diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 153 |
1 files changed, 82 insertions, 71 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index a5255a0dcbb6..4a25375ebb0d 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -1402,9 +1402,11 @@ static void ___mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) */ static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) { - /* Clear id, off, and union(map_ptr, range) */ + /* Clear off and union(map_ptr, range) */ memset(((u8 *)reg) + sizeof(reg->type), 0, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off) - sizeof(reg->type)); + reg->id = 0; + reg->ref_obj_id = 0; ___mark_reg_known(reg, imm); } @@ -1750,11 +1752,13 @@ static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) { /* - * Clear type, id, off, and union(map_ptr, range) and + * Clear type, off, and union(map_ptr, range) and * padding between 'type' and union */ memset(reg, 0, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)); reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; + reg->id = 0; + reg->ref_obj_id = 0; reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; reg->frameno = 0; reg->precise = !env->bpf_capable; @@ -7612,6 +7616,7 @@ static int check_bpf_snprintf_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *fmt_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; struct bpf_reg_state *data_len_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_5]; struct bpf_map *fmt_map = fmt_reg->map_ptr; + struct bpf_bprintf_data data = {}; int err, fmt_map_off, num_args; u64 fmt_addr; char *fmt; @@ -7636,7 +7641,7 @@ static int check_bpf_snprintf_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, /* We are also guaranteed that fmt+fmt_map_off is NULL terminated, we * can focus on validating the format specifiers. */ - err = bpf_bprintf_prepare(fmt, UINT_MAX, NULL, NULL, num_args); + err = bpf_bprintf_prepare(fmt, UINT_MAX, NULL, num_args, &data); if (err < 0) verbose(env, "Invalid format string\n"); @@ -8771,21 +8776,22 @@ static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, field = meta->arg_list_head.field; - et = btf_type_by_id(field->list_head.btf, field->list_head.value_btf_id); + et = btf_type_by_id(field->graph_root.btf, field->graph_root.value_btf_id); t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); - if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, 0, field->list_head.btf, - field->list_head.value_btf_id, true)) { + if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, 0, field->graph_root.btf, + field->graph_root.value_btf_id, true)) { verbose(env, "operation on bpf_list_head expects arg#1 bpf_list_node at offset=%d " "in struct %s, but arg is at offset=%d in struct %s\n", - field->list_head.node_offset, btf_name_by_offset(field->list_head.btf, et->name_off), + field->graph_root.node_offset, + btf_name_by_offset(field->graph_root.btf, et->name_off), list_node_off, btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off)); return -EINVAL; } - if (list_node_off != field->list_head.node_offset) { + if (list_node_off != field->graph_root.node_offset) { verbose(env, "arg#1 offset=%d, but expected bpf_list_node at offset=%d in struct %s\n", - list_node_off, field->list_head.node_offset, - btf_name_by_offset(field->list_head.btf, et->name_off)); + list_node_off, field->graph_root.node_offset, + btf_name_by_offset(field->graph_root.btf, et->name_off)); return -EINVAL; } /* Set arg#1 for expiration after unlock */ @@ -9227,9 +9233,9 @@ static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; - regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = field->list_head.btf; - regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = field->list_head.value_btf_id; - regs[BPF_REG_0].off = field->list_head.node_offset; + regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = field->graph_root.btf; + regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = field->graph_root.value_btf_id; + regs[BPF_REG_0].off = field->graph_root.node_offset; } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) { mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED; @@ -12941,6 +12947,13 @@ static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) { unsigned int i; + /* either both IDs should be set or both should be zero */ + if (!!old_id != !!cur_id) + return false; + + if (old_id == 0) /* cur_id == 0 as well */ + return true; + for (i = 0; i < BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) { if (!idmap[i].old) { /* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */ @@ -13052,79 +13065,74 @@ next: } } +static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold, + const struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, + struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) +{ + return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && + check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap) && + check_ids(rold->ref_obj_id, rcur->ref_obj_id, idmap); +} + /* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) { - bool equal; - if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ)) /* explored state didn't use this */ return true; - - equal = memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent)) == 0; - if (rold->type == NOT_INIT) /* explored state can't have used this */ return true; if (rcur->type == NOT_INIT) return false; + + /* Enforce that register types have to match exactly, including their + * modifiers (like PTR_MAYBE_NULL, MEM_RDONLY, etc), as a general + * rule. + * + * One can make a point that using a pointer register as unbounded + * SCALAR would be technically acceptable, but this could lead to + * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak while pointers + * are not. We could make this safe in special cases if root is + * calling us, but it's probably not worth the hassle. + * + * Also, register types that are *not* MAYBE_NULL could technically be + * safe to use as their MAYBE_NULL variants (e.g., PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE + * is safe to be used as PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, provided both point + * to the same map). + * However, if the old MAYBE_NULL register then got NULL checked, + * doing so could have affected others with the same id, and we can't + * check for that because we lost the id when we converted to + * a non-MAYBE_NULL variant. + * So, as a general rule we don't allow mixing MAYBE_NULL and + * non-MAYBE_NULL registers as well. + */ + if (rold->type != rcur->type) + return false; + switch (base_type(rold->type)) { case SCALAR_VALUE: - if (equal) + if (regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap)) return true; if (env->explore_alu_limits) return false; - if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { - if (!rold->precise) - return true; - /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ - return range_within(rold, rcur) && - tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); - } else { - /* We're trying to use a pointer in place of a scalar. - * Even if the scalar was unbounded, this could lead to - * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak - * while pointers are not. We could make this safe in - * special cases if root is calling us, but it's - * probably not worth the hassle. - */ - return false; - } + if (!rold->precise) + return true; + /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ + return range_within(rold, rcur) && + tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: - /* a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE could be safe to use as a - * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL into the same map. - * However, if the old PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL then got NULL- - * checked, doing so could have affected others with the same - * id, and we can't check for that because we lost the id when - * we converted to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. - */ - if (type_may_be_null(rold->type)) { - if (!type_may_be_null(rcur->type)) - return false; - if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id))) - return false; - /* Check our ids match any regs they're supposed to */ - return check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); - } - /* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and * everything else matches, we are OK. - * 'id' is not compared, since it's only used for maps with - * bpf_spin_lock inside map element and in such cases if - * the rest of the prog is valid for one map element then - * it's valid for all map elements regardless of the key - * used in bpf_map_lookup() */ - return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && + return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)) == 0 && range_within(rold, rcur) && tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off) && check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: case PTR_TO_PACKET: - if (rcur->type != rold->type) - return false; /* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr * did, so that any accesses which were safe before are * still safe. This is true even if old range < old off, @@ -13139,7 +13147,7 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, if (rold->off != rcur->off) return false; /* id relations must be preserved */ - if (rold->id && !check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap)) + if (!check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap)) return false; /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ return range_within(rold, rcur) && @@ -13148,15 +13156,10 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, /* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar */ - return equal && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno; + return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap) && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno; default: - /* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() */ - return equal; + return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap); } - - /* Shouldn't get here; if we do, say it's not safe */ - WARN_ON_ONCE(1); - return false; } static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, @@ -13222,12 +13225,20 @@ static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, return true; } -static bool refsafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, struct bpf_func_state *cur) +static bool refsafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, struct bpf_func_state *cur, + struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) { + int i; + if (old->acquired_refs != cur->acquired_refs) return false; - return !memcmp(old->refs, cur->refs, - sizeof(*old->refs) * old->acquired_refs); + + for (i = 0; i < old->acquired_refs; i++) { + if (!check_ids(old->refs[i].id, cur->refs[i].id, idmap)) + return false; + } + + return true; } /* compare two verifier states @@ -13269,7 +13280,7 @@ static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_stat if (!stacksafe(env, old, cur, env->idmap_scratch)) return false; - if (!refsafe(old, cur)) + if (!refsafe(old, cur, env->idmap_scratch)) return false; return true; |