diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/writecache.rst | 18 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/devices.rst | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/efi-stub.rst | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst | 246 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 135 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/perf/hns3-pmu.rst | 136 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/perf/index.rst | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/pm/cpuidle.rst | 15 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst | 1 |
11 files changed, 536 insertions, 32 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/writecache.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/writecache.rst index 10429779a91a..60c16b7fd5ac 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/writecache.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/writecache.rst @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ Constructor parameters: size) 5. the number of optional parameters (the parameters with an argument count as two) + start_sector n (default: 0) offset from the start of cache device in 512-byte sectors high_watermark n (default: 50) @@ -74,20 +75,21 @@ Constructor parameters: the origin volume in the last n milliseconds Status: + 1. error indicator - 0 if there was no error, otherwise error number 2. the number of blocks 3. the number of free blocks 4. the number of blocks under writeback -5. the number of read requests -6. the number of read requests that hit the cache -7. the number of write requests -8. the number of write requests that hit uncommitted block -9. the number of write requests that hit committed block -10. the number of write requests that bypass the cache -11. the number of write requests that are allocated in the cache +5. the number of read blocks +6. the number of read blocks that hit the cache +7. the number of write blocks +8. the number of write blocks that hit uncommitted block +9. the number of write blocks that hit committed block +10. the number of write blocks that bypass the cache +11. the number of write blocks that are allocated in the cache 12. the number of write requests that are blocked on the freelist 13. the number of flush requests -14. the number of discard requests +14. the number of discarded blocks Messages: flush diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/devices.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/devices.rst index 035275fedbdd..e3776d77374b 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/devices.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/devices.rst @@ -7,10 +7,9 @@ This list is the Linux Device List, the official registry of allocated device numbers and ``/dev`` directory nodes for the Linux operating system. -The LaTeX version of this document is no longer maintained, nor is -the document that used to reside at lanana.org. This version in the -mainline Linux kernel is the master document. Updates shall be sent -as patches to the kernel maintainers (see the +The version of this document at lanana.org is no longer maintained. This +version in the mainline Linux kernel is the master document. Updates +shall be sent as patches to the kernel maintainers (see the :ref:`Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst <submittingpatches>` document). Specifically explore the sections titled "CHAR and MISC DRIVERS", and "BLOCK LAYER" in the MAINTAINERS file to find the right maintainers diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/efi-stub.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/efi-stub.rst index 833edb0d0bc4..b24e7c40d832 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/efi-stub.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/efi-stub.rst @@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ as a PE/COFF image, thereby convincing EFI firmware loaders to load it as an EFI executable. The code that modifies the bzImage header, along with the EFI-specific entry point that the firmware loader jumps to are collectively known as the "EFI boot stub", and live in -arch/x86/boot/header.S and arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c, +arch/x86/boot/header.S and drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c, respectively. For ARM the EFI stub is implemented in arch/arm/boot/compressed/efi-header.S and -arch/arm/boot/compressed/efi-stub.c. EFI stub code that is shared +drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm32-stub.c. EFI stub code that is shared between architectures is in drivers/firmware/efi/libstub. For arm64, there is no compressed kernel support, so the Image itself diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst index 8cbc711cda93..4df436e7c417 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst @@ -17,3 +17,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time. special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst core-scheduling.rst l1d_flush.rst + processor_mmio_stale_data.rst diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9393c50b5afc --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst @@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ +========================================= +Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities +========================================= + +Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities are a class of memory-mapped I/O +(MMIO) vulnerabilities that can expose data. The sequences of operations for +exposing data range from simple to very complex. Because most of the +vulnerabilities require the attacker to have access to MMIO, many environments +are not affected. System environments using virtualization where MMIO access is +provided to untrusted guests may need mitigation. These vulnerabilities are +not transient execution attacks. However, these vulnerabilities may propagate +stale data into core fill buffers where the data can subsequently be inferred +by an unmitigated transient execution attack. Mitigation for these +vulnerabilities includes a combination of microcode update and software +changes, depending on the platform and usage model. Some of these mitigations +are similar to those used to mitigate Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) or +those used to mitigate Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS). + +Data Propagators +================ +Propagators are operations that result in stale data being copied or moved from +one microarchitectural buffer or register to another. Processor MMIO Stale Data +Vulnerabilities are operations that may result in stale data being directly +read into an architectural, software-visible state or sampled from a buffer or +register. + +Fill Buffer Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP) +----------------------------------------- +Stale data may propagate from fill buffers (FB) into the non-coherent portion +of the uncore on some non-coherent writes. Fill buffer propagation by itself +does not make stale data architecturally visible. Stale data must be propagated +to a location where it is subject to reading or sampling. + +Sideband Stale Data Propagator (SSDP) +------------------------------------- +The sideband stale data propagator (SSDP) is limited to the client (including +Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation. The sideband response buffer is +shared by all client cores. For non-coherent reads that go to sideband +destinations, the uncore logic returns 64 bytes of data to the core, including +both requested data and unrequested stale data, from a transaction buffer and +the sideband response buffer. As a result, stale data from the sideband +response and transaction buffers may now reside in a core fill buffer. + +Primary Stale Data Propagator (PSDP) +------------------------------------ +The primary stale data propagator (PSDP) is limited to the client (including +Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation. Similar to the sideband response +buffer, the primary response buffer is shared by all client cores. For some +processors, MMIO primary reads will return 64 bytes of data to the core fill +buffer including both requested data and unrequested stale data. This is +similar to the sideband stale data propagator. + +Vulnerabilities +=============== +Device Register Partial Write (DRPW) (CVE-2022-21166) +----------------------------------------------------- +Some endpoint MMIO registers incorrectly handle writes that are smaller than +the register size. Instead of aborting the write or only copying the correct +subset of bytes (for example, 2 bytes for a 2-byte write), more bytes than +specified by the write transaction may be written to the register. On +processors affected by FBSDP, this may expose stale data from the fill buffers +of the core that created the write transaction. + +Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS) (CVE-2022-21125) +---------------------------------------------------- +After propagators may have moved data around the uncore and copied stale data +into client core fill buffers, processors affected by MFBDS can leak data from +the fill buffer. It is limited to the client (including Intel Xeon server E3) +uncore implementation. + +Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR) (CVE-2022-21123) +------------------------------------------------ +It is similar to Shared Buffer Data Sampling (SBDS) except that the data is +directly read into the architectural software-visible state. It is limited to +the client (including Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation. + +Affected Processors +=================== +Not all the CPUs are affected by all the variants. For instance, most +processors for the server market (excluding Intel Xeon E3 processors) are +impacted by only Device Register Partial Write (DRPW). + +Below is the list of affected Intel processors [#f1]_: + + =================== ============ ========= + Common name Family_Model Steppings + =================== ============ ========= + HASWELL_X 06_3FH 2,4 + SKYLAKE_L 06_4EH 3 + BROADWELL_X 06_4FH All + SKYLAKE_X 06_55H 3,4,6,7,11 + BROADWELL_D 06_56H 3,4,5 + SKYLAKE 06_5EH 3 + ICELAKE_X 06_6AH 4,5,6 + ICELAKE_D 06_6CH 1 + ICELAKE_L 06_7EH 5 + ATOM_TREMONT_D 06_86H All + LAKEFIELD 06_8AH 1 + KABYLAKE_L 06_8EH 9 to 12 + ATOM_TREMONT 06_96H 1 + ATOM_TREMONT_L 06_9CH 0 + KABYLAKE 06_9EH 9 to 13 + COMETLAKE 06_A5H 2,3,5 + COMETLAKE_L 06_A6H 0,1 + ROCKETLAKE 06_A7H 1 + =================== ============ ========= + +If a CPU is in the affected processor list, but not affected by a variant, it +is indicated by new bits in MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. As described in a later +section, mitigation largely remains the same for all the variants, i.e. to +clear the CPU fill buffers via VERW instruction. + +New bits in MSRs +================ +Newer processors and microcode update on existing affected processors added new +bits to IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. These bits can be used to enumerate +specific variants of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities and mitigation +capability. + +MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES +-------------------------- +Bit 13 - SBDR_SSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by either the + Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR) vulnerability or the sideband stale + data propagator (SSDP). +Bit 14 - FBSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by the Fill Buffer + Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP). +Bit 15 - PSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by Primary Stale Data + Propagator (PSDP). +Bit 17 - FB_CLEAR - When set, VERW instruction will overwrite CPU fill buffer + values as part of MD_CLEAR operations. Processors that do not + enumerate MDS_NO (meaning they are affected by MDS) but that do + enumerate support for both L1D_FLUSH and MD_CLEAR implicitly enumerate + FB_CLEAR as part of their MD_CLEAR support. +Bit 18 - FB_CLEAR_CTRL - Processor supports read and write to MSR + IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[FB_CLEAR_DIS]. On such processors, the FB_CLEAR_DIS + bit can be set to cause the VERW instruction to not perform the + FB_CLEAR action. Not all processors that support FB_CLEAR will support + FB_CLEAR_CTRL. + +MSR IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL +--------------------- +Bit 3 - FB_CLEAR_DIS - When set, VERW instruction does not perform the FB_CLEAR +action. This may be useful to reduce the performance impact of FB_CLEAR in +cases where system software deems it warranted (for example, when performance +is more critical, or the untrusted software has no MMIO access). Note that +FB_CLEAR_DIS has no impact on enumeration (for example, it does not change +FB_CLEAR or MD_CLEAR enumeration) and it may not be supported on all processors +that enumerate FB_CLEAR. + +Mitigation +========== +Like MDS, all variants of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities have the +same mitigation strategy to force the CPU to clear the affected buffers before +an attacker can extract the secrets. + +This is achieved by using the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in +combination with a microcode update. The microcode clears the affected CPU +buffers when the VERW instruction is executed. + +Kernel reuses the MDS function to invoke the buffer clearing: + + mds_clear_cpu_buffers() + +On MDS affected CPUs, the kernel already invokes CPU buffer clear on +kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state (idle) transitions. No +additional mitigation is needed on such CPUs. + +For CPUs not affected by MDS or TAA, mitigation is needed only for the attacker +with MMIO capability. Therefore, VERW is not required for kernel/userspace. For +virtualization case, VERW is only needed at VMENTER for a guest with MMIO +capability. + +Mitigation points +----------------- +Return to user space +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ +Same mitigation as MDS when affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise no mitigation +needed. + +C-State transition +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ +Control register writes by CPU during C-state transition can propagate data +from fill buffer to uncore buffers. Execute VERW before C-state transition to +clear CPU fill buffers. + +Guest entry point +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ +Same mitigation as MDS when processor is also affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise +execute VERW at VMENTER only for MMIO capable guests. On CPUs not affected by +MDS/TAA, guest without MMIO access cannot extract secrets using Processor MMIO +Stale Data vulnerabilities, so there is no need to execute VERW for such guests. + +Mitigation control on the kernel command line +--------------------------------------------- +The kernel command line allows to control the Processor MMIO Stale Data +mitigations at boot time with the option "mmio_stale_data=". The valid +arguments for this option are: + + ========== ================================================================= + full If the CPU is vulnerable, enable mitigation; CPU buffer clearing + on exit to userspace and when entering a VM. Idle transitions are + protected as well. It does not automatically disable SMT. + full,nosmt Same as full, with SMT disabled on vulnerable CPUs. This is the + complete mitigation. + off Disables mitigation completely. + ========== ================================================================= + +If the CPU is affected and mmio_stale_data=off is not supplied on the kernel +command line, then the kernel selects the appropriate mitigation. + +Mitigation status information +----------------------------- +The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current +vulnerability status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and +which mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is: + + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data + +The possible values in this file are: + + .. list-table:: + + * - 'Not affected' + - The processor is not vulnerable + * - 'Vulnerable' + - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled + * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode' + - The processor is vulnerable, but microcode is not updated. The + mitigation is enabled on a best effort basis. + * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers' + - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is + enabled. + +If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended to +the above information: + + ======================== =========================================== + 'SMT vulnerable' SMT is enabled + 'SMT disabled' SMT is disabled + 'SMT Host state unknown' Kernel runs in a VM, Host SMT state unknown + ======================== =========================================== + +References +---------- +.. [#f1] Affected Processors + https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 8090130b544b..0e990f7c2aa3 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -400,6 +400,12 @@ arm64.nomte [ARM64] Unconditionally disable Memory Tagging Extension support + arm64.nosve [ARM64] Unconditionally disable Scalable Vector + Extension support + + arm64.nosme [ARM64] Unconditionally disable Scalable Matrix + Extension support + ataflop= [HW,M68k] atarimouse= [HW,MOUSE] Atari Mouse @@ -550,7 +556,7 @@ nosocket -- Disable socket memory accounting. nokmem -- Disable kernel memory accounting. - checkreqprot [SELINUX] Set initial checkreqprot flag value. + checkreqprot= [SELINUX] Set initial checkreqprot flag value. Format: { "0" | "1" } See security/selinux/Kconfig help text. 0 -- check protection applied by kernel (includes @@ -1439,7 +1445,7 @@ (in particular on some ATI chipsets). The kernel tries to set a reasonable default. - enforcing [SELINUX] Set initial enforcing status. + enforcing= [SELINUX] Set initial enforcing status. Format: {"0" | "1"} See security/selinux/Kconfig help text. 0 -- permissive (log only, no denials). @@ -2469,7 +2475,6 @@ protected: nVHE-based mode with support for guests whose state is kept private from the host. - Not valid if the kernel is running in EL2. Defaults to VHE/nVHE based on hardware support. Setting mode to "protected" will disable kexec and hibernation @@ -3104,7 +3109,7 @@ mem_encrypt=on: Activate SME mem_encrypt=off: Do not activate SME - Refer to Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst + Refer to Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst for details on when memory encryption can be activated. mem_sleep_default= [SUSPEND] Default system suspend mode: @@ -3162,7 +3167,7 @@ improves system performance, but it may also expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities. Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC] - kpti=0 [ARM64] + if nokaslr then kpti=0 [ARM64] nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC] nobp=0 [S390] nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] @@ -3176,6 +3181,8 @@ srbds=off [X86,INTEL] no_entry_flush [PPC] no_uaccess_flush [PPC] + mmio_stale_data=off [X86] + retbleed=off [X86] Exceptions: This does not have any effect on @@ -3197,6 +3204,8 @@ Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86] mds=full,nosmt [X86] tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt [X86] + mmio_stale_data=full,nosmt [X86] + retbleed=auto,nosmt [X86] mminit_loglevel= [KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this @@ -3206,6 +3215,40 @@ log everything. Information is printed at KERN_DEBUG so loglevel=8 may also need to be specified. + mmio_stale_data= + [X86,INTEL] Control mitigation for the Processor + MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities. + + Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of + vulnerabilities that may expose data after an MMIO + operation. Exposed data could originate or end in + the same CPU buffers as affected by MDS and TAA. + Therefore, similar to MDS and TAA, the mitigation + is to clear the affected CPU buffers. + + This parameter controls the mitigation. The + options are: + + full - Enable mitigation on vulnerable CPUs + + full,nosmt - Enable mitigation and disable SMT on + vulnerable CPUs. + + off - Unconditionally disable mitigation + + On MDS or TAA affected machines, + mmio_stale_data=off can be prevented by an active + MDS or TAA mitigation as these vulnerabilities are + mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to + disable this mitigation, you need to specify + mds=off and tsx_async_abort=off too. + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to + mmio_stale_data=full. + + For details see: + Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst + module.sig_enforce [KNL] When CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is set, this means that modules without (valid) signatures will fail to load. @@ -3624,6 +3667,9 @@ just as if they had also been called out in the rcu_nocbs= boot parameter. + Note that this argument takes precedence over + the CONFIG_RCU_NOCB_CPU_DEFAULT_ALL option. + noiotrap [SH] Disables trapped I/O port accesses. noirqdebug [X86-32] Disables the code which attempts to detect and @@ -3698,11 +3744,6 @@ noreplace-smp [X86-32,SMP] Don't replace SMP instructions with UP alternatives - nordrand [X86] Disable kernel use of the RDRAND and - RDSEED instructions even if they are supported - by the processor. RDRAND and RDSEED are still - available to user space applications. - noresume [SWSUSP] Disables resume and restores original swap space. @@ -4522,6 +4563,9 @@ no-callback mode from boot but the mode may be toggled at runtime via cpusets. + Note that this argument takes precedence over + the CONFIG_RCU_NOCB_CPU_DEFAULT_ALL option. + rcu_nocb_poll [KNL] Rather than requiring that offloaded CPUs (specified by rcu_nocbs= above) explicitly @@ -4631,6 +4675,34 @@ When RCU_NOCB_CPU is set, also adjust the priority of NOCB callback kthreads. + rcutree.rcu_divisor= [KNL] + Set the shift-right count to use to compute + the callback-invocation batch limit bl from + the number of callbacks queued on this CPU. + The result will be bounded below by the value of + the rcutree.blimit kernel parameter. Every bl + callbacks, the softirq handler will exit in + order to allow the CPU to do other work. + + Please note that this callback-invocation batch + limit applies only to non-offloaded callback + invocation. Offloaded callbacks are instead + invoked in the context of an rcuoc kthread, which + scheduler will preempt as it does any other task. + + rcutree.nocb_nobypass_lim_per_jiffy= [KNL] + On callback-offloaded (rcu_nocbs) CPUs, + RCU reduces the lock contention that would + otherwise be caused by callback floods through + use of the ->nocb_bypass list. However, in the + common non-flooded case, RCU queues directly to + the main ->cblist in order to avoid the extra + overhead of the ->nocb_bypass list and its lock. + But if there are too many callbacks queued during + a single jiffy, RCU pre-queues the callbacks into + the ->nocb_bypass queue. The definition of "too + many" is supplied by this kernel boot parameter. + rcutree.rcu_nocb_gp_stride= [KNL] Set the number of NOCB callback kthreads in each group, which defaults to the square root @@ -5162,6 +5234,30 @@ retain_initrd [RAM] Keep initrd memory after extraction + retbleed= [X86] Control mitigation of RETBleed (Arbitrary + Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) + vulnerability. + + off - no mitigation + auto - automatically select a migitation + auto,nosmt - automatically select a mitigation, + disabling SMT if necessary for + the full mitigation (only on Zen1 + and older without STIBP). + ibpb - mitigate short speculation windows on + basic block boundaries too. Safe, highest + perf impact. + unret - force enable untrained return thunks, + only effective on AMD f15h-f17h + based systems. + unret,nosmt - like unret, will disable SMT when STIBP + is not available. + + Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run + time according to the CPU. + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to retbleed=auto. + rfkill.default_state= 0 "airplane mode". All wifi, bluetooth, wimax, gps, fm, etc. communication is blocked by default. @@ -5533,6 +5629,7 @@ eibrs - enhanced IBRS eibrs,retpoline - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines eibrs,lfence - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE + ibrs - use IBRS to protect kernel Not specifying this option is equivalent to spectre_v2=auto. @@ -5736,6 +5833,24 @@ expediting. Set to zero to disable automatic expediting. + srcutree.srcu_max_nodelay [KNL] + Specifies the number of no-delay instances + per jiffy for which the SRCU grace period + worker thread will be rescheduled with zero + delay. Beyond this limit, worker thread will + be rescheduled with a sleep delay of one jiffy. + + srcutree.srcu_max_nodelay_phase [KNL] + Specifies the per-grace-period phase, number of + non-sleeping polls of readers. Beyond this limit, + grace period worker thread will be rescheduled + with a sleep delay of one jiffy, between each + rescan of the readers, for a grace period phase. + + srcutree.srcu_retry_check_delay [KNL] + Specifies number of microseconds of non-sleeping + delay between each non-sleeping poll of readers. + srcutree.small_contention_lim [KNL] Specifies the number of update-side contention events per jiffy will be tolerated before diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/perf/hns3-pmu.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/perf/hns3-pmu.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..578407e487d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/perf/hns3-pmu.rst @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +====================================== +HNS3 Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU) +====================================== + +HNS3(HiSilicon network system 3) Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU) is an +End Point device to collect performance statistics of HiSilicon SoC NIC. +On Hip09, each SICL(Super I/O cluster) has one PMU device. + +HNS3 PMU supports collection of performance statistics such as bandwidth, +latency, packet rate and interrupt rate. + +Each HNS3 PMU supports 8 hardware events. + +HNS3 PMU driver +=============== + +The HNS3 PMU driver registers a perf PMU with the name of its sicl id.:: + + /sys/devices/hns3_pmu_sicl_<sicl_id> + +PMU driver provides description of available events, filter modes, format, +identifier and cpumask in sysfs. + +The "events" directory describes the event code of all supported events +shown in perf list. + +The "filtermode" directory describes the supported filter modes of each +event. + +The "format" directory describes all formats of the config (events) and +config1 (filter options) fields of the perf_event_attr structure. + +The "identifier" file shows version of PMU hardware device. + +The "bdf_min" and "bdf_max" files show the supported bdf range of each +pmu device. + +The "hw_clk_freq" file shows the hardware clock frequency of each pmu +device. + +Example usage of checking event code and subevent code:: + + $# cat /sys/devices/hns3_pmu_sicl_0/events/dly_tx_normal_to_mac_time + config=0x00204 + $# cat /sys/devices/hns3_pmu_sicl_0/events/dly_tx_normal_to_mac_packet_num + config=0x10204 + +Each performance statistic has a pair of events to get two values to +calculate real performance data in userspace. + +The bits 0~15 of config (here 0x0204) are the true hardware event code. If +two events have same value of bits 0~15 of config, that means they are +event pair. And the bit 16 of config indicates getting counter 0 or +counter 1 of hardware event. + +After getting two values of event pair in usersapce, the formula of +computation to calculate real performance data is::: + + counter 0 / counter 1 + +Example usage of checking supported filter mode:: + + $# cat /sys/devices/hns3_pmu_sicl_0/filtermode/bw_ssu_rpu_byte_num + filter mode supported: global/port/port-tc/func/func-queue/ + +Example usage of perf:: + + $# perf list + hns3_pmu_sicl_0/bw_ssu_rpu_byte_num/ [kernel PMU event] + hns3_pmu_sicl_0/bw_ssu_rpu_time/ [kernel PMU event] + ------------------------------------------ + + $# perf stat -g -e hns3_pmu_sicl_0/bw_ssu_rpu_byte_num,global=1/ -e hns3_pmu_sicl_0/bw_ssu_rpu_time,global=1/ -I 1000 + or + $# perf stat -g -e hns3_pmu_sicl_0/config=0x00002,global=1/ -e hns3_pmu_sicl_0/config=0x10002,global=1/ -I 1000 + + +Filter modes +-------------- + +1. global mode +PMU collect performance statistics for all HNS3 PCIe functions of IO DIE. +Set the "global" filter option to 1 will enable this mode. +Example usage of perf:: + + $# perf stat -a -e hns3_pmu_sicl_0/config=0x1020F,global=1/ -I 1000 + +2. port mode +PMU collect performance statistic of one whole physical port. The port id +is same as mac id. The "tc" filter option must be set to 0xF in this mode, +here tc stands for traffic class. + +Example usage of perf:: + + $# perf stat -a -e hns3_pmu_sicl_0/config=0x1020F,port=0,tc=0xF/ -I 1000 + +3. port-tc mode +PMU collect performance statistic of one tc of physical port. The port id +is same as mac id. The "tc" filter option must be set to 0 ~ 7 in this +mode. +Example usage of perf:: + + $# perf stat -a -e hns3_pmu_sicl_0/config=0x1020F,port=0,tc=0/ -I 1000 + +4. func mode +PMU collect performance statistic of one PF/VF. The function id is BDF of +PF/VF, its conversion formula:: + + func = (bus << 8) + (device << 3) + (function) + +for example: + BDF func + 35:00.0 0x3500 + 35:00.1 0x3501 + 35:01.0 0x3508 + +In this mode, the "queue" filter option must be set to 0xFFFF. +Example usage of perf:: + + $# perf stat -a -e hns3_pmu_sicl_0/config=0x1020F,bdf=0x3500,queue=0xFFFF/ -I 1000 + +5. func-queue mode +PMU collect performance statistic of one queue of PF/VF. The function id +is BDF of PF/VF, the "queue" filter option must be set to the exact queue +id of function. +Example usage of perf:: + + $# perf stat -a -e hns3_pmu_sicl_0/config=0x1020F,bdf=0x3500,queue=0/ -I 1000 + +6. func-intr mode +PMU collect performance statistic of one interrupt of PF/VF. The function +id is BDF of PF/VF, the "intr" filter option must be set to the exact +interrupt id of function. +Example usage of perf:: + + $# perf stat -a -e hns3_pmu_sicl_0/config=0x00301,bdf=0x3500,intr=0/ -I 1000 diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/perf/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/perf/index.rst index 69b23f087c05..9c9ece88ce53 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/perf/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/perf/index.rst @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ Performance monitor support hisi-pmu hisi-pcie-pmu + hns3-pmu imx-ddr qcom_l2_pmu qcom_l3_pmu diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/pm/cpuidle.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/pm/cpuidle.rst index aec2cd2aaea7..19754beb5a4e 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/pm/cpuidle.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/pm/cpuidle.rst @@ -612,8 +612,8 @@ the ``menu`` governor to be used on the systems that use the ``ladder`` governor by default this way, for example. The other kernel command line parameters controlling CPU idle time management -described below are only relevant for the *x86* architecture and some of -them affect Intel processors only. +described below are only relevant for the *x86* architecture and references +to ``intel_idle`` affect Intel processors only. The *x86* architecture support code recognizes three kernel command line options related to CPU idle time management: ``idle=poll``, ``idle=halt``, @@ -635,10 +635,13 @@ idle, so it very well may hurt single-thread computations performance as well as energy-efficiency. Thus using it for performance reasons may not be a good idea at all.] -The ``idle=nomwait`` option disables the ``intel_idle`` driver and causes -``acpi_idle`` to be used (as long as all of the information needed by it is -there in the system's ACPI tables), but it is not allowed to use the -``MWAIT`` instruction of the CPUs to ask the hardware to enter idle states. +The ``idle=nomwait`` option prevents the use of ``MWAIT`` instruction of +the CPU to enter idle states. When this option is used, the ``acpi_idle`` +driver will use the ``HLT`` instruction instead of ``MWAIT``. On systems +running Intel processors, this option disables the ``intel_idle`` driver +and forces the use of the ``acpi_idle`` driver instead. Note that in either +case, ``acpi_idle`` driver will function only if all the information needed +by it is in the system's ACPI tables. In addition to the architecture-level kernel command line options affecting CPU idle time management, there are parameters affecting individual ``CPUIdle`` diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst index ddccd1077462..8ab042beeb76 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst @@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ acct If BSD-style process accounting is enabled these values control its behaviour. If free space on filesystem where the log lives -goes below ``lowwater``% accounting suspends. If free space gets -above ``highwater``% accounting resumes. ``frequency`` determines +goes below ``lowwater``\ % accounting suspends. If free space gets +above ``highwater``\ % accounting resumes. ``frequency`` determines how often do we check the amount of free space (value is in seconds). Default: diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst index ceeed7b0798d..7d80e8c307d1 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ Bit Log Number Reason that got the kernel tainted 15 _/K 32768 kernel has been live patched 16 _/X 65536 auxiliary taint, defined for and used by distros 17 _/T 131072 kernel was built with the struct randomization plugin + 18 _/N 262144 an in-kernel test has been run === === ====== ======================================================== Note: The character ``_`` is representing a blank in this table to make reading |