the caller, but that causes a warning for the definition: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:682:6: error: no previous prototype for 'gds_ucode_mitigated' [-Werror=missing-prototypes] Move it to a header where both sides can observe it instead. Fixes: 81ac7e5d74174 ("KVM: Add GDS_NO support to KVM") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230809130530.1913368-2-arnd%40kernel.org
2023-08-09x86/cpu: Make identify_boot_cpu() staticThomas Gleixner
It's not longer used outside the source file. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> # Xen PV (dom0 and unpriv. guest)
2023-08-09x86/CPU/AMD: Do not leak quotient data after a division by 0Borislav Petkov (AMD)
Under certain circumstances, an integer division by 0 which faults, can leave stale quotient data from a previous division operation on Zen1 microarchitectures. Do a dummy division 0/1 before returning from the #DE exception handler in order to avoid any leaks of potentially sensitive data. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2023-08-02x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack supportRick Edgecombe
Introduce basic shadow stack enabling/disabling/allocation routines. A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHADOW_STACK flag and has a fixed size of min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4GB). Keep the task's shadow stack address and size in thread_struct. This will be copied when cloning new threads, but needs to be cleared during exec, so add a function to do this. 32 bit shadow stack is not expected to have many users and it will complicate the signal implementation. So do not support IA32 emulation or x32. Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-29-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
2023-08-02x86: Introduce userspace API for shadow stackRick Edgecombe
Add three new arch_prctl() handles: - ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE/DISABLE enables or disables the specified feature. Returns 0 on success or a negative value on error. - ARCH_SHSTK_LOCK prevents future disabling or enabling of the specified feature. Returns 0 on success or a negative value on error. The features are handled per-thread and inherited over fork(2)/clone(2), but reset on exec(). Co-developed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-27-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
2023-07-31x86/cpu: Fix amd_check_microcode() declarationArnd Bergmann
The newly added amd_check_microcode() function has two conflicting definitions if CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD is enabled and CONFIG_MICROCODE_AMD is disabled. Since the header with the stub definition is not included in cpu/amd.c, this only causes a -Wmissing-prototype warning with W=1: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c:1289:6: error: no previous prototype for 'amd_check_microcode' [-Werror=missing-prototypes] Adding the missing #include shows the other problem: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c:1290:6: error: redefinition of 'amd_check_microcode' arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h:58:20: note: previous definition of 'amd_check_microcode' with type 'void(void)' Move the declaration into a more appropriate header that is already included, with the #ifdef check changed to match the definition's. Fixes: 522b1d69219d8 ("x86/cpu/amd: Add a Zenbleed fix") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230725121751.2007665-1-arnd@kernel.org
2023-07-27x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigationBorislav Petkov (AMD)
Add a mitigation for the speculative return address stack overflow vulnerability found on AMD processors. The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the retpoline sequence. To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return' sequence. To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference. In Zen3 and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns. In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and srso_safe_ret(). Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
2023-05-15x86/smpboot: Get rid of cpu_init_secondary()Thomas Gleixner
The synchronization of the AP with the control CPU is a SMP boot problem and has nothing to do with cpu_init(). Open code cpu_init_secondary() in start_secondary() and move wait_for_master_cpu() into the SMP boot code. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name> Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com> # Steam Deck Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230512205255.981999763@linutronix.de
2023-03-21x86/smpboot: Remove initial_stack on 64-bitBrian Gerst
In order to facilitate parallel startup, start to eliminate some of the global variables passing information to CPUs in the startup path. However, start by introducing one more: smpboot_control. For now this merely holds the CPU# of the CPU which is coming up. Each CPU can then find its own per-cpu data, and everything else it needs can be found from there, allowing the other global variables to be removed. First to be removed is initial_stack. Each CPU can load %rsp from its current_task->thread.sp instead. That is already set up with the correct idle thread for APs. Set up the .sp field in INIT_THREAD on x86 so that the BSP also finds a suitable stack pointer in the static per-cpu data when coming up on first boot. On resume from S3, the CPU needs a temporary stack because its idle task is already active. Instead of setting initial_stack, the sleep code can simply set its own current->thread.sp to point to the temporary stack. Nobody else cares about ->thread.sp for a thread which is currently on a CPU, because the true value is actually in the %rsp register. Which is restored with the rest of the CPU context in do_suspend_lowlevel(). Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Usama Arif <usama.arif@bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Usama Arif <usama.arif@bytedance.com> Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230316222109.1940300-7-usama.arif@bytedance.com
2023-02-21Merge tag 'x86_vdso_for_v6.3_rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 vdso updates from Borislav Petkov: - Add getcpu support for the 32-bit version of the vDSO - Some smaller fixes * tag 'x86_vdso_for_v6.3_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/vdso: Fix -Wmissing-prototypes warnings x86/vdso: Fake 32bit VDSO build on 64bit compile for vgetcpu selftests: Emit a warning if getcpu() is missing on 32bit x86/vdso: Provide getcpu for x86-32. x86/cpu: Provide the full setup for getcpu() on x86-32 x86/vdso: Move VDSO image init to vdso2c generated code
2023-01-25x86/vdso: Move VDSO image init to vdso2c generated codeBrian Gerst
Generate an init function for each VDSO image, replacing init_vdso() and sysenter_setup(). Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230124184019.26850-1-brgerst@gmail.com
2023-01-21x86/microcode: Check CPU capabilities after late microcode update correctlyAshok Raj
The kernel caches each CPU's feature bits at boot in an x86_capability[] structure. However, the capabilities in the BSP's copy can be turned off as a result of certain command line parameters or configuration restrictions, for example the SGX bit. This can cause a mismatch when comparing the values before and after the microcode update. Another example is X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL which gets added only after microcode update: --- cpuid.before 2023-01-21 14:54:15.652000747 +0100 +++ cpuid.after 2023-01-21 14:54:26.632001024 +0100 @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ CPU: 0x00000004 0x04: eax=0x00000000 ebx=0x00000000 ecx=0x00000000 edx=0x00000000 0x00000005 0x00: eax=0x00000040 ebx=0x00000040 ecx=0x00000003 edx=0x11142120 0x00000006 0x00: eax=0x000027f7 ebx=0x00000002 ecx=0x00000001 edx=0x00000000 - 0x00000007 0x00: eax=0x00000000 ebx=0x029c6fbf ecx=0x40000000 edx=0xbc002400 + 0x00000007 0x00: eax=0x00000000 ebx=0x029c6fbf ecx=0x40000000 edx=0xbc002e00 ^^^ and which proves for a gazillionth time that late loading is a bad bad idea. microcode_check() is called after an update to report any previously cached CPUID bits which might have changed due to the update. Therefore, store the cached CPU caps before the update and compare them with the CPU caps after the microcode update has succeeded. Thus, the comparison is done between the CPUID *hardware* bits before and after the upgrade instead of using the cached, possibly runtime modified values in BSP's boot_cpu_data copy. As a result, false warnings about CPUID bits changes are avoided. [ bp: - Massage. - Add SRBDS_CTRL example. - Add kernel-doc. - Incorporate forgotten review feedback from dhansen. ] Fixes: 1008c52c09dc ("x86/CPU: Add a microcode loader callback") Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230109153555.4986-3-ashok.raj@intel.com
2023-01-20x86/microcode: Add a parameter to microcode_check() to store CPU capabilitiesAshok Raj
Add a parameter to store CPU capabilities before performing a microcode update so that CPU capabilities can be compared before and after update. [ bp: Massage. ] Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230109153555.4986-2-ashok.raj@intel.com
2022-12-14Merge tag 'x86_core_for_v6.2' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 core updates from Borislav Petkov: - Add the call depth tracking mitigation for Retbleed which has been long in the making. It is a lighterweight software-only fix for Skylake-based cores where enabling IBRS is a big hammer and causes a significant performance impact. What it basically does is, it aligns all kernel functions to 16 bytes boundary and adds a 16-byte padding before the function, objtool collects all functions' locations and when the mitigation gets applied, it patches a call accounting thunk which is used to track the call depth of the stack at any time. When that call depth reaches a magical, microarchitecture-specific value for the Return Stack Buffer, the code stuffs that RSB and avoids its underflow which could otherwise lead to the Intel variant of Retbleed. This software-only solution brings a lot of the lost performance back, as benchmarks suggest: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220915111039.092790446@infradead.org/ That page above also contains a lot more detailed explanation of the whole mechanism - Implement a new control flow integrity scheme called FineIBT which is based on the software kCFI implementation and uses hardware IBT support where present to annotate and track indirect branches using a hash to validate them - Other misc fixes and cleanups * tag 'x86_core_for_v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (80 commits) x86/paravirt: Use common macro for creating simple asm paravirt functions x86/paravirt: Remove clobber bitmask from .parainstructions x86/debug: Include percpu.h in debugreg.h to get DECLARE_PER_CPU() et al x86/cpufeatures: Move X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH from bit 18 to bit 19 of word 11, to leave space for WIP X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA bit x86/Kconfig: Enable kernel IBT by default x86,pm: Force out-of-line memcpy() objtool: Fix weak hole vs prefix symbol objtool: Optimize elf_dirty_reloc_sym() x86/cfi: Add boot time hash randomization x86/cfi: Boot time selection of CFI scheme x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT objtool: Add --cfi to generate the .cfi_sites section x86: Add prefix symbols for function padding objtool: Add option to generate prefix symbols objtool: Avoid O(bloody terrible) behaviour -- an ode to libelf objtool: Slice up elf_create_section_symbol() kallsyms: Revert "Take callthunks into account" x86: Unconfuse CONFIG_ and X86_FEATURE_ namespaces x86/retpoline: Fix crash printing warning x86/paravirt: Fix a !PARAVIRT build warning ...
2022-11-29x86/cpuid: Carve out all CPUID functionalityBorislav Petkov
Carve it out into a special header, where it belongs. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221124164150.3040-1-bp@alien8.de
2022-10-17x86/percpu: Move irq_stack variables next to current_taskThomas Gleixner
Further extend struct pcpu_hot with the hard and soft irq stack pointers. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220915111145.599170752@infradead.org
2022-10-17x86/percpu: Move current_top_of_stack next to current_taskThomas Gleixner
Extend the struct pcpu_hot cacheline with current_top_of_stack; another very frequently used value. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220915111145.493038635@infradead.org
2022-10-17x86/cpu: Get rid of redundant switch_to_new_gdt() invocationsThomas Gleixner
The only place where switch_to_new_gdt() is required is early boot to switch from the early GDT to the direct GDT. Any other invocation is completely redundant because it does not change anything. Secondary CPUs come out of the ASM code with GDT and GSBASE correctly set up. The same is true for XEN_PV. Remove all the voodoo invocations which are left overs from the ancient past, rename the function to switch_gdt_and_percpu_base() and mark it init. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220915111143.198076128@infradead.org
2022-10-17x86/cpu: Remove segment load from switch_to_new_gdt()Thomas Gleixner
On 32bit FS and on 64bit GS segments are already set up correctly, but load_percpu_segment() still sets [FG]S after switching from the early GDT to the direct GDT. For 32bit the segment load has no side effects, but on 64bit it causes GSBASE to become 0, which means that any per CPU access before GSBASE is set to the new value is going to fault. That's the reason why the whole file containing this code has stackprotector removed. But that's a pointless exercise for both 32 and 64 bit as the relevant segment selector is already correct. Loading the new GDT does not change that. Remove the segment loads and add comments. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220915111143.097052006@infradead.org
2022-09-11kernel: exit: cleanup release_thread()Kefeng Wang
Only x86 has own release_thread(), introduce a new weak release_thread() function to clean empty definitions in other ARCHs. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220819014406.32266-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Acked-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> [csky] Acked-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: Brian Cain <bcain@quicinc.com> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [powerpc] Acked-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> [openrisc] Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> [arm64] Acked-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> [LoongArch] Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org> Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> [csky] Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Stefan Kristiansson <stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi> Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@kernel.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Xuerui Wang <kernel@xen0n.name> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.osdn.me> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-05-27x86: Always inline on_thread_stack() and current_top_of_stack()Peter Zijlstra
Becaues GCC clearly lost it's marbles again... vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: enter_from_user_mode+0x4e: call to on_thread_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x53: call to on_thread_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: syscall_enter_from_user_mode_prepare+0x4e: call to on_thread_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: irqentry_enter_from_user_mode+0x4e: call to on_thread_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: enter_from_user_mode+0x4e: call to current_top_of_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x53: call to current_top_of_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: syscall_enter_from_user_mode_prepare+0x4e: call to current_top_of_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: irqentry_enter_from_user_mode+0x4e: call to current_top_of_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220526105958.071435483@infradead.org
2022-03-15Merge branch 'x86/cpu' into x86/core, to resolve conflictsIngo Molnar
Conflicts: arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2022-03-15x86: Mark stop_this_cpu() __noreturnPeter Zijlstra
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: smp_stop_nmi_callback()+0x2b: unreachable instruction 0000 0000000000047cf0 <smp_stop_nmi_callback>: ... 0026 47d16: e8 00 00 00 00 call 47d1b <smp_stop_nmi_callback+0x2b> 47d17: R_X86_64_PLT32 stop_this_cpu-0x4 002b 47d1b: b8 01 00 00 00 mov $0x1,%eax Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308154319.290905453@infradead.org
2022-02-01x86/cpu: Read/save PPIN MSR during initializationTony Luck
Currently, the PPIN (Protected Processor Inventory Number) MSR is read by every CPU that processes a machine check, CMCI, or just polls machine check banks from a periodic timer. This is not a "fast" MSR, so this adds to overhead of processing errors. Add a new "ppin" field to the cpuinfo_x86 structure. Read and save the PPIN during initialization. Use this copy in mce_setup() instead of reading the MSR. Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131230111.2004669-4-tony.luck@intel.com
2021-11-15x86/sgx: Hook arch_memory_failure() into mainline codeTony Luck
Add a call inside memory_failure() to call the arch specific code to check if the address is an SGX EPC page and handle it. Note the SGX EPC pages do not have a "struct page" entry, so the hook goes in at the same point as the device mapping hook. Pull the call to acquire the mutex earlier so the SGX errors are also protected. Make set_mce_nospec() skip SGX pages when trying to adjust the 1:1 map. Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Tested-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211026220050.697075-6-tony.luck@intel.com
2021-11-11Merge branch 'kvm-5.16-fixes' into kvm-masterPaolo Bonzini
* Fix misuse of gfn-to-pfn cache when recording guest steal time / preempted status * Fix selftests on APICv machines * Fix sparse warnings * Fix detection of KVM features in CPUID * Cleanups for bogus writes to MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN * Fixes and cleanups for MSR bitmap handling * Cleanups for INVPCID * Make x86 KVM_SOFT_MAX_VCPUS consistent with other architectures
2021-11-11KVM: x86: Make sure KVM_CPUID_FEATURES really are KVM_CPUID_FEATURESPaul Durrant
Currently when kvm_update_cpuid_runtime() runs, it assumes that the KVM_CPUID_FEATURES leaf is located at 0x40000001. This is not true, however, if Hyper-V support is enabled. In this case the KVM leaves will be offset. This patch introdues as new 'kvm_cpuid_base' field into struct kvm_vcpu_arch to track the location of the KVM leaves and function kvm_update_kvm_cpuid_base() (called from kvm_set_cpuid()) to locate the leaves using the 'KVMKVMKVM\0\0\0' signature (which is now given a definition in kvm_para.h). Adjustment of KVM_CPUID_FEATURES will hence now target the correct leaf. NOTE: A new for_each_possible_hypervisor_cpuid_base() macro is intoduced into processor.h to avoid having duplicate code for the iteration over possible hypervisor base leaves. Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com> Message-Id: <20211105095101.5384-3-pdurrant@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-11-02Merge tag 'x86_core_for_v5.16_rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 core updates from Borislav Petkov: - Do not #GP on userspace use of CLI/STI but pretend it was a NOP to keep old userspace from breaking. Adjust the corresponding iopl selftest to that. - Improve stack overflow warnings to say which stack got overflowed and raise the exception stack sizes to 2 pages since overflowing the single page of exception stack is very easy to do nowadays with all the tracing machinery enabled. With that, rip out the custom mapping of AMD SEV's too. - A bunch of changes in preparation for FGKASLR like supporting more than 64K section headers in the relocs tool, correct ORC lookup table size to cover the whole kernel .text and other adjustments. * tag 'x86_core_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: selftests/x86/iopl: Adjust to the faked iopl CLI/STI usage vmlinux.lds.h: Have ORC lookup cover entire _etext - _stext x86/boot/compressed: Avoid duplicate malloc() implementations x86/boot: Allow a "silent" kaslr random byte fetch x86/tools/relocs: Support >64K section headers x86/sev: Make the #VC exception stacks part of the default stacks storage x86: Increase exception stack sizes x86/mm/64: Improve stack overflow warnings x86/iopl: Fake iopl(3) CLI/STI usage
2021-11-01Merge tag 'x86_cpu_for_v5.16_rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 cpu updates from Borislav Petkov: - Start checking a CPUID bit on AMD Zen3 which states that the CPU clears the segment base when a null selector is written. Do the explicit detection on older CPUs, zen2 and hygon specifically, which have the functionality but do not advertize the CPUID bit. Factor in the presence of a hypervisor underneath the kernel and avoid doing the explicit check there which the HV might've decided to not advertize for migration safety reasons, or similar. - Add support for a new X86 CPU vendor: VORTEX. Needed for whitelisting those CPUs in the hardware vulnerabilities detection - Force the compiler to use rIP-relative addressing in the fallback path of static_cpu_has(), in order to avoid unnecessary register pressure * tag 'x86_cpu_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/cpu: Fix migration safety with X86_BUG_NULL_SEL x86/CPU: Add support for Vortex CPUs x86/umip: Downgrade warning messages to debug loglevel x86/asm: Avoid adding register pressure for the init case in static_cpu_has() x86/asm: Add _ASM_RIP() macro for x86-64 (%rip) suffix
2021-11-01Merge tag 'x86-fpu-2021-11-01' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fpu updates from Thomas Gleixner: - Cleanup of extable fixup handling to be more robust, which in turn allows to make the FPU exception fixups more robust as well. - Change the return code for signal frame related failures from explicit error codes to a boolean fail/success as that's all what the calling code evaluates. - A large refactoring of the FPU code to prepare for adding AMX support: - Distangle the public header maze and remove especially the misnomed kitchen sink internal.h which is despite it's name included all over the place. - Add a proper abstraction for the register buffer storage (struct fpstate) which allows to dynamically size the buffer at runtime by flipping the pointer to the buffer container from the default container which is embedded in task_struct::tread::fpu to a dynamically allocated container with a larger register buffer. - Convert the code over to the new fpstate mechanism. - Consolidate the KVM FPU handling by moving the FPU related code into the FPU core which removes the number of exports and avoids adding even more export when AMX has to be supported in KVM. This also removes duplicated code which was of course unnecessary different and incomplete in the KVM copy. - Simplify the KVM FPU buffer handling by utilizing the new fpstate container and just switching the buffer pointer from the user space buffer to the KVM guest buffer when entering vcpu_run() and flipping it back when leaving the function. This cuts the memory requirements of a vCPU for FPU buffers in half and avoids pointless memory copy operations. This also solves the so far unresolved problem of adding AMX support because the current FPU buffer handling of KVM inflicted a circular dependency between adding AMX support to the core and to KVM. With the new scheme of switching fpstate AMX support can be added to the core code without affecting KVM. - Replace various variables with proper data structures so the extra information required for adding dynamically enabled FPU features (AMX) can be added in one place - Add AMX (Advanced Matrix eXtensions) support (finally): AMX is a large XSTATE component which is going to be available with Saphire Rapids XEON CPUs. The feature comes with an extra MSR (MSR_XFD) which allows to trap the (first) use of an AMX related instruction, which has two benefits: 1) It allows the kernel to control access to the feature 2) It allows the kernel to dynamically allocate the large register state buffer instead of burdening every task with the the extra 8K or larger state storage. It would have been great to gain this kind of control already with AVX512. The support comes with the following infrastructure components: 1) arch_prctl() to - read the supported features (equivalent to XGETBV(0)) - read the permitted features for a task - request permission for a dynamically enabled feature Permission is granted per process, inherited on fork() and cleared on exec(). The permission policy of the kernel is restricted to sigaltstack size validation, but the syscall obviously allows further restrictions via seccomp etc. 2) A stronger sigaltstack size validation for sys_sigaltstack(2) which takes granted permissions and the potentially resulting larger signal frame into account. This mechanism can also be used to enforce factual sigaltstack validation independent of dynamic features to help with finding potential victims of the 2K sigaltstack size constant which is broken since AVX512 support was added. 3) Exception handling for #NM traps to catch first use of a extended feature via a new cause MSR. If the exception was caused by the use of such a feature, the handler checks permission for that feature. If permission has not been granted, the handler sends a SIGILL like the #UD handler would do if the feature would have been disabled in XCR0. If permission has been granted, then a new fpstate which fits the larger buffer requirement is allocated. In the unlikely case that this allocation fails, the handler sends SIGSEGV to the task. That's not elegant, but unavoidable as the other discussed options of preallocation or full per task permissions come with their own set of horrors for kernel and/or userspace. So this is the lesser of the evils and SIGSEGV caused by unexpected memory allocation failures is not a fundamentally new concept either. When allocation succeeds, the fpstate properties are filled in to reflect the extended feature set and the resulting sizes, the fpu::fpstate pointer is updated accordingly and the trap is disarmed for this task permanently. 4) Enumeration and size calculations 5) Trap switching via MSR_XFD The XFD (eXtended Feature Disable) MSR is context switched with the same life time rules as the FPU register state itself. The mechanism is keyed off with a static key which is default disabled so !AMX equipped CPUs have zero overhead. On AMX enabled CPUs the overhead is limited by comparing the tasks XFD value with a per CPU shadow variable to avoid redundant MSR writes. In case of switching from a AMX using task to a non AMX using task or vice versa, the extra MSR write is obviously inevitable. All other places which need to be aware of the variable feature sets and resulting variable sizes are not affected at all because they retrieve the information (feature set, sizes) unconditonally from the fpstate properties. 6) Enable the new AMX states Note, this is relatively new code despite the fact that AMX support is in the works for more than a year now. The big refactoring of the FPU code, which allowed to do a proper integration has been started exactly 3 weeks ago. Refactoring of the existing FPU code and of the original AMX patches took a week and has been subject to extensive review and testing. The only fallout which has not been caught in review and testing right away was restricted to AMX enabled systems, which is completely irrelevant for anyone outside Intel and their early access program. There might be dragons lurking as usual, but so far the fine grained refactoring has held up and eventual yet undetected fallout is bisectable and should be easily addressable before the 5.16 release. Famous last words... Many thanks to Chang Bae and Dave Hansen for working hard on this and also to the various test teams at Intel who reserved extra capacity to follow the rapid development of this closely which provides the confidence level required to offer this rather large update for inclusion into 5.16-rc1 * tag 'x86-fpu-2021-11-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (110 commits) Documentation/x86: Add documentation for using dynamic XSTATE features x86/fpu: Include vmalloc.h for vzalloc() selftests/x86/amx: Add context switch test selftests/x86/amx: Add test cases for AMX state management x86/fpu/amx: Enable the AMX feature in 64-bit mode x86/fpu: Add XFD handling for dynamic states x86/fpu: Calculate the default sizes independently x86/fpu/amx: Define AMX state components and have it used for boot-time checks x86/fpu/xstate: Prepare XSAVE feature table for gaps in state component numbers x86/fpu/xstate: Add fpstate_realloc()/free() x86/fpu/xstate: Add XFD #NM handler x86/fpu: Update XFD state where required x86/fpu: Add sanity checks for XFD x86/fpu: Add XFD state to fpstate x86/msr-index: Add MSRs for XFD x86/cpufeatures: Add eXtended Feature Disabling (XFD) feature bit x86/fpu: Reset permission and fpstate on exec() x86/fpu: Prepare fpu_clone() for dynamically enabled features x86/fpu/signal: Prepare for variable sigframe length x86/signal: Use fpu::__state_user_size for sigalt stack validation ...
2021-10-21x86/CPU: Add support for Vortex CPUsMarcos Del Sol Vives
DM&P devices were not being properly identified, which resulted in unneeded Spectre/Meltdown mitigations being applied. The manufacturer states that these devices execute always in-order and don't support either speculative execution or branch prediction, so they are not vulnerable to this class of attack. [1] This is something I've personally tested by a simple timing analysis on my Vortex86MX CPU, and can confirm it is true. Add identification for some devices that lack the CPUID product name call, so they appear properly on /proc/cpuinfo. ¹https://www.ssv-embedded.de/doks/infos/DMP_Ann_180108_Meltdown.pdf [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Marcos Del Sol Vives <marcos@orca.pet> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211017094408.1512158-1-marcos@orca.pet
2021-10-21x86/process: Move arch_thread_struct_whitelist() out of lineThomas Gleixner
In preparation for dynamically enabled FPU features move the function out of line as the goal is to expose less and not more information. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211013145322.869001791@linutronix.de