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Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 67f1aee6f45059fd6b0f5b0ecb2c97ad0451f6b3 upstream.
The cxgb3_*_send() functions return NET_XMIT_ values, which are
positive integers values. So don't treat positive return values
as an error.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Shenai <hariprasad@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 73a203d2014f50d874b9e40083ad481ca70408e8 upstream.
The low level cxgb3 driver can return NET_XMIT_CN and friends.
The iw_cxgb3 driver should _not_ treat these as errors.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 3567eb6af614dac436c4b16a8d426f9faed639b3 upstream.
ALSA sequencer code has an open race between the timer setup ioctl and
the close of the client. This was triggered by syzkaller fuzzer, and
a use-after-free was caught there as a result.
This patch papers over it by adding a proper queue->timer_mutex lock
around the timer-related calls in the relevant code path.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 030e2c78d3a91dd0d27fef37e91950dde333eba1 upstream.
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 07d86ca93db7e5cdf4743564d98292042ec21af7 upstream.
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
[wt: file is sound/midi/usbmidi.c in 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 4dff5c7b7093b19c19d3a100f8a3ad87cb7cd9e7 upstream.
snd_timer_user_read() has a potential race among parallel reads, as
qhead and qused are updated outside the critical section due to
copy_to_user() calls. Move them into the critical section, and also
sanitize the relevant code a bit.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: there's no check for tu->connected to fix up]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 117159f0b9d392fb433a7871426fad50317f06f7 upstream.
In snd_timer_notify1(), the wrong timer instance was passed for slave
ccallback function. This leads to the access to the wrong data when
an incompatible master is handled (e.g. the master is the sequencer
timer and the slave is a user timer), as spotted by syzkaller fuzzer.
This patch fixes that wrong assignment.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+Y_Bm+7epAb=8Wi=AaWd+DYS7qawX52qxdCfOfY49vozQ@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit af368027a49a751d6ff4ee9e3f9961f35bb4fede upstream.
ALSA timer ioctls have an open race and this may lead to a
use-after-free of timer instance object. A simplistic fix is to make
each ioctl exclusive. We have already tread_sem for controlling the
tread, and extend this as a global mutex to be applied to each ioctl.
The downside is, of course, the worse concurrency. But these ioctls
aren't to be parallel accessible, in anyway, so it should be fine to
serialize there.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 094fd3be87b0f102589e2d5c3fa5d06b7e20496d upstream.
In ALSA timer core, the active timer instance is managed in
active_list linked list. Each element is added / removed dynamically
at timer start, stop and in timer interrupt. The problem is that
snd_timer_interrupt() has a thinko and leaves the element in
active_list when it's the last opened element. This eventually leads
to list corruption or use-after-free error.
This hasn't been revealed because we used to delete the list forcibly
in snd_timer_stop() in the past. However, the recent fix avoids the
double-stop behavior (in commit [f784beb75ce8: ALSA: timer: Fix link
corruption due to double start or stop]), and this leak hits reality.
This patch fixes the link management in snd_timer_interrupt(). Now it
simply unlinks no matter which stream is.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+Yy2aukHP-EDp8-ziNqNNmb-NTf=jDWXMP7jB8HDa2vng@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit ee8413b01045c74340aa13ad5bdf905de32be736 upstream.
ALSA timer instance object has a couple of linked lists and they are
unlinked unconditionally at snd_timer_stop(). Meanwhile
snd_timer_interrupt() unlinks it, but it calls list_del() which leaves
the element list itself unchanged. This ends up with unlinking twice,
and it was caught by syzkaller fuzzer.
The fix is to use list_del_init() variant properly there, too.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 7f0973e973cd74aa40747c9d38844560cd184ee8 upstream.
The port subscription code uses double mutex locks for source and
destination ports, and this may become racy once when wrongly set up.
It leads to lockdep warning splat, typically triggered by fuzzer like
syzkaller, although the actual deadlock hasn't been seen, so far.
This patch simplifies the handling by reducing to two single locks, so
that no lockdep warning will be trigger any longer.
By splitting to two actions, a still-in-progress element shall be
added in one list while handling another. For ignoring this element,
a new check is added in deliver_to_subscribers().
Along with it, the code to add/remove the subscribers list element was
cleaned up and refactored.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+aKQXV7xkBW9hpQbzaDO7LrUvohxWh-UwMxXjDy-yBD=A@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 81f577542af15640cbcb6ef68baa4caa610cbbfc upstream.
The rawmidi read and write functions manage runtime stream status
such as runtime->appl_ptr and runtime->avail. These point where to
copy the new data and how many bytes have been copied (or to be
read). The problem is that rawmidi read/write call copy_from_user()
or copy_to_user(), and the runtime spinlock is temporarily unlocked
and relocked while copying user-space. Since the current code
advances and updates the runtime status after the spin unlock/relock,
the copy and the update may be asynchronous, and eventually
runtime->avail might go to a negative value when many concurrent
accesses are done. This may lead to memory corruption in the end.
For fixing this race, in this patch, the status update code is
performed in the same lock before the temporary unlock. Also, the
spinlock is now taken more widely in snd_rawmidi_kernel_read1() for
protecting more properly during the whole operation.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+b-dCmNf1GpgPKfDO0ih+uZCL2JV4__j-r1kdhPLSgQCQ@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 06ab30034ed9c200a570ab13c017bde248ddb2a6 upstream.
A kernel WARNING in snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack() is triggered by
syzkaller fuzzer:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 20739 at sound/core/rawmidi.c:1136
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff82999e2d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff81352089>] warn_slowpath_common+0xd9/0x140 kernel/panic.c:482
[<ffffffff813522b9>] warn_slowpath_null+0x29/0x30 kernel/panic.c:515
[<ffffffff84f80bd5>] snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack+0x275/0x400 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1136
[<ffffffff84fdb3c1>] snd_virmidi_output_trigger+0x4b1/0x5a0 sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:163
[< inline >] snd_rawmidi_output_trigger sound/core/rawmidi.c:150
[<ffffffff84f87ed9>] snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x549/0x780 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1223
[<ffffffff84f89fd3>] snd_rawmidi_write+0x543/0xb30 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1273
[<ffffffff817b0323>] __vfs_write+0x113/0x480 fs/read_write.c:528
[<ffffffff817b1db7>] vfs_write+0x167/0x4a0 fs/read_write.c:577
[< inline >] SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:624
[<ffffffff817b50a1>] SyS_write+0x111/0x220 fs/read_write.c:616
[<ffffffff86336c36>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Also a similar warning is found but in another path:
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff82be2c0d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff81355139>] warn_slowpath_common+0xd9/0x140 kernel/panic.c:482
[<ffffffff81355369>] warn_slowpath_null+0x29/0x30 kernel/panic.c:515
[<ffffffff8527e69a>] rawmidi_transmit_ack+0x24a/0x3b0 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1133
[<ffffffff8527e851>] snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack+0x51/0x80 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1163
[<ffffffff852d9046>] snd_virmidi_output_trigger+0x2b6/0x570 sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:185
[< inline >] snd_rawmidi_output_trigger sound/core/rawmidi.c:150
[<ffffffff85285a0b>] snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x4bb/0x760 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1252
[<ffffffff85287b73>] snd_rawmidi_write+0x543/0xb30 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1302
[<ffffffff817ba5f3>] __vfs_write+0x113/0x480 fs/read_write.c:528
[<ffffffff817bc087>] vfs_write+0x167/0x4a0 fs/read_write.c:577
[< inline >] SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:624
[<ffffffff817bf371>] SyS_write+0x111/0x220 fs/read_write.c:616
[<ffffffff86660276>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
In the former case, the reason is that virmidi has an open code
calling snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack() with the value calculated outside
the spinlock. We may use snd_rawmidi_transmit() in a loop just for
consuming the input data, but even there, there is a race between
snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek() and snd_rawmidi_tranmit_ack().
Similarly in the latter case, it calls snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek() and
snd_rawmidi_tranmit_ack() separately without protection, so they are
racy as well.
The patch tries to address these issues by the following ways:
- Introduce the unlocked versions of snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek() and
snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack() to be called inside the explicit lock.
- Rewrite snd_rawmidi_transmit() to be race-free (the former case).
- Make the split calls (the latter case) protected in the rawmidi spin
lock.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+YPq1+cYLkadwjWa5XjzF1_Vki1eHnVn-Lm0hzhSpu5PA@mail.gmail.com
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+acG4iyphdOZx47Nyq_VHGbpJQK-6xNpiqUjaZYqsXOGw@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit f784beb75ce82f4136f8a0960d3ee872f7109e09 upstream.
Although ALSA timer code got hardening for races, it still causes
use-after-free error. This is however rather a corrupted linked list,
not actually the concurrent accesses. Namely, when timer start is
triggered twice, list_add_tail() is called twice, too. This ends
up with the link corruption and triggers KASAN error.
The simplest fix would be replacing list_add_tail() with
list_move_tail(), but fundamentally it's the problem that we don't
check the double start/stop correctly. So, the right fix here is to
add the proper checks to snd_timer_start() and snd_timer_stop() (and
their variants).
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+ZyPRoMQjmawbvmCEDrkBD2BQuH7R09=eOkf5ESK8kJAw@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context, indentation]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 2cdc7b636d55cbcf42e1e6c8accd85e62d3e9ae8 upstream.
ALSA sequencer may open/close and control ALSA timer instance
dynamically either via sequencer events or direct ioctls. These are
done mostly asynchronously, and it may call still some timer action
like snd_timer_start() while another is calling snd_timer_close().
Since the instance gets removed by snd_timer_close(), it may lead to
a use-after-free.
This patch tries to address such a race by protecting each
snd_timer_*() call via the existing spinlock and also by avoiding the
access to timer during close call.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+Z6RzW5MBr-HUdV-8zwg71WQfKTdPpYGvOeS7v4cyurNQ@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit b248371628aad599a48540962f6b85a21a8a0c3f upstream.
There are potential deadlocks in PCM OSS emulation code while
accessing read/write and mmap concurrently. This comes from the
infamous mmap_sem usage in copy_from/to_user(). Namely,
snd_pcm_oss_write() ->
&runtime->oss.params_lock ->
copy_to_user() ->
&mm->mmap_sem
mmap() ->
&mm->mmap_sem ->
snd_pcm_oss_mmap() ->
&runtime->oss.params_lock
Since we can't avoid taking params_lock from mmap code path, use
trylock variant and aborts with -EAGAIN as a workaround of this AB/BA
deadlock.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+bVrBKDG0G2_AcUgUQa+X91VKTeS4v+wN7BSHwHtqn3kQ@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit cc85f7a634cfaf9f0713c6aa06d08817424db37a upstream.
NULL user-space buffer can be passed even in a normal path, thus it's
not good to spew a kernel warning with stack trace at each time.
Just drop snd_BUG_ON() macro usage there.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+YfVJ3L+q0i-4vyQVyyPD7V=OMX0PWPi29x9Bo3QaBLdw@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 2d1b5c08366acd46c35a2e9aba5d650cb5bf5c19 upstream.
The virmidi driver has an open race at closing its assigned rawmidi
device, and this may lead to use-after-free in
snd_seq_deliver_single_event().
Plug the hole by properly protecting the linked list deletion and
calling in the right order in snd_virmidi_input_close().
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+Zd66+w12fNN85-425cVQT=K23kWbhnCEcMB8s3us-Frw@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit da10816e3d923565b470fec78a674baba794ed33 upstream.
ALSA OSS sequencer spews a kernel error message ("ALSA: seq_oss: too
many applications") when user-space tries to open more than the
limit. This means that it can easily fill the log buffer.
Since it's merely a normal error, it's safe to suppress it via
pr_debug() instead.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: this was still using snd_printk()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 599151336638d57b98d92338aa59c048e3a3e97d upstream.
ALSA sequencer OSS emulation code has a sanity check for currently
opened devices, but there is a thinko there, eventually it spews
warnings and skips the operation wrongly like:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7573 at sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c:311
Fix this off-by-one error.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit c0bcdbdff3ff73a54161fca3cb8b6cdbd0bb8762 upstream.
When a TLV ioctl with numid zero is handled, the driver may spew a
kernel warning with a stack trace at each call. The check was
intended obviously only for a kernel driver, but not for a user
interaction. Let's fix it.
This was spotted by syzkaller fuzzer.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 9586495dc3011a80602329094e746dbce16cb1f1 upstream.
This reverts one hunk of
commit ef44a1ec6eee ("ALSA: sound/core: use memdup_user()"), which
replaced a number of kmalloc followed by memcpy with memdup calls.
In this case, we are copying from a struct snd_seq_port_info32 to a
struct snd_seq_port_info, but the latter is 4 bytes longer than the
32-bit version, so we need to separate kmalloc and copy calls.
Fixes: ef44a1ec6eee ('ALSA: sound/core: use memdup_user()')
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Boichat <drinkcat@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 43c54b8c7cfe22f868a751ba8a59abf1724160b1 upstream.
This reverts one hunk of
commit ef44a1ec6eee ("ALSA: sound/core: use memdup_user()"), which
replaced a number of kmalloc followed by memcpy with memdup calls.
In this case, we are copying from a struct snd_pcm_hw_params32 to
a struct snd_pcm_hw_params, but the latter is 4 bytes longer than
the 32-bit version, so we need to separate kmalloc and copy calls.
This actually leads to an out-of-bounds memory access later on
in sound/soc/soc-pcm.c:soc_pcm_hw_params() (detected using KASan).
Fixes: ef44a1ec6eee ('ALSA: sound/core: use memdup_user()')
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Boichat <drinkcat@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 2ba1fe7a06d3624f9a7586d672b55f08f7c670f3 upstream.
hrtimer_cancel() waits for the completion from the callback, thus it
must not be called inside the callback itself. This was already a
problem in the past with ALSA hrtimer driver, and the early commit
[fcfdebe70759: ALSA: hrtimer - Fix lock-up] tried to address it.
However, the previous fix is still insufficient: it may still cause a
lockup when the ALSA timer instance reprograms itself in its callback.
Then it invokes the start function even in snd_timer_interrupt() that
is called in hrtimer callback itself, results in a CPU stall. This is
no hypothetical problem but actually triggered by syzkaller fuzzer.
This patch tries to fix the issue again. Now we call
hrtimer_try_to_cancel() at both start and stop functions so that it
won't fall into a deadlock, yet giving some chance to cancel the queue
if the functions have been called outside the callback. The proper
hrtimer_cancel() is called in anyway at closing, so this should be
enough.
Reported-and-tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit b5a663aa426f4884c71cd8580adae73f33570f0d upstream.
A slave timer instance might be still accessible in a racy way while
operating the master instance as it lacks of locking. Since the
master operation is mostly protected with timer->lock, we should cope
with it while changing the slave instance, too. Also, some linked
lists (active_list and ack_list) of slave instances aren't unlinked
immediately at stopping or closing, and this may lead to unexpected
accesses.
This patch tries to address these issues. It adds spin lock of
timer->lock (either from master or slave, which is equivalent) in a
few places. For avoiding a deadlock, we ensure that the global
slave_active_lock is always locked at first before each timer lock.
Also, ack and active_list of slave instances are properly unlinked at
snd_timer_stop() and snd_timer_close().
Last but not least, remove the superfluous call of _snd_timer_stop()
at removing slave links. This is a noop, and calling it may confuse
readers wrt locking. Further cleanup will follow in a later patch.
Actually we've got reports of use-after-free by syzkaller fuzzer, and
this hopefully fixes these issues.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 7ee96216c31aabe1eb42fb91ff50dae9fcd014b2 upstream.
ALSA dummy driver can switch the timer backend between system timer
and hrtimer via its hrtimer module option. This can be also switched
dynamically via sysfs, but it may lead to a memory corruption when
switching is done while a PCM stream is running; the stream instance
for the newly switched timer method tries to access the memory that
was allocated by another timer method although the sizes differ.
As the simplest fix, this patch just disables the switch via sysfs by
dropping the writable bit.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+ZGEeEBntHW5WHn2GoeE0G_kRrCmUh6=dWyy-wfzvuJLg@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit bef5502de074b6f6fa647b94b73155d675694420 upstream.
We have found that migration source will trigger a BUG that the refcount
of mle is already zero before put when the target is down during
migration. The situation is as follows:
dlm_migrate_lockres
dlm_add_migration_mle
dlm_mark_lockres_migrating
dlm_get_mle_inuse
<<<<<< Now the refcount of the mle is 2.
dlm_send_one_lockres and wait for the target to become the
new master.
<<<<<< o2hb detect the target down and clean the migration
mle. Now the refcount is 1.
dlm_migrate_lockres woken, and put the mle twice when found the target
goes down which trigger the BUG with the following message:
"ERROR: bad mle: ".
Signed-off-by: Jiufei Xue <xuejiufei@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit bb00c898ad1ce40c4bb422a8207ae562e9aea7ae upstream.
If a name contains at least some characters with Unicode values
exceeding single byte, the CS0 output should have 2 bytes per character.
And if other input characters have single byte Unicode values, then
the single input byte is converted to 2 output bytes, and the length
of output becomes larger than the length of input. And if the input
name is long enough, the output length may exceed the allocated buffer
length.
All this means that conversion from UTF8 or NLS to CS0 requires
checking of output length in order to stop when it exceeds the given
output buffer size.
[JK: Make code return -ENAMETOOLONG instead of silently truncating the
name]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gabbasov <andrew_gabbasov@mentor.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit ad402b265ecf6fa22d04043b41444cdfcdf4f52d upstream.
udf_CS0toUTF8 function stops the conversion when the output buffer
length reaches UDF_NAME_LEN-2, which is correct maximum name length,
but, when checking, it leaves the space for a single byte only,
while multi-bytes output characters can take more space, causing
buffer overflow.
Similar error exists in udf_CS0toNLS function, that restricts
the output length to UDF_NAME_LEN, while actual maximum allowed
length is UDF_NAME_LEN-2.
In these cases the output can override not only the current buffer
length field, causing corruption of the name buffer itself, but also
following allocation structures, causing kernel crash.
Adjust the output length checks in both functions to prevent buffer
overruns in case of multi-bytes UTF8 or NLS characters.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gabbasov <andrew_gabbasov@mentor.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit b0918d9f476a8434b055e362b83fa4fd1d462c3f upstream.
udf_next_aext() just follows extent pointers while extents are marked as
indirect. This can loop forever for corrupted filesystem. Limit number
the of indirect extents we are willing to follow in a row.
[JK: Updated changelog, limit, style]
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
[wt: udf_error() instead of udf_err() in 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 7e273e3b41e32716dc122b293b5f15635af495ff upstream.
If there is a problem with a scratched disc or loader, it's valuable to know
which error occurred.
Convert some debug messages to udf_error, neaten those messages too.
Add the calculated tag checksum and the read checksum to error message.
Make udf_error a public function and move the logging prototypes together.
Original-patch-by: NamJae Jeon <linkinjeon@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NamJae Jeon <linkinjeon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
[wt: this one is only here to export udf_error() for next commit]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit c95a51807b730e4681e2ecbdfd669ca52601959e upstream.
When recovery master down, dlm_do_local_recovery_cleanup() only remove
the $RECOVERY lock owned by dead node, but do not clear the refmap bit.
Which will make umount thread falling in dead loop migrating $RECOVERY
to the dead node.
Signed-off-by: xuejiufei <xuejiufei@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
[wt: dlm_lockres_clear_refmap_bit() takes 2 args in 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit d2d06d4fe0f2cc2df9b17fefec96e6e1a1271d91 upstream.
If MODE SELECT returns with sense '05/91/36' (command lock violation)
it should always be retried without counting the number of retries.
During an HBA upgrade or similar circumstances one might see a flood
of MODE SELECT command from various HBAs, which will easily trigger
the sense code and exceed the retry count.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit ac75fe5d8fe4a0bf063be18fb29684405279e79e upstream.
That prevents this bug:
[ 2382.269496] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000540
[ 2382.270013] IP: [<ffffffffa01fe616>] snd_card_free+0x36/0x70 [snd]
[ 2382.270013] PGD 0
[ 2382.270013] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 2382.270013] Modules linked in: saa7134_alsa(-) tda1004x saa7134_dvb videobuf2_dvb dvb_core tda827x tda8290 tuner saa7134 tveeprom videobuf2_dma_sg videobuf2_memops videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_core v4l2_common videodev media auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace sunrpc tun bridge stp llc ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack it87 hwmon_vid snd_hda_codec_idt snd_hda_codec_generic iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_seq pcspkr i2c_i801 snd_seq_device snd_pcm snd_timer lpc_ich snd mfd_core soundcore binfmt_misc i915 video i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper drm r8169 ata_generic serio_raw pata_acpi mii i2c_core [last unloaded: videobuf2_memops]
[ 2382.270013] CPU: 0 PID: 4899 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 4.5.0-rc1+ #4
[ 2382.270013] Hardware name: PCCHIPS P17G/P17G, BIOS 080012 05/14/2008
[ 2382.270013] task: ffff880039c38000 ti: ffff88003c764000 task.ti: ffff88003c764000
[ 2382.270013] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01fe616>] [<ffffffffa01fe616>] snd_card_free+0x36/0x70 [snd]
[ 2382.270013] RSP: 0018:ffff88003c767ea0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 2382.270013] RAX: ffff88003c767eb8 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000006260
[ 2382.270013] RDX: ffffffffa020a060 RSI: ffffffffa0206de1 RDI: ffff88003c767eb0
[ 2382.270013] RBP: ffff88003c767ed8 R08: 0000000000019960 R09: ffffffff811a5412
[ 2382.270013] R10: ffffea0000d7c200 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88003c767ea8
[ 2382.270013] R13: 00007ffe760617f7 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000557625d7f1e0
[ 2382.270013] FS: 00007f80bb1c0700(0000) GS:ffff88003f400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 2382.270013] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 2382.270013] CR2: 0000000000000540 CR3: 000000003c00f000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 2382.270013] Stack:
[ 2382.270013] 000000003c767ed8 ffffffff00000000 ffff880000000000 ffff88003c767eb8
[ 2382.270013] ffff88003c767eb8 ffffffffa049a890 00007ffe76060060 ffff88003c767ef0
[ 2382.270013] ffffffffa049889d ffffffffa049a500 ffff88003c767f48 ffffffff8111079c
[ 2382.270013] Call Trace:
[ 2382.270013] [<ffffffffa049889d>] saa7134_alsa_exit+0x1d/0x780 [saa7134_alsa]
[ 2382.270013] [<ffffffff8111079c>] SyS_delete_module+0x19c/0x1f0
[ 2382.270013] [<ffffffff8170fc2e>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x71
[ 2382.270013] Code: 20 a0 48 c7 c6 e1 6d 20 a0 48 89 e5 41 54 53 4c 8d 65 d0 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 28 c7 45 d0 00 00 00 00 49 8d 7c 24 08 e8 7a 55 ed e0 <4c> 89 a3 40 05 00 00 48 89 df e8 eb fd ff ff 85 c0 75 1a 48 8d
[ 2382.270013] RIP [<ffffffffa01fe616>] snd_card_free+0x36/0x70 [snd]
[ 2382.270013] RSP <ffff88003c767ea0>
[ 2382.270013] CR2: 0000000000000540
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit e8beb02343e7582980c6705816cd957cf4f74c7a upstream.
The tda1004x was updating the properties cache before locking.
If the device is not locked, the data at the registers are just
random values with no real meaning.
This caused the driver to fail with libdvbv5, as such library
calls GET_PROPERTY from time to time, in order to return the
DVB stats.
Tested with a saa7134 card 78:
ASUSTeK P7131 Dual, vendor PCI ID: 1043:4862
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 13b4389143413a1f18127c07f72c74cad5b563e8 upstream.
Runtime suspend during driver probe and removal can cause problems.
The driver's runtime_suspend or runtime_resume callbacks may invoked
before the driver has finished binding to the device or after the
driver has unbound from the device.
This problem shows up with the sd and sr drivers, and can cause disk
or CD/DVD drives to become unusable as a result. The fix is simple.
The drivers store a pointer to the scsi_disk or scsi_cd structure as
their private device data when probing is finished, so we simply have
to be sure to clear the private data during removal and test it during
runtime suspend/resume.
This fixes <https://bugs.debian.org/801925>.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Paul Menzel <paul.menzel@giantmonkey.de>
Reported-by: Erich Schubert <erich@debian.org>
Reported-by: Alexandre Rossi <alexandre.rossi@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Paul Menzel <paul.menzel@giantmonkey.de>
Tested-by: Erich Schubert <erich@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: drop changes to sr as it doesn't support runtime PM]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 6736fde9672ff6717ac576e9bba2fd5f3dfec822 upstream.
The code within wait_event_interruptible() is called with
!TASK_RUNNING, so mustn't call any functions that can sleep,
like mutex_lock().
Since we re-check the list_empty() in a loop after the wait,
it's safe to simply use list_empty() without locking.
This bug has existed forever, but was only discovered now
because all userspace implementations, including the default
'rfkill' tool, use poll() or select() to get a readable fd
before attempting to read.
Fixes: c64fb01627e24 ("rfkill: create useful userspace interface")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 566d1827df2ef0cbe921d3d6946ac3007b1a6938 upstream.
Some early controllers incorrectly reported zero ports in PORTS_IMPL
register and the ahci driver fabricates PORTS_IMPL from the number of
ports in those cases. This hasn't mattered but with the new nvme
controllers there are cases where zero PORTS_IMPL is valid and should
be honored.
Disable the workaround for >= AHCI 1.3.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/CALCETrU7yMvXEDhjAUShoHEhDwifJGapdw--BKxsP0jmjKGmRw@mail.gmail.com
Cc: Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
[wt: file is drivers/ata/ahci.c in 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 4ae2182b1e3407de369f8c5d799543b7db74221b upstream.
A Root Port's AER structure (rpc) contains a queue of events. aer_irq()
enqueues AER status information and schedules aer_isr() to dequeue and
process it. When we remove a device, aer_remove() waits for the queue to
be empty, then frees the rpc struct.
But aer_isr() references the rpc struct after dequeueing and possibly
emptying the queue, which can cause a use-after-free error as in the
following scenario with two threads, aer_isr() on the left and a
concurrent aer_remove() on the right:
Thread A Thread B
-------- --------
aer_irq():
rpc->prod_idx++
aer_remove():
wait_event(rpc->prod_idx == rpc->cons_idx)
# now blocked until queue becomes empty
aer_isr(): # ...
rpc->cons_idx++ # unblocked because queue is now empty
... kfree(rpc)
mutex_unlock(&rpc->rpc_mutex)
To prevent this problem, use flush_work() to wait until the last scheduled
instance of aer_isr() has completed before freeing the rpc struct in
aer_remove().
I reproduced this use-after-free by flashing a device FPGA and
re-enumerating the bus to find the new device. With SLUB debug, this
crashes with 0x6b bytes (POISON_FREE, the use-after-free magic number) in
GPR25:
pcieport 0000:00:00.0: AER: Multiple Corrected error received: id=0000
Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x27ef9e3e
Workqueue: events aer_isr
GPR24: dd6aa000 6b6b6b6b 605f8378 605f8360 d99b12c0 604fc674 606b1704 d99b12c0
NIP [602f5328] pci_walk_bus+0xd4/0x104
[bhelgaas: changelog, stable tag]
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
[wt: in 2.6.32, kfree() is called from aer_delete_rootport()]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit fa0dc04df259ba2df3ce1920e9690c7842f8fa4b upstream.
Dmitry reported a struct pid leak detected by a syzkaller program.
Bug happens in unix_stream_recvmsg() when we break the loop when a
signal is pending, without properly releasing scm.
Fixes: b3ca9b02b007 ("net: fix multithreaded signal handling in unix recv routines")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
[wt: note, according to Rainer & Ben the bug was really introduced in
2.5.65, not by the commit mentionned in Fixes. 2.6.32 uses siocb->scm
instead of scm]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Quoting the RHEL advisory:
> It was found that the fix for CVE-2015-1805 incorrectly kept buffer
> offset and buffer length in sync on a failed atomic read, potentially
> resulting in a pipe buffer state corruption. A local, unprivileged user
> could use this flaw to crash the system or leak kernel memory to user
> space. (CVE-2016-0774, Moderate)
The same flawed fix was applied to stable branches from 2.6.32.y to
3.14.y inclusive, and I was able to reproduce the issue on 3.2.y.
We need to give pipe_iov_copy_to_user() a separate offset variable
and only update the buffer offset if it succeeds.
References: https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2016-0103.html
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 435f49a518c78eec8e2edbbadd912737246cbe20 upstream.
We used to protect against overflow, but rather than return an error, do
what read/write does, namely to limit the total size to MAX_RW_COUNT.
This is not only more consistent, but it also means that any broken
low-level read/write routine that still keeps counts in 'int' can't
break.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit a70b52ec1aaeaf60f4739edb1b422827cb6f3893 upstream.
We had for some reason overlooked the AIO interface, and it didn't use
the proper rw_verify_area() helper function that checks (for example)
mandatory locking on the file, and that the size of the access doesn't
cause us to overflow the provided offset limits etc.
Instead, AIO did just the security_file_permission() thing (that
rw_verify_area() also does) directly.
This fixes it to do all the proper helper functions, which not only
means that now mandatory file locking works with AIO too, we can
actually remove lines of code.
Reported-by: Manish Honap <manish_honap_vit@yahoo.co.in>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Commit 3feec9095d1 ("l2tp: Fix oops in pppol2tp_xmit") was backported
into 2.6.32.16 to fix a possible null deref in pppol2tp. But the same
still exists in pppol2tp_sendmsg() possibly causing the same crash.
Note that this bug doesn't appear to have any other impact than crashing
the system, as the dereferenced pointer is only used to test a value
against a 3-bit mask, so it can hardly be abused for anything except
leaking one third of a bit of memory.
This issue doesn't exist upstream because the code was replaced in 2.6.35
and the new function l2tp_xmit_skb() performs the appropriate check.
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 7f3697e24dc3820b10f445a4a7d914fc356012d1 upstream.
Dmitry reported that he was able to reproduce the WARN_ON_ONCE that
fires in locks_free_lock_context when the flc_posix list isn't empty.
The problem turns out to be that we're basically rebuilding the
file_lock from scratch in fcntl_setlk when we discover that the setlk
has raced with a close. If the l_whence field is SEEK_CUR or SEEK_END,
then we may end up with fl_start and fl_end values that differ from
when the lock was initially set, if the file position or length of the
file has changed in the interim.
Fix this by just reusing the same lock request structure, and simply
override fl_type value with F_UNLCK as appropriate. That ensures that
we really are unlocking the lock that was initially set.
While we're there, make sure that we do pop a WARN_ON_ONCE if the
removal ever fails. Also return -EBADF in this event, since that's
what we would have returned if the close had happened earlier.
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: c293621bbf67 (stale POSIX lock handling)
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: s/i_flctx->flc_posix/inode->i_flock/ in comments]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 525fd5a94e1be0776fa652df5c687697db508c91 upstream.
The value returned by sys_personality has type "long int".
It is saved to a variable of type "int", which is not a problem
yet because the type of task_struct->pesonality is "unsigned int".
The problem is the sign extension from "int" to "long int"
that happens on return from sys_sparc64_personality.
For example, a userspace call personality((unsigned) -EINVAL) will
result to any subsequent personality call, including absolutely
harmless read-only personality(0xffffffff) call, failing with
errno set to EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 742563777e8da62197d6cb4b99f4027f59454735 upstream.
There are a couple of nasty truncation bugs lurking in the pageattr
code that can be triggered when mapping EFI regions, e.g. when we pass
a cpa->pgd pointer. Because cpa->numpages is a 32-bit value, shifting
left by PAGE_SHIFT will truncate the resultant address to 32-bits.
Viorel-CÄtÄlin managed to trigger this bug on his Dell machine that
provides a ~5GB EFI region which requires 1236992 pages to be mapped.
When calling populate_pud() the end of the region gets calculated
incorrectly in the following buggy expression,
end = start + (cpa->numpages << PAGE_SHIFT);
And only 188416 pages are mapped. Next, populate_pud() gets invoked
for a second time because of the loop in __change_page_attr_set_clr(),
only this time no pages get mapped because shifting the remaining
number of pages (1048576) by PAGE_SHIFT is zero. At which point the
loop in __change_page_attr_set_clr() spins forever because we fail to
map progress.
Hitting this bug depends very much on the virtual address we pick to
map the large region at and how many pages we map on the initial run
through the loop. This explains why this issue was only recently hit
with the introduction of commit
a5caa209ba9c ("x86/efi: Fix boot crash by mapping EFI memmap
entries bottom-up at runtime, instead of top-down")
It's interesting to note that safe uses of cpa->numpages do exist in
the pageattr code. If instead of shifting ->numpages we multiply by
PAGE_SIZE, no truncation occurs because PAGE_SIZE is a UL value, and
so the result is unsigned long.
To avoid surprises when users try to convert very large cpa->numpages
values to addresses, change the data type from 'int' to 'unsigned
long', thereby making it suitable for shifting by PAGE_SHIFT without
any type casting.
The alternative would be to make liberal use of casting, but that is
far more likely to cause problems in the future when someone adds more
code and fails to cast properly; this bug was difficult enough to
track down in the first place.
Reported-and-tested-by: Viorel-CÄtÄlin RÄpiÈeanu <rapiteanu.catalin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=110131
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1454067370-10374-1-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 4eaffdd5a5fe6ff9f95e1ab4de1ac904d5e0fa8b upstream.
My previous comments were still a bit confusing and there was a
typo. Fix it up.
Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 71b3c126e611 ("x86/mm: Add barriers and document switch_mm()-vs-flush synchronization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0a0b43cdcdd241c5faaaecfbcc91a155ddedc9a1.1452631609.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 71b3c126e61177eb693423f2e18a1914205b165e upstream.
When switch_mm() activates a new PGD, it also sets a bit that
tells other CPUs that the PGD is in use so that TLB flush IPIs
will be sent. In order for that to work correctly, the bit
needs to be visible prior to loading the PGD and therefore
starting to fill the local TLB.
Document all the barriers that make this work correctly and add
a couple that were missing.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 2.6.32:
- There's no flush_tlb_mm_range(), only flush_tlb_mm() which does not use
INVLPG
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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