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Byte cycle measurement and word cycle measurement of scalar misaligned
access are very similar. Split these parts out into a common
measure_cycles() function to avoid duplication.
This function will also be reused for vector misaligned access probe in a
follow-up commit.
Signed-off-by: Nam Cao <namcao@linutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/50d0598e45acc56c95176e52fbbe56e1f4becc84.1770830596.git.namcao@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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check_unaligned_access_speed_all_cpus() is more complicated than it should
be:
- It uses on_each_cpu() to probe unaligned memory access on all CPUs but
excludes CPU0 with a check in the callback function. So an IPI to CPU0
is wasted.
- Probing on CPU0 is done with smp_call_on_cpu(), which is not as fast as
on_each_cpu().
The reason for this design is because the probe is timed with jiffies.
Therefore on_each_cpu() excludes CPU0 because that CPU needs to tend to
jiffies.
Instead, replace jiffies usage with ktime_get_mono_fast_ns(). With jiffies
out of the way, on_each_cpu() can be used for all CPUs and
smp_call_on_cpu() can be dropped.
To make ktime_get_mono_fast_ns() usable, move this probe to late_initcall.
Anything after clocksource's fs_initcall works, but avoid depending on
clocksource staying at fs_initcall.
The choice of probe time is now 8000000 ns, which is the same as before (2
jiffies) for riscv defconfig. This is excessive for the CPUs I have, and
probably should be reduced; but that's a different discussion.
Suggested-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Nam Cao <namcao@linutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/9b9a20affe2e4f5c380926ceb885a47e20a59395.1770830596.git.namcao@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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The vdso_cfi build process copies source files (*.c, *.S) from the main
vdso directory to the build directory. Without a .gitignore file, these
copied files appear as untracked files in git status, cluttering the
working directory.
Add a .gitignore file to exclude:
- Copied source files (*.c, *.S)
- Temporary build files (vdso.lds, *.tmp, vdso-syms.S)
- While preserving vdso-cfi.S which is the original entry point
This follows the same pattern used in the main vdso directory
and keeps the working directory clean.
Signed-off-by: Chen Pei <cp0613@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260320021850.1877-3-cp0613@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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When building VDSO with CFI support, source files are copied from the main
VDSO directory to the CFI build directory as part of the build process.
However, these copied source files were not removed during 'make clean',
leaving temporary files in the build directory.
Add the clean-files variable to ensure that these copied .c and .S files
are properly cleaned up. The notdir() function is used to strip the path
prefix, as clean-files expects relative file names without directory
components.
This ensures the build directory is left in a clean state after make clean.
Signed-off-by: Chen Pei <cp0613@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260320021850.1877-2-cp0613@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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ACPI 6.6 is required for RISC-V as it introduces RISC-V specific
tables such as RHCT (RISC-V Hart Capabilities Table) and
RIMT (RISC-V I/O Mapping Table).
Update the FADT revision check from 6.5 to 6.6 and remove
the TODO comment since ACPI 6.6 has been officially released.
Signed-off-by: Yufeng Wang <wangyufeng@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@oss.qualcomm.com>
Acked-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Yao Zi <me@ziyao.cc>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260305091433.83983-1-r4o5m6e8o@163.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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Add support for handling hardware error traps (exception code 19)
in the RISC-V architecture. The changes include:
- Add do_trap_hardware_error function declaration in asm-prototypes.h
- Add hardware error trap vector entry in entry.S exception vector table
- Implement do_trap_hardware_error handler in traps.c that generates
SIGBUS with BUS_MCEERR_AR for hardware errors
This enables proper handling of hardware error exceptions that may occur
in RISC-V systems, providing appropriate error reporting and signal
generation for user space processes.
Signed-off-by: Rui Qi <qirui.001@bytedance.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260202094200.53735-1-qirui.001@bytedance.com
[pjw@kernel.org: clean up commit message slightly]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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The cpu-hotplug.c only is built when CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU is defined,
it is not needed to check HOTPLUG_CPU in this file.
Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260304033403.238012-2-hui.wang@canonical.com
[pjw@kernel.org: removed extra whitespace at EOF]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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The following options are required by the kdump crash utility for RISC-V
based vmcore file:
- kaslr: If the vmcore is generated from a KASLR-enabled Linux kernel,
the KASLR offset is required for the crash utility to load
the vmcore. Without the proper kaslr option, the crash utility
fails to load the vmcore file.
- satp: The exact root page table address helps determine the correct base
PGD address.
With this patch, RISC-V VMCOREINFO ELF notes now include both kaslr
and satp information.
Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austin.kim@lge.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aYwKUE3ZzN7/ZY/A@adminpc-PowerEdge-R7525
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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local_flush_icache_all() only flushes and synchronizes the *instruction*
cache, not the data cache. Since RISC-V does have a cbo.flush
instruction for data cache flush, clarify the comment to avoid
confusion.
Fixes: 58661a30f1bc ("riscv: Flush the instruction cache during SMP bringup")
Signed-off-by: Vivian Wang <wangruikang@iscas.ac.cn>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260204-riscv-smp-comment-update-2026-01-v1-2-8b77aa181530@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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Commit f1a0a376ca0c ("sched/core: Initialize the idle task with
preemption disabled") removed a call to preempt_disable(), but not the
associated comment. Remove the outdated comment.
Fixes: f1a0a376ca0c ("sched/core: Initialize the idle task with preemption disabled")
Signed-off-by: Vivian Wang <wangruikang@iscas.ac.cn>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260204-riscv-smp-comment-update-2026-01-v1-1-8b77aa181530@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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Fix various typos in RISC-V architecture code and comments.
The following changes are included:
- arch/riscv/errata/thead/errata.c: "futher" → "further"
- arch/riscv/include/asm/atomic.h: "therefor" → "therefore", "arithmatic" → "arithmetic"
- arch/riscv/include/asm/elf.h: "availiable" → "available", "coorespends" → "corresponds"
- arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h: "requries" → "is required"
- arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h: "returing" → "returning"
- arch/riscv/kernel/acpi.c: "compliancy" → "compliance"
- arch/riscv/kernel/ftrace.c: "therefor" → "therefore"
- arch/riscv/kernel/head.S: "intruction" → "instruction"
- arch/riscv/kernel/mcount-dyn.S: "localtion → "location"
- arch/riscv/kernel/module-sections.c: "maxinum" → "maximum"
- arch/riscv/kernel/probes/kprobes.c: "reenabled" → "re-enabled"
- arch/riscv/kernel/probes/uprobes.c: "probbed" → "probed"
- arch/riscv/kernel/soc.c: "extremly" → "extremely"
- arch/riscv/kernel/suspend.c: "incosistent" → "inconsistent"
- arch/riscv/kvm/tlb.c: "cahce" → "cache"
- arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_pmu.c: "indicies" → "indices"
- arch/riscv/lib/csum.c: "implmentations" → "implementations"
- arch/riscv/lib/memmove.S: "ammount" → "amount"
- arch/riscv/mm/cacheflush.c: "visable" → "visible"
- arch/riscv/mm/physaddr.c: "aginst" → "against"
Signed-off-by: Sean Chang <seanwascoding@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260212163325.60389-1-seanwascoding@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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Per Linus' comments requesting the replacement of "INDIR_BR_LP" in the
indirect branch tracking prctl()s with something more readable, and
suggesting the use of the speculation control prctl()s as an exemplar,
reimplement the prctl()s and related constants that control per-task
forward-edge control flow integrity.
This primarily involves two changes. First, the prctls are
restructured to resemble the style of the speculative execution
workaround control prctls PR_{GET,SET}_SPECULATION_CTRL, to make them
easier to extend in the future. Second, the "indir_br_lp" abbrevation
is expanded to "branch_landing_pads" to be less telegraphic. The
kselftest and documentation is adjusted accordingly.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/CAHk-=whhSLGZAx3N5jJpb4GLFDqH_QvS07D+6BnkPWmCEzTAgw@mail.gmail.com/
Cc: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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Similar to the recent change to expand "LP" to "branch landing pad",
let's expand "SS" in the ptrace uapi macros to "shadow stack" as well.
This aligns with the existing prctl() arguments, which use the
expanded "shadow stack" names, rather than just the abbreviation.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/CAHk-=whhSLGZAx3N5jJpb4GLFDqH_QvS07D+6BnkPWmCEzTAgw@mail.gmail.com/
Cc: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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Per Linus' comments about the unreadability of abbreviations such as
"indir_br_lp", rename the three prctl() implementation functions to be more
explicit. This involves renaming "indir_br_lp_status" in the function
names to "branch_landing_pad_state".
While here, add _prctl_ into the function names, following the
speculation control prctl implementation functions.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/CAHk-=whhSLGZAx3N5jJpb4GLFDqH_QvS07D+6BnkPWmCEzTAgw@mail.gmail.com/
Cc: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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Per Linus' comments about the unreadability of abbreviations such as
"LP", rename the RISC-V ptrace landing pad CFI macro names to be more
explicit. This primarily involves expanding "LP" in the names to some
variant of "branch landing pad."
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/CAHk-=whhSLGZAx3N5jJpb4GLFDqH_QvS07D+6BnkPWmCEzTAgw@mail.gmail.com/
Cc: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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When libc locks the CFI status through the following prctl:
- PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS
- PR_LOCK_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS
A newly execd address space will inherit the lock status
if it does not clear the lock bits. Since the lock bits
remain set, libc will later fail to enable the landing
pad and shadow stack.
Signed-off-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260323065640.4045713-1-zong.li@sifive.com
[pjw@kernel.org: ensure we unlock before changing state; cleaned up subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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A CFI-related macro defined in arch/riscv/uapi/asm/ptrace.h misspells
"PTRACE" as "PRACE"; fix this.
Fixes: 2af7c9cf021c ("riscv/ptrace: expose riscv CFI status and state via ptrace and in core files")
Cc: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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In set_tagged_addr_ctrl(), when PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE is not set, pmlen
is correctly set to 0, but it forgets to reset pmm. This results in the
CPU pmm state not corresponding to the software pmlen state.
Fix this by resetting pmm along with pmlen.
Fixes: 2e1743085887 ("riscv: Add support for the tagged address ABI")
Signed-off-by: Zishun Yi <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260322160022.21908-1-vulab@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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Similarly to commit 8d09e2d569f6 ("arm64: patching: avoid early
page_to_phys()"), avoid using phys_to_page() for the kernel address case
in patch_map().
Since this is called from apply_boot_alternatives() in setup_arch(), and
commit 4267739cabb8 ("arch, mm: consolidate initialization of SPARSE
memory model") has moved sparse_init() to after setup_arch(),
phys_to_page() is not available there yet, and it panics on boot with
SPARSEMEM on RV32, which does not use SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP.
Reported-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260223144108-dcace0b9-02e8-4b67-a7ce-f263bed36f26@linutronix.de/
Fixes: 4267739cabb8 ("arch, mm: consolidate initialization of SPARSE memory model")
Suggested-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vivian Wang <wangruikang@iscas.ac.cn>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260310-riscv-sparsemem-alternatives-fix-v1-1-659d5dd257e2@iscas.ac.cn
[pjw@kernel.org: fix the subject line to align with the patch description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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Fix several bugs in the RISC-V kgdb implementation:
- The element of dbg_reg_def[] that is supposed to pertain to the S1
register embeds instead the struct pt_regs offset of the A1
register. Fix this to use the S1 register offset in struct pt_regs.
- The sleeping_thread_to_gdb_regs() function copies the value of the
S10 register into the gdb_regs[] array element meant for the S9
register, and copies the value of the S11 register into the array
element meant for the S10 register. It also neglects to copy the
value of the S11 register. Fix all of these issues.
Fixes: fe89bd2be8667 ("riscv: Add KGDB support")
Cc: Vincent Chen <vincent.chen@sifive.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/fde376f8-bcfd-bfe4-e467-07d8f7608d05@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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Previously different architectures were using random sources of
differing strength and cost to decide the random kstack offset. A number
of architectures (loongarch, powerpc, s390, x86) were using their
timestamp counter, at whatever the frequency happened to be. Other
arches (arm64, riscv) were using entropy from the crng via
get_random_u16().
There have been concerns that in some cases the timestamp counters may
be too weak, because they can be easily guessed or influenced by user
space. And get_random_u16() has been shown to be too costly for the
level of protection kstack offset randomization provides.
So let's use a common, architecture-agnostic source of entropy; a
per-cpu prng, seeded at boot-time from the crng. This has a few
benefits:
- We can remove choose_random_kstack_offset(); That was only there to
try to make the timestamp counter value a bit harder to influence
from user space [*].
- The architecture code is simplified. All it has to do now is call
add_random_kstack_offset() in the syscall path.
- The strength of the randomness can be reasoned about independently
of the architecture.
- Arches previously using get_random_u16() now have much faster
syscall paths, see below results.
[*] Additionally, this gets rid of some redundant work on s390 and x86.
Before this patch, those architectures called
choose_random_kstack_offset() under arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(),
which is also called for exception returns to userspace which were *not*
syscalls (e.g. regular interrupts). Getting rid of
choose_random_kstack_offset() avoids a small amount of redundant work
for the non-syscall cases.
In some configurations, add_random_kstack_offset() will now call
instrumentable code, so for a couple of arches, I have moved the call a
bit later to the first point where instrumentation is allowed. This
doesn't impact the efficacy of the mechanism.
There have been some claims that a prng may be less strong than the
timestamp counter if not regularly reseeded. But the prng has a period
of about 2^113. So as long as the prng state remains secret, it should
not be possible to guess. If the prng state can be accessed, we have
bigger problems.
Additionally, we are only consuming 6 bits to randomize the stack, so
there are only 64 possible random offsets. I assert that it would be
trivial for an attacker to brute force by repeating their attack and
waiting for the random stack offset to be the desired one. The prng
approach seems entirely proportional to this level of protection.
Performance data are provided below. The baseline is v6.18 with rndstack
on for each respective arch. (I)/(R) indicate statistically significant
improvement/regression. arm64 platform is AWS Graviton3 (m7g.metal).
x86_64 platform is AWS Sapphire Rapids (m7i.24xlarge):
+-----------------+--------------+---------------+---------------+
| Benchmark | Result Class | per-cpu-prng | per-cpu-prng |
| | | arm64 (metal) | x86_64 (VM) |
+=================+==============+===============+===============+
| syscall/getpid | mean (ns) | (I) -9.50% | (I) -17.65% |
| | p99 (ns) | (I) -59.24% | (I) -24.41% |
| | p99.9 (ns) | (I) -59.52% | (I) -28.52% |
+-----------------+--------------+---------------+---------------+
| syscall/getppid | mean (ns) | (I) -9.52% | (I) -19.24% |
| | p99 (ns) | (I) -59.25% | (I) -25.03% |
| | p99.9 (ns) | (I) -59.50% | (I) -28.17% |
+-----------------+--------------+---------------+---------------+
| syscall/invalid | mean (ns) | (I) -10.31% | (I) -18.56% |
| | p99 (ns) | (I) -60.79% | (I) -20.06% |
| | p99.9 (ns) | (I) -61.04% | (I) -25.04% |
+-----------------+--------------+---------------+---------------+
I tested an earlier version of this change on x86 bare metal and it
showed a smaller but still significant improvement. The bare metal
system wasn't available this time around so testing was done in a VM
instance. I'm guessing the cost of rdtsc is higher for VMs.
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303150840.3789438-3-ryan.roberts@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
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Commit 3e86e4d74c04 ("kbuild: keep .modinfo section in
vmlinux.unstripped") added .modinfo to ELF_DETAILS while removing it
from COMMON_DISCARDS, as it was needed in vmlinux.unstripped and
ELF_DETAILS was present in all architecture specific vmlinux linker
scripts. While this shuffle is fine for vmlinux, ELF_DETAILS and
COMMON_DISCARDS may be used by other linker scripts, such as the s390
and x86 compressed boot images, which may not expect to have a .modinfo
section. In certain circumstances, this could result in a bootloader
failing to load the compressed kernel [1].
Commit ddc6cbef3ef1 ("s390/boot/vmlinux.lds.S: Ensure bzImage ends with
SecureBoot trailer") recently addressed this for the s390 bzImage but
the same bug remains for arm, parisc, and x86. The presence of .modinfo
in the x86 bzImage was the root cause of the issue worked around with
commit d50f21091358 ("kbuild: align modinfo section for Secureboot
Authenticode EDK2 compat"). misc.c in arch/x86/boot/compressed includes
lib/decompress_unzstd.c, which in turn includes lib/xxhash.c and its
MODULE_LICENSE / MODULE_DESCRIPTION macros due to the STATIC definition.
Split .modinfo out from ELF_DETAILS into its own macro and handle it in
all vmlinux linker scripts. Discard .modinfo in the places where it was
previously being discarded from being in COMMON_DISCARDS, as it has
never been necessary in those uses.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3e86e4d74c04 ("kbuild: keep .modinfo section in vmlinux.unstripped")
Reported-by: Ed W <lists@wildgooses.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/587f25e0-a80e-46a5-9f01-87cb40cfa377@wildgooses.com/ [1]
Tested-by: Ed W <lists@wildgooses.com> # x86_64
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260225-separate-modinfo-from-elf-details-v1-1-387ced6baf4b@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
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Conversion performed via this Coccinelle script:
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
// Options: --include-headers-for-types --all-includes --include-headers --keep-comments
virtual patch
@gfp depends on patch && !(file in "tools") && !(file in "samples")@
identifier ALLOC = {kmalloc_obj,kmalloc_objs,kmalloc_flex,
kzalloc_obj,kzalloc_objs,kzalloc_flex,
kvmalloc_obj,kvmalloc_objs,kvmalloc_flex,
kvzalloc_obj,kvzalloc_objs,kvzalloc_flex};
@@
ALLOC(...
- , GFP_KERNEL
)
$ make coccicheck MODE=patch COCCI=gfp.cocci
Build and boot tested x86_64 with Fedora 42's GCC and Clang:
Linux version 6.19.0+ (user@host) (gcc (GCC) 15.2.1 20260123 (Red Hat 15.2.1-7), GNU ld version 2.44-12.fc42) #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC 1970-01-01
Linux version 6.19.0+ (user@host) (clang version 20.1.8 (Fedora 20.1.8-4.fc42), LLD 20.1.8) #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC 1970-01-01
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This converts some of the visually simpler cases that have been split
over multiple lines. I only did the ones that are easy to verify the
resulting diff by having just that final GFP_KERNEL argument on the next
line.
Somebody should probably do a proper coccinelle script for this, but for
me the trivial script actually resulted in an assertion failure in the
middle of the script. I probably had made it a bit _too_ trivial.
So after fighting that far a while I decided to just do some of the
syntactically simpler cases with variations of the previous 'sed'
scripts.
The more syntactically complex multi-line cases would mostly really want
whitespace cleanup anyway.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This is the exact same thing as the 'alloc_obj()' version, only much
smaller because there are a lot fewer users of the *alloc_flex()
interface.
As with alloc_obj() version, this was done entirely with mindless brute
force, using the same script, except using 'flex' in the pattern rather
than 'objs*'.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This was done entirely with mindless brute force, using
git grep -l '\<k[vmz]*alloc_objs*(.*, GFP_KERNEL)' |
xargs sed -i 's/\(alloc_objs*(.*\), GFP_KERNEL)/\1)/'
to convert the new alloc_obj() users that had a simple GFP_KERNEL
argument to just drop that argument.
Note that due to the extreme simplicity of the scripting, any slightly
more complex cases spread over multiple lines would not be triggered:
they definitely exist, but this covers the vast bulk of the cases, and
the resulting diff is also then easier to check automatically.
For the same reason the 'flex' versions will be done as a separate
conversion.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This is the result of running the Coccinelle script from
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci. The script is designed to
avoid scalar types (which need careful case-by-case checking), and
instead replace kmalloc-family calls that allocate struct or union
object instances:
Single allocations: kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with: kmalloc_obj(TYPE, ...)
Array allocations: kmalloc_array(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with: kmalloc_objs(TYPE, COUNT, ...)
Flex array allocations: kmalloc(struct_size(PTR, FAM, COUNT), ...)
are replaced with: kmalloc_flex(*PTR, FAM, COUNT, ...)
(where TYPE may also be *VAR)
The resulting allocations no longer return "void *", instead returning
"TYPE *".
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux
Pull RISC-V updates from Paul Walmsley:
- Add support for control flow integrity for userspace processes.
This is based on the standard RISC-V ISA extensions Zicfiss and
Zicfilp
- Improve ptrace behavior regarding vector registers, and add some
selftests
- Optimize our strlen() assembly
- Enable the ISO-8859-1 code page as built-in, similar to ARM64, for
EFI volume mounting
- Clean up some code slightly, including defining copy_user_page() as
copy_page() rather than memcpy(), aligning us with other
architectures; and using max3() to slightly simplify an expression
in riscv_iommu_init_check()
* tag 'riscv-for-linus-7.0-mw1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux: (42 commits)
riscv: lib: optimize strlen loop efficiency
selftests: riscv: vstate_exec_nolibc: Use the regular prctl() function
selftests: riscv: verify ptrace accepts valid vector csr values
selftests: riscv: verify ptrace rejects invalid vector csr inputs
selftests: riscv: verify syscalls discard vector context
selftests: riscv: verify initial vector state with ptrace
selftests: riscv: test ptrace vector interface
riscv: ptrace: validate input vector csr registers
riscv: csr: define vtype register elements
riscv: vector: init vector context with proper vlenb
riscv: ptrace: return ENODATA for inactive vector extension
kselftest/riscv: add kselftest for user mode CFI
riscv: add documentation for shadow stack
riscv: add documentation for landing pad / indirect branch tracking
riscv: create a Kconfig fragment for shadow stack and landing pad support
arch/riscv: add dual vdso creation logic and select vdso based on hw
arch/riscv: compile vdso with landing pad and shadow stack note
riscv: enable kernel access to shadow stack memory via the FWFT SBI call
riscv: add kernel command line option to opt out of user CFI
riscv/hwprobe: add zicfilp / zicfiss enumeration in hwprobe
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 paravirt updates from Borislav Petkov:
- A nice cleanup to the paravirt code containing a unification of the
paravirt clock interface, taming the include hell by splitting the
pv_ops structure and removing of a bunch of obsolete code (Juergen
Gross)
* tag 'x86_paravirt_for_v7.0_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (23 commits)
x86/paravirt: Use XOR r32,r32 to clear register in pv_vcpu_is_preempted()
x86/paravirt: Remove trailing semicolons from alternative asm templates
x86/pvlocks: Move paravirt spinlock functions into own header
x86/paravirt: Specify pv_ops array in paravirt macros
x86/paravirt: Allow pv-calls outside paravirt.h
objtool: Allow multiple pv_ops arrays
x86/xen: Drop xen_mmu_ops
x86/xen: Drop xen_cpu_ops
x86/xen: Drop xen_irq_ops
x86/paravirt: Move pv_native_*() prototypes to paravirt.c
x86/paravirt: Introduce new paravirt-base.h header
x86/paravirt: Move paravirt_sched_clock() related code into tsc.c
x86/paravirt: Use common code for paravirt_steal_clock()
riscv/paravirt: Use common code for paravirt_steal_clock()
loongarch/paravirt: Use common code for paravirt_steal_clock()
arm64/paravirt: Use common code for paravirt_steal_clock()
arm/paravirt: Use common code for paravirt_steal_clock()
sched: Move clock related paravirt code to kernel/sched
paravirt: Remove asm/paravirt_api_clock.h
x86/paravirt: Move thunk macros to paravirt_types.h
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull performance event updates from Ingo Molnar:
"x86 PMU driver updates:
- Add support for the core PMU for Intel Diamond Rapids (DMR) CPUs
(Dapeng Mi)
Compared to previous iterations of the Intel PMU code, there's been
a lot of changes, which center around three main areas:
- Introduce the OFF-MODULE RESPONSE (OMR) facility to replace the
Off-Core Response (OCR) facility
- New PEBS data source encoding layout
- Support the new "RDPMC user disable" feature
- Likewise, a large series adds uncore PMU support for Intel Diamond
Rapids (DMR) CPUs (Zide Chen)
This centers around these four main areas:
- DMR may have two Integrated I/O and Memory Hub (IMH) dies,
separate from the compute tile (CBB) dies. Each CBB and each IMH
die has its own discovery domain.
- Unlike prior CPUs that retrieve the global discovery table
portal exclusively via PCI or MSR, DMR uses PCI for IMH PMON
discovery and MSR for CBB PMON discovery.
- DMR introduces several new PMON types: SCA, HAMVF, D2D_ULA, UBR,
PCIE4, CRS, CPC, ITC, OTC, CMS, and PCIE6.
- IIO free-running counters in DMR are MMIO-based, unlike SPR.
- Also add support for Add missing PMON units for Intel Panther Lake,
and support Nova Lake (NVL), which largely maps to Panther Lake.
(Zide Chen)
- KVM integration: Add support for mediated vPMUs (by Kan Liang and
Sean Christopherson, with fixes and cleanups by Peter Zijlstra,
Sandipan Das and Mingwei Zhang)
- Add Intel cstate driver to support for Wildcat Lake (WCL) CPUs,
which are a low-power variant of Panther Lake (Zide Chen)
- Add core, cstate and MSR PMU support for the Airmont NP Intel CPU
(aka MaxLinear Lightning Mountain), which maps to the existing
Airmont code (Martin Schiller)
Performance enhancements:
- Speed up kexec shutdown by avoiding unnecessary cross CPU calls
(Jan H. Schönherr)
- Fix slow perf_event_task_exit() with LBR callstacks (Namhyung Kim)
User-space stack unwinding support:
- Various cleanups and refactorings in preparation to generalize the
unwinding code for other architectures (Jens Remus)
Uprobes updates:
- Transition from kmap_atomic to kmap_local_page (Keke Ming)
- Fix incorrect lockdep condition in filter_chain() (Breno Leitao)
- Fix XOL allocation failure for 32-bit tasks (Oleg Nesterov)
Misc fixes and cleanups:
- s390: Remove kvm_types.h from Kbuild (Randy Dunlap)
- x86/intel/uncore: Convert comma to semicolon (Chen Ni)
- x86/uncore: Clean up const mismatch (Greg Kroah-Hartman)
- x86/ibs: Fix typo in dc_l2tlb_miss comment (Xiang-Bin Shi)"
* tag 'perf-core-2026-02-09' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (58 commits)
s390: remove kvm_types.h from Kbuild
uprobes: Fix incorrect lockdep condition in filter_chain()
x86/ibs: Fix typo in dc_l2tlb_miss comment
x86/uprobes: Fix XOL allocation failure for 32-bit tasks
perf/x86/intel/uncore: Convert comma to semicolon
perf/x86/intel: Add support for rdpmc user disable feature
perf/x86: Use macros to replace magic numbers in attr_rdpmc
perf/x86/intel: Add core PMU support for Novalake
perf/x86/intel: Add support for PEBS memory auxiliary info field in NVL
perf/x86/intel: Add core PMU support for DMR
perf/x86/intel: Add support for PEBS memory auxiliary info field in DMR
perf/x86/intel: Support the 4 new OMR MSRs introduced in DMR and NVL
perf/core: Fix slow perf_event_task_exit() with LBR callstacks
perf/core: Speed up kexec shutdown by avoiding unnecessary cross CPU calls
uprobes: use kmap_local_page() for temporary page mappings
arm/uprobes: use kmap_local_page() in arch_uprobe_copy_ixol()
mips/uprobes: use kmap_local_page() in arch_uprobe_copy_ixol()
arm64/uprobes: use kmap_local_page() in arch_uprobe_copy_ixol()
riscv/uprobes: use kmap_local_page() in arch_uprobe_copy_ixol()
perf/x86/intel/uncore: Add Nova Lake support
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi
Pull EFI updates from Ard Biesheuvel:
- Quirk the broken EFI framebuffer geometry on the Valve Steam Deck
- Capture the EDID information of the primary display also on non-x86
EFI systems when booting via the EFI stub.
* tag 'efi-next-for-v7.0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi:
efi: Support EDID information
sysfb: Move edid_info into sysfb_primary_display
sysfb: Pass sysfb_primary_display to devices
sysfb: Replace screen_info with sysfb_primary_display
sysfb: Add struct sysfb_display_info
efi: sysfb_efi: Reduce number of references to global screen_info
efi: earlycon: Reduce number of references to global screen_info
efi: sysfb_efi: Fix efidrmfb and simpledrmfb on Valve Steam Deck
efi: sysfb_efi: Convert swap width and height quirk to a callback
efi: sysfb_efi: Fix lfb_linelength calculation when applying quirks
efi: sysfb_efi: Replace open coded swap with the macro
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Add strict validation for vector csr registers when setting them via
ptrace:
- reject attempts to set reserved bits or invalid field combinations
- enforce strict VL checks against calculated VLMAX values
Vector specs 0.7.1 and 1.0 allow normal applications to set candidate
VL values and read back the hardware-adjusted results, see section 6
for details. Disallow such flexibility in vector ptrace operations
and strictly enforce valid VL input.
The traced process may not update its saved vector context if no vector
instructions execute between breakpoints. So the purpose of the strict
ptrace approach is to make sure that debuggers maintain an accurate view
of the tracee's vector context across multiple halt/resume debug cycles.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Matyukevich <geomatsi@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Chiu <andybnac@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andy Chiu <andybnac@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251214163537.1054292-5-geomatsi@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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The vstate in thread_struct is zeroed when the vector context is
initialized. That includes read-only register vlenb, which holds
the vector register length in bytes. Zeroed state persists until
mstatus.VS becomes 'dirty' and a context switch saves the actual
hardware values.
This can expose the zero vlenb value to the user-space in early
debug scenarios, e.g. when ptrace attaches to a traced process
early, before any vector instruction except the first one was
executed.
Fix this by specifying proper vlenb on vector context init.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Matyukevich <geomatsi@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Chiu <andybnac@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andy Chiu <andybnac@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251214163537.1054292-3-geomatsi@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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Currently, ptrace returns EINVAL when the vector extension is supported
but not yet activated for the traced process. This error code is not
always appropriate since the ptrace arguments may be valid.
Debug tools like gdbserver expect ENODATA when the requested register
set is not active, e.g. see [1]. This expectation seems to be more
appropriate, so modify the vector ptrace implementation to return:
- EINVAL when V extension is not supported
- ENODATA when V extension is supported but not active
[1] https://github.com/bminor/binutils-gdb/blob/637f25e88675fa47e47f9cc5e2cf37384836b8a2/gdbserver/linux-low.cc#L5020
Signed-off-by: Ilya Mamay <mmamayka01@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergey Matyukevich <geomatsi@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Chiu <andybnac@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andy Chiu <andybnac@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251214163537.1054292-2-geomatsi@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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Shadow stack instructions are taken from the Zimop ISA extension,
which is mandated on RVA23. Any userspace with shadow stack
instructions in it will fault on hardware that doesn't have support
for Zimop. Thus, a shadow stack-enabled userspace can't be run on
hardware that doesn't support Zimop.
It's not known how Linux userspace providers will respond to this kind
of binary fragmentation. In order to keep kernel portable across
different hardware, 'arch/riscv/kernel/vdso_cfi' is created which has
Makefile logic to compile 'arch/riscv/kernel/vdso' sources with CFI
flags, and 'arch/riscv/kernel/vdso.c' is modified to select the
appropriate vdso depending on whether the underlying CPU implements
the Zimop extension. Since the offset of vdso symbols will change due
to having two different vdso binaries, there is added logic to include
a new generated vdso offset header and dynamically select the offset
(like for rt_sigreturn).
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Acked-by: Charles Mirabile <cmirabil@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de> # QEMU, custom CVA6
Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-24-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com
[pjw@kernel.org: cleaned up patch description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
|
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User mode tasks compiled with Zicfilp may call indirectly into the
vdso (like hwprobe indirect calls). Add support for compiling landing
pads into the vdso. Landing pad instructions in the vdso will be
no-ops for tasks which have not enabled landing pads. Furthermore, add
support for the C sources of the vdso to be compiled with shadow stack
and landing pads enabled as well.
Landing pad and shadow stack instructions are emitted only when the
VDSO_CFI cflags option is defined during compile.
Signed-off-by: Jim Shu <jim.shu@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de> # QEMU, custom CVA6
Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-23-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com
[pjw@kernel.org: cleaned up patch description, issues reported by checkpatch]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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The kernel has to perform shadow stack operations on the user shadow stack.
During signal delivery and sigreturn, the shadow stack token must be
created and validated respectively. Thus shadow stack access for the kernel
must be enabled.
In the future, when kernel shadow stacks are enabled, they must be
enabled as early as possible for better coverage and to prevent any
imbalance between the regular stack and the shadow stack. After
'relocate_enable_mmu' has completed, this is the earliest that it can
be enabled.
Reviewed-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de> # QEMU, custom CVA6
Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-22-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com
[pjw@kernel.org: updated to apply; cleaned up commit message]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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Add a kernel command line option to disable part or all
of user CFI. User backward CFI and forward CFI can be controlled
independently. The kernel command line parameter "riscv_nousercfi" can
take the following values:
- "all" : Disable forward and backward cfi both
- "bcfi" : Disable backward cfi
- "fcfi" : Disable forward cfi
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de> # QEMU, custom CVA6
Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-21-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com
[pjw@kernel.org: fixed warnings from checkpatch; cleaned up patch description, doc, printk text]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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Add enumeration of the zicfilp and zicfiss extensions in the hwprobe syscall.
Reviewed-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de> # QEMU, custom CVA6
Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-20-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com
[pjw@kernel.org: updated to apply; extend into RISCV_HWPROBE_KEY_IMA_EXT_1; clean patch description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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We've run out of bits to describe RISC-V ISA extensions in our initial
hwprobe key, RISCV_HWPROBE_KEY_IMA_EXT_0. So, let's add
RISCV_HWPROBE_KEY_IMA_EXT_1, along with the framework to set the
appropriate hwprobe tuple, and add testing for it.
Based on a suggestion from Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@oss.qualcomm.com>,
also fix the documentation for RISCV_HWPROBE_KEY_IMA_EXT_0.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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Expose a new register type NT_RISCV_USER_CFI for risc-v CFI status and
state. Intentionally, both landing pad and shadow stack status and
state are rolled into the CFI state. Creating two different
NT_RISCV_USER_XXX would not be useful and would waste a note
type. Enabling, disabling and locking the CFI feature is not allowed
via ptrace set interface. However, setting 'elp' state or setting
shadow stack pointer are allowed via the ptrace set interface. It is
expected that 'gdb' might need to fixup 'elp' state or 'shadow stack'
pointer.
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de> # QEMU, custom CVA6
Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-19-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com
[pjw@kernel.org: updated to apply; cleaned patch description and comments; addressed checkpatch issues]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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Update __show_regs() to print the captured shadow stack pointer. On
tasks where shadow stack is disabled, simply print 0.
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de> # QEMU, custom CVA6
Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-18-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com
[pjw@kernel.org: cleaned up patch description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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Save the shadow stack pointer in the sigcontext structure when
delivering a signal. Restore the shadow stack pointer from sigcontext
on sigreturn.
As part of the save operation, the kernel uses the 'ssamoswap'
instruction to save a snapshot of the current shadow stack on the
shadow stack itself (this can be called a "save token"). During
restore on sigreturn, the kernel retrieves the save token from the top
of the shadow stack and validates it. This ensures that user mode
can't arbitrarily pivot to any shadow stack address without having a
token and thus provides a strong security assurance during the window
between signal delivery and sigreturn.
Use an ABI-compatible way of saving/restoring the shadow stack pointer
into the signal stack. This follows the vector extension, where extra
registers are placed in a form of extension header + extension body in
the stack. The extension header indicates the size of the extra
architectural states plus the size of header itself, and a magic
identifier for the extension. Then, the extension body contains the
new architectural states in the form defined by uapi.
Signed-off-by: Andy Chiu <andy.chiu@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de>
Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-17-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com
[pjw@kernel.org: cleaned patch description, code comments; resolved checkpatch warning]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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The Zicfiss and Zicfilp extensions introduce a new exception, the
'software check exception', in the privileged ISA, with cause code =
18. This patch implements support for software check exceptions.
Additionally, the patch implements a CFI violation handler which
checks the code in the xtval register. If xtval=2, the software check
exception happened because of an indirect branch that didn't land on a
4 byte aligned PC or on a 'lpad' instruction, or the label value
embedded in 'lpad' didn't match the label value set in the x7
register. If xtval=3, the software check exception happened due to a
mismatch between the link register (x1 or x5) and the top of shadow
stack (on execution of `sspopchk`).
In case of a CFI violation, SIGSEGV is raised with code=SEGV_CPERR.
SEGV_CPERR was introduced by the x86 shadow stack patches.
To keep uprobes working, handle the uprobe event first before
reporting the CFI violation in the software check exception
handler. This is because, when the landing pad is activated, if the
uprobe point is set at the lpad instruction at the beginning of a
function, the system triggers a software check exception instead of an
ebreak exception due to the exception priority. This would prevent
uprobe from working.
Reviewed-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com>
Co-developed-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de> # QEMU, custom CVA6
Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-15-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com
[pjw@kernel.org: cleaned up the patch description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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This patch adds a RISC-V implementation of the following prctls:
PR_SET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS, PR_GET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS and
PR_LOCK_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS.
Reviewed-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de>
Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-14-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com
[pjw@kernel.org: clean up patch description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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Implement an architecture-agnostic prctl() interface for setting and
getting shadow stack status. The prctls implemented are
PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS, PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS and
PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS.
As part of PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS/PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS, only
PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE is implemented because RISCV allows each mode to
write to their own shadow stack using 'sspush' or 'ssamoswap'.
PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS locks the current shadow stack enablement
configuration.
Reviewed-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de> # QEMU, custom CVA6
Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-12-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com
[pjw@kernel.org: cleaned up patch description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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Userspace specifies CLONE_VM to share address space and spawn new
thread. 'clone' allows userspace to specify a new stack for a new
thread. However there is no way to specify a new shadow stack base
address without changing the API. This patch allocates a new shadow
stack whenever CLONE_VM is given.
In case of CLONE_VFORK, the parent is suspended until the child
finishes; thus the child can use the parent's shadow stack. In case of
!CLONE_VM, COW kicks in because entire address space is copied from
parent to child.
'clone3' is extensible and can provide mechanisms for specifying the
shadow stack as an input parameter. This is not settled yet and is
being extensively discussed on the mailing list. Once that's settled,
this code should be adapted.
Reviewed-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de> # QEMU, custom CVA6
Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-11-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com
[pjw@kernel.org: cleaned up patch description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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As discussed extensively in the changelog for the addition of this
syscall on x86 ("x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall") the
existing mmap() and madvise() syscalls do not map entirely well onto the
security requirements for shadow stack memory since they lead to windows
where memory is allocated but not yet protected or stacks which are not
properly and safely initialised. Instead a new syscall map_shadow_stack()
has been defined which allocates and initialises a shadow stack page.
This patch implements this syscall for riscv. riscv doesn't require
tokens to be setup by kernel because user mode can do that by
itself. However to provide compatibility and portability with other
architectues, user mode can specify token set flag.
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-10-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/aXfRPJvoSsOW8AwM@debug.ba.rivosinc.com/
[pjw@kernel.org: added allocate_shadow_stack() fix per Deepak; fixed bug found by sparse]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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'arch_calc_vm_prot_bits' is implemented on risc-v to return VM_READ |
VM_WRITE if PROT_WRITE is specified. Similarly 'riscv_sys_mmap' is
updated to convert all incoming PROT_WRITE to (PROT_WRITE | PROT_READ).
This is to make sure that any existing apps using PROT_WRITE still work.
Earlier 'protection_map[VM_WRITE]' used to pick read-write PTE encodings.
Now 'protection_map[VM_WRITE]' will always pick PAGE_SHADOWSTACK PTE
encodings for shadow stack. The above changes ensure that existing apps
continue to work because underneath, the kernel will be picking
'protection_map[VM_WRITE|VM_READ]' PTE encodings.
Reviewed-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de> # QEMU, custom CVA6
Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-6-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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Carve out space in the RISC-V architecture-specific thread struct for
cfi status and shadow stack in usermode.
This patch:
- defines a new structure cfi_status with status bit for cfi feature
- defines shadow stack pointer, base and size in cfi_status structure
- defines offsets to new member fields in thread in asm-offsets.c
- saves and restores shadow stack pointer on trap entry (U --> S) and exit
(S --> U)
Shadow stack save/restore is gated on feature availability and is
implemented using alternatives. CSR_SSP can be context-switched in
'switch_to' as well, but as soon as kernel shadow stack support gets
rolled in, the shadow stack pointer will need to be switched at trap
entry/exit point (much like 'sp'). It can be argued that a kernel
using a shadow stack deployment scenario may not be as prevalent as
user mode using this feature. But even if there is some minimal
deployment of kernel shadow stack, that means that it needs to be
supported. Thus save/restore of shadow stack pointer is implemented
in entry.S instead of in 'switch_to.h'.
Reviewed-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de> # QEMU, custom CVA6
Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-5-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com
[pjw@kernel.org: cleaned up patch description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
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