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Diffstat (limited to 'fs/namei.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/namei.c121
1 files changed, 86 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index fd4724bce4f5..d78d74f5f5af 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -259,7 +259,24 @@ void putname(struct filename *name)
__putname(name);
}
-static int check_acl(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+/**
+ * check_acl - perform ACL permission checking
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @inode: inode to check permissions on
+ * @mask: right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC ...)
+ *
+ * This function performs the ACL permission checking. Since this function
+ * retrieve POSIX acls it needs to know whether it is called from a blocking or
+ * non-blocking context and thus cares about the MAY_NOT_BLOCK bit.
+ *
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then take
+ * care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking permissions.
+ * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the
+ * raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
+ */
+static int check_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
struct posix_acl *acl;
@@ -271,14 +288,14 @@ static int check_acl(struct inode *inode, int mask)
/* no ->get_acl() calls in RCU mode... */
if (is_uncached_acl(acl))
return -ECHILD;
- return posix_acl_permission(inode, acl, mask);
+ return posix_acl_permission(mnt_userns, inode, acl, mask);
}
acl = get_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
if (IS_ERR(acl))
return PTR_ERR(acl);
if (acl) {
- int error = posix_acl_permission(inode, acl, mask);
+ int error = posix_acl_permission(mnt_userns, inode, acl, mask);
posix_acl_release(acl);
return error;
}
@@ -287,18 +304,31 @@ static int check_acl(struct inode *inode, int mask)
return -EAGAIN;
}
-/*
- * This does the basic UNIX permission checking.
+/**
+ * acl_permission_check - perform basic UNIX permission checking
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @inode: inode to check permissions on
+ * @mask: right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC ...)
+ *
+ * This function performs the basic UNIX permission checking. Since this
+ * function may retrieve POSIX acls it needs to know whether it is called from a
+ * blocking or non-blocking context and thus cares about the MAY_NOT_BLOCK bit.
*
- * Note that the POSIX ACL check cares about the MAY_NOT_BLOCK bit,
- * for RCU walking.
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then take
+ * care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking permissions.
+ * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the
+ * raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
*/
-static int acl_permission_check(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+static int acl_permission_check(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
unsigned int mode = inode->i_mode;
+ kuid_t i_uid;
/* Are we the owner? If so, ACL's don't matter */
- if (likely(uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid))) {
+ i_uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
+ if (likely(uid_eq(current_fsuid(), i_uid))) {
mask &= 7;
mode >>= 6;
return (mask & ~mode) ? -EACCES : 0;
@@ -306,7 +336,7 @@ static int acl_permission_check(struct inode *inode, int mask)
/* Do we have ACL's? */
if (IS_POSIXACL(inode) && (mode & S_IRWXG)) {
- int error = check_acl(inode, mask);
+ int error = check_acl(mnt_userns, inode, mask);
if (error != -EAGAIN)
return error;
}
@@ -320,7 +350,8 @@ static int acl_permission_check(struct inode *inode, int mask)
* about? Need to check group ownership if so.
*/
if (mask & (mode ^ (mode >> 3))) {
- if (in_group_p(inode->i_gid))
+ kgid_t kgid = i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
+ if (in_group_p(kgid))
mode >>= 3;
}
@@ -330,6 +361,7 @@ static int acl_permission_check(struct inode *inode, int mask)
/**
* generic_permission - check for access rights on a Posix-like filesystem
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @inode: inode to check access rights for
* @mask: right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC,
* %MAY_NOT_BLOCK ...)
@@ -342,25 +374,32 @@ static int acl_permission_check(struct inode *inode, int mask)
* generic_permission is rcu-walk aware. It returns -ECHILD in case an rcu-walk
* request cannot be satisfied (eg. requires blocking or too much complexity).
* It would then be called again in ref-walk mode.
+ *
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then take
+ * care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking permissions.
+ * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the
+ * raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
*/
-int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+int generic_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
+ int mask)
{
int ret;
/*
* Do the basic permission checks.
*/
- ret = acl_permission_check(inode, mask);
+ ret = acl_permission_check(mnt_userns, inode, mask);
if (ret != -EACCES)
return ret;
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
/* DACs are overridable for directories */
if (!(mask & MAY_WRITE))
- if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode,
+ if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode,
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return 0;
- if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode,
+ if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode,
CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
return -EACCES;
@@ -371,7 +410,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
*/
mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
if (mask == MAY_READ)
- if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode,
+ if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode,
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return 0;
/*
@@ -380,7 +419,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
* at least one exec bit set.
*/
if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO))
- if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode,
+ if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode,
CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
@@ -388,13 +427,19 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_permission);
-/*
+/**
+ * do_inode_permission - UNIX permission checking
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @inode: inode to check permissions on
+ * @mask: right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC ...)
+ *
* We _really_ want to just do "generic_permission()" without
* even looking at the inode->i_op values. So we keep a cache
* flag in inode->i_opflags, that says "this has not special
* permission function, use the fast case".
*/
-static inline int do_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+static inline int do_inode_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
if (unlikely(!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_FASTPERM))) {
if (likely(inode->i_op->permission))
@@ -405,7 +450,7 @@ static inline int do_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
inode->i_opflags |= IOP_FASTPERM;
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
}
- return generic_permission(inode, mask);
+ return generic_permission(mnt_userns, inode, mask);
}
/**
@@ -430,8 +475,9 @@ static int sb_permission(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode, int mask)
/**
* inode_permission - Check for access rights to a given inode
- * @inode: Inode to check permission on
- * @mask: Right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC)
+ * @mnt_userns: User namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @inode: Inode to check permission on
+ * @mask: Right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC)
*
* Check for read/write/execute permissions on an inode. We use fs[ug]id for
* this, letting us set arbitrary permissions for filesystem access without
@@ -439,7 +485,8 @@ static int sb_permission(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode, int mask)
*
* When checking for MAY_APPEND, MAY_WRITE must also be set in @mask.
*/
-int inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+int inode_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
int retval;
@@ -463,7 +510,7 @@ int inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
return -EACCES;
}
- retval = do_inode_permission(inode, mask);
+ retval = do_inode_permission(mnt_userns, inode, mask);
if (retval)
return retval;
@@ -1009,7 +1056,7 @@ static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)
return false;
/* Hardlinking to unreadable or unwritable sources is dangerous. */
- if (inode_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))
+ if (inode_permission(&init_user_ns, inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))
return false;
return true;
@@ -1569,13 +1616,14 @@ static struct dentry *lookup_slow(const struct qstr *name,
static inline int may_lookup(struct nameidata *nd)
{
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
- int err = inode_permission(nd->inode, MAY_EXEC|MAY_NOT_BLOCK);
+ int err = inode_permission(&init_user_ns, nd->inode,
+ MAY_EXEC | MAY_NOT_BLOCK);
if (err != -ECHILD)
return err;
if (unlazy_walk(nd))
return -ECHILD;
}
- return inode_permission(nd->inode, MAY_EXEC);
+ return inode_permission(&init_user_ns, nd->inode, MAY_EXEC);
}
static int reserve_stack(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *link, unsigned seq)
@@ -2509,7 +2557,7 @@ static int lookup_one_len_common(const char *name, struct dentry *base,
return err;
}
- return inode_permission(base->d_inode, MAY_EXEC);
+ return inode_permission(&init_user_ns, base->d_inode, MAY_EXEC);
}
/**
@@ -2703,7 +2751,7 @@ static int may_delete(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *victim, bool isdir)
audit_inode_child(dir, victim, AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE);
- error = inode_permission(dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
+ error = inode_permission(&init_user_ns, dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
if (error)
return error;
if (IS_APPEND(dir))
@@ -2747,7 +2795,7 @@ static inline int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *child)
if (!kuid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, current_fsuid()) ||
!kgid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, current_fsgid()))
return -EOVERFLOW;
- return inode_permission(dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
+ return inode_permission(&init_user_ns, dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
}
/*
@@ -2877,7 +2925,7 @@ static int may_open(const struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
break;
}
- error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode);
+ error = inode_permission(&init_user_ns, inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -2939,7 +2987,8 @@ static int may_o_create(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t m
!kgid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, current_fsgid()))
return -EOVERFLOW;
- error = inode_permission(dir->dentry->d_inode, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
+ error = inode_permission(&init_user_ns, dir->dentry->d_inode,
+ MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -3276,7 +3325,7 @@ struct dentry *vfs_tmpfile(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, int open_flag)
int error;
/* we want directory to be writable */
- error = inode_permission(dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
+ error = inode_permission(&init_user_ns, dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
if (error)
goto out_err;
error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -4267,12 +4316,14 @@ int vfs_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
*/
if (new_dir != old_dir) {
if (is_dir) {
- error = inode_permission(source, MAY_WRITE);
+ error = inode_permission(&init_user_ns, source,
+ MAY_WRITE);
if (error)
return error;
}
if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && new_is_dir) {
- error = inode_permission(target, MAY_WRITE);
+ error = inode_permission(&init_user_ns, target,
+ MAY_WRITE);
if (error)
return error;
}