diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
33 files changed, 657 insertions, 84 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index ff4e9cd99854..20da391b5f32 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ config X86 select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_MIN_ADJUST select GENERIC_CMOS_UPDATE select GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE + select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES select GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP select GENERIC_FIND_FIRST_BIT select GENERIC_IOMAP @@ -428,6 +429,19 @@ config GOLDFISH def_bool y depends on X86_GOLDFISH +config RETPOLINE + bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel" + default y + help + Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against + kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding speculative indirect + branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern + support for full protection. The kernel may run slower. + + Without compiler support, at least indirect branches in assembler + code are eliminated. Since this includes the syscall entry path, + it is not entirely pointless. + config INTEL_RDT bool "Intel Resource Director Technology support" default n diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile index 3e73bc255e4e..e98f8e2e3708 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile @@ -230,6 +230,16 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wno-sign-compare # KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables +# Avoid indirect branches in kernel to deal with Spectre +ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register) + ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),) + KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS) -DRETPOLINE + else + $(warning CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y, but not supported by the compiler. Toolchain update recommended.) + endif +endif + archscripts: scripts_basic $(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=arch/x86/tools relocs diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S index 16627fec80b2..3d09e3aca18d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <asm/inst.h> #include <asm/frame.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> /* * The following macros are used to move an (un)aligned 16 byte value to/from @@ -2884,7 +2885,7 @@ ENTRY(aesni_xts_crypt8) pxor INC, STATE4 movdqu IV, 0x30(OUTP) - call *%r11 + CALL_NOSPEC %r11 movdqu 0x00(OUTP), INC pxor INC, STATE1 @@ -2929,7 +2930,7 @@ ENTRY(aesni_xts_crypt8) _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble() movups IV, (IVP) - call *%r11 + CALL_NOSPEC %r11 movdqu 0x40(OUTP), INC pxor INC, STATE1 diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S index f7c495e2863c..a14af6eb09cb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <asm/frame.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #define CAMELLIA_TABLE_BYTE_LEN 272 @@ -1227,7 +1228,7 @@ camellia_xts_crypt_16way: vpxor 14 * 16(%rax), %xmm15, %xmm14; vpxor 15 * 16(%rax), %xmm15, %xmm15; - call *%r9; + CALL_NOSPEC %r9; addq $(16 * 16), %rsp; diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S index eee5b3982cfd..b66bbfa62f50 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <asm/frame.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #define CAMELLIA_TABLE_BYTE_LEN 272 @@ -1343,7 +1344,7 @@ camellia_xts_crypt_32way: vpxor 14 * 32(%rax), %ymm15, %ymm14; vpxor 15 * 32(%rax), %ymm15, %ymm15; - call *%r9; + CALL_NOSPEC %r9; addq $(16 * 32), %rsp; diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S index 7a7de27c6f41..d9b734d0c8cc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ #include <asm/inst.h> #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> ## ISCSI CRC 32 Implementation with crc32 and pclmulqdq Instruction @@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ continue_block: movzxw (bufp, %rax, 2), len lea crc_array(%rip), bufp lea (bufp, len, 1), bufp - jmp *bufp + JMP_NOSPEC bufp ################################################################ ## 2a) PROCESS FULL BLOCKS: diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h index 45a63e00a6af..3f48f695d5e6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h +++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h @@ -198,8 +198,11 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with * PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION PGDs are 8k. Flip bit 12 to switch between the two * halves: */ -#define PTI_SWITCH_PGTABLES_MASK (1<<PAGE_SHIFT) -#define PTI_SWITCH_MASK (PTI_SWITCH_PGTABLES_MASK|(1<<X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT)) +#define PTI_USER_PGTABLE_BIT PAGE_SHIFT +#define PTI_USER_PGTABLE_MASK (1 << PTI_USER_PGTABLE_BIT) +#define PTI_USER_PCID_BIT X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT +#define PTI_USER_PCID_MASK (1 << PTI_USER_PCID_BIT) +#define PTI_USER_PGTABLE_AND_PCID_MASK (PTI_USER_PCID_MASK | PTI_USER_PGTABLE_MASK) .macro SET_NOFLUSH_BIT reg:req bts $X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH_BIT, \reg @@ -208,7 +211,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with .macro ADJUST_KERNEL_CR3 reg:req ALTERNATIVE "", "SET_NOFLUSH_BIT \reg", X86_FEATURE_PCID /* Clear PCID and "PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION bit", point CR3 at kernel pagetables: */ - andq $(~PTI_SWITCH_MASK), \reg + andq $(~PTI_USER_PGTABLE_AND_PCID_MASK), \reg .endm .macro SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg:req @@ -239,15 +242,19 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with /* Flush needed, clear the bit */ btr \scratch_reg, THIS_CPU_user_pcid_flush_mask movq \scratch_reg2, \scratch_reg - jmp .Lwrcr3_\@ + jmp .Lwrcr3_pcid_\@ .Lnoflush_\@: movq \scratch_reg2, \scratch_reg SET_NOFLUSH_BIT \scratch_reg +.Lwrcr3_pcid_\@: + /* Flip the ASID to the user version */ + orq $(PTI_USER_PCID_MASK), \scratch_reg + .Lwrcr3_\@: - /* Flip the PGD and ASID to the user version */ - orq $(PTI_SWITCH_MASK), \scratch_reg + /* Flip the PGD to the user version */ + orq $(PTI_USER_PGTABLE_MASK), \scratch_reg mov \scratch_reg, %cr3 .Lend_\@: .endm @@ -263,17 +270,12 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with movq %cr3, \scratch_reg movq \scratch_reg, \save_reg /* - * Is the "switch mask" all zero? That means that both of - * these are zero: - * - * 1. The user/kernel PCID bit, and - * 2. The user/kernel "bit" that points CR3 to the - * bottom half of the 8k PGD - * - * That indicates a kernel CR3 value, not a user CR3. + * Test the user pagetable bit. If set, then the user page tables + * are active. If clear CR3 already has the kernel page table + * active. */ - testq $(PTI_SWITCH_MASK), \scratch_reg - jz .Ldone_\@ + bt $PTI_USER_PGTABLE_BIT, \scratch_reg + jnc .Ldone_\@ ADJUST_KERNEL_CR3 \scratch_reg movq \scratch_reg, %cr3 @@ -290,7 +292,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with * KERNEL pages can always resume with NOFLUSH as we do * explicit flushes. */ - bt $X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT, \save_reg + bt $PTI_USER_PGTABLE_BIT, \save_reg jnc .Lnoflush_\@ /* diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S index ace8f321a5a1..a1f28a54f23a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ #include <asm/asm.h> #include <asm/smap.h> #include <asm/frame.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> .section .entry.text, "ax" @@ -290,7 +291,7 @@ ENTRY(ret_from_fork) /* kernel thread */ 1: movl %edi, %eax - call *%ebx + CALL_NOSPEC %ebx /* * A kernel thread is allowed to return here after successfully * calling do_execve(). Exit to userspace to complete the execve() @@ -919,7 +920,7 @@ common_exception: movl %ecx, %es TRACE_IRQS_OFF movl %esp, %eax # pt_regs pointer - call *%edi + CALL_NOSPEC %edi jmp ret_from_exception END(common_exception) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index f048e384ff54..4f8e1d35a97c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ #include <asm/pgtable_types.h> #include <asm/export.h> #include <asm/frame.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include "calling.h" @@ -191,7 +192,7 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline) */ pushq %rdi movq $entry_SYSCALL_64_stage2, %rdi - jmp *%rdi + JMP_NOSPEC %rdi END(entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline) .popsection @@ -270,7 +271,12 @@ entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath: * It might end up jumping to the slow path. If it jumps, RAX * and all argument registers are clobbered. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + movq sys_call_table(, %rax, 8), %rax + call __x86_indirect_thunk_rax +#else call *sys_call_table(, %rax, 8) +#endif .Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath_call: movq %rax, RAX(%rsp) @@ -442,7 +448,7 @@ ENTRY(stub_ptregs_64) jmp entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path 1: - jmp *%rax /* Called from C */ + JMP_NOSPEC %rax /* Called from C */ END(stub_ptregs_64) .macro ptregs_stub func @@ -521,7 +527,7 @@ ENTRY(ret_from_fork) 1: /* kernel thread */ movq %r12, %rdi - call *%rbx + CALL_NOSPEC %rbx /* * A kernel thread is allowed to return here after successfully * calling do_execve(). Exit to userspace to complete the execve() diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c index 141e07b06216..24ffa1e88cf9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c @@ -582,6 +582,24 @@ static __init int bts_init(void) if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DTES64) || !x86_pmu.bts) return -ENODEV; + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) { + /* + * BTS hardware writes through a virtual memory map we must + * either use the kernel physical map, or the user mapping of + * the AUX buffer. + * + * However, since this driver supports per-CPU and per-task inherit + * we cannot use the user mapping since it will not be availble + * if we're not running the owning process. + * + * With PTI we can't use the kernal map either, because its not + * there when we run userspace. + * + * For now, disable this driver when using PTI. + */ + return -ENODEV; + } + bts_pmu.capabilities = PERF_PMU_CAP_AUX_NO_SG | PERF_PMU_CAP_ITRACE | PERF_PMU_CAP_EXCLUSIVE; bts_pmu.task_ctx_nr = perf_sw_context; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h index ff700d81e91e..0927cdc4f946 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h @@ -11,7 +11,32 @@ #include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/special_insns.h> #include <asm/preempt.h> +#include <asm/asm.h> #ifndef CONFIG_X86_CMPXCHG64 extern void cmpxchg8b_emu(void); #endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 +#define INDIRECT_THUNK(reg) extern asmlinkage void __x86_indirect_thunk_e ## reg(void); +#else +#define INDIRECT_THUNK(reg) extern asmlinkage void __x86_indirect_thunk_r ## reg(void); +INDIRECT_THUNK(8) +INDIRECT_THUNK(9) +INDIRECT_THUNK(10) +INDIRECT_THUNK(11) +INDIRECT_THUNK(12) +INDIRECT_THUNK(13) +INDIRECT_THUNK(14) +INDIRECT_THUNK(15) +#endif +INDIRECT_THUNK(ax) +INDIRECT_THUNK(bx) +INDIRECT_THUNK(cx) +INDIRECT_THUNK(dx) +INDIRECT_THUNK(si) +INDIRECT_THUNK(di) +INDIRECT_THUNK(bp) +INDIRECT_THUNK(sp) +#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 21ac898df2d8..f275447862f4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -203,6 +203,8 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */ #define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT ( 7*32+15) /* Intel Processor Trace */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW ( 7*32+16) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */ @@ -342,5 +344,7 @@ #define X86_BUG_MONITOR X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */ #define X86_BUG_AMD_E400 X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */ #define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */ +#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1 X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */ +#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h index 5400add2885b..8bf450b13d9f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include <linux/nmi.h> #include <asm/io.h> #include <asm/hyperv.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> /* * The below CPUID leaves are present if VersionAndFeatures.HypervisorPresent @@ -186,10 +187,11 @@ static inline u64 hv_do_hypercall(u64 control, void *input, void *output) return U64_MAX; __asm__ __volatile__("mov %4, %%r8\n" - "call *%5" + CALL_NOSPEC : "=a" (hv_status), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, "+c" (control), "+d" (input_address) - : "r" (output_address), "m" (hv_hypercall_pg) + : "r" (output_address), + THUNK_TARGET(hv_hypercall_pg) : "cc", "memory", "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11"); #else u32 input_address_hi = upper_32_bits(input_address); @@ -200,13 +202,13 @@ static inline u64 hv_do_hypercall(u64 control, void *input, void *output) if (!hv_hypercall_pg) return U64_MAX; - __asm__ __volatile__("call *%7" + __asm__ __volatile__(CALL_NOSPEC : "=A" (hv_status), "+c" (input_address_lo), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT : "A" (control), "b" (input_address_hi), "D"(output_address_hi), "S"(output_address_lo), - "m" (hv_hypercall_pg) + THUNK_TARGET(hv_hypercall_pg) : "cc", "memory"); #endif /* !x86_64 */ return hv_status; @@ -227,10 +229,10 @@ static inline u64 hv_do_fast_hypercall8(u16 code, u64 input1) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 { - __asm__ __volatile__("call *%4" + __asm__ __volatile__(CALL_NOSPEC : "=a" (hv_status), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, "+c" (control), "+d" (input1) - : "m" (hv_hypercall_pg) + : THUNK_TARGET(hv_hypercall_pg) : "cc", "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11"); } #else @@ -238,13 +240,13 @@ static inline u64 hv_do_fast_hypercall8(u16 code, u64 input1) u32 input1_hi = upper_32_bits(input1); u32 input1_lo = lower_32_bits(input1); - __asm__ __volatile__ ("call *%5" + __asm__ __volatile__ (CALL_NOSPEC : "=A"(hv_status), "+c"(input1_lo), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT : "A" (control), "b" (input1_hi), - "m" (hv_hypercall_pg) + THUNK_TARGET(hv_hypercall_pg) : "cc", "edi", "esi"); } #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 34c4922bbc3f..e7b983a35506 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -355,6 +355,9 @@ #define FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE_MASK 0xfffffffULL #define FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE_SHIFT 20 #define MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID 0xc001100c +#define MSR_F10H_DECFG 0xc0011029 +#define MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT 1 +#define MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE BIT_ULL(MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT) /* K8 MSRs */ #define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM1 0xc001001a diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..402a11c803c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +#ifndef __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ +#define __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ + +#include <asm/alternative.h> +#include <asm/alternative-asm.h> +#include <asm/cpufeatures.h> + +/* + * Fill the CPU return stack buffer. + * + * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an + * infinite 'pause; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution. + * + * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based + * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to + * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes + * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would + * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used. + * + * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and + * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that + * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there. + */ + +#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */ +#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */ + +/* + * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be + * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation + * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop. + */ +#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \ + mov $(nr/2), reg; \ +771: \ + call 772f; \ +773: /* speculation trap */ \ + pause; \ + jmp 773b; \ +772: \ + call 774f; \ +775: /* speculation trap */ \ + pause; \ + jmp 775b; \ +774: \ + dec reg; \ + jnz 771b; \ + add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp; + +#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ + +/* + * This should be used immediately before a retpoline alternative. It tells + * objtool where the retpolines are so that it can make sense of the control + * flow by just reading the original instruction(s) and ignoring the + * alternatives. + */ +.macro ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE + .Lannotate_\@: + .pushsection .discard.nospec + .long .Lannotate_\@ - . + .popsection +.endm + +/* + * These are the bare retpoline primitives for indirect jmp and call. + * Do not use these directly; they only exist to make the ALTERNATIVE + * invocation below less ugly. + */ +.macro RETPOLINE_JMP reg:req + call .Ldo_rop_\@ +.Lspec_trap_\@: + pause + jmp .Lspec_trap_\@ +.Ldo_rop_\@: + mov \reg, (%_ASM_SP) + ret +.endm + +/* + * This is a wrapper around RETPOLINE_JMP so the called function in reg + * returns to the instruction after the macro. + */ +.macro RETPOLINE_CALL reg:req + jmp .Ldo_call_\@ +.Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@: + RETPOLINE_JMP \reg +.Ldo_call_\@: + call .Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@ +.endm + +/* + * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple + * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2 + * attack. + */ +.macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE + ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(jmp *\reg), \ + __stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \ + __stringify(lfence; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD +#else + jmp *\reg +#endif +.endm + +.macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE + ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(call *\reg), \ + __stringify(RETPOLINE_CALL \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,\ + __stringify(lfence; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD +#else + call *\reg +#endif +.endm + + /* + * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP + * monstrosity above, manually. + */ +.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \ + __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)) \ + \ftr +.Lskip_rsb_\@: +#endif +.endm + +#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ + +#define ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \ + "999:\n\t" \ + ".pushsection .discard.nospec\n\t" \ + ".long 999b - .\n\t" \ + ".popsection\n\t" + +#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(RETPOLINE) + +/* + * Since the inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC, + * the 64-bit one is dependent on RETPOLINE not CONFIG_RETPOLINE. + */ +# define CALL_NOSPEC \ + ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \ + ALTERNATIVE( \ + "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \ + "call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n", \ + X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) +# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr) + +#elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32) && defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) +/* + * For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because + * otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET + * here, anyway. + */ +# define CALL_NOSPEC ALTERNATIVE("call *%[thunk_target]\n", \ + " jmp 904f;\n" \ + " .align 16\n" \ + "901: call 903f;\n" \ + "902: pause;\n" \ + " jmp 902b;\n" \ + " .align 16\n" \ + "903: addl $4, %%esp;\n" \ + " pushl %[thunk_target];\n" \ + " ret;\n" \ + " .align 16\n" \ + "904: call 901b;\n", \ + X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) + +# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr) +#else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */ +# define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n" +# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr) +#endif + +/* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */ +enum spectre_v2_mitigation { + SPECTRE_V2_NONE, + SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL, + SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD, + SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, + SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD, + SPECTRE_V2_IBRS, +}; + +/* + * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest + * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both + * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future + * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided. + */ +static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + unsigned long loops = RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS / 2; + + asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE + ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f", + __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)), + X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) + "910:" + : "=&r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT + : "r" (loops) : "memory" ); +#endif +} +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ +#endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h index 6a60fea90b9d..625a52a5594f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ #define CR3_NOFLUSH BIT_ULL(63) #ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION -# define X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT 11 +# define X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT 11 #endif #else diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h index 4a08dd2ab32a..d33e4a26dc7e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h @@ -81,13 +81,13 @@ static inline u16 kern_pcid(u16 asid) * Make sure that the dynamic ASID space does not confict with the * bit we are using to switch between user and kernel ASIDs. */ - BUILD_BUG_ON(TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS >= (1 << X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT)); + BUILD_BUG_ON(TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS >= (1 << X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT)); /* * The ASID being passed in here should have respected the * MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE and thus never have the switch bit set. */ - VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(asid & (1 << X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT)); + VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(asid & (1 << X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT)); #endif /* * The dynamically-assigned ASIDs that get passed in are small @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static inline u16 user_pcid(u16 asid) { u16 ret = kern_pcid(asid); #ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION - ret |= 1 << X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT; + ret |= 1 << X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT; #endif return ret; } diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h index 7cb282e9e587..bfd882617613 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/smap.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <xen/interface/xen.h> #include <xen/interface/sched.h> @@ -217,9 +218,9 @@ privcmd_call(unsigned call, __HYPERCALL_5ARG(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5); stac(); - asm volatile("call *%[call]" + asm volatile(CALL_NOSPEC : __HYPERCALL_5PARAM - : [call] "a" (&hypercall_page[call]) + : [thunk_target] "a" (&hypercall_page[call]) : __HYPERCALL_CLOBBER5); clac(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index dbaf14d69ebd..4817d743c263 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -344,9 +344,12 @@ done: static void __init_or_module noinline optimize_nops(struct alt_instr *a, u8 *instr) { unsigned long flags; + int i; - if (instr[0] != 0x90) - return; + for (i = 0; i < a->padlen; i++) { + if (instr[i] != 0x90) + return; + } local_irq_save(flags); add_nops(instr + (a->instrlen - a->padlen), a->padlen); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index bcb75dc97d44..ea831c858195 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -829,8 +829,32 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_K8); if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XMM2)) { - /* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */ - set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC); + unsigned long long val; + int ret; + + /* + * A serializing LFENCE has less overhead than MFENCE, so + * use it for execution serialization. On families which + * don't have that MSR, LFENCE is already serializing. + * msr_set_bit() uses the safe accessors, too, even if the MSR + * is not present. + */ + msr_set_bit(MSR_F10H_DECFG, + MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT); + + /* + * Verify that the MSR write was successful (could be running + * under a hypervisor) and only then assume that LFENCE is + * serializing. + */ + ret = rdmsrl_safe(MSR_F10H_DECFG, &val); + if (!ret && (val & MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE)) { + /* A serializing LFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */ + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC); + } else { + /* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */ + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC); + } } /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index ba0b2424c9b0..e4dc26185aa7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ */ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/utsname.h> +#include <linux/cpu.h> + +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> +#include <asm/cmdline.h> #include <asm/bugs.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/processor-flags.h> @@ -20,6 +24,8 @@ #include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/set_memory.h> +static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void); + void __init check_bugs(void) { identify_boot_cpu(); @@ -29,6 +35,9 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data); } + /* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */ + spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 /* * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP. @@ -60,3 +69,179 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1); #endif } + +/* The kernel command line selection */ +enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd { + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, +}; + +static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = { + [SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable", + [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL] = "Vulnerable: Minimal generic ASM retpoline", + [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD] = "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline", + [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline", + [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline", +}; + +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 mitigation: " fmt + +static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE; + +static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason) +{ + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) + pr_info("%s\n", reason); +} + +static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) + pr_info("%s\n", reason); +} + +static inline bool retp_compiler(void) +{ + return __is_defined(RETPOLINE); +} + +static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt) +{ + int len = strlen(opt); + + return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len); +} + +static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) +{ + char arg[20]; + int ret; + + ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, + sizeof(arg)); + if (ret > 0) { + if (match_option(arg, ret, "off")) { + goto disable; + } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "on")) { + spec2_print_if_secure("force enabled on command line."); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE; + } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline")) { + spec2_print_if_insecure("retpoline selected on command line."); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE; + } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,amd")) { + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) { + pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n"); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + spec2_print_if_insecure("AMD retpoline selected on command line."); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD; + } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,generic")) { + spec2_print_if_insecure("generic retpoline selected on command line."); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC; + } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "auto")) { + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + } + + if (!cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2")) + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; +disable: + spec2_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line."); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE; +} + +static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) +{ + enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(); + enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE; + + /* + * If the CPU is not affected and the command line mode is NONE or AUTO + * then nothing to do. + */ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) && + (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO)) + return; + + switch (cmd) { + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE: + return; + + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE: + /* FALLTRHU */ + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO: + goto retpoline_auto; + + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD: + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) + goto retpoline_amd; + break; + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC: + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) + goto retpoline_generic; + break; + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE: + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) + goto retpoline_auto; + break; + } + pr_err("kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!"); + return; + +retpoline_auto: + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) { + retpoline_amd: + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) { + pr_err("LFENCE not serializing. Switching to generic retpoline\n"); + goto retpoline_generic; + } + mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD : + SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD; + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE); + } else { + retpoline_generic: + mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC : + SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL; + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE); + } + + spectre_v2_enabled = mode; + pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]); +} + +#undef pr_fmt + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS +ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN)) + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); +} + +ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1)) + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); +} + +ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); + + return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]); +} +#endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 39d7ea865207..ef29ad001991 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -926,6 +926,9 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN); + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1); + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2); + fpu__init_system(c); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S index b6c6468e10bc..4c8440de3355 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include <asm/segment.h> #include <asm/export.h> #include <asm/ftrace.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #ifdef CC_USING_FENTRY # define function_hook __fentry__ @@ -197,7 +198,8 @@ ftrace_stub: movl 0x4(%ebp), %edx subl $MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE, %eax - call *ftrace_trace_function + movl ftrace_trace_function, %ecx + CALL_NOSPEC %ecx popl %edx popl %ecx @@ -241,5 +243,5 @@ return_to_handler: movl %eax, %ecx popl %edx popl %eax - jmp *%ecx + JMP_NOSPEC %ecx #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S index c832291d948a..7cb8ba08beb9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ #include <asm/ptrace.h> #include <asm/ftrace.h> #include <asm/export.h> - +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> .code64 .section .entry.text, "ax" @@ -286,8 +286,8 @@ trace: * ip and parent ip are used and the list function is called when * function tracing is enabled. */ - call *ftrace_trace_function - + movq ftrace_trace_function, %r8 + CALL_NOSPEC %r8 restore_mcount_regs jmp fgraph_trace @@ -329,5 +329,5 @@ GLOBAL(return_to_handler) movq 8(%rsp), %rdx movq (%rsp), %rax addq $24, %rsp - jmp *%rdi + JMP_NOSPEC %rdi #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c index a83b3346a0e1..c1bdbd3d3232 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <linux/mm.h> #include <asm/apic.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW @@ -55,11 +56,11 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct irq_stack *, softirq_stack); static void call_on_stack(void *func, void *stack) { asm volatile("xchgl %%ebx,%%esp \n" - "call *%%edi \n" + CALL_NOSPEC "movl %%ebx,%%esp \n" : "=b" (stack) : "0" (stack), - "D"(func) + [thunk_target] "D"(func) : "memory", "cc", "edx", "ecx", "eax"); } @@ -95,11 +96,11 @@ static inline int execute_on_irq_stack(int overflow, struct irq_desc *desc) call_on_stack(print_stack_overflow, isp); asm volatile("xchgl %%ebx,%%esp \n" - "call *%%edi \n" + CALL_NOSPEC "movl %%ebx,%%esp \n" : "=a" (arg1), "=b" (isp) : "0" (desc), "1" (isp), - "D" (desc->handle_irq) + [thunk_target] "D" (desc->handle_irq) : "memory", "cc", "ecx"); return 1; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c index a4eb27918ceb..a2486f444073 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c @@ -138,6 +138,17 @@ static int map_tboot_page(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long pfn, return -1; set_pte_at(&tboot_mm, vaddr, pte, pfn_pte(pfn, prot)); pte_unmap(pte); + + /* + * PTI poisons low addresses in the kernel page tables in the + * name of making them unusable for userspace. To execute + * code at such a low address, the poison must be cleared. + * + * Note: 'pgd' actually gets set in p4d_alloc() _or_ + * pud_alloc() depending on 4/5-level paging. + */ + pgd->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX; + return 0; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 3158dac87f82..f40d0da1f1d3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ #include <asm/debugreg.h> #include <asm/kvm_para.h> #include <asm/irq_remapping.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/virtext.h> #include "trace.h" @@ -5027,6 +5028,9 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) #endif ); + /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */ + vmexit_fill_RSB(); + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base); #else diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c index 3f89f6783aa5..c829d89e2e63 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ #include <asm/apic.h> #include <asm/irq_remapping.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include "trace.h" #include "pmu.h" @@ -9490,6 +9491,9 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) #endif ); + /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */ + vmexit_fill_RSB(); + /* MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is zeroed on vmexit. Restore it if needed */ if (debugctlmsr) update_debugctlmsr(debugctlmsr); diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile index 7b181b61170e..f23934bbaf4e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ lib-y += memcpy_$(BITS).o lib-$(CONFIG_RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM) += rwsem.o lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o insn-eval.o lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o +lib-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S b/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S index 4d34bb548b41..46e71a74e612 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S @@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ #include <asm/errno.h> #include <asm/asm.h> #include <asm/export.h> - +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> + /* * computes a partial checksum, e.g. for TCP/UDP fragments */ @@ -156,7 +157,7 @@ ENTRY(csum_partial) negl %ebx lea 45f(%ebx,%ebx,2), %ebx testl %esi, %esi - jmp *%ebx + JMP_NOSPEC %ebx # Handle 2-byte-aligned regions 20: addw (%esi), %ax @@ -439,7 +440,7 @@ ENTRY(csum_partial_copy_generic) andl $-32,%edx lea 3f(%ebx,%ebx), %ebx testl %esi, %esi - jmp *%ebx + JMP_NOSPEC %ebx 1: addl $64,%esi addl $64,%edi SRC(movb -32(%edx),%bl) ; SRC(movb (%edx),%bl) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cb45c6cb465f --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +#include <linux/stringify.h> +#include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <asm/dwarf2.h> +#include <asm/cpufeatures.h> +#include <asm/alternative-asm.h> +#include <asm/export.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> + +.macro THUNK reg + .section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk.\reg + +ENTRY(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg) + CFI_STARTPROC + JMP_NOSPEC %\reg + CFI_ENDPROC +ENDPROC(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg) +.endm + +/* + * Despite being an assembler file we can't just use .irp here + * because __KSYM_DEPS__ only uses the C preprocessor and would + * only see one instance of "__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg" rather + * than one per register with the correct names. So we do it + * the simple and nasty way... + */ +#define EXPORT_THUNK(reg) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg) +#define GENERATE_THUNK(reg) THUNK reg ; EXPORT_THUNK(reg) + +GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_AX) +GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_BX) +GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_CX) +GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_DX) +GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_SI) +GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_DI) +GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_BP) +GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_SP) +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT +GENERATE_THUNK(r8) +GENERATE_THUNK(r9) +GENERATE_THUNK(r10) +GENERATE_THUNK(r11) +GENERATE_THUNK(r12) +GENERATE_THUNK(r13) +GENERATE_THUNK(r14) +GENERATE_THUNK(r15) +#endif diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c index 43d4a4a29037..ce38f165489b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ pgd_t __pti_set_user_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd) * * Returns a pointer to a P4D on success, or NULL on failure. */ -static p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(unsigned long address) +static __init p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(unsigned long address) { pgd_t *pgd = kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd_offset_k(address)); gfp_t gfp = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO); @@ -164,12 +164,7 @@ static p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(unsigned long address) if (!new_p4d_page) return NULL; - if (pgd_none(*pgd)) { - set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_p4d_page))); - new_p4d_page = 0; - } - if (new_p4d_page) - free_page(new_p4d_page); + set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_p4d_page))); } BUILD_BUG_ON(pgd_large(*pgd) != 0); @@ -182,7 +177,7 @@ static p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(unsigned long address) * * Returns a pointer to a PMD on success, or NULL on failure. */ -static pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address) +static __init pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address) { gfp_t gfp = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO); p4d_t *p4d = pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(address); @@ -194,12 +189,7 @@ static pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address) if (!new_pud_page) return NULL; - if (p4d_none(*p4d)) { - set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pud_page))); - new_pud_page = 0; - } - if (new_pud_page) - free_page(new_pud_page); + set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pud_page))); } pud = pud_offset(p4d, address); @@ -213,12 +203,7 @@ static pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address) if (!new_pmd_page) return NULL; - if (pud_none(*pud)) { - set_pud(pud, __pud(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pmd_page))); - new_pmd_page = 0; - } - if (new_pmd_page) - free_page(new_pmd_page); + set_pud(pud, __pud(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pmd_page))); } return pmd_offset(pud, address); @@ -251,12 +236,7 @@ static __init pte_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte(unsigned long address) if (!new_pte_page) return NULL; - if (pmd_none(*pmd)) { - set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pte_page))); - new_pte_page = 0; - } - if (new_pte_page) - free_page(new_pte_page); + set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pte_page))); } pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address); diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c index d87ac96e37ed..2dd15e967c3f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c @@ -135,7 +135,9 @@ pgd_t * __init efi_call_phys_prolog(void) pud[j] = *pud_offset(p4d_k, vaddr); } } + pgd_offset_k(pgd * PGDIR_SIZE)->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX; } + out: __flush_tlb_all(); |