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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-05-07 18:48:09 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-05-07 18:48:09 -0700
commitf72dae20891d7bcc43e9263ab206960b6ae5209f (patch)
tree59a5b8c026adad15855d3824d1a7014468033274 /security
parent498e8631f27ed649bd3e31998a00b2b9b288cf3a (diff)
parent35a196bef449b5824033865b963ed9a43fb8c730 (diff)
downloadlwn-f72dae20891d7bcc43e9263ab206960b6ae5209f.tar.gz
lwn-f72dae20891d7bcc43e9263ab206960b6ae5209f.zip
Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190507' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: "We've got a few SELinux patches for the v5.2 merge window, the highlights are below: - Add LSM hooks, and the SELinux implementation, for proper labeling of kernfs. While we are only including the SELinux implementation here, the rest of the LSM folks have given the hooks a thumbs-up. - Update the SELinux mdp (Make Dummy Policy) script to actually work on a modern system. - Disallow userspace to change the LSM credentials via /proc/self/attr when the task's credentials are already overridden. The change was made in procfs because all the LSM folks agreed this was the Right Thing To Do and duplicating it across each LSM was going to be annoying" * tag 'selinux-pr-20190507' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: proc: prevent changes to overridden credentials selinux: Check address length before reading address family kernfs: fix xattr name handling in LSM helpers MAINTAINERS: update SELinux file patterns selinux: avoid uninitialized variable warning selinux: remove useless assignments LSM: lsm_hooks.h - fix missing colon in docstring selinux: Make selinux_kernfs_init_security static kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes selinux: implement the kernfs_init_security hook LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initialization kernfs: use simple_xattrs for security attributes selinux: try security xattr after genfs for kernfs filesystems kernfs: do not alloc iattrs in kernfs_xattr_get kernfs: clean up struct kernfs_iattrs scripts/selinux: fix build selinux: use kernel linux/socket.h for genheaders and mdp scripts/selinux: modernize mdp
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/security.c6
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c229
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/security.h1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlabel.c14
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c7
5 files changed, 169 insertions, 88 deletions
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 23cbb1a295a3..8d6ef9da94eb 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1318,6 +1318,12 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
+int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
+ struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, kn_dir, kn);
+}
+
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
int ret;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1d0b37af2444..c61787b15f27 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <linux/shm.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <linux/kernfs.h>
+#include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include "avc.h"
@@ -751,11 +753,13 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
- !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
- !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
+ sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
+
+ if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
- sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
+ sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
if (!sbsec->behavior) {
/*
@@ -1354,6 +1358,67 @@ static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
return rc;
}
+static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
+ u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
+{
+#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
+ char *context;
+ unsigned int len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
+ context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!context)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ context[len] = '\0';
+ rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
+ if (rc == -ERANGE) {
+ kfree(context);
+
+ /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
+ rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ len = rc;
+ context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!context)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ context[len] = '\0';
+ rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+ context, len);
+ }
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(context);
+ if (rc != -ENODATA) {
+ pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
+ __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ *sid = def_sid;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid,
+ def_sid, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (rc) {
+ char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
+ unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
+
+ if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+ pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
+ ino, dev, context);
+ } else {
+ pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
+ __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
+ }
+ }
+ kfree(context);
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
{
@@ -1362,9 +1427,6 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
u16 sclass;
struct dentry *dentry;
-#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
- char *context = NULL;
- unsigned len = 0;
int rc = 0;
if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
@@ -1432,72 +1494,11 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
goto out;
}
- len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
- context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
- if (!context) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- dput(dentry);
- goto out;
- }
- context[len] = '\0';
- rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
- if (rc == -ERANGE) {
- kfree(context);
-
- /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
- rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
- if (rc < 0) {
- dput(dentry);
- goto out;
- }
- len = rc;
- context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
- if (!context) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- dput(dentry);
- goto out;
- }
- context[len] = '\0';
- rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
- }
+ rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
+ &sid);
dput(dentry);
- if (rc < 0) {
- if (rc != -ENODATA) {
- pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
- "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
- -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
- kfree(context);
- goto out;
- }
- /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
- sid = sbsec->def_sid;
- rc = 0;
- } else {
- rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state,
- context, rc, &sid,
- sbsec->def_sid,
- GFP_NOFS);
- if (rc) {
- char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
- unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
-
- if (rc == -EINVAL) {
- if (printk_ratelimit())
- pr_notice("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
- "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
- "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
- } else {
- pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
- "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
- __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
- }
- kfree(context);
- /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
- rc = 0;
- break;
- }
- }
- kfree(context);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
break;
case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
sid = task_sid;
@@ -1548,9 +1549,21 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
goto out;
rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
sbsec->flags, &sid);
- dput(dentry);
- if (rc)
+ if (rc) {
+ dput(dentry);
goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
+ (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
+ rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
+ sid, &sid);
+ if (rc) {
+ dput(dentry);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ dput(dentry);
}
break;
}
@@ -3371,6 +3384,67 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
+/* kernfs node operations */
+
+static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
+ struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
+ int rc;
+ char *context;
+
+ rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
+ if (rc == -ENODATA)
+ return 0;
+ else if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ clen = (u32)rc;
+ context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!context)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(context);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ kfree(context);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (tsec->create_sid) {
+ newsid = tsec->create_sid;
+ } else {
+ u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
+ struct qstr q;
+
+ q.name = kn->name;
+ q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
+
+ rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
+ parent_sid, secclass, &q,
+ &newsid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
+ &context, &clen);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
+ XATTR_CREATE);
+ kfree(context);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
/* file security operations */
static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
@@ -4438,7 +4512,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
- u16 family_sa = address->sa_family;
+ u16 family_sa;
unsigned short snum;
u32 sid, node_perm;
@@ -4448,6 +4522,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
* need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
* sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
*/
+ if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ family_sa = address->sa_family;
switch (family_sa) {
case AF_UNSPEC:
case AF_INET:
@@ -4580,6 +4657,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
* need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
* sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
*/
+ if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
+ return -EINVAL;
switch (address->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
@@ -6719,6 +6798,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
+
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index b5b7c5aade8c..111121281c47 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
#define SE_SBINITIALIZED 0x0100
#define SE_SBPROC 0x0200
#define SE_SBGENFS 0x0400
+#define SE_SBGENFS_XATTR 0x0800
#define CONTEXT_STR "context"
#define FSCONTEXT_STR "fscontext"
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 186e727b737b..6fd9954e1c08 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -288,11 +288,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
int rc;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
- struct sockaddr *addr;
struct sockaddr_in addr4;
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
-#endif
if (ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET &&
ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
@@ -310,16 +307,15 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
if (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
- addr = (struct sockaddr *)&addr4;
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
- } else {
+ rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, (void *)&addr4, &secattr);
+ } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && ip_hdr(skb)->version == 6) {
addr6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
addr6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
- addr = (struct sockaddr *)&addr6;
-#endif
+ rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, (void *)&addr6, &secattr);
+ } else {
+ rc = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
- rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, addr, &secattr);
if (rc == 0)
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index ec62918521b1..cc043bc8fd4c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1318,14 +1318,11 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state,
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
- if (only_invalid && !context->len) {
- scontext = NULL;
- scontext_len = 0;
+ if (only_invalid && !context->len)
rc = 0;
- } else {
+ else
rc = context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, scontext,
scontext_len);
- }
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
out: