5 files changed, 40 insertions, 34 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 35682852ddea..764b896cd628 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)
 {
 	long rc;
 	const char *algo;
-	struct crypto_shash **tfm;
+	struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm;
 	struct shash_desc *desc;
 
 	if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
@@ -91,31 +91,31 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)
 		algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo];
 	}
 
-	if (*tfm == NULL) {
-		mutex_lock(&mutex);
-		if (*tfm)
-			goto out;
-		*tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD);
-		if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) {
-			rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm);
-			pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc);
-			*tfm = NULL;
+	if (*tfm)
+		goto alloc;
+	mutex_lock(&mutex);
+	if (*tfm)
+		goto unlock;
+
+	tmp_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD);
+	if (IS_ERR(tmp_tfm)) {
+		pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo,
+		       PTR_ERR(tmp_tfm));
+		mutex_unlock(&mutex);
+		return ERR_CAST(tmp_tfm);
+	}
+	if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
+		rc = crypto_shash_setkey(tmp_tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
+		if (rc) {
+			crypto_free_shash(tmp_tfm);
 			mutex_unlock(&mutex);
 			return ERR_PTR(rc);
 		}
-		if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
-			rc = crypto_shash_setkey(*tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
-			if (rc) {
-				crypto_free_shash(*tfm);
-				*tfm = NULL;
-				mutex_unlock(&mutex);
-				return ERR_PTR(rc);
-			}
-		}
-out:
-		mutex_unlock(&mutex);
 	}
-
+	*tfm = tmp_tfm;
+unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&mutex);
+alloc:
 	desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),
 			GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!desc)
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
 	data->hdr.length = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
 
 	error = -ENODATA;
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
 		bool is_ima = false;
 
 		if (strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index d361d7fdafc4..0d36259b690d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
 	if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
 		error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, xattr->name, NULL, 0);
 		if (error < 0) {
 			if (error == -ENODATA)
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
 	struct xattr_list *xattr;
 
 	namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name);
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
 		if ((strlen(xattr->name) == namelen)
 		    && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, xattr->name, namelen) == 0)) {
 			found = 1;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
index 39ad1038d45d..cfc3075769bb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -232,7 +232,14 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	/* Guard against races in evm_read_xattrs */
+	/*
+	 * xattr_list_mutex guards against races in evm_read_xattrs().
+	 * Entries are only added to the evm_config_xattrnames list
+	 * and never deleted. Therefore, the list is traversed
+	 * using list_for_each_entry_lockless() without holding
+	 * the mutex in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(), evm_find_protected_xattrs()
+	 * and evm_protected_xattr().
+	 */
 	mutex_lock(&xattr_list_mutex);
 	list_for_each_entry(tmp, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
 		if (strcmp(xattr->name, tmp->name) == 0) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 423c84f95a14..88b5e288f241 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
 	loff_t i_size;
 	int rc;
 	struct file *f = file;
-	bool new_file_instance = false, modified_flags = false;
+	bool new_file_instance = false, modified_mode = false;
 
 	/*
 	 * For consistency, fail file's opened with the O_DIRECT flag on
@@ -431,13 +431,13 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
 		f = dentry_open(&file->f_path, flags, file->f_cred);
 		if (IS_ERR(f)) {
 			/*
-			 * Cannot open the file again, lets modify f_flags
+			 * Cannot open the file again, lets modify f_mode
 			 * of original and continue
 			 */
 			pr_info_ratelimited("Unable to reopen file for reading.\n");
 			f = file;
-			f->f_flags |= FMODE_READ;
-			modified_flags = true;
+			f->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
+			modified_mode = true;
 		} else {
 			new_file_instance = true;
 		}
@@ -455,8 +455,8 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
 out:
 	if (new_file_instance)
 		fput(f);
-	else if (modified_flags)
-		f->f_flags &= ~FMODE_READ;
+	else if (modified_mode)
+		f->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
 	return rc;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index a71e822a6e92..3efc8308ad26 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -338,8 +338,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
 				    "policy_update", "signed policy required",
 				    1, 0);
-		if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
-			result = -EACCES;
+		result = -EACCES;
 	} else {
 		result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
 	}