Merge tag 'integrity-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "The nicest change is the IMA policy rule checking. The other changes
  include allowing the kexec boot cmdline line measure policy rules to
  be defined in terms of the inode associated with the kexec kernel
  image, making the IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM, which governs the IMA
  appraise mode (log, fix, enforce), a runtime decision based on the
  secure boot mode of the system, and including errno in the audit log"

* tag 'integrity-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  integrity: remove redundant initialization of variable ret
  ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime
  ima: AppArmor satisfies the audit rule requirements
  ima: Rename internal filter rule functions
  ima: Support additional conditionals in the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function
  ima: Use the common function to detect LSM conditionals in a rule
  ima: Move comprehensive rule validation checks out of the token parser
  ima: Use correct type for the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements
  ima: Shallow copy the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements
  ima: Fail rule parsing when appraise_flag=blacklist is unsupportable
  ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEY_CHECK hook is combined with an invalid cond
  ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook is combined with an invalid cond
  ima: Fail rule parsing when buffer hook functions have an invalid action
  ima: Free the entire rule if it fails to parse
  ima: Free the entire rule when deleting a list of rules
  ima: Have the LSM free its audit rule
  IMA: Add audit log for failure conditions
  integrity: Add errno field in audit message

12 files changed, 283 insertions, 140 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
index 4e0d6778277e..cfa4127d0518 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
 	struct public_key_signature pks;
 	struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig;
 	struct key *key;
-	int ret = -ENOMEM;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (siglen <= sizeof(*hdr))
 		return -EBADMSG;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index edde88dbe576..080c53545ff0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
 
 config IMA_LSM_RULES
 	bool
-	depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK)
+	depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK || SECURITY_APPARMOR)
 	default y
 	help
 	  Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules.
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS
 
 config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
 	bool "ima_appraise boot parameter"
-	depends on IMA_APPRAISE && !IMA_ARCH_POLICY
+	depends on IMA_APPRAISE
 	default y
 	help
 	  This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modes
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 9d94080bdad8..38043074ce5e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -186,27 +186,43 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
 	return (digest[0] | digest[1] << 8) % IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE;
 }
 
-#define __ima_hooks(hook)		\
-	hook(NONE)			\
-	hook(FILE_CHECK)		\
-	hook(MMAP_CHECK)		\
-	hook(BPRM_CHECK)		\
-	hook(CREDS_CHECK)		\
-	hook(POST_SETATTR)		\
-	hook(MODULE_CHECK)		\
-	hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK)		\
-	hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)	\
-	hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK)	\
-	hook(POLICY_CHECK)		\
-	hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE)		\
-	hook(KEY_CHECK)			\
-	hook(MAX_CHECK)
-#define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM)	ENUM,
+#define __ima_hooks(hook)				\
+	hook(NONE, none)				\
+	hook(FILE_CHECK, file)				\
+	hook(MMAP_CHECK, mmap)				\
+	hook(BPRM_CHECK, bprm)				\
+	hook(CREDS_CHECK, creds)			\
+	hook(POST_SETATTR, post_setattr)		\
+	hook(MODULE_CHECK, module)			\
+	hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK, firmware)			\
+	hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, kexec_kernel)		\
+	hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, kexec_initramfs)	\
+	hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy)			\
+	hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline)		\
+	hook(KEY_CHECK, key)				\
+	hook(MAX_CHECK, none)
+
+#define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str)	ENUM,
+#define __ima_stringify(arg) (#arg)
+#define __ima_hook_measuring_stringify(ENUM, str) \
+		(__ima_stringify(measuring_ ##str)),
 
 enum ima_hooks {
 	__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_enumify)
 };
 
+static const char * const ima_hooks_measure_str[] = {
+	__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_measuring_stringify)
+};
+
+static inline const char *func_measure_str(enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+	if (func >= MAX_CHECK)
+		return ima_hooks_measure_str[NONE];
+
+	return ima_hooks_measure_str[func];
+}
+
 extern const char *const func_tokens[];
 
 struct modsig;
@@ -249,7 +265,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			   int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
 			   struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
-void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
+void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
 				const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
 				int pcr, const char *keyring);
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -356,7 +372,6 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
-bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func);
 int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
 		    struct modsig **modsig);
 void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, loff_t size);
@@ -366,11 +381,6 @@ int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig, const void **data,
 		       u32 *data_len);
 void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig);
 #else
-static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
-{
-	return false;
-}
-
 static inline int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf,
 				  loff_t buf_len, struct modsig **modsig)
 {
@@ -403,19 +413,24 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
 /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
 
-#define security_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
-#define security_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
+#define ima_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
+#define ima_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
+#define ima_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
 
 #else
 
-static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
-					    void **lsmrule)
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+				       void **lsmrule)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
-					     void *lsmrule)
+static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+					void *lsmrule)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index bf22de8b7ce0..4f39fb93f278 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ err_out:
 
 /**
  * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
- * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
+ * @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated
  * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
  * @secid: secid of the task being validated
  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index a9649b04b9f1..372d16382960 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@
 static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
+	if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
+		pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s boot parameter option",
+			str);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
 	if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
 		ima_appraise = 0;
 	else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
@@ -328,7 +334,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 
 		rc = is_binary_blacklisted(digest, digestsize);
 		if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
-			process_buffer_measurement(digest, digestsize,
+			process_buffer_measurement(NULL, digest, digestsize,
 						   "blacklisted-hash", NONE,
 						   pcr, NULL);
 	}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
index aaae80c4e376..1c68c500c26f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
 	 * if the IMA policy is configured to measure a key linked
 	 * to the given keyring.
 	 */
-	process_buffer_measurement(payload, payload_len,
+	process_buffer_measurement(NULL, payload, payload_len,
 				   keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0,
 				   keyring->description);
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index c1583d98c5e5..8a91711ca79b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -726,6 +726,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
 
 /*
  * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log.
+ * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK)
  * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log.
  * @size: size of buffer(in bytes).
  * @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry.
@@ -735,11 +736,12 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
  *
  * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log.
  */
-void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
+void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
 				const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
 				int pcr, const char *keyring)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
+	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
 	struct integrity_iint_cache iint = {};
 	struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = &iint,
@@ -767,7 +769,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
 	 */
 	if (func) {
 		security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
-		action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
+		action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
 					&pcr, &template, keyring);
 		if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
 			return;
@@ -794,37 +796,54 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
 	iint.ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
 
 	ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, iint.ima_hash);
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		audit_cause = "hashing_error";
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template);
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr);
-
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		audit_cause = "store_entry";
 		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
+	}
 
 out:
 	if (ret < 0)
-		pr_devel("%s: failed, result: %d\n", __func__, ret);
+		integrity_audit_message(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, eventname,
+					func_measure_str(func),
+					audit_cause, ret, 0, ret);
 
 	return;
 }
 
 /**
  * ima_kexec_cmdline - measure kexec cmdline boot args
+ * @kernel_fd: file descriptor of the kexec kernel being loaded
  * @buf: pointer to buffer
  * @size: size of buffer
  *
  * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised.
  */
-void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size)
+void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
 {
-	if (buf && size != 0)
-		process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, "kexec-cmdline",
-					   KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL);
+	struct fd f;
+
+	if (!buf || !size)
+		return;
+
+	f = fdget(kernel_fd);
+	if (!f.file)
+		return;
+
+	process_buffer_measurement(file_inode(f.file), buf, size,
+				   "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL);
+	fdput(f);
 }
 
 static int __init init_ima(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
index d106885cc495..fb25723c65bc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
@@ -32,26 +32,6 @@ struct modsig {
 	u8 raw_pkcs7[];
 };
 
-/**
- * ima_hook_supports_modsig - can the policy allow modsig for this hook?
- *
- * modsig is only supported by hooks using ima_post_read_file(), because only
- * they preload the contents of the file in a buffer. FILE_CHECK does that in
- * some cases, but not when reached from vfs_open(). POLICY_CHECK can support
- * it, but it's not useful in practice because it's a text file so deny.
- */
-bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
-{
-	switch (func) {
-	case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK:
-	case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
-	case MODULE_CHECK:
-		return true;
-	default:
-		return false;
-	}
-}
-
 /*
  * ima_read_modsig - Read modsig from buf.
  *
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e493063a3c34..07f033634b27 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
 	int pcr;
 	struct {
 		void *rule;	/* LSM file metadata specific */
-		void *args_p;	/* audit value */
+		char *args_p;	/* audit value */
 		int type;	/* audit type */
 	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
 	char *fsname;
@@ -258,9 +258,24 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
-		kfree(entry->lsm[i].rule);
+		ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
 		kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 	}
+}
+
+static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+	if (!entry)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * entry->template->fields may be allocated in ima_parse_rule() but that
+	 * reference is owned by the corresponding ima_template_desc element in
+	 * the defined_templates list and cannot be freed here
+	 */
+	kfree(entry->fsname);
+	kfree(entry->keyrings);
+	ima_lsm_free_rule(entry);
 	kfree(entry);
 }
 
@@ -285,24 +300,22 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			continue;
 
 		nentry->lsm[i].type = entry->lsm[i].type;
-		nentry->lsm[i].args_p = kstrdup(entry->lsm[i].args_p,
-						GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!nentry->lsm[i].args_p)
-			goto out_err;
-
-		security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type,
-					  Audit_equal,
-					  nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
-					  &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
+		nentry->lsm[i].args_p = entry->lsm[i].args_p;
+		/*
+		 * Remove the reference from entry so that the associated
+		 * memory will not be freed during a later call to
+		 * ima_lsm_free_rule(entry).
+		 */
+		entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
+
+		ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
+				     nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
+				     &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
 		if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
 			pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
-				(char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+				nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
 	}
 	return nentry;
-
-out_err:
-	ima_lsm_free_rule(nentry);
-	return NULL;
 }
 
 static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
@@ -315,11 +328,29 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 
 	list_replace_rcu(&entry->list, &nentry->list);
 	synchronize_rcu();
+	/*
+	 * ima_lsm_copy_rule() shallow copied all references, except for the
+	 * LSM references, from entry to nentry so we only want to free the LSM
+	 * references and the entry itself. All other memory refrences will now
+	 * be owned by nentry.
+	 */
 	ima_lsm_free_rule(entry);
+	kfree(entry);
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+		if (entry->lsm[i].args_p)
+			return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 /*
  * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring
  * to the old, stale LSM policy.  Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect
@@ -328,17 +359,10 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *e;
-	int i, result, needs_update;
+	int result;
 
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, e, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
-		needs_update = 0;
-		for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
-			if (entry->lsm[i].args_p) {
-				needs_update = 1;
-				break;
-			}
-		}
-		if (!needs_update)
+		if (!ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
 			continue;
 
 		result = ima_lsm_update_rule(entry);
@@ -418,13 +442,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 {
 	int i;
 
-	if ((func == KEXEC_CMDLINE) || (func == KEY_CHECK)) {
-		if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func)) {
-			if (func == KEY_CHECK)
-				return ima_match_keyring(rule, keyring, cred);
-			return true;
-		}
-		return false;
+	if (func == KEY_CHECK) {
+		return (rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func) &&
+		       ima_match_keyring(rule, keyring, cred);
 	}
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
 	    (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
@@ -474,18 +494,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 		case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
 			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
-			rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
-							rule->lsm[i].type,
-							Audit_equal,
-							rule->lsm[i].rule);
+			rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
+						   Audit_equal,
+						   rule->lsm[i].rule);
 			break;
 		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
-			rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
-							rule->lsm[i].type,
-							Audit_equal,
-							rule->lsm[i].rule);
+			rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type,
+						   Audit_equal,
+						   rule->lsm[i].rule);
 		default:
 			break;
 		}
@@ -880,16 +898,16 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
-	result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
-					   Audit_equal,
-					   entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
-					   &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
+	result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
+				      entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
+				      &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
 	if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
 		pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
-			(char *)entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
+			entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
 
 		if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) {
 			kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
+			entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = NULL;
 			result = -EINVAL;
 		} else
 			result = 0;
@@ -949,6 +967,96 @@ static void check_template_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *template)
 #undef MSG
 }
 
+static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+	/* Ensure that the action is set and is compatible with the flags */
+	if (entry->action == UNKNOWN)
+		return false;
+
+	if (entry->action != MEASURE && entry->flags & IMA_PCR)
+		return false;
+
+	if (entry->action != APPRAISE &&
+	    entry->flags & (IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED | IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * The IMA_FUNC bit must be set if and only if there's a valid hook
+	 * function specified, and vice versa. Enforcing this property allows
+	 * for the NONE case below to validate a rule without an explicit hook
+	 * function.
+	 */
+	if (((entry->flags & IMA_FUNC) && entry->func == NONE) ||
+	    (!(entry->flags & IMA_FUNC) && entry->func != NONE))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure that the hook function is compatible with the other
+	 * components of the rule
+	 */
+	switch (entry->func) {
+	case NONE:
+	case FILE_CHECK:
+	case MMAP_CHECK:
+	case BPRM_CHECK:
+	case CREDS_CHECK:
+	case POST_SETATTR:
+	case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
+	case POLICY_CHECK:
+		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_FSMAGIC |
+				     IMA_UID | IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID |
+				     IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR |
+				     IMA_FSNAME | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
+				     IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
+			return false;
+
+		break;
+	case MODULE_CHECK:
+	case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK:
+	case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
+		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_FSMAGIC |
+				     IMA_UID | IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID |
+				     IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR |
+				     IMA_FSNAME | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
+				     IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED |
+				     IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST))
+			return false;
+
+		break;
+	case KEXEC_CMDLINE:
+		if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
+			return false;
+
+		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_FSMAGIC | IMA_UID |
+				     IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID | IMA_EUID |
+				     IMA_PCR | IMA_FSNAME))
+			return false;
+
+		break;
+	case KEY_CHECK:
+		if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
+			return false;
+
+		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR |
+				     IMA_KEYRINGS))
+			return false;
+
+		if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
+			return false;
+
+		break;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/* Ensure that combinations of flags are compatible with each other */
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST &&
+	    !(entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -1126,8 +1234,6 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			keyrings_len = strlen(args[0].from) + 1;
 
 			if ((entry->keyrings) ||
-			    (entry->action != MEASURE) ||
-			    (entry->func != KEY_CHECK) ||
 			    (keyrings_len < 2)) {
 				result = -EINVAL;
 				break;
@@ -1267,15 +1373,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 						   AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
 			break;
 		case Opt_appraise_type:
-			if (entry->action != APPRAISE) {
-				result = -EINVAL;
-				break;
-			}
-
 			ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
 			if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0)
 				entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
-			else if (ima_hook_supports_modsig(entry->func) &&
+			else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
 				 strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") == 0)
 				entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
 						IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED;
@@ -1284,17 +1385,16 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			break;
 		case Opt_appraise_flag:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_flag", args[0].from);
-			if (strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist"))
+			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
+			    strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist"))
 				entry->flags |= IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST;
+			else
+				result = -EINVAL;
 			break;
 		case Opt_permit_directio:
 			entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
 			break;
 		case Opt_pcr:
-			if (entry->action != MEASURE) {
-				result = -EINVAL;
-				break;
-			}
 			ima_log_string(ab, "pcr", args[0].from);
 
 			result = kstrtoint(args[0].from, 10, &entry->pcr);
@@ -1332,7 +1432,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			break;
 		}
 	}
-	if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
+	if (!result && !ima_validate_rule(entry))
 		result = -EINVAL;
 	else if (entry->action == APPRAISE)
 		temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entry->func);
@@ -1381,7 +1481,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 
 	result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
 	if (result) {
-		kfree(entry);
+		ima_free_rule(entry);
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
 				    NULL, op, "invalid-policy", result,
 				    audit_info);
@@ -1402,19 +1502,15 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 void ima_delete_rules(void)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
-	int i;
 
 	temp_ima_appraise = 0;
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) {
-		for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
-			kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
-
 		list_del(&entry->list);
-		kfree(entry);
+		ima_free_rule(entry);
 	}
 }
 
-#define __ima_hook_stringify(str)	(#str),
+#define __ima_hook_stringify(func, str)	(#func),
 
 const char *const func_tokens[] = {
 	__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify)
@@ -1589,27 +1685,27 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 			switch (i) {
 			case LSM_OBJ_USER:
 				seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user),
-					   (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+					   entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 				break;
 			case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
 				seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_role),
-					   (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+					   entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 				break;
 			case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
 				seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_type),
-					   (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+					   entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 				break;
 			case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
 				seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_user),
-					   (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+					   entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 				break;
 			case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
 				seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_role),
-					   (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+					   entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 				break;
 			case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
 				seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_type),
-					   (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+					   entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 				break;
 			}
 			seq_puts(m, " ");
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
index cb3e3f501593..69a8626a35c0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ static struct ima_key_entry *ima_alloc_key_entry(struct key *keyring,
 						 size_t payload_len)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
+	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	struct ima_key_entry *entry;
 
 	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -88,6 +89,10 @@ static struct ima_key_entry *ima_alloc_key_entry(struct key *keyring,
 
 out:
 	if (rc) {
+		integrity_audit_message(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL,
+					keyring->description,
+					func_measure_str(KEY_CHECK),
+					audit_cause, rc, 0, rc);
 		ima_free_key_entry(entry);
 		entry = NULL;
 	}
@@ -153,7 +158,7 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void)
 
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_keys, list) {
 		if (!timer_expired)
-			process_buffer_measurement(entry->payload,
+			process_buffer_measurement(NULL, entry->payload,
 						   entry->payload_len,
 						   entry->keyring_name,
 						   KEY_CHECK, 0,
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 16c1894c29bb..413c803c5208 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -239,6 +239,11 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 			 const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
 			 const char *cause, int result, int info);
 
+void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+			     const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
+			     const char *cause, int result, int info,
+			     int errno);
+
 static inline struct audit_buffer *
 integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type)
 {
@@ -253,6 +258,14 @@ static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 {
 }
 
+static inline void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno,
+					   struct inode *inode,
+					   const unsigned char *fname,
+					   const char *op, const char *cause,
+					   int result, int info, int errno)
+{
+}
+
 static inline struct audit_buffer *
 integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type)
 {
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
index 5109173839cc..f25e7df099c8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
@@ -29,6 +29,15 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 			 const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
 			 const char *cause, int result, int audit_info)
 {
+	integrity_audit_message(audit_msgno, inode, fname, op, cause,
+				result, audit_info, 0);
+}
+
+void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+			     const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
+			     const char *cause, int result, int audit_info,
+			     int errno)
+{
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	char name[TASK_COMM_LEN];
 
@@ -53,6 +62,6 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id);
 		audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino);
 	}
-	audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !result);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d errno=%d", !result, errno);
 	audit_log_end(ab);
 }