diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
48 files changed, 542 insertions, 265 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c index a5e5db6ada3c..39b2eded7bc2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c @@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ void initialize_identity_maps(void *rmode) add_identity_map(cmdline, cmdline + COMMAND_LINE_SIZE); /* Load the new page-table. */ + sev_verify_cbit(top_level_pgt); write_cr3(top_level_pgt); } diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S index dd07e7b41b11..aa561795efd1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S @@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(get_sev_encryption_bit) SYM_FUNC_END(get_sev_encryption_bit) .code64 + +#include "../../kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S" + SYM_FUNC_START(set_sev_encryption_mask) #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT push %rbp @@ -81,6 +84,19 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(set_sev_encryption_mask) bts %rax, sme_me_mask(%rip) /* Create the encryption mask */ + /* + * Read MSR_AMD64_SEV again and store it to sev_status. Can't do this in + * get_sev_encryption_bit() because this function is 32-bit code and + * shared between 64-bit and 32-bit boot path. + */ + movl $MSR_AMD64_SEV, %ecx /* Read the SEV MSR */ + rdmsr + + /* Store MSR value in sev_status */ + shlq $32, %rdx + orq %rdx, %rax + movq %rax, sev_status(%rip) + .Lno_sev_mask: movq %rbp, %rsp /* Restore original stack pointer */ @@ -96,5 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(set_sev_encryption_mask) #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT .balign 8 -SYM_DATA(sme_me_mask, .quad 0) +SYM_DATA(sme_me_mask, .quad 0) +SYM_DATA(sev_status, .quad 0) +SYM_DATA(sev_check_data, .quad 0) #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h index 6d31f1b4c4d1..d9a631c5973c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h @@ -159,4 +159,6 @@ void boot_page_fault(void); void boot_stage1_vc(void); void boot_stage2_vc(void); +unsigned long sev_verify_cbit(unsigned long cr3); + #endif /* BOOT_COMPRESSED_MISC_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c index f1926e9f2143..af457f8cb29d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c @@ -2630,7 +2630,7 @@ static int handle_pmi_common(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 status) u64 pebs_enabled = cpuc->pebs_enabled; handled++; - x86_pmu.drain_pebs(regs); + x86_pmu.drain_pebs(regs, &data); status &= x86_pmu.intel_ctrl | GLOBAL_STATUS_TRACE_TOPAPMI; /* @@ -4987,6 +4987,12 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void) x86_add_quirk(intel_arch_events_quirk); /* Install first, so it runs last */ + if (version >= 5) { + x86_pmu.intel_cap.anythread_deprecated = edx.split.anythread_deprecated; + if (x86_pmu.intel_cap.anythread_deprecated) + pr_cont(" AnyThread deprecated, "); + } + /* * Install the hw-cache-events table: */ @@ -5512,6 +5518,10 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void) x86_pmu.intel_ctrl |= ((1LL << x86_pmu.num_counters_fixed)-1) << INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED; + /* AnyThread may be deprecated on arch perfmon v5 or later */ + if (x86_pmu.intel_cap.anythread_deprecated) + x86_pmu.format_attrs = intel_arch_formats_attr; + if (x86_pmu.event_constraints) { /* * event on fixed counter2 (REF_CYCLES) only works on this diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c index 442e1ed4acd4..4eb7ee5fed72 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c @@ -107,14 +107,14 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); #define DEFINE_CSTATE_FORMAT_ATTR(_var, _name, _format) \ -static ssize_t __cstate_##_var##_show(struct kobject *kobj, \ - struct kobj_attribute *attr, \ +static ssize_t __cstate_##_var##_show(struct device *dev, \ + struct device_attribute *attr, \ char *page) \ { \ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_format) >= PAGE_SIZE); \ return sprintf(page, _format "\n"); \ } \ -static struct kobj_attribute format_attr_##_var = \ +static struct device_attribute format_attr_##_var = \ __ATTR(_name, 0444, __cstate_##_var##_show, NULL) static ssize_t cstate_get_attr_cpumask(struct device *dev, diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c index 404315df1e16..b47cc4226934 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c @@ -642,8 +642,8 @@ int intel_pmu_drain_bts_buffer(void) rcu_read_lock(); perf_prepare_sample(&header, &data, event, ®s); - if (perf_output_begin(&handle, event, header.size * - (top - base - skip))) + if (perf_output_begin(&handle, &data, event, + header.size * (top - base - skip))) goto unlock; for (at = base; at < top; at++) { @@ -670,7 +670,9 @@ unlock: static inline void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_buffer(void) { - x86_pmu.drain_pebs(NULL); + struct perf_sample_data data; + + x86_pmu.drain_pebs(NULL, &data); } /* @@ -1719,23 +1721,24 @@ intel_pmu_save_and_restart_reload(struct perf_event *event, int count) return 0; } -static void __intel_pmu_pebs_event(struct perf_event *event, - struct pt_regs *iregs, - void *base, void *top, - int bit, int count, - void (*setup_sample)(struct perf_event *, - struct pt_regs *, - void *, - struct perf_sample_data *, - struct pt_regs *)) +static __always_inline void +__intel_pmu_pebs_event(struct perf_event *event, + struct pt_regs *iregs, + struct perf_sample_data *data, + void *base, void *top, + int bit, int count, + void (*setup_sample)(struct perf_event *, + struct pt_regs *, + void *, + struct perf_sample_data *, + struct pt_regs *)) { struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events); struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw; - struct perf_sample_data data; struct x86_perf_regs perf_regs; struct pt_regs *regs = &perf_regs.regs; void *at = get_next_pebs_record_by_bit(base, top, bit); - struct pt_regs dummy_iregs; + static struct pt_regs dummy_iregs; if (hwc->flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_AUTO_RELOAD) { /* @@ -1752,14 +1755,14 @@ static void __intel_pmu_pebs_event(struct perf_event *event, iregs = &dummy_iregs; while (count > 1) { - setup_sample(event, iregs, at, &data, regs); - perf_event_output(event, &data, regs); + setup_sample(event, iregs, at, data, regs); + perf_event_output(event, data, regs); at += cpuc->pebs_record_size; at = get_next_pebs_record_by_bit(at, top, bit); count--; } - setup_sample(event, iregs, at, &data, regs); + setup_sample(event, iregs, at, data, regs); if (iregs == &dummy_iregs) { /* * The PEBS records may be drained in the non-overflow context, @@ -1767,18 +1770,18 @@ static void __intel_pmu_pebs_event(struct perf_event *event, * last record the same as other PEBS records, and doesn't * invoke the generic overflow handler. */ - perf_event_output(event, &data, regs); + perf_event_output(event, data, regs); } else { /* * All but the last records are processed. * The last one is left to be able to call the overflow handler. */ - if (perf_event_overflow(event, &data, regs)) + if (perf_event_overflow(event, data, regs)) x86_pmu_stop(event, 0); } } -static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_core(struct pt_regs *iregs) +static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_core(struct pt_regs *iregs, struct perf_sample_data *data) { struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events); struct debug_store *ds = cpuc->ds; @@ -1812,7 +1815,7 @@ static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_core(struct pt_regs *iregs) return; } - __intel_pmu_pebs_event(event, iregs, at, top, 0, n, + __intel_pmu_pebs_event(event, iregs, data, at, top, 0, n, setup_pebs_fixed_sample_data); } @@ -1835,7 +1838,7 @@ static void intel_pmu_pebs_event_update_no_drain(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc, int } } -static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm(struct pt_regs *iregs) +static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm(struct pt_regs *iregs, struct perf_sample_data *data) { struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events); struct debug_store *ds = cpuc->ds; @@ -1942,14 +1945,14 @@ static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm(struct pt_regs *iregs) } if (counts[bit]) { - __intel_pmu_pebs_event(event, iregs, base, + __intel_pmu_pebs_event(event, iregs, data, base, top, bit, counts[bit], setup_pebs_fixed_sample_data); } } } -static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_icl(struct pt_regs *iregs) +static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_icl(struct pt_regs *iregs, struct perf_sample_data *data) { short counts[INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED + MAX_FIXED_PEBS_EVENTS] = {}; struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events); @@ -1997,7 +2000,7 @@ static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_icl(struct pt_regs *iregs) if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!event->attr.precise_ip)) continue; - __intel_pmu_pebs_event(event, iregs, base, + __intel_pmu_pebs_event(event, iregs, data, base, top, bit, counts[bit], setup_pebs_adaptive_sample_data); } diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c index 86d012b3e0b4..80d52cbe2fde 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c @@ -94,8 +94,8 @@ end: return map; } -ssize_t uncore_event_show(struct kobject *kobj, - struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) +ssize_t uncore_event_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { struct uncore_event_desc *event = container_of(attr, struct uncore_event_desc, attr); diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.h b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.h index 83d2a7d490e0..9efea154349d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.h +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.h @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ struct intel_uncore_box { #define UNCORE_BOX_FLAG_CFL8_CBOX_MSR_OFFS 2 struct uncore_event_desc { - struct kobj_attribute attr; + struct device_attribute attr; const char *config; }; @@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ struct pci2phy_map { struct pci2phy_map *__find_pci2phy_map(int segment); int uncore_pcibus_to_physid(struct pci_bus *bus); -ssize_t uncore_event_show(struct kobject *kobj, - struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf); +ssize_t uncore_event_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); static inline struct intel_uncore_pmu *dev_to_uncore_pmu(struct device *dev) { @@ -201,14 +201,14 @@ extern int __uncore_max_dies; } #define DEFINE_UNCORE_FORMAT_ATTR(_var, _name, _format) \ -static ssize_t __uncore_##_var##_show(struct kobject *kobj, \ - struct kobj_attribute *attr, \ +static ssize_t __uncore_##_var##_show(struct device *dev, \ + struct device_attribute *attr, \ char *page) \ { \ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_format) >= PAGE_SIZE); \ return sprintf(page, _format "\n"); \ } \ -static struct kobj_attribute format_attr_##_var = \ +static struct device_attribute format_attr_##_var = \ __ATTR(_name, 0444, __uncore_##_var##_show, NULL) static inline bool uncore_pmc_fixed(int idx) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c index 39e632ed6ca9..bbd1120ae161 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c @@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ enum perf_snb_uncore_imc_freerunning_types { static struct freerunning_counters snb_uncore_imc_freerunning[] = { [SNB_PCI_UNCORE_IMC_DATA_READS] = { SNB_UNCORE_PCI_IMC_DATA_READS_BASE, 0x0, 0x0, 1, 32 }, - [SNB_PCI_UNCORE_IMC_DATA_READS] = { SNB_UNCORE_PCI_IMC_DATA_WRITES_BASE, + [SNB_PCI_UNCORE_IMC_DATA_WRITES] = { SNB_UNCORE_PCI_IMC_DATA_WRITES_BASE, 0x0, 0x0, 1, 32 }, [SNB_PCI_UNCORE_IMC_GT_REQUESTS] = { SNB_UNCORE_PCI_IMC_GT_REQUESTS_BASE, 0x0, 0x0, 1, 32 }, diff --git a/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h b/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h index ee2b9b9fc2a5..6a8edfe59b09 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h +++ b/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h @@ -585,6 +585,7 @@ union perf_capabilities { u64 pebs_baseline:1; u64 perf_metrics:1; u64 pebs_output_pt_available:1; + u64 anythread_deprecated:1; }; u64 capabilities; }; @@ -727,7 +728,7 @@ struct x86_pmu { int pebs_record_size; int pebs_buffer_size; int max_pebs_events; - void (*drain_pebs)(struct pt_regs *regs); + void (*drain_pebs)(struct pt_regs *regs, struct perf_sample_data *data); struct event_constraint *pebs_constraints; void (*pebs_aliases)(struct perf_event *event); unsigned long large_pebs_flags; diff --git a/arch/x86/events/rapl.c b/arch/x86/events/rapl.c index 7c0120e2e957..7dbbeaacd995 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/rapl.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/rapl.c @@ -93,18 +93,6 @@ static const char *const rapl_domain_names[NR_RAPL_DOMAINS] __initconst = { * any other bit is reserved */ #define RAPL_EVENT_MASK 0xFFULL - -#define DEFINE_RAPL_FORMAT_ATTR(_var, _name, _format) \ -static ssize_t __rapl_##_var##_show(struct kobject *kobj, \ - struct kobj_attribute *attr, \ - char *page) \ -{ \ - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_format) >= PAGE_SIZE); \ - return sprintf(page, _format "\n"); \ -} \ -static struct kobj_attribute format_attr_##_var = \ - __ATTR(_name, 0444, __rapl_##_var##_show, NULL) - #define RAPL_CNTR_WIDTH 32 #define RAPL_EVENT_ATTR_STR(_name, v, str) \ @@ -441,7 +429,7 @@ static struct attribute_group rapl_pmu_events_group = { .attrs = attrs_empty, }; -DEFINE_RAPL_FORMAT_ATTR(event, event, "config:0-7"); +PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(event, "config:0-7"); static struct attribute *rapl_formats_attr[] = { &format_attr_event.attr, NULL, diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c index 40e0e322161d..284e73661a18 100644 --- a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c +++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c @@ -273,11 +273,15 @@ void __init hv_apic_init(void) pr_info("Hyper-V: Using enlightened APIC (%s mode)", x2apic_enabled() ? "x2apic" : "xapic"); /* - * With x2apic, architectural x2apic MSRs are equivalent to the - * respective synthetic MSRs, so there's no need to override - * the apic accessors. The only exception is - * hv_apic_eoi_write, because it benefits from lazy EOI when - * available, but it works for both xapic and x2apic modes. + * When in x2apic mode, don't use the Hyper-V specific APIC + * accessors since the field layout in the ICR register is + * different in x2apic mode. Furthermore, the architectural + * x2apic MSRs function just as well as the Hyper-V + * synthetic APIC MSRs, so there's no benefit in having + * separate Hyper-V accessors for x2apic mode. The only + * exception is hv_apic_eoi_write, because it benefits from + * lazy EOI when available, but the same accessor works for + * both xapic and x2apic because the field layout is the same. */ apic_set_eoi_write(hv_apic_eoi_write); if (!x2apic_enabled()) { diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index d44858b69353..324ddd7fd0aa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -639,6 +639,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch { int cpuid_nent; struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *cpuid_entries; + unsigned long cr3_lm_rsvd_bits; int maxphyaddr; int max_tdp_level; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h index 6960cd6d1f23..b9a7fd0a27e2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h @@ -137,7 +137,9 @@ union cpuid10_edx { struct { unsigned int num_counters_fixed:5; unsigned int bit_width_fixed:8; - unsigned int reserved:19; + unsigned int reserved1:2; + unsigned int anythread_deprecated:1; + unsigned int reserved2:16; } split; unsigned int full; }; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sparsemem.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sparsemem.h index 6bfc878f6771..6a9ccc1b2be5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sparsemem.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sparsemem.h @@ -28,4 +28,14 @@ #endif #endif /* CONFIG_SPARSEMEM */ + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA_KEEP_MEMINFO +extern int phys_to_target_node(phys_addr_t start); +#define phys_to_target_node phys_to_target_node +extern int memory_add_physaddr_to_nid(u64 start); +#define memory_add_physaddr_to_nid memory_add_physaddr_to_nid +#endif +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ + #endif /* _ASM_X86_SPARSEMEM_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uv/uv.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uv/uv.h index 172d3e4a9e4b..648eb23fe7f0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uv/uv.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uv/uv.h @@ -2,14 +2,8 @@ #ifndef _ASM_X86_UV_UV_H #define _ASM_X86_UV_UV_H -#include <asm/tlbflush.h> - enum uv_system_type {UV_NONE, UV_LEGACY_APIC, UV_X2APIC}; -struct cpumask; -struct mm_struct; -struct flush_tlb_info; - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_UV #include <linux/efi.h> @@ -44,10 +38,6 @@ static inline int is_uv_system(void) { return 0; } static inline int is_uv_hubbed(int uv) { return 0; } static inline void uv_cpu_init(void) { } static inline void uv_system_init(void) { } -static inline const struct cpumask * -uv_flush_tlb_others(const struct cpumask *cpumask, - const struct flush_tlb_info *info) -{ return cpumask; } #endif /* X86_UV */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h index 812e9b4c1114..950afebfba88 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ #define KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL 12 #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 #define KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT 14 +#define KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID 15 #define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_uv_x.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_uv_x.c index 714233cee0b5..1b98f8c12b96 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_uv_x.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_uv_x.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static union uvh_apicid uvh_apicid; static int uv_node_id; /* Unpack AT/OEM/TABLE ID's to be NULL terminated strings */ -static u8 uv_archtype[UV_AT_SIZE]; +static u8 uv_archtype[UV_AT_SIZE + 1]; static u8 oem_id[ACPI_OEM_ID_SIZE + 1]; static u8 oem_table_id[ACPI_OEM_TABLE_ID_SIZE + 1]; @@ -290,6 +290,9 @@ static void __init uv_stringify(int len, char *to, char *from) { /* Relies on 'to' being NULL chars so result will be NULL terminated */ strncpy(to, from, len-1); + + /* Trim trailing spaces */ + (void)strim(to); } /* Find UV arch type entry in UVsystab */ @@ -317,7 +320,7 @@ static int __init decode_arch_type(unsigned long ptr) if (n > 0 && n < sizeof(uv_ate->archtype)) { pr_info("UV: UVarchtype received from BIOS\n"); - uv_stringify(UV_AT_SIZE, uv_archtype, uv_ate->archtype); + uv_stringify(sizeof(uv_archtype), uv_archtype, uv_ate->archtype); return 1; } return 0; @@ -366,7 +369,7 @@ static int __init early_get_arch_type(void) return ret; } -static int __init uv_set_system_type(char *_oem_id) +static int __init uv_set_system_type(char *_oem_id, char *_oem_table_id) { /* Save OEM_ID passed from ACPI MADT */ uv_stringify(sizeof(oem_id), oem_id, _oem_id); @@ -375,7 +378,7 @@ static int __init uv_set_system_type(char *_oem_id) if (!early_get_arch_type()) /* If not use OEM ID for UVarchtype */ - uv_stringify(UV_AT_SIZE, uv_archtype, _oem_id); + uv_stringify(sizeof(uv_archtype), uv_archtype, oem_id); /* Check if not hubbed */ if (strncmp(uv_archtype, "SGI", 3) != 0) { @@ -386,13 +389,23 @@ static int __init uv_set_system_type(char *_oem_id) /* (Not hubless), not a UV */ return 0; + /* Is UV hubless system */ + uv_hubless_system = 0x01; + + /* UV5 Hubless */ + if (strncmp(uv_archtype, "NSGI5", 5) == 0) + uv_hubless_system |= 0x20; + /* UV4 Hubless: CH */ - if (strncmp(uv_archtype, "NSGI4", 5) == 0) - uv_hubless_system = 0x11; + else if (strncmp(uv_archtype, "NSGI4", 5) == 0) + uv_hubless_system |= 0x10; /* UV3 Hubless: UV300/MC990X w/o hub */ else - uv_hubless_system = 0x9; + uv_hubless_system |= 0x8; + + /* Copy APIC type */ + uv_stringify(sizeof(oem_table_id), oem_table_id, _oem_table_id); pr_info("UV: OEM IDs %s/%s, SystemType %d, HUBLESS ID %x\n", oem_id, oem_table_id, uv_system_type, uv_hubless_system); @@ -456,7 +469,7 @@ static int __init uv_acpi_madt_oem_check(char *_oem_id, char *_oem_table_id) uv_cpu_info->p_uv_hub_info = &uv_hub_info_node0; /* If not UV, return. */ - if (likely(uv_set_system_type(_oem_id) == 0)) + if (uv_set_system_type(_oem_id, _oem_table_id) == 0) return 0; /* Save and Decode OEM Table ID */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index d3f0db463f96..581fb7223ad0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1254,6 +1254,14 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) return 0; } +static bool is_spec_ib_user_controlled(void) +{ + return spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL || + spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP || + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL || + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP; +} + static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) { switch (ctrl) { @@ -1261,16 +1269,26 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE && spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE) return 0; + /* - * Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict - * mode. It can neither be enabled if it was force-disabled - * by a previous prctl call. + * With strict mode for both IBPB and STIBP, the instruction + * code paths avoid checking this task flag and instead, + * unconditionally run the instruction. However, STIBP and IBPB + * are independent and either can be set to conditionally + * enabled regardless of the mode of the other. + * + * If either is set to conditional, allow the task flag to be + * updated, unless it was force-disabled by a previous prctl + * call. Currently, this is possible on an AMD CPU which has the + * feature X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON. In this case, if the + * kernel is booted with 'spectre_v2_user=seccomp', then + * spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP and + * spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED. */ - if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED || + if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled() || task_spec_ib_force_disable(task)) return -EPERM; + task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task); task_update_spec_tif(task); break; @@ -1283,10 +1301,10 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE && spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE) return -EPERM; - if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED) + + if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled()) return 0; + task_set_spec_ib_disable(task); if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE) task_set_spec_ib_force_disable(task); @@ -1351,20 +1369,17 @@ static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task) if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE && spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE) return PR_SPEC_ENABLE; - else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED) - return PR_SPEC_DISABLE; - else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL || - spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP || - spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL || - spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP) { + else if (is_spec_ib_user_controlled()) { if (task_spec_ib_force_disable(task)) return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE; if (task_spec_ib_disable(task)) return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE; return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE; - } else + } else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED) + return PR_SPEC_DISABLE; + else return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c index 6a99535d7f37..7e8e07bddd5f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c @@ -100,53 +100,6 @@ static int has_newer_microcode(void *mc, unsigned int csig, int cpf, int new_rev return find_matching_signature(mc, csig, cpf); } -/* - * Given CPU signature and a microcode patch, this function finds if the - * microcode patch has matching family and model with the CPU. - * - * %true - if there's a match - * %false - otherwise - */ -static bool microcode_matches(struct microcode_header_intel *mc_header, - unsigned long sig) -{ - unsigned long total_size = get_totalsize(mc_header); - unsigned long data_size = get_datasize(mc_header); - struct extended_sigtable *ext_header; - unsigned int fam_ucode, model_ucode; - struct extended_signature *ext_sig; - unsigned int fam, model; - int ext_sigcount, i; - - fam = x86_family(sig); - model = x86_model(sig); - - fam_ucode = x86_family(mc_header->sig); - model_ucode = x86_model(mc_header->sig); - - if (fam == fam_ucode && model == model_ucode) - return true; - - /* Look for ext. headers: */ - if (total_size <= data_size + MC_HEADER_SIZE) - return false; - - ext_header = (void *) mc_header + data_size + MC_HEADER_SIZE; - ext_sig = (void *)ext_header + EXT_HEADER_SIZE; - ext_sigcount = ext_header->count; - - for (i = 0; i < ext_sigcount; i++) { - fam_ucode = x86_family(ext_sig->sig); - model_ucode = x86_model(ext_sig->sig); - - if (fam == fam_ucode && model == model_ucode) - return true; - - ext_sig++; - } - return false; -} - static struct ucode_patch *memdup_patch(void *data, unsigned int size) { struct ucode_patch *p; @@ -164,7 +117,7 @@ static struct ucode_patch *memdup_patch(void *data, unsigned int size) return p; } -static void save_microcode_patch(void *data, unsigned int size) +static void save_microcode_patch(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, void *data, unsigned int size) { struct microcode_header_intel *mc_hdr, *mc_saved_hdr; struct ucode_patch *iter, *tmp, *p = NULL; @@ -210,6 +163,9 @@ static void save_microcode_patch(void *data, unsigned int size) if (!p) return; + if (!find_matching_signature(p->data, uci->cpu_sig.sig, uci->cpu_sig.pf)) + return; + /* * Save for early loading. On 32-bit, that needs to be a physical * address as the APs are running from physical addresses, before @@ -344,13 +300,14 @@ scan_microcode(void *data, size_t size, struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, bool save) size -= mc_size; - if (!microcode_matches(mc_header, uci->cpu_sig.sig)) { + if (!find_matching_signature(data, uci->cpu_sig.sig, + uci->cpu_sig.pf)) { data += mc_size; continue; } if (save) { - save_microcode_patch(data, mc_size); + save_microcode_patch(uci, data, mc_size); goto next; } @@ -483,14 +440,14 @@ static void show_saved_mc(void) * Save this microcode patch. It will be loaded early when a CPU is * hot-added or resumes. */ -static void save_mc_for_early(u8 *mc, unsigned int size) +static void save_mc_for_early(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, u8 *mc, unsigned int size) { /* Synchronization during CPU hotplug. */ static DEFINE_MUTEX(x86_cpu_microcode_mutex); mutex_lock(&x86_cpu_microcode_mutex); - save_microcode_patch(mc, size); + save_microcode_patch(uci, mc, size); show_saved_mc(); mutex_unlock(&x86_cpu_microcode_mutex); @@ -935,7 +892,7 @@ static enum ucode_state generic_load_microcode(int cpu, struct iov_iter *iter) * permanent memory. So it will be loaded early when a CPU is hot added * or resumes. */ - save_mc_for_early(new_mc, new_mc_size); + save_mc_for_early(uci, new_mc, new_mc_size); pr_debug("CPU%d found a matching microcode update with version 0x%x (current=0x%x)\n", cpu, new_rev, uci->cpu_sig.rev); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c index 25c06b67e7e0..97aa900386cb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c @@ -78,6 +78,9 @@ static int copy_code(struct pt_regs *regs, u8 *buf, unsigned long src, if (!user_mode(regs)) return copy_from_kernel_nofault(buf, (u8 *)src, nbytes); + /* The user space code from other tasks cannot be accessed. */ + if (regs != task_pt_regs(current)) + return -EPERM; /* * Make sure userspace isn't trying to trick us into dumping kernel * memory by pointing the userspace instruction pointer at it. @@ -85,6 +88,12 @@ static int copy_code(struct pt_regs *regs, u8 *buf, unsigned long src, if (__chk_range_not_ok(src, nbytes, TASK_SIZE_MAX)) return -EINVAL; + /* + * Even if named copy_from_user_nmi() this can be invoked from + * other contexts and will not try to resolve a pagefault, which is + * the correct thing to do here as this code can be called from any + * context. + */ return copy_from_user_nmi(buf, (void __user *)src, nbytes); } @@ -115,13 +124,19 @@ void show_opcodes(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *loglvl) u8 opcodes[OPCODE_BUFSIZE]; unsigned long prologue = regs->ip - PROLOGUE_SIZE; - if (copy_code(regs, opcodes, prologue, sizeof(opcodes))) { - printk("%sCode: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x%lx.\n", - loglvl, prologue); - } else { + switch (copy_code(regs, opcodes, prologue, sizeof(opcodes))) { + case 0: printk("%sCode: %" __stringify(PROLOGUE_SIZE) "ph <%02x> %" __stringify(EPILOGUE_SIZE) "ph\n", loglvl, opcodes, opcodes[PROLOGUE_SIZE], opcodes + PROLOGUE_SIZE + 1); + break; + case -EPERM: + /* No access to the user space stack of other tasks. Ignore. */ + break; + default: + printk("%sCode: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x%lx.\n", + loglvl, prologue); + break; } } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S index 7eb2a1c87969..3c417734790f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S @@ -161,6 +161,21 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) /* Setup early boot stage 4-/5-level pagetables. */ addq phys_base(%rip), %rax + + /* + * For SEV guests: Verify that the C-bit is correct. A malicious + * hypervisor could lie about the C-bit position to perform a ROP + * attack on the guest by writing to the unencrypted stack and wait for + * the next RET instruction. + * %rsi carries pointer to realmode data and is callee-clobbered. Save + * and restore it. + */ + pushq %rsi + movq %rax, %rdi + call sev_verify_cbit + popq %rsi + + /* Switch to new page-table */ movq %rax, %cr3 /* Ensure I am executing from virtual addresses */ @@ -279,6 +294,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) SYM_CODE_END(secondary_startup_64) #include "verify_cpu.S" +#include "sev_verify_cbit.S" #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/perf_regs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/perf_regs.c index bb7e1132290b..f9e5352b3bef 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/perf_regs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/perf_regs.c @@ -101,8 +101,7 @@ u64 perf_reg_abi(struct task_struct *task) } void perf_get_regs_user(struct perf_regs *regs_user, - struct pt_regs *regs, - struct pt_regs *regs_user_copy) + struct pt_regs *regs) { regs_user->regs = task_pt_regs(current); regs_user->abi = perf_reg_abi(current); @@ -129,12 +128,20 @@ u64 perf_reg_abi(struct task_struct *task) return PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_ABI_64; } +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct pt_regs, nmi_user_regs); + void perf_get_regs_user(struct perf_regs *regs_user, - struct pt_regs *regs, - struct pt_regs *regs_user_copy) + struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct pt_regs *regs_user_copy = this_cpu_ptr(&nmi_user_regs); struct pt_regs *user_regs = task_pt_regs(current); + if (!in_nmi()) { + regs_user->regs = user_regs; + regs_user->abi = perf_reg_abi(current); + return; + } + /* * If we're in an NMI that interrupted task_pt_regs setup, then * we can't sample user regs at all. This check isn't really diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c index 5f83ccaab877..7d04b356d44d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c @@ -178,6 +178,32 @@ void __init do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code) goto fail; regs->dx = val >> 32; + /* + * This is a VC handler and the #VC is only raised when SEV-ES is + * active, which means SEV must be active too. Do sanity checks on the + * CPUID results to make sure the hypervisor does not trick the kernel + * into the no-sev path. This could map sensitive data unencrypted and + * make it accessible to the hypervisor. + * + * In particular, check for: + * - Hypervisor CPUID bit + * - Availability of CPUID leaf 0x8000001f + * - SEV CPUID bit. + * + * The hypervisor might still report the wrong C-bit position, but this + * can't be checked here. + */ + + if ((fn == 1 && !(regs->cx & BIT(31)))) + /* Hypervisor bit */ + goto fail; + else if (fn == 0x80000000 && (regs->ax < 0x8000001f)) + /* SEV leaf check */ + goto fail; + else if ((fn == 0x8000001f && !(regs->ax & BIT(1)))) + /* SEV bit */ + goto fail; + /* Skip over the CPUID two-byte opcode */ regs->ip += 2; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c index 4a96726fbaf8..0bd1a0fc587e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c @@ -374,8 +374,8 @@ fault: return ES_EXCEPTION; } -static bool vc_slow_virt_to_phys(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, - unsigned long vaddr, phys_addr_t *paddr) +static enum es_result vc_slow_virt_to_phys(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, + unsigned long vaddr, phys_addr_t *paddr) { unsigned long va = (unsigned long)vaddr; unsigned int level; @@ -394,15 +394,19 @@ static bool vc_slow_virt_to_phys(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, if (user_mode(ctxt->regs)) ctxt->fi.error_code |= X86_PF_USER; - return false; + return ES_EXCEPTION; } + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(pte_val(*pte) & _PAGE_ENC)) + /* Emulated MMIO to/from encrypted memory not supported */ + return ES_UNSUPPORTED; + pa = (phys_addr_t)pte_pfn(*pte) << PAGE_SHIFT; pa |= va & ~page_level_mask(level); *paddr = pa; - return true; + return ES_OK; } /* Include code shared with pre-decompression boot stage */ @@ -731,6 +735,7 @@ static enum es_result vc_do_mmio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, { u64 exit_code, exit_info_1, exit_info_2; unsigned long ghcb_pa = __pa(ghcb); + enum es_result res; phys_addr_t paddr; void __user *ref; @@ -740,11 +745,12 @@ static enum es_result vc_do_mmio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, exit_code = read ? SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ : SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE; - if (!vc_slow_virt_to_phys(ghcb, ctxt, (unsigned long)ref, &paddr)) { - if (!read) + res = vc_slow_virt_to_phys(ghcb, ctxt, (unsigned long)ref, &paddr); + if (res != ES_OK) { + if (res == ES_EXCEPTION && !read) ctxt->fi.error_code |= X86_PF_WRITE; - return ES_EXCEPTION; + return res; } exit_info_1 = paddr; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S b/arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ee04941a6546 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * sev_verify_cbit.S - Code for verification of the C-bit position reported + * by the Hypervisor when running with SEV enabled. + * + * Copyright (c) 2020 Joerg Roedel (jroedel@suse.de) + * + * sev_verify_cbit() is called before switching to a new long-mode page-table + * at boot. + * + * Verify that the C-bit position is correct by writing a random value to + * an encrypted memory location while on the current page-table. Then it + * switches to the new page-table to verify the memory content is still the + * same. After that it switches back to the current page-table and when the + * check succeeded it returns. If the check failed the code invalidates the + * stack pointer and goes into a hlt loop. The stack-pointer is invalidated to + * make sure no interrupt or exception can get the CPU out of the hlt loop. + * + * New page-table pointer is expected in %rdi (first parameter) + * + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(sev_verify_cbit) +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT + /* First check if a C-bit was detected */ + movq sme_me_mask(%rip), %rsi + testq %rsi, %rsi + jz 3f + + /* sme_me_mask != 0 could mean SME or SEV - Check also for SEV */ + movq sev_status(%rip), %rsi + testq %rsi, %rsi + jz 3f + + /* Save CR4 in %rsi */ + movq %cr4, %rsi + + /* Disable Global Pages */ + movq %rsi, %rdx + andq $(~X86_CR4_PGE), %rdx + movq %rdx, %cr4 + + /* + * Verified that running under SEV - now get a random value using + * RDRAND. This instruction is mandatory when running as an SEV guest. + * + * Don't bail out of the loop if RDRAND returns errors. It is better to + * prevent forward progress than to work with a non-random value here. + */ +1: rdrand %rdx + jnc 1b + + /* Store value to memory and keep it in %rdx */ + movq %rdx, sev_check_data(%rip) + + /* Backup current %cr3 value to restore it later */ + movq %cr3, %rcx + + /* Switch to new %cr3 - This might unmap the stack */ + movq %rdi, %cr3 + + /* + * Compare value in %rdx with memory location. If C-bit is incorrect + * this would read the encrypted data and make the check fail. + */ + cmpq %rdx, sev_check_data(%rip) + + /* Restore old %cr3 */ + movq %rcx, %cr3 + + /* Restore previous CR4 */ + movq %rsi, %cr4 + + /* Check CMPQ result */ + je 3f + + /* + * The check failed, prevent any forward progress to prevent ROP + * attacks, invalidate the stack and go into a hlt loop. + */ + xorq %rsp, %rsp + subq $0x1000, %rsp +2: hlt + jmp 2b +3: +#endif + /* Return page-table pointer */ + movq %rdi, %rax + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(sev_verify_cbit) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c index 992fb1415c0f..420be871d9d4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c @@ -514,9 +514,6 @@ int tboot_force_iommu(void) if (!tboot_enabled()) return 0; - if (intel_iommu_tboot_noforce) - return 1; - if (no_iommu || swiotlb || dmar_disabled) pr_warn("Forcing Intel-IOMMU to enabled\n"); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c index 3c70fb34028b..e19df6cde35d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c @@ -793,19 +793,6 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long debug_read_clear_dr6(void) set_debugreg(DR6_RESERVED, 6); dr6 ^= DR6_RESERVED; /* Flip to positive polarity */ - /* - * Clear the virtual DR6 value, ptrace routines will set bits here for - * things we want signals for. - */ - current->thread.virtual_dr6 = 0; - - /* - * The SDM says "The processor clears the BTF flag when it - * generates a debug exception." Clear TIF_BLOCKSTEP to keep - * TIF_BLOCKSTEP in sync with the hardware BTF flag. - */ - clear_thread_flag(TIF_BLOCKSTEP); - return dr6; } @@ -873,6 +860,20 @@ static __always_inline void exc_debug_kernel(struct pt_regs *regs, */ WARN_ON_ONCE(user_mode(regs)); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_BLOCKSTEP)) { + /* + * The SDM says "The processor clears the BTF flag when it + * generates a debug exception." but PTRACE_BLOCKSTEP requested + * it for userspace, but we just took a kernel #DB, so re-set + * BTF. + */ + unsigned long debugctl; + + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, debugctl); + debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF; + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, debugctl); + } + /* * Catch SYSENTER with TF set and clear DR_STEP. If this hit a * watchpoint at the same time then that will still be handled. @@ -936,6 +937,22 @@ static __always_inline void exc_debug_user(struct pt_regs *regs, instrumentation_begin(); /* + * Start the virtual/ptrace DR6 value with just the DR_STEP mask + * of the real DR6. ptrace_triggered() will set the DR_TRAPn bits. + * + * Userspace expects DR_STEP to be visible in ptrace_get_debugreg(6) + * even if it is not the result of PTRACE_SINGLESTEP. + */ + current->thread.virtual_dr6 = (dr6 & DR_STEP); + + /* + * The SDM says "The processor clears the BTF flag when it + * generates a debug exception." Clear TIF_BLOCKSTEP to keep + * TIF_BLOCKSTEP in sync with the hardware BTF flag. + */ + clear_thread_flag(TIF_BLOCKSTEP); + + /* * If dr6 has no reason to give us about the origin of this trap, * then it's very likely the result of an icebp/int01 trap. * User wants a sigtrap for that. diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index 06a278b3701d..83637a2ff605 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -90,6 +90,20 @@ static int kvm_check_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries, int nent) return 0; } +void kvm_update_pv_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; + + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, KVM_CPUID_FEATURES, 0); + + /* + * save the feature bitmap to avoid cpuid lookup for every PV + * operation + */ + if (best) + vcpu->arch.pv_cpuid.features = best->eax; +} + void kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; @@ -124,13 +138,6 @@ void kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) (best->eax & (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT))) best->eax &= ~(1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT); - /* - * save the feature bitmap to avoid cpuid lookup for every PV - * operation - */ - if (best) - vcpu->arch.pv_cpuid.features = best->eax; - if (!kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_MISC_ENABLE_NO_MWAIT)) { best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x1, 0); if (best) @@ -162,6 +169,8 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 = (best->eax | ((u64)best->edx << 32)) & supported_xcr0; + kvm_update_pv_runtime(vcpu); + vcpu->arch.maxphyaddr = cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(vcpu); kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu); @@ -169,6 +178,8 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_rsvd_bits = __cr4_reserved_bits(guest_cpuid_has, vcpu); + vcpu->arch.cr3_lm_rsvd_bits = rsvd_bits(cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu), 63); + /* Invoke the vendor callback only after the above state is updated. */ kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_after_set_cpuid(vcpu); } @@ -672,7 +683,9 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function) edx.split.num_counters_fixed = min(cap.num_counters_fixed, MAX_FIXED_COUNTERS); edx.split.bit_width_fixed = cap.bit_width_fixed; - edx.split.reserved = 0; + edx.split.anythread_deprecated = 1; + edx.split.reserved1 = 0; + edx.split.reserved2 = 0; entry->eax = eax.full; entry->ebx = cap.events_mask; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h index bf8577947ed2..f7a6e8f83783 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ extern u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NCAPINTS] __read_mostly; void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void); void kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +void kvm_update_pv_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 function, u32 index); int kvm_dev_ioctl_get_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c index 0d917eb70319..56cae1ff9e3f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -4046,6 +4046,12 @@ static int em_clflush(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; } +static int em_clflushopt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) +{ + /* emulating clflushopt regardless of cpuid */ + return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; +} + static int em_movsxd(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { ctxt->dst.val = (s32) ctxt->src.val; @@ -4585,7 +4591,7 @@ static const struct opcode group11[] = { }; static const struct gprefix pfx_0f_ae_7 = { - I(SrcMem | ByteOp, em_clflush), N, N, N, + I(SrcMem | ByteOp, em_clflush), I(SrcMem | ByteOp, em_clflushopt), N, N, }; static const struct group_dual group15 = { { diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c index 17587f496ec7..5bb1939b65d8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ static gfn_t get_mmio_spte_gfn(u64 spte) { u64 gpa = spte & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask; - gpa |= (spte >> shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask_len) + gpa |= (spte >> SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN) & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask; return gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT; @@ -591,15 +591,15 @@ static u64 mmu_spte_get_lockless(u64 *sptep) static u64 restore_acc_track_spte(u64 spte) { u64 new_spte = spte; - u64 saved_bits = (spte >> shadow_acc_track_saved_bits_shift) - & shadow_acc_track_saved_bits_mask; + u64 saved_bits = (spte >> SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_SHIFT) + & SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_MASK; WARN_ON_ONCE(spte_ad_enabled(spte)); WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_access_track_spte(spte)); new_spte &= ~shadow_acc_track_mask; - new_spte &= ~(shadow_acc_track_saved_bits_mask << - shadow_acc_track_saved_bits_shift); + new_spte &= ~(SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_MASK << + SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_SHIFT); new_spte |= saved_bits; return new_spte; @@ -856,12 +856,14 @@ static int pte_list_add(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *spte, } else { rmap_printk("pte_list_add: %p %llx many->many\n", spte, *spte); desc = (struct pte_list_desc *)(rmap_head->val & ~1ul); - while (desc->sptes[PTE_LIST_EXT-1] && desc->more) { - desc = desc->more; + while (desc->sptes[PTE_LIST_EXT-1]) { count += PTE_LIST_EXT; - } - if (desc->sptes[PTE_LIST_EXT-1]) { - desc->more = mmu_alloc_pte_list_desc(vcpu); + + if (!desc->more) { + desc->more = mmu_alloc_pte_list_desc(vcpu); + desc = desc->more; + break; + } desc = desc->more; } for (i = 0; desc->sptes[i]; ++i) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c index d9c5665a55e9..fcac2cac78fe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ u64 make_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gfn, unsigned int access) mask |= shadow_mmio_value | access; mask |= gpa | shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask; mask |= (gpa & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask) - << shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask_len; + << SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN; return mask; } @@ -231,12 +231,12 @@ u64 mark_spte_for_access_track(u64 spte) !spte_can_locklessly_be_made_writable(spte), "kvm: Writable SPTE is not locklessly dirty-trackable\n"); - WARN_ONCE(spte & (shadow_acc_track_saved_bits_mask << - shadow_acc_track_saved_bits_shift), + WARN_ONCE(spte & (SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_MASK << + SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_SHIFT), "kvm: Access Tracking saved bit locations are not zero\n"); - spte |= (spte & shadow_acc_track_saved_bits_mask) << - shadow_acc_track_saved_bits_shift; + spte |= (spte & SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_MASK) << + SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_SHIFT; spte &= ~shadow_acc_track_mask; return spte; @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ u64 mark_spte_for_access_track(u64 spte) void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 access_mask) { BUG_ON((u64)(unsigned)access_mask != access_mask); - WARN_ON(mmio_value & (shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask << shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask_len)); + WARN_ON(mmio_value & (shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask << SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN)); WARN_ON(mmio_value & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask); shadow_mmio_value = mmio_value | SPTE_MMIO_MASK; shadow_mmio_access_mask = access_mask; @@ -306,9 +306,9 @@ void kvm_mmu_reset_all_pte_masks(void) low_phys_bits = boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits; if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF) && !WARN_ON_ONCE(boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits >= - 52 - shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask_len)) { + 52 - SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN)) { low_phys_bits = boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits - - shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask_len; + - SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN; shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask = rsvd_bits(low_phys_bits, boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits - 1); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h index 4ecf40e0b8fe..5c75a451c000 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h @@ -105,19 +105,19 @@ extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_acc_track_mask; extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask; /* + * The number of high-order 1 bits to use in the mask above. + */ +#define SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN 5 + +/* * The mask/shift to use for saving the original R/X bits when marking the PTE * as not-present for access tracking purposes. We do not save the W bit as the * PTEs being access tracked also need to be dirty tracked, so the W bit will be * restored only when a write is attempted to the page. */ -static const u64 shadow_acc_track_saved_bits_mask = PT64_EPT_READABLE_MASK | - PT64_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK; -static const u64 shadow_acc_track_saved_bits_shift = PT64_SECOND_AVAIL_BITS_SHIFT; - -/* - * The number of high-order 1 bits to use in the mask above. - */ -static const u64 shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask_len = 5; +#define SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_MASK (PT64_EPT_READABLE_MASK | \ + PT64_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK) +#define SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_SHIFT PT64_SECOND_AVAIL_BITS_SHIFT /* * In some cases, we need to preserve the GFN of a non-present or reserved diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c index 27e381c9da6c..ff28a5c6abd6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c @@ -49,7 +49,14 @@ bool is_tdp_mmu_root(struct kvm *kvm, hpa_t hpa) { struct kvm_mmu_page *sp; + if (!kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_enabled) + return false; + if (WARN_ON(!VALID_PAGE(hpa))) + return false; + sp = to_shadow_page(hpa); + if (WARN_ON(!sp)) + return false; return sp->tdp_mmu_page && sp->root_count; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index 2f32fd09e259..1e81cfebd491 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -3741,6 +3741,7 @@ static u64 svm_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio) static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; vcpu->arch.xsaves_enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) && @@ -3753,6 +3754,13 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) /* Check again if INVPCID interception if required */ svm_check_invpcid(svm); + /* For sev guests, the memory encryption bit is not reserved in CR3. */ + if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x8000001F, 0); + if (best) + vcpu->arch.cr3_lm_rsvd_bits &= ~(1UL << (best->ebx & 0x3f)); + } + if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) return; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c index e5325bd0f304..f3199bb02f22 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c @@ -297,14 +297,13 @@ const struct evmcs_field vmcs_field_to_evmcs_1[] = { }; const unsigned int nr_evmcs_1_fields = ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_evmcs_1); -void evmcs_sanitize_exec_ctrls(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf) +__init void evmcs_sanitize_exec_ctrls(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf) { vmcs_conf->pin_based_exec_ctrl &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_PINCTRL; vmcs_conf->cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_2NDEXEC; vmcs_conf->vmexit_ctrl &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_VMEXIT_CTRL; vmcs_conf->vmentry_ctrl &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_VMENTRY_CTRL; - } #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h index e5f7a7ebf27d..bd41d9462355 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static inline void evmcs_load(u64 phys_addr) vp_ap->enlighten_vmentry = 1; } -void evmcs_sanitize_exec_ctrls(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf); +__init void evmcs_sanitize_exec_ctrls(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf); #else /* !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) */ static inline void evmcs_write64(unsigned long field, u64 value) {} static inline void evmcs_write32(unsigned long field, u32 value) {} @@ -194,7 +194,6 @@ static inline u64 evmcs_read64(unsigned long field) { return 0; } static inline u32 evmcs_read32(unsigned long field) { return 0; } static inline u16 evmcs_read16(unsigned long field) { return 0; } static inline void evmcs_load(u64 phys_addr) {} -static inline void evmcs_sanitize_exec_ctrls(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf) {} static inline void evmcs_touch_msr_bitmap(void) {} #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index d14c94d0aff1..47b8357b9751 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -2560,8 +2560,10 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, vmcs_conf->vmexit_ctrl = _vmexit_control; vmcs_conf->vmentry_ctrl = _vmentry_control; - if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs)) +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) + if (enlightened_vmcs) evmcs_sanitize_exec_ctrls(vmcs_conf); +#endif return 0; } @@ -6834,7 +6836,6 @@ static void vmx_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) static int vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_vmx *vmx; - unsigned long *msr_bitmap; int i, cpu, err; BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu) != 0); @@ -6894,7 +6895,6 @@ static int vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) bitmap_fill(vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.read, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS); bitmap_fill(vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.write, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS); - msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap; vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_TYPE_R); vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW); vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 397f599b20e5..078a39d489fe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -255,24 +255,23 @@ static struct kmem_cache *x86_emulator_cache; /* * When called, it means the previous get/set msr reached an invalid msr. - * Return 0 if we want to ignore/silent this failed msr access, or 1 if we want - * to fail the caller. + * Return true if we want to ignore/silent this failed msr access. */ -static int kvm_msr_ignored_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, - u64 data, bool write) +static bool kvm_msr_ignored_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, + u64 data, bool write) { const char *op = write ? "wrmsr" : "rdmsr"; if (ignore_msrs) { if (report_ignored_msrs) - vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "ignored %s: 0x%x data 0x%llx\n", - op, msr, data); + kvm_pr_unimpl("ignored %s: 0x%x data 0x%llx\n", + op, msr, data); /* Mask the error */ - return 0; + return true; } else { - vcpu_debug_ratelimited(vcpu, "unhandled %s: 0x%x data 0x%llx\n", - op, msr, data); - return -ENOENT; + kvm_debug_ratelimited("unhandled %s: 0x%x data 0x%llx\n", + op, msr, data); + return false; } } @@ -1042,7 +1041,7 @@ int kvm_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3) } if (is_long_mode(vcpu) && - (cr3 & rsvd_bits(cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu), 63))) + (cr3 & vcpu->arch.cr3_lm_rsvd_bits)) return 1; else if (is_pae_paging(vcpu) && !load_pdptrs(vcpu, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu, cr3)) @@ -1416,7 +1415,8 @@ static int do_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned index, u64 *data) if (r == KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID) { /* Unconditionally clear the output for simplicity */ *data = 0; - r = kvm_msr_ignored_check(vcpu, index, 0, false); + if (kvm_msr_ignored_check(vcpu, index, 0, false)) + r = 0; } if (r) @@ -1540,7 +1540,7 @@ static int __kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data, struct msr_data msr; if (!host_initiated && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, index, KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE)) - return -EPERM; + return KVM_MSR_RET_FILTERED; switch (index) { case MSR_FS_BASE: @@ -1581,7 +1581,8 @@ static int kvm_set_msr_ignored_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int ret = __kvm_set_msr(vcpu, index, data, host_initiated); if (ret == KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID) - ret = kvm_msr_ignored_check(vcpu, index, data, true); + if (kvm_msr_ignored_check(vcpu, index, data, true)) + ret = 0; return ret; } @@ -1599,7 +1600,7 @@ int __kvm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 *data, int ret; if (!host_initiated && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, index, KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ)) - return -EPERM; + return KVM_MSR_RET_FILTERED; msr.index = index; msr.host_initiated = host_initiated; @@ -1618,7 +1619,8 @@ static int kvm_get_msr_ignored_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, if (ret == KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID) { /* Unconditionally clear *data for simplicity */ *data = 0; - ret = kvm_msr_ignored_check(vcpu, index, 0, false); + if (kvm_msr_ignored_check(vcpu, index, 0, false)) + ret = 0; } return ret; @@ -1662,9 +1664,9 @@ static int complete_emulated_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) static u64 kvm_msr_reason(int r) { switch (r) { - case -ENOENT: + case KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID: return KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_UNKNOWN; - case -EPERM: + case KVM_MSR_RET_FILTERED: return KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER; default: return KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_INVAL; @@ -1965,7 +1967,7 @@ static void kvm_write_system_time(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t system_time, struct kvm_arch *ka = &vcpu->kvm->arch; if (vcpu->vcpu_id == 0 && !host_initiated) { - if (ka->boot_vcpu_runs_old_kvmclock && old_msr) + if (ka->boot_vcpu_runs_old_kvmclock != old_msr) kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MASTERCLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu); ka->boot_vcpu_runs_old_kvmclock = old_msr; @@ -3063,9 +3065,9 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) /* Values other than LBR and BTF are vendor-specific, thus reserved and should throw a #GP */ return 1; - } - vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "%s: MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR 0x%llx, nop\n", - __func__, data); + } else if (report_ignored_msrs) + vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "%s: MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR 0x%llx, nop\n", + __func__, data); break; case 0x200 ... 0x2ff: return kvm_mtrr_set_msr(vcpu, msr, data); @@ -3463,29 +3465,63 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.efer; break; case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK: + if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE)) + return 1; + + msr_info->data = vcpu->kvm->arch.wall_clock; + break; case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW: + if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE2)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vcpu->kvm->arch.wall_clock; break; case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME: + if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE)) + return 1; + + msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.time; + break; case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW: + if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE2)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.time; break; case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN: + if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.apf.msr_en_val; break; case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT: + if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.apf.msr_int_val; break; case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK: + if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = 0; break; case MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME: + if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.st.msr_val; break; case MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN: + if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val; break; case MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL: + if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.msr_kvm_poll_control; break; case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR: @@ -4575,6 +4611,8 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, case KVM_CAP_ENFORCE_PV_FEATURE_CPUID: vcpu->arch.pv_cpuid.enforce = cap->args[0]; + if (vcpu->arch.pv_cpuid.enforce) + kvm_update_pv_runtime(vcpu); return 0; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h index 3900ab0c6004..e7ca622a468f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h @@ -376,7 +376,13 @@ int kvm_handle_memory_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int r, int kvm_handle_invpcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long type, gva_t gva); bool kvm_msr_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u32 type); -#define KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID 2 +/* + * Internal error codes that are used to indicate that MSR emulation encountered + * an error that should result in #GP in the guest, unless userspace + * handles it. + */ +#define KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID 2 /* in-kernel MSR emulation #GP condition */ +#define KVM_MSR_RET_FILTERED 3 /* #GP due to userspace MSR filter */ #define __cr4_reserved_bits(__cpu_has, __c) \ ({ \ diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S index 037faac46b0c..1e299ac73c86 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S @@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ * to a jmp to memcpy_erms which does the REP; MOVSB mem copy. */ -.weak memcpy - /* * memcpy - Copy a memory block. * @@ -30,7 +28,7 @@ * rax original destination */ SYM_FUNC_START_ALIAS(__memcpy) -SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(memcpy) +SYM_FUNC_START_WEAK(memcpy) ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp memcpy_orig", "", X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD, \ "jmp memcpy_erms", X86_FEATURE_ERMS diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S index 7ff00ea64e4f..41902fe8b859 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S @@ -24,9 +24,7 @@ * Output: * rax: dest */ -.weak memmove - -SYM_FUNC_START_ALIAS(memmove) +SYM_FUNC_START_WEAK(memmove) SYM_FUNC_START(__memmove) mov %rdi, %rax diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S index 9ff15ee404a4..0bfd26e4ca9e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S @@ -6,8 +6,6 @@ #include <asm/alternative-asm.h> #include <asm/export.h> -.weak memset - /* * ISO C memset - set a memory block to a byte value. This function uses fast * string to get better performance than the original function. The code is @@ -19,7 +17,7 @@ * * rax original destination */ -SYM_FUNC_START_ALIAS(memset) +SYM_FUNC_START_WEAK(memset) SYM_FUNC_START(__memset) /* * Some CPUs support enhanced REP MOVSB/STOSB feature. It is recommended diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index efbb3de472df..bc0833713be9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ */ u64 sme_me_mask __section(".data") = 0; u64 sev_status __section(".data") = 0; +u64 sev_check_data __section(".data") = 0; EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask); DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_enable_key); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enable_key); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/numa.c b/arch/x86/mm/numa.c index 44148691d78b..5eb4dc2b97da 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/numa.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/numa.c @@ -938,6 +938,7 @@ int phys_to_target_node(phys_addr_t start) return meminfo_to_nid(&numa_reserved_meminfo, start); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(phys_to_target_node); int memory_add_physaddr_to_nid(u64 start) { @@ -947,4 +948,5 @@ int memory_add_physaddr_to_nid(u64 start) nid = numa_meminfo.blk[0].nid; return nid; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(memory_add_physaddr_to_nid); #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c index 8f5759df7776..e1e8d4e3a213 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c @@ -78,28 +78,30 @@ int __init efi_alloc_page_tables(void) gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO; efi_pgd = (pgd_t *)__get_free_pages(gfp_mask, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER); if (!efi_pgd) - return -ENOMEM; + goto fail; pgd = efi_pgd + pgd_index(EFI_VA_END); p4d = p4d_alloc(&init_mm, pgd, EFI_VA_END); - if (!p4d) { - free_page((unsigned long)efi_pgd); - return -ENOMEM; - } + if (!p4d) + goto free_pgd; pud = pud_alloc(&init_mm, p4d, EFI_VA_END); - if (!pud) { - if (pgtable_l5_enabled()) - free_page((unsigned long) pgd_page_vaddr(*pgd)); - free_pages((unsigned long)efi_pgd, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER); - return -ENOMEM; - } + if (!pud) + goto free_p4d; efi_mm.pgd = efi_pgd; mm_init_cpumask(&efi_mm); init_new_context(NULL, &efi_mm); return 0; + +free_p4d: + if (pgtable_l5_enabled()) + free_page((unsigned long)pgd_page_vaddr(*pgd)); +free_pgd: + free_pages((unsigned long)efi_pgd, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER); +fail: + return -ENOMEM; } /* diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c b/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c index 799f4eba0a62..043c73dfd2c9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c @@ -93,10 +93,20 @@ void xen_init_lock_cpu(int cpu) void xen_uninit_lock_cpu(int cpu) { + int irq; + if (!xen_pvspin) return; - unbind_from_irqhandler(per_cpu(lock_kicker_irq, cpu), NULL); + /* + * When booting the kernel with 'mitigations=auto,nosmt', the secondary + * CPUs are not activated, and lock_kicker_irq is not initialized. + */ + irq = per_cpu(lock_kicker_irq, cpu); + if (irq == -1) + return; + + unbind_from_irqhandler(irq, NULL); per_cpu(lock_kicker_irq, cpu) = -1; kfree(per_cpu(irq_name, cpu)); per_cpu(irq_name, cpu) = NULL; |